Financial statement fraud detection using supervised learning methods by Gepp, Adrian
Bond University
DOCTORAL THESIS






Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. May. 2019
  
 
Financial statement fraud detection 
using supervised learning methods 
by 




Submitted in total fulfilment 
of the requirements of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at the Faculty of Business, Bond University. 
 
Doctor of Philosophy dissertation  Adrian Gepp 
  I 
Abstract 
Famous frauds such as at Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth are potent reminders 
that the detection of financial statement fraud needs to be improved. Studies estimate the 
median loss from a single financial statement fraud scheme to be at least one million US 
dollars. The annual cost of financial statement fraud exceeds 1.2 trillion US dollars 
worldwide and 377 billion dollars in the US (ACFE, 2014). 
Many business decisions rely on the accuracy of financial statements, but resources 
are not available to comprehensively investigate all of them. Moreover, detection of fraud in 
financial statements is difficult. Consequently, there is a need for better decision aids such as 
detection models developed using supervised learning methods. Standard parametric 
regression-based techniques, particularly logistic regression, have been extensively studied 
for detecting financial statement fraud. More investigation is needed into non-parametric 
techniques such as decision trees and ensemble techniques that combine multiple models 
such as bagging and boosting. Using data about companies listed on US stock exchanges, 
multiple statistical modelling techniques new to the field are compared with established 
techniques for detecting this type of fraud. Comparisons are made using a range of ratios for 
the cost of failing to detect fraud relative to the cost of falsely alleging it, as these costs differ 
depending on the stakeholder. Newly developed ensemble models that include decision-tree 
based techniques performed particularly well. 
A large number of potential indicators (explanatory variables) of financial statement 
fraud are investigated in order to study which are the most useful to detection models. These 
include financial information, non-financial information and comparisons of the two. 
Empirical support has been found for both financial and non-financial explanatory variables, 
including new variables. A new framework, the Fraud Detection Triangle, is also developed 
to assist in the selection of explanatory variables for financial statement fraud detection 
models. Empirical evidence is provided to support the use of this new framework. 
Using models developed in this research, financial statements can be automatically 
classified as either fraudulent or legitimate, as well as being ranked according to their 
likelihood of being fraudulent. This information can be used to improve early detection, 
which would mitigate the costs of fraud and help deter it from occurring by increasing the 
probability of being detected. Beneficiaries of this information include auditors, investors, 
financiers, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators, company directors and the financial 
markets as a whole through improved integrity and allocation of resources. 
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riskier classifications from DT_One 
Simpler Models 
TN_90%_6 TreeNet using the six variables with a minimum importance score of 90% in 
the TN model 
TN_4 TreeNet using four variables; the most important (according to the TN model) 
from each of the four factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework 
LR_Step_11 Logistic regression using 11 of the 14 variables in the LR_Step model 
LR_Int_11 Logistic regression using 11 variables including an interaction term 
LR_TN_6 
Logistic regression using the six variables with a minimum importance score of 
90% in the TN model 
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  XVIII 
Variable Identifier Variable Name 
V1 
   V1a 
   V1b 
   V1c 
Accounts Receivable 
   Value for the specified year 
   Percentage change 
   Was Percentage change > 10%? 
V2 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Sales 
V3 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Total Assets 
V4 Percentage change in AFDA 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to Accounts Receivable 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to Sales 
V7 Change in Inventory to average Total Assets 
V8 
   V8a 
   V8b 
Inventory to Sales 
   Value for the specified year 
   Change 
V9 Was Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) inventory valuation used? 
V10 
   V10a 
   V10b 
   V10c 
   V10d 
   V10e 
Sales Growth 
   Percentage change 
   V10a minus the Industry Average 
   Previous year’s Percentage change 
   Four-year growth rate 
   Previous year’s percentage change in total assets 
V11 
   V11a 
   V11b 
Sales to Total Assets 
   Value for the specified year 
   Percentage change 
V12 
   V12a 
   V12b 
Gross Margin to Sales 
   Percentage change 
   Was percentage change > 10%? 
V13 
   V13a 
   V13b 
Cash Sales 
   Percentage change 
   Was change < 0? 
V14 Were any sales from acquisitions? 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets 
V16 Net Property Plant & Equipment (PP&E) to Total Assets 
V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets 
V18 
Percentage Change in Assets other than Current Assets and Net PP&E to 
Total Assets 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets 
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  XIX 
Variable Identifier Variable Name 
V20 
Were the specified and the prior year’s  
Total Accruals > 0? 
V21 Total Discretionary Accruals 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals 
V23 Debt to Total Assets 
V24 Debt to Equity 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress measure (Z-score) 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned 
V27 
   V27a 
   V27b 
Return on Equity 
   Value for the specified year 
   Industry Average minus Specific Company 
V28 
   V28a 
   V28b 
   V28c 
Return on Average Prior Assets 
   Value for the specified year 
   Previous year 
   Change 
V29 
   V29a 
   V29b 
Holding Period Return 
   One-year 
   Previous One-year 
V30 Were analyst Earnings Per Share (EPS) forecasts achieved or exceeded? 
V31 
   V31a 
   V31b 
Were New Securities issued? 
   Common Stock? 
   Common Stock or Long-term Debt? 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued 
V33 
   V33a 
   V33b 
   V33c 
Demand for financing 
   Specific Value (ex ante) 
   Was there demand (ex ante)? 
   Cash from operating and investment activities 
V34 Were there operating leases? 
V35 Was the auditor a Big Six firm? 
V36 Number of auditor changes in the most recent four financial statements 
V37 
   V37a 
   V37b 
CEO 
   Tenure 
   Number of changes in the last three years 
V38 Has the CFO changed in the last three years? 
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  XX 
Variable Identifier Variable Name 
V39 
   V39a 
   V39b 
   V39c 
Composition/Holdings of the Board 
   Number of Directors 
   Percentage of Directors who are also Executives 
   Percentage of Director shares owned by those who are also Executives 
V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO 
V41 
Percentage change in the number of Employees minus percentage change 
in Total Assets 
V42 
Percentage change in Sales minus percentage change in the number of 
Employees 
V43 
Percentage Change in Sales to Employees: Specific Company minus 
Industry Average 
V44 Company Age: Number of years since foundation 
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets 
V46 Industry: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code starts with a 3? 
V47 
   V47a 
   V47b 
 
Stock Exchange listed on 
   NASDAQ stock exchange? 
   New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)? 
(No to both V47a and V47b indicates American Stock Exchange [AMEX]) 
V48 
   V48a 
   V48b 
   V48c 
Macroeconomic indicators 
   Previous year’s percentage change in annual real GDP 
   Previous year’s percentage change in annual retail sales 
   Previous year’s unemployment rate inverted 
V49 
   V49a 
   V49b 
Corporate governance indices 
   G-Index 
   E-Index 






Nobody, as long as they move about among the chaotic currents of life, is without influence from fraud. 
- modified from Carl Jung 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Fraud, in general terms, is an act of intentional deception to gain a benefit or to cause 
a loss to another party. While it is impossible to know the true cost of fraud because of the 
inherent concealment involved, in a bid to make a reliable estimate the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) recently concluded that fraud in business costs the world 
nearly 3.7 trillion US dollars each year (ACFE 2014). This was based on an analysis of 1,483 
fraud cases that were investigated by experienced Certified Fraud Examiners. It is 
unquestionably an alarming figure that must not be ignored. It also provides justification for 
more research on the early detection of fraud before its cost to society rises more. 
Financial statement fraud involves the intentional publication of false or misleading 
information in financial statements. It is also known as management fraud most likely 
because it is commonly perpetrated by managers trying to overstate a business’s financial 
profitability or viability. In their 2014 publication, the ACFE (2014) reported that financial 
statement fraud now occurs in 9% of the cases they studied, and that this figure has 
progressively increased from 4.8% in 2010 to 7.6% in 2012. Although it is more common to 
encounter asset misappropriation or corruption, the cost of a financial statement fraud scheme 
is much higher. The median loss from an individual financial statement fraud scheme was 
reported to be one million US dollars by the ACFE (2014). A much higher estimate was 
found in a ten-year study (Beasley et al. 2010) commissioned by a private sector committee 
specifically formed to study financial statement fraud in the US. They found that the median 
loss from financial statement fraud prosecuted by the US Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) was 12.1 million dollars, which is nearly three times larger than was 
found by the same committee ten years earlier. Using the worldwide ACFE figures1, the 
annual cost of financial statement fraud is estimated to be more than 1.2 trillion US dollars 
worldwide and more than 377 billion dollars in the US. 
Waste Management, Sunbeam, Tyco, Enron, WorldCom and other cases of financial 
statement fraud in the US have made news headlines around the world, stark reminders of 
how costly it can be. The frauds by Harris Scarfe in Australia, Parmalat in Italy, Ahold in The 
Netherlands, Satyam in India and Vivendi in France further demonstrate that the damage 
from this problem is felt around the world. Financial statement fraud is not a victimless 
crime, but rather leaves behind a very real financial loss and victims that include investors, 
financiers, employees and other stakeholders. There are also wider costs to society such as a 
reduction in confidence and trust in regulators, and also a reduction in the integrity of 
financial markets. This results in higher transaction costs and reduced efficiency 
(Perols 2011). 
Multiple high-profile fraud cases over the last decade have left legislators, regulators, 
practitioners (accountants and auditors) and academics searching for answers (Erickson et al. 
2006). This fact probably contributed to a review paper, in which Ngai et al. (2011) identified 
that research into corporate fraud (which includes financial statement fraud) was prevalent 
compared with other types of financial fraud. Despite this research, anti-fraud legislation such 
as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, changes to auditing standards and 
enforcement efforts, the risk of financial statement fraud remains substantial (Silver et al. 
2008) and is a public concern (Deloitte 2009). Furthermore, the magnitude of the problem has 
increased (Beasley et al. 2010) and it appears that the penalties facing perpetrators of fraud 
are not a sufficient deterrent (Beasley et al. 2010; Partnoy 2010). 
Humpherys et al. (2011) state that there is a need for better decision aids to help 
detect financial statement fraud because research has shown that human beings have only a 
slightly better than random chance ability at detecting deception. Worryingly, the authors go 
on to state that meeting this need for better aids is critical because most external auditors do 
not have a lot of experience in detecting fraud. The ACFE found that audits are not very 
                                                 
 
1 The ACFE (2014) report contains estimates of the median cost and relative frequency per fraud category 
and per region. The cost of financial statement fraud was then estimated assuming that the relative differences 
among the mean costs are similar to differences in median costs. This method was also used by Perols (2011). 
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effective at detecting fraud as less than 19% of occupational fraud2 was initially detected by 
either internal or external audit (ACFE 2010, 2012, 2014). This has occurred even after the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in the US explicitly clarified the 
responsibility of auditors to provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are free 
from material misstatement (Perols 2011). Fraud detection decision aids also need to be made 
available to stakeholders other than auditors, because Beasley et al. (2010) found that 
external auditors were implicated in the fraud in 23% of the SEC-enforced cases between 
1998 and 2007.  
Classification models can be used as decision aids to assist in detecting financial 
statement fraud. These models assign classifications (fraudulent or legitimate) by analysing 
information such as publicly available financial and accounting ratios derived from data in 
financial statements. Because the financial information in cases of fraud is, by definition, 
fraudulent, non-financial information is also routinely incorporated into models. While 
financial statement fraud is less common than other types of fraud, models that can act as a 
first test to identify firms warranting more investigation are useful (Dechow et al. 2011). 
Accurate classification models can reduce the costs of detecting financial statement fraud by 
facilitating better directed investigations. This would reduce the loss from financial statement 
fraud by two separate means, first as a result of faster detection and secondly the factor of 
deterrence to potential fraudsters caused by the faster detection. It is useful to note that 
fraudsters will generally not be deterred by harsher penalties because they usually believe 
they will never be caught (ACFE 2013a). Consequently, increasing the perception of the 
likelihood of being caught is the primary deterrent (ACFE 2013a) and classification models 
and education about the use of them can assist in increasing this perception.  
1.1  Introduction to fraud detection models and their benefits 
Specialists in this area, such as forensic accountants, are a scarce and expensive 
resource so it is impracticable to have them investigate all financial statements. Classification 
models can be used as a first step to quickly process large amounts of data, find patterns and 
then produce a predicted classification that can be used to rank cases in terms of the 
                                                 
 
2 Occupational frauds occur when an employee abuses the trust of an employer, and consequently they 
include asset misappropriation, corruption and financial statement fraud (ACFE 2014). 
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likelihood of fraud. These results can then be used to prioritise and more efficiently allocate 
human specialists to investigate cases with the highest likelihood of fraud. Unlike computer 
models that might consider probabilities, human specialists can investigate with a view to 
establishing proof. As suggested by Belhadji et al. (2000) as a general modelling principle, 
fraud detection models are to complement, not replace, human specialists. 
It is also important to note that static classification models developed using supervised 
learning methods are inferior to humans at adapting to new events such as new ways to 
commit fraud. Care must also be taken to avoid fraud models that are too rigid and 
predictable as they allow fraudsters to learn how to conceal their behaviour over time. 
Consequently, to maintain initial accuracy levels, models implemented in industry need to be 
regularly updated with new information.  
Fraud detection models must pay particular attention to minimising both types of 
errors resulting from misclassifying financial statements. 
1. Missing fraud, that is misclassifying fraudulent financial statements as legitimate, is 
costly in terms of stakeholders being misled into making decisions using fraudulent 
information. 
2. Falsely alleging fraud, that is misclassifying legitimate financial statements as fraudulent, 
is also costly in terms of lost investment opportunities, wasted investigatory and 
regulatory time and money, and damage to the misclassified businesses. 
While it is agreed that the first error is more costly than the second, a quantifiable 
difference in the error costs has not been, and is unlikely to be, agreed upon since the costs 
vary depending on the particular conditions and stakeholders (Beneish 1999a). Consequently, 
research considering a range of error costs is desirable. 
The exact proportion of fraudulent statements relative to all financial statements is 
also unknown, because frauds that have gone undetected remain unidentified. Some studies 
have estimated the proportion of fraudulent statements to be less than 1% (Beneish 1997; Bell 
and Carcello 2000; Dechow et al. 2011), but recent estimates are as high as 14.5% (Dyck et 
al. 2013). All the estimates indicate that the proportions of fraudulent and legitimate 
statements are drastically unequal, which presents challenges for classification models and is 
often referred to as the “class imbalance” problem. Consequently, it is important to assess 
models using metrics that take the proportion of fraud into account. 
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In addition to the importance of considering class imbalance and unequal error costs, 
Perols (2011) states that the noisy nature of the explanatory variables (data) and inherent 
concealment involved means that empirical research using data specific to financial statement 
fraud is necessary, because results from other fields cannot be assumed to be applicable. And 
while the similar area of business failure prediction has been well-researched, fewer 
empirical studies have focused on financial statement fraud detection. 
1.2  Introduction to supervised learning methods for classification 
Supervised learning methods attempt to use existing data to learn the relationship 
between input variables and an output variable, a process referred to as training. Thus, 
supervised learning methods can be used to train classification models on past (or simulated) 
known data before being used on new data. The name of the method can be better understood 
when it is viewed as a conceptual supervisor providing the known data for the training 
process. For fraud detection, the output variable is often a binary variable that indicates either 
fraudulence or legitimacy. Supervised learning methods train models using both fraudulent 
and legitimate cases. 
There are many different modelling techniques that use supervised learning methods. 
Discriminant analysis and logistic regression have traditionally been popular modelling 
techniques for analysing classification problems, such as financial statement fraud detection. 
These traditional modelling techniques are parametric, and there is now a search for new, 
more accurate and less distribution-dependent approaches. Potentially suitable 
non-parametric modelling techniques include artificial neural networks, decision trees and 
ensembles of multiple decision trees such as Random Forests and TreeNet. To date, decision 
trees and ensembles of them have been the subject of very few research studies on financial 
statement fraud detection. 
Major advantages of decision trees include that they are non-parametric, immune to 
outliers, resistant to irrelevant variables, can easily model interactions between explanatory 
variables and are relatively easy to interpret and simple to develop into automated systems. 
Decision tree models suffer from being sensitive to small changes in the training data set 
(Sudjianto et al. 2010) similar to artificial neural networks, but newer ensemble techniques 
such as TreeNet overcome this issue to provide more stable models that also make better 
classifications close to region boundaries. Salford Systems are the providers of CART 
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decision trees (Breiman et al. 1984), TreeNet (Friedman 1999) and Random Forests (Breiman 
2001a). They have had unparalleled success at data mining competitions and credit TreeNet 
for the majority of their award-winning results3. 
1.3  Aim of this research 
The overall aims of this research are to advance the field of detecting financial 
statement fraud in terms of: 
• Identifying the most appropriate modelling techniques and parameter settings; 
• Developing and evaluating new models in comparison with existing models; and, 
• Identifying the most appropriate explanatory variables (data) for models to use. 
This research also has the potential to develop new theory and methodology in order to 
achieve these aims. Additionally, it is the aim of this research to produce findings that are 
widely applicable to investors, regulators, auditors and other stakeholders. 
As a consequence of these aims, this research has the potential to uncover new 
information about the nature of financial statement fraud. Insights from research on detecting 
financial statement fraud can also be used by others to refine general theories of deception 
(Humpherys et al. 2011). What happens in the years after financial statement fraud is detected 
is also an interesting and important research topic, but one that is outside the scope of this 
research4. 
The four main research questions that this study addresses are introduced below. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) Which supervised-learning modelling techniques are the 
most accurate at detecting financial statement fraud under varying assumptions about the 
prior probability of fraud and ratios of misclassification error costs? 
As suggested above in Section 1.1, this research considers numerous ratios of 
misclassification error costs because the cost of missing fraud relative to falsely alleging 
fraud differs depending on the circumstance and the stakeholder. A range of prior fraud 
                                                 
 
3 This information is from Salford Systems’ website, https://www.salford-systems.com/en/company/awards 
and https://www.salford-systems.com/products/treenet, accessed January 2013. 
4 The article by Farber (2005) is a good reference on what happens after fraud occurs. 
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probabilities is also considered because estimates vary in the literature of the proportion of 
financial statements that are fraudulent. 
The ratio of error costs and the prior fraud probability might not be able to be reliably 
estimated in some cases. The following research question addresses the issue of which 
modelling technique to use in such a circumstance. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Which supervised-learning modelling technique is the best 
overall at detecting financial statement fraud, considering the entire range of assumptions 
investigated in RQ1? 
It is also of interest to investigate the following related questions. 
Research Question 3 (RQ3): Which explanatory variables are the most useful in models 
that detect financial statement fraud? 
Research Question 4 (RQ4): How do simpler models compare with those developed for 
the first two research questions in their ability to detect financial statement fraud? 
1.4  Main contributions of this research 
The set of explanatory variables used in this research is more comprehensive than any 
prior studies. Further to this, the number of fraud cases analysed is often more than double 
that used in prior studies. Consequently, findings from this research greatly contribute to a 
better understanding of the variables that are important in models detecting financial 
statement fraud and how these variables are associated with it. Some of these findings that are 
new include: 
• Empirical support for the use of a corporate governance index in models that detect 
financial statement fraud; 
• Empirical support for increased debt being associated with reduced financial statement 
fraud, in accordance with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976); and 
• Empirical support for the use of an interaction variable between CEO tenure and 
company size in models that detect financial statement fraud. Theoretical justification for 
this interaction according to the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework is also 
provided. 
This research also makes a theoretical contribution to the field of financial statement 
fraud. Despite the fact that the selection of variables is crucial to developing a fraud detection 
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model, their selection in prior financial statement fraud detection research is not standardised 
by a common overall theory (Perols and Lougee 2011). Consequently, a new theoretical 
framework has been developed and proposed for this purpose. It is called the Fraud Detection 
Triangle framework and is based on the famous Fraud Triangle (Cressey 1953). Empirical 
evidence is also provided to support the use of this new framework to assist in the selection 
of explanatory variables for models that detect financial statement fraud. 
Many supervised-learning modelling techniques, particularly decision trees and 
ensembles of them, have not been as extensively tested for financial statement fraud detection 
as they have been in this research. This is the first study to evaluate models both on separate 
holdout data for accurate evaluation of model performance and under varying assumptions 
about prior fraud probabilities and ratios of misclassification error costs. Consequently, 
results from this research greatly contribute to a better understanding of various models’ 
performance in financial statement fraud detection. Some of these results are briefly 
overviewed below. 
More than 30 different models have been developed, after many more were initially 
analysed in order to choose the best parameters. Some models are based on those used in 
prior studies, others are modifications of previously used models, and entirely new ones have 
also been developed. The best model to detect financial statement fraud varies depending on 
the assumptions about prior fraud probabilities and ratios of misclassification error costs. 
Overall, models that have been newly developed in this research have outperformed 
benchmark models and others based on those used in prior research. Newly developed 
ensemble models performed particularly well. Simpler models have also been developed for 
stakeholders who prefer models easier to interpret or which use fewer explanatory variables. 
It is important to note that all explanatory variables used in this research are publicly 
available, because variables too difficult to obtain are unlikely to be used in a practical 
context (Perols 2011). 
Overall, new contributions are made to the current body of research on financial 
statement fraud. This information can be used to improve its early detection, which would 
mitigate its cost to society and help deter its occurrence. There are also specific beneficiaries 
of this information such as auditors and regulators, who can use detection models to assist 
them to better assess the risk of fraud having occurred and whether there is a need to 
investigate further. Additionally, investors, financiers and employees are examples of 
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stakeholders who can use detection models to help them avoid prolonged association with 
fraudulent companies.  
1.5  Dissertation Structure 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) introduces and discusses the concepts of financial 
statements and fraud within them. This includes a discussion of the key entities involved in, 
and the different types of, financial statement fraud. This information is followed by a 
discussion of deterrence, detection and prevention of such fraud. 
Following this overview of financial statement fraud, Chapter 3 presents a review of 
prior research into financial statement fraud detection in terms of the modelling techniques 
used. This includes an explanation of each modelling technique and a discussion of both its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The new Fraud Detection Triangle framework is developed in Chapter 4. It is also 
used in this chapter to assist in the selection of the explanatory variables to be used in this 
research. The justification of this selection incorporates a review of explanatory variables 
used in prior research, which complements the review of modelling techniques in Chapter 3. 
Based on the review of modelling techniques and selection of explanatory variables in 
the prior two chapters, Chapter 5 presents the research that addresses the first two research 
questions (RQ1 and RQ2, defined on pages 6 and 7). The data and methodology being used 
are discussed first, including the development of new models. The chapter then concludes 
with presentation and discussion of the results from comparing multiple modelling techniques 
to detect financial statement fraud. 
Chapter 6 presents the research that addresses the last two research questions (RQ3 
and RQ4, defined on page 7). It begins with an analysis of the explanatory variables in terms 
of their usefulness in the models developed in Chapter 5. These results are then used, along 
with those from Chapter 5, to develop and evaluate simpler models that use fewer variables 
and are easier to interpret. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the overall conclusions and suggested future work.  
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Chapter 2 Overview of Financial Statement Fraud 
Fraud in general is any act to deceive in order to gain a benefit. It has existed as long 
as humans have and there are countless forms it can take (Bose et al. 2011); some examples 
include personal and corporate identity fraud, credit card fraud, insurance fraud and financial 
statement fraud, which is also known as management fraud. Based on information from the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ngai et al. (2011) classify financial fraud into four areas: 
bank fraud, insurance fraud, securities and commodities fraud and other related financial 
fraud. Financial statement fraud is classified as a type of corporate fraud, which is a member 
of the other related financial fraud category. 
To better understand financial statement fraud, this chapter begins with a brief 
introduction into the concept of financial statements in accounting. This is followed by an 
introduction to fraud within financial statements and that provides the background 
information needed to discuss the detection, deterrence and prevention of that type of fraud. 
2.1  Brief Introduction to Financial Statements 
This subsection briefly introduces financial statements from an accounting viewpoint 
and some of the relevant terms used later in this dissertation. A more detailed introduction 
into financial statements can be found in the early chapters of most reputable textbooks on 
financial accounting such as the first three chapters of Trotman and Gibbins (2005) or 
Anthony et al. (2004). An  alternative and even more comprehensive treatment of financial 
statements is provided in the book by Ittelson (2009), which is exclusively focused on this 
topic. 
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2.1.1 Accrual Accounting 
Most corporations today use the accrual method of accounting. Accrual accounting 
recognises events when they occur, rather than cash accounting which recognises events at 
the time the cash transaction takes place. As an example, consider a retailer who sells and 
delivers a suite of furniture during a particular accounting period, but the customer has credit 
terms which means they will not pay until next accounting period. Accrual accounting 
recognises the sales revenue in the particular period when the sale took place, rather than the 
next period when the payment was made. Another example is a painting contractor, who 
completes work during one period but who will not be paid until the next period. This accrual 
expense is recognised in the period the contractor completed the work rather than in the 
following period when payment occurs. Apportioning the cost of a long-term asset over its 
useful life5 (rather than entirely at the time of purchase) is a component of accrual accounting 
and is achieved by the concept known as depreciation, further explained in the next 
subsection. The reasoning behind apportioning the cost is to better match the expense of the 
asset with the revenue it will generate over multiple accounting periods. While accrual 
accounting is a more complex concept than cash accounting, it is arguably more 
economically relevant and more useful for decision-making. However, it will be seen later 
that this complexity also provides more opportunities for fraud to occur. 
2.1.2 Main Types of Financial Statements 
The four main financial statements are the: 
• Balance Sheet6, 
• Income Statement7, 
• Cash Flow Statement, and the 
• Statement of Changes in Equity8. 
These will be discussed briefly in this order. Different accounting standards have slightly 
different definitions, but the following explanations are general in nature to give a basic 
                                                 
 
5 Useful life refers to the period over which an asset is expected to be available for use by a business 
(Trotman and Gibbins 2005). 
6 The Balance Sheet is called the Statement of Financial Position in some countries such as Australia. 
7 The Income Statement is also known as the Profit and Loss Statement, Statement of Operations and 
Statement of Earnings. 
8 The Statement of Changes in Equity is also known as the Statement of Retained Earnings.  
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understanding of the concepts to a reader who is unfamiliar with accounting language and 
standards. 
The Balance Sheet describes the financial position of a business at a point in time. It 
is based on the model that Assets = Liabilities + Equity. Brief explanations of the three 
categories (assets, liabilities and equity) in this model and accounts commonly found within 
them are provided below. 
• Assets are essentially useful financial resources, and more precisely assets are future 
economic benefits that include 
• Current Assets, which are expected to be realised (converted to cash) within the next 
operating cycle (usually one year in the normal course of business), such as  
• Accounts Receivable: Amount owing from customers, minus any amounts that are 
not expected to be collected that are shown in the Allowance for Doubtful 
Accounts contra account9. 
• Inventory: Unsold products on hand (also known as stock). 
• Noncurrent assets, which are not expected to be fully realised in the next operating 
cycle (usually one year), such as 
• Fixed Assets or Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E): Assets such as land, 
buildings, vehicles, computers and office furniture. 
• PP&E is usually listed as Net PP&E, which is the Gross PP&E minus any 
Accumulated Depreciation. Assets often lose value over time as a result of 
wear and tear or becoming obsolete and accumulated depreciation is a measure 
of how much value an asset has lost. Accumulated depreciation can be 
calculated as the sum of the depreciation expense that occurs in each period 
(which is discussed more below). 
• Intangible Assets such as Goodwill, which arises when the price paid for a group 
of assets (such as in the acquisition of a company) is higher than the sum of the 
tangible assets. 
                                                 
 
9 A contra account is an account used to record certain deductions from an asset 
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• Liabilities are essentially obligations to be paid, or more precisely future economic 
sacrifices of economic benefits that are obliged to be made by the business. Liabilities can 
be categorised as current (shorter-term) or noncurrent (longer-term), as was shown with 
the assets presented above. Examples of liabilities include 
• Accounts payable (a current liability), which are amounts owed to suppliers 
(including the painting contractor from the example above), and 
• Debt agreements such as a loan (a current or noncurrent liability) or bank overdraft (a 
current liability). 
• Equity is the owners’ interest in the business (which is assets minus liabilities), which can 
be derived from 
• Retained earnings, which are accumulated profits that have not been withdrawn from 
the company and distributed to owners and 
• Direct financial contributions from owners. 
The Income Statement describes the financial performance and profitability over a 
given period of time (often one year). It is based on the relationship that 
Income = Revenue - Expenses, where income can also be referred to as profit or earnings. 
Brief explanations follow of the categories of this financial statement (revenues and 
expenses) and accounts commonly found within them. All of them are accruals that are 
recognised when they occur, not necessarily when payment is made. 
• Revenues are inflows excluding contributions by owners and primarily include Sales from 
a product or service. 
• Expenses are outflows excluding distributions paid to owners and include 
• Cost of Goods Sold such as the cost of the inputs to the product or service offered 
• Interest payable on debt 
• Income Taxes 
• Salaries of employees 
• Depreciation that recognises a decline in the value of a noncurrent asset10 
                                                 
 
10 Depreciation is termed Amortisation when it is applied to intangible assets such as goodwill. 
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The Cash Flow Statement shows the changes in cash during a period. The cash flows 
are broken into the following categories 
• Operating activities that relate to providing goods and services, 
• Investing activities that relate to the purchase or sale of noncurrent assets such as PP&E, 
and 
• Financing activities that relate to the financial structure of the company such as 
distributions paid to owners (which are called dividends).  
Each category has inflows, outflows and net cash flows that are calculated as the inflows 
minus the outflows. 
The Statement of Changes in Equity details any changes in the owners’ interest in the 
company. This statement is influenced by events such as new shares being sold or bought 
back, profit or losses being made and distributions paid to owners (called dividends). 
2.1.3 Double-Entry Accounting 
The double-entry accounting used today has its origins many hundreds of years ago 
(Section 3.11 of Trotman and Gibbins [2005]), and is such that there are two equal and 
opposite aspects to be recorded for every event. This concept is easier to understand by using 
some examples, such as those that follow. 
The examples use double-entries to maintain the Balance Sheet relationship Assets = 
Liabilities + Equity.  
a.  The purchase of a new machine will increase total assets via PP&E and will also cause a 
corresponding 
a.1.  Decrease in another asset such as  the cash paid for the machine,  
a.2.  Creation of a new liability for future payment if the machine was purchased on 
credit, or 
a.3.  A combination of a.1 and a.211. 
b.  New contributions from owners will increase equity, as well as correspondingly 
increase assets via increased cash. 
                                                 
 
11 It is unlikely that the machine will be directly purchased out of Equity using new funds, because they will 
be listed as separate transactions as the next dot-point example suggests. 
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c.  Paying for products bought on credit will decrease liabilities by reducing accounts 
payable and will also reduce assets via decreased cash. 
d.  Obtaining a loan from a bank will create a new debt liability and also increase assets via 
the cash provided by the bank. 
Double-entry accounting becomes more complicated when the income statement is 
included, but the concept of two equal and opposite aspects being recorded remains true. For 
example, 
e.  When employees are paid, cash (from the balance sheet) decreases and correspondingly 
the wage expenses increase. 
f.  When a product is sold for cash or credit, two events are recorded: 
f.1.  Record of the sale: An asset from the balance sheet (cash or accounts receivable) 
increases and sales revenue increases. 
f.2.  Record of the cost of the sale: An asset from the balance sheet (inventory) 
decreases and an expense from the income statement (cost of goods sold) 
increases. 
The implications of the double-entry system for financial statement fraud is that 
fraudulent accounting affects two accounts, and typically two different financial statements, 
commonly the balance sheet and the income statement (ACFE 2013b). 
2.2  Fraud within Financial Statements 
This section briefly introduces the concept of fraud within financial statements. The 
following subsections define financial statement fraud, clarify the difference between similar 
terms, discuss the key entities involved and the different ways it is committed.  
2.2.1 Defining Financial Statement Fraud 
As mentioned in the previous chapter financial statement fraud involves the 
intentional publication of false or misleading information in financial statements. The precise 
definition may vary slightly from country to country, but it is common that fraud involves 
breaking the law. A formal definition can be found in Section 240 of the Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) 122 issued by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) titled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The 
definition provided is 
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An intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged 
with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception that results in a 
misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit. 
Key terms used in this definition are elaborated in the following dot points. 
• Financial Statements: These include the Balance Sheet12, Income Statement13, Cash 
Flow Statement, Statement of Changes in Equity14 and all other sections such as the notes 
to the statements that provide additional relevant information not contained in the main 
statements. 
• Misstatement: Something must be incorrect, which includes something that is fictitious, 
improper, inappropriate, omitted or false. This includes the manipulation of records or 
supporting documents, misrepresentation or omission of information or misapplication of 
principles and regulations with reference to financial statements. 
• Intentional: This means that the act is done with reason and purpose 
(TheLawDictionary.org 2015) . A report by the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (1987) in the US includes reckless acts in this definition. 
• Material: There are slight differences between the definitions of what constitutes a 
material misstatement, but a core issue is that it be substantial enough to influence 
decisions of users of financial statements. The US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) refers to it being material if “there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in making an investment decision” and the US 
accounting standards board refers to it being material if “it makes it probable that the 
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed or 
influenced” (ACFE 2013b). 
• Subject of an Audit: Financial statements are reviewed by external auditors who are 
required to be independent and whose task it is to express an opinion on the financial 
statements. 
                                                 
 
12 The Balance Sheet is called the Statement of Financial Position in some countries such as Australia. 
13 The Income Statement is also known as the Profit and Loss Statement, Statement of Operations and 
Statement of Earnings. 
14 The Statement of Changes in Equity is also known as the Statement of Retained Earnings.  
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Legally, a fraudulent  act also requires an entity relying on the misstatement and an injury or 
loss caused to that entity by the misstatement (Romney et al. 2013). In brief, financial 
statement fraud is an intentional violation of applicable accounting standards and regulations. 
2.2.2 Terms Similar to Financial Statement Fraud 
Financial statements can range from true and fair to fraudulent. Stages on a continuum 
describing this range are extracted and modified from Jones and Library (2011) and described 
below.  
a.  Intended Accounting: Working within the regulatory framework and accounting rules 
to produce a “true and fair view” that best serves the users of financial statements. This 
is the ideal scenario and the intention of financial statements (Jones and Library 2011). 
b.  Creative Accounting15: Working within the regulatory framework and accounting rules 
to produce a “creative view” that best serves the producers of financial statements. 
Flexibility when producing financial statements is necessary to produce true and fair 
statements that are useful to assist the users in making economic decisions, but this 
same flexibility makes possible creative accounting that benefits the producers (Jones 
and Library 2011). Creative accounting does not clearly break any rules, but it is not 
consistent with Intended Accounting. 
c.  False Accounting (including financial statement fraud): Working “outside” the 
regulatory framework and accounting rules to produce financial statements that do not 
comply with regulations and rules. If the intent and material criteria described above are 
met, then false accounting can be fraudulent. Fraud needs to be proved in a court of law 
or by a regulatory body (Jones and Library 2011). Financial statement fraud is the 
extreme of this continuum and is the focus of this dissertation. 
Other commonly used terms are briefly described below. 
• Aggressive accounting is a term that essentially means the same as creative accounting.  
• Impression management is similar to creative accounting in that it serves the best 
interests of the producers of the statements, but it is usually specific to the visual 
representation of information including the creation of graphs. 
                                                 
 
15 There are many different definitions of creative accounting. The preferred definition from Jones and 
Library (2011) has been used here. Refer to Jones and Library (2011) for more information on creative 
accounting and a discussion of other definitions.  
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• Profit Smoothing or Income Smoothing uses creative accounting to reduce the 
variability in profits and income over time.  
• Earnings management involves using flexibility to try to deliver a predetermined 
objective, such as the profit level expected by analysts16 (Jones and Library 2011). This 
term is very commonly found in the academic literature. Depending upon the source, 
earnings management can either be exclusively creative accounting or it can encompass 
both creative and false accounting. This differs from financial statement fraud, which 
invariably involves false accounting. 
• Restatements occur when regulators require companies to correct false accounting. This 
usually only occurs if the misstatement is regarded as being material. Restatements differ 
from fraud in that they do not require the intent to deceive. For example, Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) examined 492 restatements and found that only 19% of cases involved 
fraud.  
While earnings management, profit smoothing, restatements and fraud share certain 
traits and are all phenomena worthy of study, they are not the same. Examining financial 
statement fraud is important in its own right, as evidenced by the widespread impact of the 
recent frauds of this century such as Tyco, Enron and WorldCom (Erickson et al. 2006). 
2.2.3 Key Entities Involved 
The following subsections discuss the victims and perpetrators of financial statement 
fraud after introducing some of the main entities responsible for protecting against financial 
statement fraud.  
2.2.3.a Responsible Entities – the Regulator 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the primary overseer and 
regulator of the securities markets in the US, the place of focus in this study. The SEC has a 
mission to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation. This includes protecting investors from fraud and taking enforcement action 
relating to fraud. The SEC investigates on the basis of many internal and external sources and 
then can take enforcement action relating to financial statement fraud (Cotter and Young 
                                                 
 
16 Analysts are sophisticated users of financial statements (Block 1999) who issue reports on their view of 
companies to market participants, either for nothing or for a fee.  
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2007). This enforcement action includes civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in US Federal 
Court, administrative notices or orders issued by the SEC and information on the settlement 
of cases involving the SEC. Lane and O'Connell (2009) found that SEC has become more 
aggressive and that enforcement activities have increased since 2002, when high-profile 
frauds such as Enron were revealed. 
Since 1982 the SEC has issued Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs) for misconduct related to financial statements during or at the conclusion of an 
investigation against a company, an auditor or an officer (Dechow et al. 2011), as well as 
other misconduct such as insider trading unrelated to this research. These AAERs are 
publicly available on the SEC’s website www.sec.gov and contain varying levels of detail. 
That is, the AAERs contain SEC alleged cases of fraudulent misstatement in financial 
statements and have been a source of data in many research studies about financial statement 
fraud. 
2.2.3.b Responsible Entities – Management and the Board 
Senior management personnel, including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), are responsible for ensuring quality financial statements free 
from fraud. However, as is mentioned below they are also the main perpetrators of fraud that 
conflicts with their responsibility. As overseers of senior management that have a 
responsibility to act on behalf of the shareholders, the board of directors through its audit 
committee also has a responsibility for the financial statement’s quality and for its being free 
from fraud (ACFE 2013b). 
Companies also have internal auditors who are responsible for continual auditing 
throughout the year, which includes (but is not limited to) the production of the financial 
statements. Internal auditors work across all areas of the organisation and should be able to 
report directly without senior management involvement to the board of directors via the audit 
committee. 
2.2.3.c Responsible Entities – External Auditors 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) clarified the 
auditor’s responsibility and provided guidance for considering fraud in an audit in SAS 82 
issued in 1997 (AICPA 1997), SAS 99 issued in 2002 (AICPA 2002) and more recently with 
effect from the end of 2012 in Section 240 from SAS 122 (AICPA 2011). Additionally, 
Section 200 from SAS 122/123 (AICPA 2011) that also came into effect at the end of 2012 
Chapter 2 Overview of Financial Statement Fraud Adrian Gepp 
   Page 20 
specifies that the objective of the external auditor includes the need “to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material 
misstatement, whether due to fraud or error”. Reasonable assurance is specified to 
differentiate it from a guarantee that is essentially impossible to provide, but the exact 
definition of “reasonable assurance” has been the subject of much debate in the past (Hogan 
et al. 2008). Despite their responsibility, unfortunately Beasley et al. (2010) found that 
external auditors were implicated in 23% of the AAERs between 1998 and 2007. 
2.2.3.d Perpetrators (Fraudsters) 
While perpetrators of fraud in general have been shown to be very diverse, 
perpetrators of financial statement fraud are most often members of senior management. 
Nieschwietz et al. (2000) state that financial statement fraud is typically perpetrated by more 
than one highly motivated and intelligent manager well-versed in persuasion and 
intimidation. From analysing AAERs from 1998 to 2007, Beasley et al. (2010) found that in 
89% of cases the CEO, CFO or both were named as being associated with the fraud. This 
increased from 83% from the equivalent prior study. The increase is caused by an increase in 
CFO involvement. The ACFE (2014) also found from its worldwide survey that senior 
management were the group most responsible for committing financial statement fraud. It is 
noteworthy that while senior management most often commit fraud, they often pressure other 
employees such as clerks to perform the data entry to implement the fraud (ACFE 2013a). It 
is also worth noting that the most costly frauds usually involve collusion (Silver et al. 2008). 
Silver et al. (2008) reveal that collusion assists with withholding information and providing 
false information to auditors and the audit committee, as well as overriding traditional 
internal accounting controls that attempt to prevent fraud being committed by a single person. 
From analysing AAERs, Beasley et al. (2010) state that the most common motivators 
alleged by the SEC are to: 
• Meet internal or external earnings expectations, 
• Hide deteriorating financial conditions, 
• Increase the share price, 
• Improve financial performance to assist with raising new equity or debt, and to 
• Increase management compensation based on financial results. 
The motivations for committing fraud are discussed more in Section 4.2 on page 76. For an 
analysis of the psychological aspects of fraud, refer to Ramamoorti (2008). 
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2.2.3.e Victims 
Financial statement fraud occurs across a range of industries and company sizes 
(Beasley et al. 2010). The ACFE (2014) refers to fraud as being ubiquitous, claiming that 
there is no entity that is immune from the problem. Estimates of the aggregated cost of 
financial statement fraud were given in Chapter 1, but the cost to individual organisations is 
estimated to be 5% of revenues according to the ACFE (2014) based on frauds reported from 
a survey of experts who investigated them. Using data from security class actions that are not 
limited to financial statement fraud, Dyck et al. (2013) measure the cost to fraudulent 
companies at 22% of their value and the cost to all firms at 3% of their value. The authors 
explain their well thought-out methodology for the cost valuation in detail, but in brief they 
calculated the difference between the value of the company after the fraud and the projected 
value of the company had the fraud not occurred. This was seen as an improvement to 
analysing the decline in the stock prices in the days following disclosure of a fraud. 
Incidentally, this alternative method estimated a large decline in value from a drop in the 
share price of 16.7% in the two days surrounding the disclosure of a fraud alleged by the SEC 
in an AAER (Beasley et al. 2010). 
In addition to the companies themselves, entities that are negatively affected by 
financial statement fraud include: 
• Investors and other financiers who have provided funds to the company under false 
pretences, who might not recover their funds. KPMG Forensic (2013) estimates that 
recovery of proceeds from a major fraud in Australia and New Zealand only occurs in full 
8% of the time and in part 49% of the time. 
• Employees who have their professional reputation diminished by working for a company 
involved in fraud, even if they weren’t involved. Additionally, many employees lose their 
jobs because companies often over-hire during fraud schemes and then reduce employee 
numbers after the fraud is detected (Kedia and Philippon 2009). 
• Suppliers, customers and other stakeholders having their reputation diminished by 
association and potentially having to find an alternative to the fraudulent company after 
the fraud is detected. 
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• Accounting and audit firms that face legal and image problems. An extreme example is 
that the large accounting and audit firm Arthur Andersen does not exist any more because 
of  the major frauds in financial statements that it audited (Whiting et al. 2012)17.  
• Analysts (Cotter and Young 2007) and regulators (Dechow et al. 2011) who could have 
their reputation diminished if they missed the fraud. 
• All entities involved in the financial markets, because they face higher transaction costs 
and reduced efficiency (Perols 2011), and reduced liquidity (Dechow et al. 2011), as a 
result of a loss in confidence and trust in regulators and the integrity of financial markets. 
• All entities in the economy; Kedia and Philippon (2009) argue that fraud (and earnings 
management) causes the misallocation of resources in the economy and the amplification 
of business cycles. 
There is also evidence that suggests fraud increases the likelihood of the company 
failing (Rosner 2003; Deloitte 2008; Beasley et al. 2010). In fact, six of the ten most costly 
corporate failures in the US were associated with large fraud schemes, including Enron and 
WorldCom (Whiting et al. 2012). When financial statement fraud leads to failure then there 
will be even more damage to the entities listed above. 
Whiting et al. (2012) provide a good example of the magnitude of the overall cost of 
fraud to society, which is presented here. The example is the large frauds that occurred in the 
US in the early 2000s, such as Enron and WorldCom. In brief, Enron managers profited 
personally while hiding billions of dollars of liabilities and WorldCom falsely capitalised 
billions of dollars of expenses. These and other types of financial statement fraud are 
explained in the next section. Overall these and other frauds caused a loss of confidence in 
business in the US (Carson 2003) and large declines on sharemarkets worldwide (Whiting et 
al. 2012). The NASDAQ stock exchange in the US reached a peak of 5049 before a suite of 
large frauds including Enron and WorldCom were made public, after which the NASDAQ 
dropped 78% to a low of 1141. There were other factors involved, but the drop in the 
NASDAQ from the September 11 2001 terrorist acts was only a small fraction of the drop 
from these frauds. These frauds also caused the accounting profession and the SEC to change 
basic accounting and internal control procedures and recommendations. 
                                                 
 
17 For this statement, Whiting et al. (2012) cited another article by C. Albrecht and W.S. Albrecht (2001), 
but a copy of this  article could not be obtained via the library of the author of this dissertation. 
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2.2.4 Types of Financial Statement Fraud 
There are many different ways to fraudulently manipulate financial statements and 
many different ways to categorise them. Examples of financial statement fraud are presented 
in five categories based on those in ACFE (2013b): improper revenue recognition, improper 
treatment of expenses and costs, improper asset valuation, improper recording of liabilities 
and inadequate disclosures. It is worth noting that manipulating cash flows does not 
obviously fall into any of these categories, as cash is not commonly fraudulently manipulated 
because it is more easily verified through the analysis of bank statements18 (ACFE 2013a). It 
is also important to note that there are other ways to categorise financial statement fraud; for 
example, Gao and Srivastava (2011) presented an alternative classification of fraud types, as 
well as the most relevant evidence schemes available to auditors for each type of fraud. 
Example evidence types include fake documents, false responses from companies 
(management) and hidden documents. This taxonomy is exclusively focused on being used 
within an audit, and so it is not the preferred choice for this study that has a broader scope. 
Known warning signs (commonly referred to as red flags and referred to as such 
hereafter) for each type of fraud are listed for each category of fraud discussed below19. The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2013) has been used as the primary reference for 
these red flags, because it is the world’s largest anti-fraud organization. Many of these red 
flags use information available to the auditor but not easily available to the public, such as 
complex transactions being recorded near the end of a reporting period, sales being recorded 
by corporate headquarters (rather than the appropriate accounting department) or recurring 
attempts by management to justify unusual accounting practices to the auditor. However, this 
dissertation focuses on using publicly available information to enable the findings to be more 
widely applicable. Consequently red flags that use public information will be the focus of this 
section and this dissertation in general. Part of the contribution of this research is to identify 
indicators to assist in detection of financial statement fraud. In addition to the red flags 
presented in this section, the development of potential indicators of fraud for modelling 
purposes (which are influenced by these red flags) will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
 
18 It is possible to fraudulently manipulate cash and it has been done in the past by forging bank statements, 
but it is not very common. 
19 For readers who are interested in how the red flags for financial statement fraud differ from asset 
misappropriation please refer to the paper by Gullkvist and Jokipii (2013).  
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There is some overlap between the different types of fraud listed in the following 
subsections. Fraud schemes commonly involve more than one type of fraud because of the 
double-entry nature of modern accounting. This means that there are usually at least two 
ways to detect any given fraud scheme.  
2.2.4.a Improper Revenue Recognition 
In simple terms, revenue is recognised and recorded for financial statement purposes 
when the sale occurs, which usually occurs on delivery of the product or provision of the 
service. Thus it is different from cash flows that are recorded when the cash is received. In 
reality, determining when to recognise revenue in all of the scenarios that happen in the real 
world is very complex. There are accounting rules to guide the revenue recognition process, 
which can be broken when committing fraud. In fact, improper revenue recognition is the 
most common type of financial statement fraud (Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2010; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Gao and Srivastava 2011). 
The usual reason revenue is improperly recognised is to fraudulently increase revenue 
and consequently raise income, in order to improve the financial performance as shown in the 
income statement. It can also be used to decrease these figures, but that is comparatively rare. 
Ways to fraudulently manipulate revenue are briefly discussed below.  
• Premature revenue recognition is the most common method (Gao and Srivastava 2011; 
ACFE 2013a) and it involves recording a sale before all the conditions for recognising 
revenue have been met. An example is recording a conditional or consignment sale as a 
standard sale. A conditional or consignment sale can be returned by the buyer at a later 
date without payment. For example, buyers usually return the items they do not 
successfully on-sell to their customers. This means that there is a chance that the sale 
might not ever occur, and so revenue should not be recorded until the sale is confirmed 
and payment is made or unconditionally expected to be made. 
• Delayed revenue recognition involves the opposite strategy whereby revenue that has 
occurred in a specific reporting period is fraudulently moved into the next period. This is 
usually done if the current period has been very profitable, but there are concerns about 
the next period. This technique will consequently assist in income smoothing. 
• The creation of fictitious revenue is also common (Brennan and McGrath 2007), which 
usually results in a fictitious asset because of the double-entry accounting. 
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• Incorrectly classified revenue includes manoeuvres such as the sale of an asset being 
booked as general operating revenue. 
• Indirect manipulation involves methods such as fraudulently changing discounts, sales 
returns and bad receivables accounts. 
There are many known red flags for improperly recognising revenue. Some examples are: 
• Noticeably higher growth in profitability, particularly compared to that of competitors; 
• Positive income and negative operating cash flows; 
• Rapidly increasing gross margin (which is sales minus cost of goods sold); 
• A substantial increase in the time between sales being recorded and the payment being 
collected, as measured by the ratio of accounts receivable to sales; 
• Financial trouble or failures in the industry; and 
• A change in auditors. 
2.2.4.b Improper Treatment of Expenses and Costs 
Improper treatment of expenses and costs usually involves fraudulently reducing them 
to improve the financial appearance of the company. This can be easier to do than revenue 
manipulation because it can be perpetrated by simply omitting costs or expenses. Ways to 
fraudulently manipulate expenses are listed below. 
• Omitting expenses to increase income, which can be easier than creating fictitious 
revenue. 
• Capitalizing expenditures that should be recorded as expenses. Capitalized expenditures 
are recorded as a long-term asset, which allows their cost to be allocated over a long 
period using depreciation without an immediate reduction in income, which is what 
happens if the item is recorded as an expense. Capitalizing expenditures is only allowed 
in certain situations as defined in accounting reporting standards. Inappropriately 
capitalising expenses is commonly referred to as deferring the inevitable, because the cost 
will eventually be seen in the statements as depreciation for tangible assets. 
• Shifting current period expenses to prior or future reporting periods, and thus avoiding 
reporting them in the current period. This can be done by improperly changing accounting 
policies or manipulating dates close to the end of reporting periods. 
• Not accounting for costs such as increases in doubtful debts, obsolete inventory and 
increases in accumulated depreciation. 
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The red flags for improper treatment of costs and expenses include: 
• A high proportion of assets derived from capitalised expenses; 
• High levels of inventory relative to other types of assets; and, 
• Low levels of or lack of growth in allowance for doubtful debts and accumulated 
depreciation. 
2.2.4.c Improper Asset Valuation 
Improperly valuing assets usually involves the value of an asset being artificially 
inflated to improve the financial situation as shown in the balance sheet. These schemes all 
have ties to either improper treatment of revenues or expenses on the income statement as per 
the double-entry accounting system. Most schemes fall into one of the following categories: 
• Illegitimate valuation of inventory, such as fraudulently valuing obsolete inventory as if  
it were saleable inventory; 
• Illegitimate manipulation of accounts receivable, which is particularly prevalent because 
(1) it directly influences income, (2) it allows for influential changes because accounts 
receivable commonly has a relatively high value and (3) it can be relatively easily done. 
The two most common ways to do this are creating fictitious receivables and not 
recording receivables that are doubtful of being collected. 
• Incorrectly recording fixed assets including fictitious assets, misrepresenting asset value 
and incorrect capitalisation of unrelated costs in order to artificially inflate the value of an 
asset.  
• Not recognising impairments on assets. Assets are often required to be decreased in value 
on the financial statements if their economic value falls below the net amount20 on the 
financial statements, and this is known as impairment. Impairments are also recognised as 
expenses on the income statement21.  
The red flags for improperly valuing assets include: 
• Increased levels of inventory, relative to other assets and particularly relative to sales; 
• High levels of accounts receivable, or low levels of allowance for doubtful debts, relative 
to other assets and amounts in the previous year(s); 
                                                 
 
20 The net amount refers to the fact that depreciation has already been deducted. 
21 Impairments on revalued assets are not treated as expenses, but rather a decrease in the revaluation. 
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• Noticeably higher growth or profitability, particularly compared to those of competitors; 
• Positive income and negative operating cash flows; and, 
• Unusual increases in gross margin (which is sales minus cost of goods sold). 
2.2.4.d Improper Recording of Liabilities 
Similar to improper asset valuation, improperly recording liabilities is usually done to 
improve the financial situation by understating liabilities that appear on the balance sheet. 
Common ways to do this include: 
• Omitting liabilities, which is the easiest way to manipulate liabilities. Examples include 
omitting court judgements, misplacing and destroying invoices from suppliers and 
omitting liabilities for product warranty claims or product returns.  
• Improperly removing liabilities such as allowances for restructuring costs or severance 
costs. 
• Inappropriately changing accounting assumptions – for example, reducing the number of 
expected loyalty program claims without appropriate justification when revenue drops. 
This was done by Tasmanian Airlines who reduced their estimated frequent flyer liability 
from $7 million to $2 million because of a lack of paying passengers (ACFE 2013a). 
The red flags for improperly recording liabilities include: 
• Positive income and negative operating cash flows; 
• Unusual increases in gross margins; 
• Decreases in allowances for product returns or warranty claims; and, 
• Unusual changes in accounts payable. 
2.2.4.e Inadequate Disclosures 
Inadequate disclosures can result in fraudulent financial statements because 
knowledge of the information important to the financial statements is required to be able to 
interpret them accurately and meaningfully. The main ways fraud can occur are by 
• Incorrectly explaining the key accounting principles and methods used to produce the 
financial statements, 
• Grouping items together into single line items, when they should be presented separately, 
and 
• Not adequately disclosing contingencies. For example, when a liability such as losses 
from ongoing litigation is not recorded in the balance sheet because the value cannot be 
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reasonably estimated, it must still be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements if it 
is probable that it will have to be paid. 
The red flags for inadequate disclosures are limited when using publicly available 
information, but include rapid growth in profitability particularly relative to competitors and 
also the control of management decision-making by a small number of people (as much as 
this can be observed from public information).  
2.3  Deterrence, Detection and Prevention 
This section discusses the deterrence, detection and prevention of financial statement 
fraud and concludes with the benefits that fraud detection models can provide. 
2.3.1 Red Flags 
In addition to the red flags associated with the types of financial statement fraud listed 
above, the ACFE (2014) compiled a list of red flag behaviours that perpetrators22 share from 
analysing 1,483 fraud cases as reported by the Certified Fraud Examiners who investigated 
them. The top red-flag behaviours of perpetrators are: 
1. Living beyond their means, 
2. Control issues including not being willing to share duties, 
3. Excessive pressure on them from within the organisation, 
4. A Wheeler-dealer23 attitude involving shrewd or unscrupulous behaviour, and 
5. Financial difficulties. 
These behaviours can be useful for organisations in identifying potential fraudsters. In 
fact, the ACFE (2014) found that at least one red-flag behaviour was present before the fraud 
was detected in 92% of cases they analysed. Ramamoorti (2008) also lists in his appendix 
five behavioural-oriented solutions to financial statement fraud that include cultivating a 
culture of integrity with a tone from management that does not encourage fraud, decisive 
response to any instances of fraud, background checks for new employees, fraud awareness 
                                                 
 
22 These traits are not limited to perpetrators of financial statement fraud, but also asset misappropriation 
and corruption. 
23 Wheeler-dealer is defined in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary) as “a person who makes deals in business or politics in a skillful and sometimes 
dishonest way” (accessed 23 January 2015). 
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training and hotlines for reporting suspicious activity. The ACFE (2013a) also suggested a 
culture where it is acceptable to ask questions if something appears strange to an employee, 
even if it is about a relatively small issue. KPMG Forensic (2013) noted two strategies that 
still remain relatively unused; these are enforced job rotation and screening of employees due 
for promotion or transfer into positions that have a high opportunity to commit fraud. 
However, the ACFE (2014) cautioned that background checks might not perform well at 
predicting fraudulent behaviour, stating that only 5% of perpetrators have been convicted of a 
prior fraud-related offence and only 18% had been punished by an employer for a prior fraud-
related offence. Consequently, the ACFE suggested continuing monitoring of employees and 
understanding the red flags to be alert for were better approaches.  
While the red flags described in this and the previous section are observed in many 
fraud cases, it is important to note that the presence of a red flag does not guarantee fraud has 
occurred. Red flags also occur many times in legitimate cases, which makes minimising the 
error of falsely alleging fraud a difficult task for the investigators or models detecting 
financial statement fraud (Hogan et al. 2008). 
2.3.2 Main Methods of Detection 
The ACFE (2014, 2012, 2010) found the most common way financial statement fraud 
and asset misappropriation fraud schemes are detected is by tips from people. Internal audits 
and management reviews are the next two most common methods which have been found to 
follow the tips. Nearly half of the tips come from employees, as well as nearly 22% from 
customers and almost 10% from suppliers. Furthermore, companies that implemented an 
anonymous hotline for reporting tips experienced even more detection of fraud from tips. 
However, more could be done to encourage tips as only 54% of companies had a hotline in 
place and too many hotlines that were provided were limited to employees when customers 
and suppliers should also be included (ACFE 2014). Only 11% of companies offered rewards 
for whistle-blowers24 (ACFE 2014), which is a particular concern because employees lose by 
whistle-blowing without them (Dyck et al. 2010). The SEC has created a division called the 
Office of the Whistleblower (https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower) that receives tips as well as 
pays whistle-blowers between 10% and 30% of the money collected. This acknowledges the 
                                                 
 
24 Whistle-blowers in this context are people who provide useful and actionable tips and information about 
a fraud. 
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effectiveness of tips in detecting fraud and the importance of offering rewards to incentivise 
them. It also suggests that the SEC might not have the resources to investigate and prosecute 
all the financial statement fraud that occurs, a likelihood also acknowledged throughout the 
academic literature. 
It is notable that there is a gap between the perceived and actual problem of fraud. 
Although the study was not limited to financial statement fraud, KPMG’s (2012) fraud survey 
found that while 43% of organisations surveyed have been victims of fraud, only 15% of 
respondents thought fraud was a problem for their organisation. Addressing this gap between 
perception and reality might assist people to be more alert to the red flags that have been 
described above that might in turn generate more tips and whistle-blowing. 
In addition to the responsible entities (regulators, management, boards of directors 
and external auditors), there are also other entities that might offer a layer of protection 
against financial statement fraud, which is important because Dyck et al. (2010) find that it 
takes a wide range of entities to detect fraud. These other entities include employees, 
customers and suppliers as listed above, as well as analysts who report on the company, as 
there is some evidence they signal fraud in advance of its occurring (Cotter and Young 2007). 
In fact, all the entities listed above as victims have incentives of varying degrees to stop 
financial statement fraud. Private litigation lawyers also have large incentives to bring cases 
against companies committing large financial statement fraud and media journalists gain 
reputation benefits from exposing financial statement fraud. 
The ACFE (2014) empirically confirmed the intuitive result that longer fraud schemes 
cost more. They extend this analysis to discover that frauds detected passively (such as by 
external audit, law enforcement, accident or confession) have been going on longer and cost 
more than frauds proactively detected (such as by hotlines, internal audit and controls and 
management reviews). Effective detection models could assist to reduce the length of time 
until detection and consequently reduce the cost for both passive (such as external audit) and 
proactive (such as management review and internal audit) detection. 
2.3.3 Detection As a Means of Deterrence and Prevention 
Becker (1968) presented an economic theory of crime that states people commit crime 
because the expected utility of the payoff exceeds the expected disutility of getting caught 
and being punished. Johnson et al. (2009) found evidence to suggest this is true for financial 
statement fraud because it is committed more at companies with a lower likelihood (and 
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consequently lower expected disutility) of being caught. This implies that better detection of 
financial statement fraud, which will increase the perception of the likelihood of being 
caught, is an important deterrent to potential fraudsters. While it is difficult to change the 
expected payoff from fraud, another aspect of Becker’s theory concerns the expected 
punishment. Although there are consequences, sometimes severe, for perpetrators of financial 
statement fraud, the severity of these consequences may not be a sufficient deterrent (Beasley 
et al. 2010; Partnoy 2010). Moreover, perpetrators are difficult to prosecute because they are 
usually well connected and often first-time offenders (Ramamoorti 2008; ACFE 2014). 
Consequently, increasing the perception of the likelihood of being caught is likely to be more 
effective at deterring and preventing fraud than harsher punishments (ACFE 2013a) 
2.3.4 External Auditors Are Not Enough 
Although stealing or embezzling company assets occurs more often, management and 
auditors are more concerned with financial statement fraud because its loss is higher 
(Romney et al. 2013). Although it is usually large and of great interest to auditors, research 
finds they perform poorly at detecting financial statement fraud25. 
• Financial statement and asset misappropriation fraud are only detected 3% of the time, 
reduced from 3.3% two years prior and 4.6% another two years prior (ACFE 2014). This 
is put into perspective when approximately 7% were detected by accident. The use of 
external audits did reduce the loss involved, but it was amongst the least effective 
methods analysed. 
• The Treadway Commission in the US, which was set up to study financial statement 
fraud, found undetected fraud to be a factor in half of the 450 lawsuits against auditors 
they studied (Romney et al. 2013). 
Some possible reasons for this poor performance are listed below. 
• Most external auditors do not have a lot of experience in detecting fraud (Humpherys et 
al. 2011). This has been the case for many years as a survey by Loebbecke et al. (1989) 
found that only about half of audit partners had ever encountered fraud. 
                                                 
 
25 Francis (2004) provides a review of the overall quality of audits, rather than specifically related to fraud 
detection. 
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• Managers who commit fraud understand the limitations of an audit and deliberately try to 
deceive inexperienced auditors (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
• Auditors struggle to effectively combine fraud risk factors to assess the overall likelihood 
of fraud having occurred (Patterson and Noel 2003), and it is easy for auditors of large 
companies to be overwhelmed by the volume of information (Eppler and Mengis 2004). 
• Audits are not typically designed to reveal the collusion and forgery often involved in 
financial statement fraud (Whiting et al. 2012). 
While external audits are important, they should not be relied upon to detect fraud 
(ACFE 2014). Given that knowledgeable managers deliberately try to deceive inexperienced 
auditors, auditors need better decision aids to help them in detection (Fanning and Cogger 
1998; Humpherys et al. 2011). In fact, the use of analytical procedures as decision aids for 
auditors was suggested back in 1988 (Coglitore and Berryman 1988). Some prior research 
has shown that decision aids such as checklists and questionnaires reduce the effectiveness of 
an audit (Hogan et al. 2008), possibly because they cannot model the complexity required to 
effectively detect fraud. However, auditors’ ability to detect fraud improves as their 
understanding of the probability (risk) of fraud existing improves (Bernardi 1994). These 
facts support the creation of more powerful fraud detection models that can assist auditors in 
estimating the probability of fraud and assist in detecting it, particularly given the adverse 
consequences to auditors when it goes undiscovered26 (Bell and Carcello 2000; Lin et al. 
2003). Detection models might also reduce the error associated with people trying to combine 
multiple risk factors (Bell and Carcello 2000). Additionally, detection models might assist in 
uncovering costly fraud schemes that involve collusion as Silver et al. (2008) state that they 
generally cannot be prevented using traditional controls. Furthermore, correctly identifying 
statements with a low risk of fraud increases the efficiency of an audit by reducing 
unnecessary tests (Lin et al. 2003).  
2.3.5 Benefits of Fraud Detection Models 
It is clear that the current situation regarding financial statement fraud detection needs 
to be improved. This is highlighted by the fact that a large public company in the US, 
HealthSouth, was able to falsify its financial statements for eleven years without discovery 
                                                 
 
26 Refer to Burton et al. (2011) for a discussion on what type of penalties increase auditors’ effort to detect 
fraud. 
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(Whiting et al. 2012). Detection is difficult, so better tools and aids are needed to assist in 
making it more effective. Financial statement fraud detection models are an example of such 
an aid. 
Poor as it is, auditors’ current capacity to detect fraud has acted as a deterrent (Hogan 
et al. 2008). Consequently, fraud detection models that assist auditors to improve their ability 
to detect it will also act as an increased deterrent and possibly reduce the occurrence rates. 
Given that longer fraud schemes are more costly, models that speed up the process will also 
assist in mitigating the cost of fraud schemes that do occur. 
In addition to their value to auditors, fraud detection models can also be used to benefit: 
• Other responsible entities (that are not perpetrators of the fraud) including regulators, 
management, the board of directors and its audit committee. The models can assist them 
to better assess the risk of fraud having occurred and whether there is a need to 
investigate further. 
• Victim entities including investors, financiers, employees, customers, suppliers and other 
stakeholders. The models can assist them to better assess the likelihood of fraudulence 
with a view to avoiding association with fraudulent companies. In addition, models can 
be used by analysts to better assess the true value of a company. 
Unfortunately, potential fraudsters can use detection models to help them conceal 
their fraud and avoid detection. Hence, it is important that models are regularly updated to 
incorporate new information so that their accuracy level does not decline over time. Ideally, 
this means that before potential fraudsters can exploit what they have learnt from the model, a 
changed (updated) version will be developed and implemented. Additionally, given the 
double-entry nature of accounting, it might not be possible for a fraudster to avoid being 
detected by a sophisticated model even if they know about the model. Furthermore, models 
are only to complement, not replace, experts such as auditors, and so there will also always 
be a human component that can add flexibility and unpredictability to the fraud detection 
process. 
Fraud detection models can make an important contribution to the field of financial 
statement fraud. The next chapter introduces techniques that both have been and could be 
used to build these models. 
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Chapter 3 Review of Modelling Techniques 
The importance of models to detect financial statement fraud and the contribution 
they can make was described in the previous chapter. This chapter follows on by introducing 
and explaining the relevant terminology and classifications of the detection models. Issues 
identified from other review papers will then be discussed before a review of prior research 
into financial statement fraud detection from the perspective of the modelling technique used. 
This review of modelling techniques complements the following chapter that 
discusses the types of data or variables used in these models. This review also assists in 
validating the importance of the research presented later in this dissertation. Within the field 
of financial statement fraud detection, the focus is on: 
• Data from the US, particularly SEC issued AAERs. Despite studies outside the US not 
being the focus, many are briefly mentioned for their modelling methodology. 
• Data that are publicly available and assessable (discussed more in the next chapter). 
Accurate models that only use this data are referred to as the “Holy Grail” by Whiting et 
al. (2012). Modelling can also be used in many other ways to assist auditors who have 
access to private, disaggregated data. For example, research has been undertaken on 
models analysing journal entries and internal accounting databases (Debreceny and Gray 
2010; Argyrou and Andreev 2011), emails (Debreceny and Gray 2011) and event logs 
from company’s information systems (Jans et al. 2013). Gray and Debreceny (2014) 
discuss this type of research further. Models can also be used to analyse and combine data 
from auditors’ opinions or working papers (Loebbecke et al. 1989; Fanning et al. 1995; 
Hansen et al. 1996; Deshmukh et al. 1997; Deshmukh and Talluru 1998; Chen et al. 2009; 
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Krambia‐Kapardis et al. 2010), and to study characteristics of auditors (Welch et al. 1998) 
and how they relate to their ability to detect fraud (Bernardi 1994). 
• Multivariate modelling techniques. While there have been univariate studies (Beasley et 
al. 2000), fraud is like many other phenomena, too complex to be able to be described by 
one variable, and so modelling techniques that utilise multiple variables are called for. 
• Supervised learning methods, which are discussed in the next section. As the title of this 
dissertation suggests, these methods will be a focus of this research. 
3.1  Introduction to Modelling Terminology and Classifications 
There are a large number of interrelated terms used in the modelling literature, 
partially because of its cross-disciplinary nature. There is also a lack of widespread 
agreement on the definitions of each term and how much they overlap with each other. A 
brief comment on some of the more common terms is given here to assist the reader 
unfamiliar with modelling. More information can be found in the introductory sections of 
Rokach and Maimon (2015), Sathya and Abraham (2013) or reputable textbooks on data 
mining or data science. 
Data science refers to the entire process involving data, from generation or collection 
through to all the processing and analysis. It is a very similar definition to the discipline of 
statistics, but much debate occurs on whether statistics has or is growing to include data 
mining
27. Data mining, knowledge mining, knowledge discovery and machine learning are 
overlapping parts of data science that, broadly speaking, involve discovering useful 
information, patterns, rules or models from one or more samples (or populations) of data. It is 
possible to categorise the types of techniques used in data mining as Classification, 
Clustering, Outlier Detection, Prediction, Regression and Visualisation (Ngai et al. 2011; 
Sharma and Panigrahi 2012). Many of these techniques involve models that learn from data 
(hence the name, machine learning). This learning can happen in a variety of ways including 
supervised, unsupervised, reinforcement or stochastic learning (Sathya and Abraham 2013). 
Supervised learning is the method most relevant to this study and is explained in the context 
of fraud detection below. 
                                                 
 
27 Breiman (2001b) provides an excellent argument for including data mining, termed algorithmic 
modelling in the paper, as a part of statistics. 
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3.1.1 Supervised versus Unsupervised Learning Methods 
Supervised learning methods attempt to use existing data to learn the relationship 
between input variables (also known as independent or explanatory variables) and an output 
variable (also known as a dependent variable). This process is referred to as training a model. 
For fraud detection, the dependent variable is often a binary variable that indicates whether it 
is either fraudulent or legitimate. When the dependent variable takes on a predefined number 
of values (such as two, fraudulent and legitimate), the resulting model is often termed a 
classification model. 
Supervised learning methods learn from data that comprise explanatory variables for a 
range of known values of the dependent variable. The name of the method can be understood 
by thinking that a conceptual supervisor provides the value of the dependent variable for each 
training case. In the case of fraud detection, models are trained on both fraudulent and 
legitimate cases. Unlike supervised learning that requires training data with specified values 
for the dependent variable (fraudulent or legitimate), unsupervised learning is a heuristic 
process that does not require any information about the dependent variable (from a 
supervisor)28. Consequently, it does not rely on past data with classifications of either 
fraudulence or legitimacy from human investigations that could be misclassified, which can 
be an advantage of this type of learning. As mentioned in the previous chapter, with fraud 
data from SEC-issued AAERs the likelihood of incorrectly alleged frauds is extremely low, 
but there almost certainly are missed cases of fraud. 
As opposed to a specific relationship between inputs and output, unsupervised 
learning methods look for any relationships in the data. Clustering is an example of 
unsupervised learning and anomaly detection can be a mixture of both supervised and 
unsupervised. Furthermore, some techniques such as neural networks can be trained using 
either supervised or unsupervised learning (Sathya and Abraham 2013). Sudjianto et al. 
(2010) provide more information about these methods as used in a financial crime setting. 
                                                 
 
28 Some papers refer to supervised and unsupervised learning respectively as directed and undirected. 
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3.2  Models to Detect Financial Fraud: Lessons from Review Papers 
The purpose of fraud detection models is to accurately identify signals of fraudulent 
reporting. Phua et al. (2010) provide a concise review of fraud detection modelling that 
includes references to other review papers such as Bolton and Hand (2002) who review credit 
card fraud, telecommunications and medical fraud, computer intrusion detection and money 
laundering. Sudjianto et al. (2010) provide an excellent review that includes the challenges 
faced when modelling, but it is focused on money laundering and retail banking fraud. More 
recently, Ngai et al. (2011) review financial fraud detection that encompasses bank fraud, 
insurance fraud, securities and commodities fraud and other, which includes financial 
statement fraud (termed corporate fraud in the paper). They also provide references to other 
review papers on the topic of financial fraud detection. Also there have been specific reviews 
of financial statement fraud detection with comments on the modelling techniques used 
(Apparao et al. 2009; Shiguo 2010; Sharma and Panigrahi 2012), but they are brief. 
Relevant issues and lessons for producing models to detect fraud that arise from these 
review papers are listed below. 
• Detection of insurance fraud and credit card fraud have been the most researched areas, 
but financial statement fraud detection has also received considerable focus; 
• Bridging the gap between researchers and practitioners is important (Ngai et al. 2011), 
which indicates that presenting results in a clear, usable way is important, too. 
• Prevention activities are important to complement detection (Sudjianto et al. 2010), and 
as presented in the previous chapter detection also helps deter and prevent fraud. 
• Accessing large and good quality data sets is a challenge, particularly with regard to 
financial statement fraud that has some of the smallest data sets (Phua et al. 2010; Ngai et 
al. 2011). This issue is important as the size of the data set has implications for the ability 
of models to distinguish between fraudulence and legitimacy, and the accuracy of 
performance measurements. Consequently, research using larger data sets would be more 
valuable. 
• Model performance is overestimated if it is tested on the same data used to develop the 
model (Shiguo 2010). If there are sufficient data, the best method is to keep a portion of 
the data separate from the training phase (known as a holdout sample) that will be used to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of accuracy (Sutton 2005). To best assess real-world 
performance, the data can be partitioned such that the holdout sample occurs 
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chronologically after the other data. This more closely models reality where models 
would be developed using currently available data and then implemented on as yet 
unknown future data. When the data set is too small to have a separate holdout sample, 
cross-validation is preferable (Sutton 2005). Cross-validation with k-folds partitions the 
data into k non-overlapping sets, and then trains the model on k-1 sets and tests it on the 
remaining set. This is performed so that every set is used for testing once and then the 
results are aggregated. In the extreme case, usually for the smallest sample sizes, the 
number of data items in each set size can be set to one (so that k equals the total number 
of data items), which is called leave-one-out or jackknife cross-validation. Five- or ten-
fold (k = 5 or 10) is common for cross-validation in the modelling literature. 
• It is very important to appropriately handle the difference between the cost of the two 
types of errors, missing fraud and falsely alleging fraud (as discussed earlier in Section 
1.1) (Phua et al. 2010; Ngai et al. 2011). Consequently, assessing models using a 
performance measure such as the cost of errors is superior to studying the percentage 
accuracy (Phua et al. 2010). While this will be taken into account in this study, comments 
about the performance of the models used in prior studies are presented in the next 
section using the performance measure used in each particular study. 
• Regression-based techniques have been widely used and neural networks are very 
appropriate techniques for financial statement fraud detection (Sharma and Panigrahi 
2012). These two techniques will be discussed below in the first two subsections of the 
next section. 
3.3  Review of Modelling Techniques for Financial Statement Fraud 
Detection 
Purely accounting-based accrual models have been used to detect earnings 
management (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 2000), but much has been done 
using accrual models and some researchers (Bayley and Taylor 2007; Dechow et al. 2011) 
now believe research should move away from refining accrual models and towards utilising 
other information in financial statements. The modelling techniques presented in this section 
are ways that additional information from financial statements can be utilised to assist in 
detecting financial statement fraud. 
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This section first covers studies that use or introduce a single modelling technique, 
and includes an explanation of the relevant techniques. Comparative studies are then 
reviewed, which are more relevant as this research also compares multiple modelling 
techniques. The modelling techniques presented in this section are more comprehensive than 
those in the review papers mentioned in the previous section. 
Standard regression-based techniques have been extremely popular in financial 
statement fraud detection as well as in other classification problems in business. There is also 
a search for new, more accurate and less distribution-dependent modelling techniques, such 
as neural networks, survival analysis, decision trees and decision tree ensembles (multiple 
decision trees). These will be discussed in the following subsections. A summary table of the 
most relevant studies is presented at the end of each subsection, except for those subsections 
that do not contain any studies focused on financial statement fraud detection that assess 
model performance using publicly available US data. An overall summary table covering all 
techniques is also presented at the end of this section. 
3.3.1 Standard Regression-based Techniques 
Discriminant analysis is a linear model that has been around for many decades (Fisher 
1938) and can be thought of as multiple regression applied to classification problems. A 
standard discriminant function can be represented as  =  +   +  . . .  +   +  , 
where  are the independent explanatory variables, and  and  are the estimated 
parameters. N cut-off (or critical) values for  can then be established to separate the data 
into N+1 groups. For example, values of  ≤  might be classified as legitimate, while 
values of  >  are classified as fraudulent, where R is a real number. Although not designed 
for calculating probabilities associated with classifications they can be calculated, usually 
using Bayes’s theorem. 
Two notable assumptions include the s being multivariate normal and the 
covariance of the two classification groups being equal, both of which are rarely satisfied 
with data from financial statements (Skogsvik 2005). The first is often violated, for example 
with binary explanatory variables, but the practical significance of this violation in terms of 
modelling performance is questionable (Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999). The second 
assumption is also a common problem for fraud data sets as they are unbalanced, which 
means that the probability of fraud significantly differs from 50%. Squaring the explanatory 
variables and conducting quadratic discriminant analysis overcomes the second assumption, 
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but it is questionable whether it has any practical significance (Altman et al. 1977). Overall, 
prior research suggests that both linear and quadratic discriminant analysis are robust even 
when their assumptions are not met (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
Unlike discriminant analysis, logistic regression or logit analysis is designed for two 
(or more) class classification problems such as classifying data points as legitimate or 
fraudulent. It is theoretically more suitable to these classification problems as it does not 
suffer from the same assumptions as discriminant analysis. A logistic regression when 
applied to fraud detection can be represented as  
 ℎ  !" !# =  $%&'&( %)') ( ... ( %*'* ( +1 + $%&'&( %)') ( ... ( %*'* ( + , 
and the estimates are usually estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure. Unlike 
discriminant analysis the probability of fraud is modelled directly and cut-off probabilities 
can then be used on the probability for classification purposes. The default cut-off rule is to 
classify as fraudulent if the probability is greater than 0.5, but this cut-off can be changed to 
cater for different error costs. Probit analysis is very similar to logistic regression, but it 
differs by being based on the cumulative standard normal distribution instead of the 
cumulative logistic distribution. Although the logistic distribution has fatter tails, both 
distributions are very similar. Consequently, both techniques usually produce the same 
classifications for the same data. One advantage for logistic regression is that it is 
computationally more efficient, but this is only an advantage with very large data sets. 
As a result of consistently good performance, discriminant analysis and logistic 
regression (or logit analysis) have become standard benchmark techniques in most fields of 
classification, and probit analysis has also been used as an alternative to logit analysis. 
Multicollinearity is an issue for all these regression methods. One way to help address this 
problem is to use stepwise techniques that either add one variable at a time or remove one 
variable at a time, and assess the fit of the model at each stage to try to use the best subset of 
explanatory variables. However, better handling of multicollinearity is one advantage of other 
techniques that will be presented. The shape of the underlying distributions not being 
representative for fraud detection, the inability to incorporate error costs into the model 
estimation stage with these regression techniques, and the desire for greater classification 
accuracy are all reasons to consider other modelling techniques that might overcome some or 
all of these issues. 
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3.3.1.a Standard Regression-based Techniques applied to Financial Statement Fraud 
Detection 
Logistic regression is the most frequently used technique in the financial statement 
fraud detection literature. Many studies have used logistic regression as a means to 
empirically study what variables might explain or indicate financial statement fraud or a 
specific type of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Abbott et al. 
2000; Owusu-Ansah et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Uzun et al. 2004; Erickson et al. 
2006; O'Connor et al. 2006; Ettredge et al. 2008; Yuan et al. 2008; Brazel et al. 2009; 
Johnson et al. 2009; Perols and Lougee 2011; Wang et al. 2011). Beneish (1999b) used the 
closely related probit analysis for the same purpose. None of these studies considered their 
models from a detection viewpoint and so do not provide estimates of classification accuracy. 
The number of fraud data points in these studies is rather small with the vast majority being 
fewer than one hundred. 
Standard regression-based techniques have also been used to study financial statement 
fraud in other ways. For example, Bonner et al. (1998) used logistic regression to analyse the 
relationship between the type of financial statement fraud and the likelihood of litigation 
against external auditors, and Stice (1991) used probit to model whether litigation would be 
brought against external auditors. Gao and Srivastava (2011) also used logistic regression to 
analyse how the methods used by perpetrators to commit financial statement fraud differ 
according to the type of fraud (such as fictitious revenue compared with fictitious assets). 
Logistic regression was also used to study whether fraud helps to explain cumulative 
abnormal returns (Feroz et al. 1991), the effect revenue-related fraud has on cash flows (Scott 
2012) and the influence of restatements on management turnover (Desai et al. 2006).  
Standard-regression-based techniques are now primarily used as a benchmark with 
which to compare other techniques, but there are also studies that solely used these 
techniques and analysed them from a classification accuracy perspective. As is the case with 
the studies above, the number of fraud cases in the data sets remains small. Bayley and 
Taylor (2007) trained a logistic regression model on data comprising 129 fraud cases from 
AAERs and found that it outperformed traditional accounting and accrual models. The study 
considered varying error costs, but did not have holdout sample or perform cross-validation 
and so the model performance estimates are not reliable. Similarly, Summers and Sweeney 
(1998) used logistic regression to analyse data comprising 102 fraud cases, but did not 
include holdout or cross-validated results. In contrast though, they used a cascaded or multi-
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stage logistic regression, which appears to be a development based on the idea in Bell et al. 
(1991). First, the explanatory variables were partitioned into two groups, insider trading and 
financial statement variables, and separate logistic models were estimated using each group 
of variables. Then in the second stage, a third logistic regression was estimated using the 
probability outputs of the first two models. Interestingly, analysis on a sample comprising 51 
fraud cases showed that the second-stage cascaded logistic model had superior classification 
accuracy compared with the first-stage model. Using Greek data, Spathis (2002) had success 
using a logistic regression and a stepwise procedure to select variables, but without testing 
the model using cross-validation or holdout data. 
Kaminski et al. (2004) found a discriminant analysis model to have impractically high 
error rates using jackknife cross-validation on a sample comprising 79 fraud cases from 
AAERs. Better results have also been attained using logistic regression or univariate analysis 
to select the variables to be used in a discriminant analysis model (Skousen and Wright 2008; 
Skousen et al. 2009). Specifically, using Jackknife cross-validation on a sample comprising 
86 fraud cases, 65-70% and 72-77% accuracy was attained for classifying fraudulent and 
legitimate cases respectively. 
Some studies also considered varying error costs by varying the cut-off probability of 
fraud for logistic regression. Using 36-fold (one fold for each industry group) cross-
validation on data comprising 56 fraud cases, Lee et al. (1999) respectively achieved 
classification accuracy ranging from 73% for fraudulent and 90% legitimate cases with a 0.1 
cut-off to 43% for fraudulent and 98% for legitimate cases with a 0.3 cut-off. It was noted 
that the drop in classification accuracy for fraud is very large relative to the small gain for the 
legitimate cases. Bell and Carcello (2000) tried hundreds of different model variations, 
including using univariate tests to select combinations of explanatory variables, and used cut-
off values ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 in 0.05 intervals. The models were trained on data with 
37 fraud cases and then tested on holdout data with 40 fraud cases. Overall, their model was 
found to outperform auditors and was recommended for use as an aid to auditors. Using 
Taiwanese data, Lou and Wang (2009) found promising results using jackknife cross-
validation with the same range of cut-off values. 
Beneish (1997, 1999a) and Persons (1995) addressed varying error costs further by 
using a weighted error cost measure to assess accuracy as well as empirically optimising 
(during the training phase) the cut-off value to minimise the error cost for each cost ratio. 
Persons (1995) used stepwise logistic regression trained on data comprising 103 fraud cases 
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from AAERs and tested it using jackknife cross-validation. They also considered cost ratios 
of missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud that ranged from 1:1 to 30:1 and showed 
their model improved on the naïve strategy of classifying everything as legitimate. In 
contrast, Beneish (1997, 1999a) used probit analysis and considered cost ratios that ranged 
from 1:1 to 100:1. The data for Beneish’s studies comprised 43/50 fraud cases for training 
and 21/24 cases that occurred in the years after the training cases in the holdout sample. 
Overall, they demonstrated that their model outperformed simple accrual models. The latter 
study has led to the now well-known M-score model, which is defined later in Section 5.2.2 
as it is used as a benchmark model in this current study. Classification accuracy of the M-
score model on holdout data is presented in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1. Classification accuracy of the M-score model on holdout data for three different cost ratios 
of missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud. 
Cost ratio 
Classification Accuracy for 
Fraud cases Legitimate cases 
10:1 37.5% 96.5% 
20:1 50% 92.8% 
40:1 54.2% 90.9% 
Once again the classification accuracy for fraud cases is worse and more sensitive 
than for legitimate cases. These percentages are an improvement over Persons (1995); for 
example, with a ratio of 20:1 the accuracy is 47% and 86% respectively for fraud and 
legitimate cases. 
Dechow et al. (2011) also used logistic regression to produce a probability of fraud 
that was converted into their F-score by considering the prior probability that financial 
statement fraud occurs. The model selected a small subset of explanatory variables from a 
large initial set by using all the variables and then using a stepwise removal procedure to 
remove statistically insignificant variables. The resulting F-score model is defined later in 
Section 5.2.2. Testing was conducted on a holdout sample comprising 107 fraud cases from 
AAERs that occurred after the 247 training cases, which is also similar to Beneish’s work but 
using a much larger data set. In contrast to other research, the F-score is better at classifying 
fraud with 73.8% accuracy compared with 61.7% correctly classified legitimate cases on the 
holdout sample. Dechow et al. (2011) demonstrated that the cut-off values could be changed 
to represent different cost ratios, but they did not optimise the cut-off values for specific cost 
ratios as was done by Beneish. 
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The most relevant studies presented in this section are summarised in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2. Summary of studies that exclusively use standard regression-based techniques to detect 
financial statement fraud, and that assess model performance using publicly available US data. The 
last column refers to whether the study considers different values for the cost ratio of falsely missing 
fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud. 
Study Modelling Technique Test Data Consideration of Costs 
Bayley and 
Taylor (2007) 
Logistic Regression No 
Cost ratios 20-50:1, 





No No, 0.5 cut-off used 








Skousen et al. 
(2009) 
Discriminant Analysis: 












in 0.05 intervals 
Persons (1995) 
Logistic Regression 




Cost ratios 1-30:1, 







Cost ratios 1-100:1, 
optimised cut-off values 







Varied F-score cut-off to 
model different cost 
ratios 
 
3.3.2 Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis (also known as duration analysis) techniques analyse the time until a 
certain event. Survival analysis techniques model problems as a timeline of a life, which is 
most commonly described by the survival or hazard function (where each is derivable from 
the other). The survival function -() indicates the probability that an individual survives 
until time . Contrastingly, the hazard function ℎ() indicates the instantaneous rate of death 
at a certain time . 
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There are many different survival analysis techniques including regression-based 
models that define relationships between one of the descriptor functions (usually survival or 
hazard) and a set of explanatory variables. The most prominent is the semi-parametric 
proportional hazards (PH) model proposed by Cox (1972), but there are alternatives such as 
fully-parametric PH models, accelerated failure time models and Aalen’s additive model. 
Cox’s PH model is defined as ℎ() = ℎ0() $123(+, where:  
• ℎ0() is the non-parametric baseline hazards function that describes the change in the 
hazard function over time. The flexibility from not having to specify the hazard 
distribution is one of the key reasons for the model’s popularity; and,   
• $123(+ describes how the hazard function relates to the explanatory variables (4) and is 
the parametric part of the model, where 5 is a vector of variable coefficients and c a 
constant estimated by a method very similar to the maximum likelihood procedure. 
The survival function is then computed as -() =  $67(8), where 9() is the 
cumulative hazard function from time 0 to . Survival probabilities can then be compared 
with cut-off values as is performed when using discriminant analysis and logistic regression. 
3.3.2.a Survival Analysis applied to Fraud Detection 
Survival analysis techniques have been widely and successfully used in biomedical 
sciences, where the concepts of lifetime, survival and death can be directly applied to a 
person. However, it is less obvious how to use these techniques in business problems. The 
Cox and other models have been used with moderate success to predict the failure of a 
business (Lane et al. 1986; Crapp and Stevenson 1987; Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999; 
Shumway 2001; Gepp and Kumar 2014), where a business and its failure were respectively 
modelled as an individual and death. The Cox model has also been used on a very small data 
set for the detection of car insurance fraud (Gepp et al. 2012), where a policy and fraud on the 
policy were respectively modelled as an individual and death. However, while death and 
company failure are terminal states, fraud is not, as it can occur, then stop, then start again 
and then stop again and so on. As the survival analysis model considers fraud as death 
without the possibility of coming back to life, an individual case must be re-entered back into 
the model every time a company changes from having fraudulent statements to legitimate 
statements. This could cause substantial impediments to implementing the model (Gepp et al. 
2012) and is a particular problem for continuing detection of financial statement fraud as 
companies can produce statements that vary between legitimate and fraudulent over time. 
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Even if financial statement fraud occurs within a company, that same company usually 
continues to produce financial statements in future years that could be either legitimate or 
fraudulent, and so modelling the fraud as a terminal event is not representative. Nevertheless, 
survival analysis is a very useful technique in related research that is concerned only with 
changes leading up to the first instance of a fraud occurring, because the first instance of 
fraud only happens once and so can be treated as a terminal event. Furthermore, survival 
analysis is particularly useful when an inherent time dimension is being studied. For example, 
Cotter and Young (2007) analysed AAERs from 1995 to 2002 using the Cox model and 
found that companies committing fraud were more likely to have analysts stop reporting on 
them earlier in the period preceding the public announcement of the fraud. Additionally, Yu 
and Yu (2011) used the Cox model as well as two other methods, the Kaplan-Meier method 
and Weilbull distribution regression. They produced findings such as businesses that engaged 
in lobbying activities evaded fraud detection 117 days longer than those that did not. 
Recently, Cao et al. (2015) have used survival analysis along with multiple regression to 
study the way firms change in terms of corporate governance and default risk after they are 
named in an AAER. 
Overall, while it can lead to failure, financial statement fraud is not a terminal event 
like death or company failure, and so financial statement fraud detection as a classification 
problem does not naturally lend itself to be modelled as a single lifetime. Considering that 
this study focuses on the classification problem of detecting fraud, other techniques will be 
used in preference to survival analysis. 
3.3.3 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks are a set of interconnected neurons designed on the inner-
processes of the human brain, primarily with respect to pattern learning and problem-solving 
tasks. Artificial neural networks can be trained using supervised methods such as 
backpropagation, unsupervised methods such as self-organising maps, stochastic learning or 
reinforcement learning29. These different learning methods are discussed further in Sathya 
and Abraham (2013), but in all cases the model is trained by adjusting the interconnections of 
neurons in the model. Neural networks trained using backpropagation are by far the most 
widely applied in business and social science applications. (Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). 
                                                 
 
29 Reinforcement learning can be considered a special case of supervised learning (Koskivaara 2004). 
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Koskivaara (2004) and Chapter 6 of Negnevitsky (2011) respectively provide a brief and 
more detailed introduction into artificial neural networks, including an explanation of the 
backpropagation algorithm. 
An example neural network is shown in Figure 3-1 and comprises directional, 
weighted connections between 
• One layer of input neurons for the independent explanatory variables, 
• One (or more) hidden layer(s) of interconnected neurons30, and 
• One output layer such as a binary neuron representing either a fraudulent or legitimate 
case. 
The structure of the network is often described using the number of neurons in each layer. 
For example, a 6-4-1 neural network would have 6 input neurons, 4 neurons in the hidden 
layer and 1 output neuron. During training, connections of neurons that lead to correct 
classifications are rewarded by increasing their weighting and those that lead to incorrect 
classifications are reduced in weighting. It is also possible that the output layer can produce a 
continuous score that can be compared against different cut-off values to model different 
error costs, as is done with standard regression techniques. 
Figure 3-1. Example neural network for fraud detection. 
 
 
                                                 
 
30 One hidden layer is common, partially because multiple hidden layers using linear functions can always 
be transformed into one hidden layer using a non-linear function (Feroz et al. 2000). 
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Artificial neural networks generally perform well on large, complex data sets in 
comparison to standard regression-based techniques (Gepp et al. 2012). One advantage of the 
use of artificial neural networks for financial statement fraud detection is that they are non-
parametric and can model non-linear relationships that are likely to be present (Fanning and 
Cogger 1998). Elliot and Kennedy (1988) provide a review of the statistical assumptions 
made in standard parametric regression approaches that are not applicable to artificial neural 
networks. Because of large-scale redundancies in their architecture, artificial neural networks 
are also better than standard regression-based techniques at choosing among explanatory 
variables in situations where multicollinearity is present, which is often the case in financial 
statement fraud detection (Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). Artificial neural networks are also 
better able to handle outliers and have a high tolerance for ambiguity or noise in the data 
(Feroz et al. 2000), all of which are common in financial statement fraud data. 
The performance of an artificial neural network varies greatly depending on how it 
was trained. The training phrase requires setting the levels of multiple parameters such as the 
number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in each layer to match the complexity of 
the problem. A simple rule for setting these parameters does not exist, so the values can 
greatly vary with the person training the network. Automatic techniques to train neural 
networks have consequently been proposed to save time and remove bias from the trainer 
(Fanning and Cogger 1998). Genetic algorithms are likely the best way to optimise the 
parameters associated with training an artificial neural network for fraud detection 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). Genetic algorithms are a type of evolutionary algorithm, heavily 
based on Darwin’s survival of the fittest principle to evolve better individuals. Genetic 
algorithms make the training phase more efficient by removing the need to compare 
alternative configurations, because only the most optimal configuration is expected to survive 
the optimisation process (Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). 
Artificial neural networks are black-box in nature with hidden internal logic. For 
complex networks such as those needed to detect fraud, it is not possible to gain a full 
understanding of the importance of each explanatory variable and the interactions between 
them. However, it is possible to extract decision rules from an artificial neural network in the 
form of a tree (similar to those discussed in Section 3.3.4) that can be easily analysed 
(Schmitz et al. 1999). 
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3.3.3.a Artificial Neural Networks applied to Financial Statement Fraud Detection 
Artificial neural networks have been extensively used for classification problems in 
recent decades and have had success in related fields of auditing (reviewed by Koskivaara 
[2004]), credit card fraud (Ngai et al. 2011; Khan et al. 2014), fraud involving mobile phone 
SIM cards (Sallehuddin et al. 2014), energy consumption fraud (Ford et al. 2014), 
accounting, economics and finance (Fanning and Cogger 1998) and handwritten word 
recognition (Blumenstein et al. 2007). They have also been used by a public accounting firm 
to assist in detecting financial statement fraud (Cerullo and Cerullo 1999a, 1999b). Academic 
studies that focus on the use of artificial neural networks for detecting financial statement 
fraud are discussed below. 
Green and Choi (1997) compared three back-propagation networks with one hidden 
layer on a randomly selected holdout sample. The network was trained using variables 
calculated as a one-year percentage change and outperformed networks trained using 
variables based on other trend calculations. After testing between two and thirty nodes in a 
layer, an 8-4-1 structure was chosen. The best model was trained and tested on data 
comprising 27 and 19 fraud cases from AAERs respectively. It achieved a 74% classification 
accuracy for fraudulent cases and 68% for legitimate cases, which is promising, albeit on a 
very small data set. 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) found that an artificial neural network optimised by an 
evolutionary algorithm outperformed stepwise regression techniques, specifically logistic 
regression and both linear and quadratic discriminant analysis. Their network was trained on 
data comprising 75 fraud cases from AAERs using a program called AutoNet that adds extra 
hidden layers as required according to the evolutionary algorithm that guides the training. 
Two stages of variable selection were undertaken, the first with univariate tests and the 
second with AutoNet. The testing was performed assuming equal error costs on a holdout 
sample that chronologically occurred after the training sample and comprised 27 fraud cases. 
The neural network achieved an overall classification percentage of 63% compared with 50% 
for logistic regression and quadratic discriminant analysis and 52% for standard discriminant 
analysis. While the other techniques had similar or superior ability to classify fraud, the 
neural network was the only technique able to effectively classify legitimate statements. It is 
also interesting to note that the quadratic discriminant analysis did perform slightly worse 
than standard discriminant analysis, despite its theoretical advantages mentioned above. 
Using private auditor data, Fanning et al. (1995) also found that AutoNet and another 
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evolutionary neural network performed well relative to cascaded logistic regression on a 
holdout sample and considering different cut-off values. 
Feroz et al. (2000) also considered error costs and found an artificial neural network 
performed well compared with logistic regression using data comprising 28 training and 14 
holdout cases of fraud from AAERs. Both models, but particularly logistic regression, were 
better at detecting legitimate cases compared with fraudulent cases. Their 7-14-1 feed-
forward network clearly outperformed logistic regression in terms of overall accuracy (81% 
versus 70%) with equal error costs. Earlier, the same authors (Kwon and Feroz 1996; Feroz 
and Kwon 1999) found that a similar neural network had higher overall classification 
accuracy than both logistic regression and a self-organising fuzzy set model, but Feroz et al. 
(2000) also considered varying error costs. For cost ratios of missing fraud relative to falsely 
alleging fraud that ranged from 10:1 to 40:1, logistic regression was often superior using a 
weighted error cost measure, but no model was superior in all cases. It appears that the cut-
off values were not manipulated or optimised as the error cost ratios changes, although this is 
not clear in the paper. It is also important to note that prior to final testing, performance on 
the holdout sample was used to determine model parameters such as the number of hidden 
nodes. This reduces the real-world applicability of the accuracy estimates, but it was probably 
necessary given the small size of the data set. 
Lin et al. (2003) considered cost ratios that ranged from 1:1 to 100:1, and found that a 
fuzzy neural network outperformed logistic regression for cost ratios greater than 30:1 using 
a weighted error cost measure. The fuzzy neural network model was better with larger cost 
ratios because it was better at detecting fraud, while logistic regression was better at detecting 
legitimate cases. Overall, logistic regression had the higher classification accuracy with 79% 
compared with 76% for the fuzzy neural network. This study used a test sample of equal size 
to the training sample comprising 20 fraud cases. Similar to Feroz et al. (2000), the cut-off 
values appear not to have been manipulated or optimised for different error cost ratios, and 
the holdout sample was used to determine training parameters such as the number of training 
cycles. The fuzzy neural network model utilises a backpropagation network to train a fuzzy 
logic clustering system of IF-THEN rules. It is called an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference 
System and is explained further in Section 8.4 of Negnevitsky (2011). The theoretical 
advantage of fuzzy logic is that it better handles the uncertainty and imprecision of the real 
world by behaving with less analytical precision. However, fuzzy models do not learn, which 
is overcome by combining them with neural networks. 
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Unsupervised neural networks have been used to cluster similar cases together, extract 
features comprising multiple variables, and visualise those clusters to help understand 
financial statement fraud (Huang et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2014). Using the extracted features 
and inputs, discriminant analysis has also been used to detect fraud on Taiwan data without a 
holdout sample or consideration for error costs (Huang et al. 2014). Logistic regression has 
also been found to outperform a backpropagation neural network on Taiwanese data with the 
same limitations (Shih et al. 2011). 
The most relevant studies presented in this section are summarised in Table 3-3. In 
addition, some more recent studies have used artificial neural network models as a 
comparison technique. These studies are discussed below in Section 3.3.7. 
Table 3-3. Summary of studies that focus on artificial neural network models to detect financial 
statement fraud, and that assess model performance using publicly available US data. The 
“Consideration of Costs” column refers to whether the study considers different values for the cost 
ratio of falsely missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud. 
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3.3.4 Decision Trees 
Decision trees can be used for both regression and classification, and when used for 
each purpose they are commonly referred to as regression trees and classification trees 
respectively. Decision trees are most commonly binary trees that consist of a root node, other 
                                                 
 
31 The authors did not specify whether the supervised learning algorithm was backpropagation. 
32 It is assumed that the holdout sample was randomly formed, although the authors did not specify. 
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non-leaf nodes and leaf nodes connected by branches, whereby each non-leaf node has two 
branches leading to two distinct nodes, as shown in Figure 3-2 below. 
Figure 3-2. Basic structure of a binary tree33. 
 
 
The tree is built by a recursive process of splitting the data when moving from a 
higher to a lower level of the tree. This process is described by splitting (or decision) rules 
that are associated with every non-leaf node including the root node decision. While decision 
trees have all the power of a multivariate technique, the splitting rules are often univariate. 
The fact that variables are considered individually is more akin to stepwise techniques and 
assists them in being able to handle irrelevant variables in the data. Multi-way splits have 
been proposed instead of binary (two-way) splits, but all multi-way splits can be modelled as 
multiple binary splits. Further to this, binary splits are preferred to reduce complexity and 
computation time, and increase the potential number of explanatory variables.  
When applied to classification problems such as fraud detection, leaf nodes (also 
known as terminal or decision nodes) represent classification groups such as fraud and 
                                                 
 
33 This figure has been reproduced from Figure 1 in Gepp et al. (2010). 
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legitimate as shown in Figure 3-3. A terminal node is assigned fraud or legitimate according 
to which classification produces the lowest error cost on the training sample. 
Figure 3-3. An example decision tree for detecting financial statement fraud. 
 
 
The tree structure automatically models interactions between multiple explanatory variables 
as demonstrated by the model in Figure 3-3 that classifies statements as fraudulent if one of 
the following occurs: 
• “Income > 0” and “Operating Cash Flows ≤ 0”, or 
• “Income > 0” and “Change in Gross Margin > 40%”, or 
• “Income ≤ 0” and “New Auditor? = Yes”, or 
• “Income > 0” and “New Auditor? = No” and “Change in Gross Margin > 10%”. 
This is an advantage over standard regression-based techniques that can only model 
interactions that are predefined, which is difficult and time-consuming when there are many 
variables and many or unknown interactions. Decision tree interactions are more flexible and 
can correspond to specific regions of data compared with traditional  × < interactions in 
regression equations. Variables can be repeated in a decision tree to allow for more complex 
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interactions, such as the case with Change in Gross Margin in the example above. The dot 
points above also illustrate that categorical variables such as New Auditor are easily modelled 
and that only the ranking of numerical data is important because only ≤ and > operators are 
used. Treating numerical variables as ordinal (ranked) means that decision trees are immune 
to outliers and that monotonically transforming variables (such as taking the natural 
logarithm) is unnecessary and irrelevant. This is an advantage over standard techniques 
because the appropriate transformation is not always clear in the real world (Derrig and 
Francis 2008). It is important to note that if multivariate splitting rules are allowed then 
monotonic transformations can make a difference (Sutton 2005). Although linear 
combination splits are not common because they increase the complexity of interpretation, 
sometimes they can offset this increase in complexity by reducing the number of nodes 
required in the tree (Sutton 2005). 
The major advantages of decision trees include that they are non-parametric and are 
able to model interactions similar to artificial neural networks, but in contrast they are also 
transparent, easy to represent visually and simple to interpret as seen in Figure 3-334. 
Decision trees are also immune to outliers, resistant to irrelevant variables, do not require 
variable transformations, can incorporate varying error costs into model building (not just 
model assessment) and are easy to develop into automated systems. However, they also have 
disadvantages. A major one is that they do not produce an accurate probability of 
classification, because they do not differentiate between cases classified into the same leaf 
node35. Decision trees also suffer from their construction being sensitive to small changes in 
the training data set (Sudjianto et al. 2010) similar to artificial neural networks, and therefore 
perform better when trained on larger data sets. Consequently, the choice of the decision tree 
building technique is important (Derrig and Francis 2008) as there can be a large variation in 
accuracy between them. 
Sophisticated decision tree software called CART (Classification and Regression 
Trees) based on the seminal work of Breiman et al. (1984) is sold exclusively by Salford 
Systems. Decision trees similar to those underlying the CART program can also be created in 
                                                 
 
34 It should be noted that extremely large trees with many nodes are difficult to interpret and display 
visually. 
35 This disadvantage can be addressed by combining decision trees with other techniques. This will be done 
in the research presented later in Section 5.2.3.f. 
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the software packages S-Plus and Matlab (Sutton 2005). Other alternatives include Quinlan's 
See5 based on See4.5 (Quinlan 1993) and ID3 (Iterative Dichotomiser 3), and CHAID based 
on THAID (Morgan and Messenger 1973) that is available in the SPSS software package. In 
addition to choosing the best splitting rule at each non-leaf node, the tree building techniques 
determine how many nodes to include in the tree. Having a rule to stop adding nodes to a tree 
does not work well, because a split at a higher level that only offers a small improvement 
might facilitate a latter split that significantly improves the classification ability (Sutton 
2005). Consequently, most trees are built using a two-stage process to: 
1. Create an overly complex tree that has many nodes, and then 
2. “Prune” the tree to the desired complexity by multiple node sub-trees with single leaf 
nodes36. This is important for accuracy on holdout data (Breiman et al. 1984). 
Some techniques allow “pre-pruning” during stage 1 to improve computational efficiency, 
but this is at the risk of lowering classification accuracy. Growing an overly complex tree and 
then pruning it is a clearly promoted feature of CART. 
Salford Systems claim that CART outperforms all competitors in terms of features, 
accuracy, reliability and robustness (Steinberg 2015). This claim is supported by CART 
having a better record than any other decision tree software in data mining competitions. This 
record includes winning multiple first prizes in a very competitive data mining competition, 
the KDDCup. One of the features of CART in addition to classification accuracy is its ability 
to assess the relative importance of explanatory variables. Accurately assessing variable 
importance is complicated when correlations between explanatory variables exist, as is the 
case with financial statement fraud data. A basic assessment of variable importance can be 
gained by considering variables that appear in higher levels of the tree to be more important. 
However, consider the situation when an excluded variable such as sales could have replaced 
income as the root node in Figure 3-3 without a large loss in accuracy. It is arguable that sales 
(called a surrogate in CART) would then be an important variable for detecting fraud even 
though it is not present in the model. CART provides a variable importance score ranging 
from 0 to 100 that considers the contribution of variables in the model as well as the 
                                                 
 
36 Pages 313 and 314 of Sutton (2005) explain how minimum cost-complexity pruning works, which is the 
most common algorithm used for pruning and is the one used by CART. 
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contributions that variables would have had if they were included. Additionally, CART 
provides a sophisticated means of handling missing values using surrogates. 
3.3.4.a Decision Trees applied to Fraud Detection 
Decision trees have been frequently used in finance, marketing, engineering and 
medicine contexts (Rokach and Maimon 2015). They have also shown promise in detecting 
insurance fraud (Derrig and Francis 2008; Gepp et al. 2012). In a study (Gepp et al. 2010) 
that used a weighted error cost measure to assess performance over a range of error cost 
ratios, CART was found to outperform See5 decision trees at predicting company failure 
using data from financial statements (similar to financial statement fraud detection models). 
In terms of detecting financial statement fraud, CART decision trees were assessed 
using a holdout sample of Chinese data and were found to outperform logistic regression (Bai 
et al. 2008). However, no study has focused on decision trees to detect financial statement 
fraud using US data. Consequently, no summary table is provided for this section. Decision 
trees have been used in comparative studies that compare multiple techniques. These studies 
are presented in Section 3.3.7. 
3.3.5 Ensembles of Decision Trees 
Ensemble techniques aggregate the results from multiple models (called base 
classifiers) that include, but are not limited to, decision trees. One previously mentioned 
disadvantage of decision trees is that they are sensitive to changes in the training data. 
However, newer ensemble techniques that use multiple trees overcome this issue and provide 
more stable and robust models with reduced variance. Two main ensemble techniques are 
bagging and boosting, both of which are designed to improve accuracy by reducing the 
associated variance (Sutton 2005) and will be explained in the following sections. For 
ensembles to be effective the underlying base classifiers need to be both accurate and diverse. 
Consequently, trees are excellent underlying base classifiers because their instability results 
in diverse models given small changes in the training process. 
Tree ensembles have the potential to be more accurate than single trees and have 
fewer parameters to be set, because the final decision is aggregated from a large number of 
trees. They also include more explanatory variables and make better classifications close to 
region boundaries as a consequence of using a large number of trees. Tree ensemble 
techniques are also better at handling missing values and noise or ambiguity in the data. 
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Conversely, ensembles of trees suffer from a disadvantage common to all ensemble 
techniques, which is that they become more difficult to interpret and more similar to neural 
networks with hidden internal logic because of the increased complexity that results from so 
many individual trees. This disadvantage is weighed against the advantage of being both 
more accurate and more stable than single trees. 
No financial statement fraud detection studies have exclusively focused on ensembles 
of decision trees, but they have been used in comparative studies that are presented in Section 
3.3.7. Ensembles of trees have also been used for related classification problems such as the 
detection of credit card fraud (Bhattacharya et al. 2011a) and money laundering (Sudjianto et 
al. 2010) with favourable results. 
3.3.5.a Bagging and Random Forests 
Bagging (Breiman 1996a) is short for bootstrap aggregation and is designed to 
improve stability and accuracy of individual models. It is based on repeated sampling with 
replacement. Many samples are taken from the data, models are then fitted to each sample 
and the results are aggregated to provide a classification (Sutton 2005). The aggregated 
classification is usually made by Majority Vote (or mode) from the individual models37, but 
the average of the probability of fraud could be used. Average probability has been shown to 
be better with a small number of trees, but Majority Vote is better with a larger number of 
trees (Sutton 2005). 
Random Forests (Breiman 2001a) is an example of bagging that uses decision trees. 
Random Forests using CART decision trees is exclusively available through Salford Systems, 
but other similar implementations are available. Random Forests uses complex trees that have 
not been pruned and that are built from random samples with replacement. Usually unpruned 
trees would find patterns specific to the training data that do not generalise and consequently 
perform poorly on holdout data, but this problem is avoided because of the large number of 
trees built using random samples that never contain all the data. Random Forests also 
incorporates more randomness by using the random subspace method that randomly selects a 
different subset of explanatory variables for each individual node in each decision tree. The 
size of the subset is held constant and previous research has shown that the square root of the 
                                                 
 
37 Majority Vote determines the final classification as that which has been assigned the most times (the 
mode) by a set of underlying models. For example, if two trees classified a statement as fraudulent and three 
classified it as legitimate, then legitimate would be the final classification because three is bigger than two. 
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total number of variables is a good choice (Bhattacharya et al. 2011a). The reduction in the 
number of variables available at each node provides an opportunity for the second and third 
(and so on) variables to be used in some nodes. This is desirable because it creates diversity 
by reducing the correlation between base classifiers, which subsequently increases accuracy 
(Breiman 2001a). 
In summary, for each tree, Random Forests draws a random sample from the entire 
training data set and uses it to grow an unpruned tree using a different randomly chosen 
subset of explanatory variables at each node. The result is a form of dynamically constructed 
nearest neighbour classifier (Whiting et al. 2012). 
The advantages of Random Forests over single decision trees are increased stability 
through reduced variance and reduced sensitivity to the training data, and commonly 
increased accuracy. They are also easy to use as only two main parameters need to be set: the 
number of trees in the forest and the size of the variable subset. Their accuracy has been 
demonstrated by success in data mining competitions (Aldhous 2012). Random Forests have 
also recently become popular in the academic modelling literature with excellent results when 
compared with other techniques (Bhattacharya et al. 2011a). The drawback is the black box 
nature of Random Forests caused by the complexity of a large number of trees, but the 
Random Forests program by Salford Systems does still provide a variable importance score 
ranking the explanatory variables. 
3.3.5.b Boosting and TreeNet 
The classification power of decision trees can be “boosted” by iteratively applying the 
classification function and combining (with weights) the output so that the classification error 
is minimised. Unlike bagging that builds models independently of one another, the boosting 
process is iterative as the incorrect predictions from the current model are given higher 
weighting (probability) of being selected in the data used to grow the next tree. This process 
iteratively improves the classification accuracy. Unlike bagging that uses complex models 
(unpruned trees), boosting uses simple classifiers (small trees) that are poor classifiers on 
their own. This results in a slow learning process over many iterations, which avoids the 
problem of largely reduced performance on holdout data. 
Stochastic gradient boosting (Friedman 1999; Friedman 2002) is a leading method of 
boosting. TreeNet, also sold exclusively by Salford Systems, is the commercial product based 
on Friedman’s work. This process also incorporates random sampling and uses the next tree 
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to model errors from the current tree (instead of reweighting data) to improve results 
(Friedman 1999). 
Similar to Random Forests, the advantages of stochastic gradient boosting over single 
decision trees are increased stability through reduced variance and reduced sensitivity to the 
training data, and commonly increased accuracy. In addition, as errors are specifically 
modelled by the next tree, stochastic gradient boosting is particularly good at classifications 
near region boundaries with smooth decision boundaries (Derrig and Francis 2008; Whiting 
et al. 2012). Stochastic gradient boosting is also noted for being able to handle unbalanced 
data sets (Whiting et al. 2012), which is the case with financial statement fraud data sets. 
The nature of decision trees forces newly entered variables to interact with variables 
at higher levels. In contrast, the level of interaction can be controlled in TreeNet by varying 
the parameter for the size of the trees. This is possible because the size of the tree is fixed by 
a predefined parameter, unlike the unpruned trees in Random Forests that vary in size. If the 
size of individual trees in TreeNet is limited to three nodes (one root and two terminal nodes) 
then no interactions are possible. The level of interactions that are able to be modelled then 
increase as the size of the trees increases. 
It has been suggested that boosting is one of the most powerful data modelling 
concepts to have been introduced in the 1990s, and furthermore boosted decision trees are 
generally competitive with any other classifier (Sutton 2005)38. Salford Systems credit 
TreeNet for most of their outstanding results at data mining competitions and claim that 
stochastic gradient boosting is widely regarded as the most powerful technique available for 
most cases. Once again, the drawback is the black box nature of TreeNet, but it does provide 
a variable importance score that ranks the explanatory variables. This ranking is very useful 
because variables have many opportunities to be used (as a result of many trees), and their 
importance is built up slowly one iteration at a time. 
3.3.6 Other Studies 
Expert systems that incorporate fuzzy logic have been proposed for detecting 
financial statement fraud, and the best results were obtained when the results were fed into a 
logistic regression (Lenard and Alam 2004; Lenard et al. 2007). However, data comprising 
                                                 
 
38 See Section 1.2 of Sutton (2005) for a brief history of boosting and references to more detailed histories. 
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only 15 cases of fraud in service-based computer and technology firms were analysed from 
information provided from surveying auditors, which severely limits the generalizability of 
the results. Comunale et al. (2010) also used fuzzy logic to aggregate survey responses from 
auditors. Expert systems that incorporate some fuzzy logic have also been used to model 
insurance fraud (Pathak et al. 2005) and litigation against public accountants (Ragothaman et 
al. 1995). In the latter example, the fuzzy expert system outperformed discriminant analysis, 
but the current applicability of the results is questionable because it used data prior to 1984. 
In addition to being used to optimise parameters in artificial neural networks, genetic 
algorithms39 have been used to detect time-based patterns that identify fraudulent companies, 
rather than specific financial statements (Kiehl et al. 2005; Hoogs et al. 2007). This research 
used quarterly, rather than annual, data comprising 51 firms accused of fraud in AAERs. 
They also used a holdout sample approximately 30% of the size of the main data. However, 
the authors did not present results that incorporated the detection of multiple patterns. This is 
unfortunate as single pattern detection only achieved accuracy of 27% or less in detecting 
fraud, although it is good at detecting legitimacy. The results were however similar to a 
logistic regression model tested on the same data. Chai et al. (2006) complement this genetic 
algorithm approach by assigning to each pattern detected a fuzzy logic score representing the 
degree to which it is present in a company’s financial statement (Alden et al. 2012). The 
advantages of genetic algorithms include being both nonparametric and transparent, and their 
ability to handle small data sets, missing values and interactions between explanatory 
variables (Hoogs et al. 2007). However, they also have drawbacks that include being 
sensitive to changes in the large number of parameters that need to be set, as well as 
assuming that fraud cases are located “near” each other in the search space (Alden et al. 
2012). In response to these and other limitations of genetic algorithms, Alden et al. (2012) 
also tested a technique called the Markovian Learning Estimation of Distribution Algorithm 
(MARLEDA) that incorporates learning from a Markov random field probability model with 
evolutionary algorithms. Using ten-fold cross-validation on data comprising 229 fraud cases 
alleged in AAERs, both models were found to have similar promising results without 
considering different error costs. The genetic algorithm and MARLEDA models were able to 
                                                 
 
39 Genetic algorithms and other evolutionary algorithms are explained in more detail in Chapter 7 of 
Negnevitsky (2011). 
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respectively correctly detect 66.4% and 68.1% of fraud cases, and 61.1% and 60.7% of 
legitimate cases.  
Amershi and Feroz (2000) researched whether numbers or sequences of numbers with 
mathematical significance (Golden Ratio, Golden Mean, Fibonacci sequence), and the 
frequency of them, might be able to distinguish between fraud and legitimate companies. 
They found some early promising results and concluded that more research needed to be 
done, including into Silver Means. 
Research has also investigated whether deviations from particular statistical 
distributions are a good indicator of fraud. Zipf’s Law describes the expected frequency of 
the occurrence of various complex patterns or natural languages, and has been tested using 
simulation for its ability to assist auditors by highlighting potentially fraudulent accounting 
records (Huang et al. 2008). They found that there are limitations; in particular, the 
accounting data that were used might not conform to the usual distribution described by 
Zipf’s Law. Benford’s Law, which some consider to be a special case of Zipf’s Law, 
describes the expected frequency of individual digits within sets of numbers. This has been 
applied to disaggregated transaction level data (Durtschi et al. 2004), as well as on aggregated 
financial statement data (Reed and Pence 2005). Incorporating Benford’s Law into an 
artificial neural network has also shown promise using simulated data (Busta and Weinberg 
1998; Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). Hogan et al. (2008) also discusses other studies that use 
Benford’s Law. 
Other approaches have also been used to model financial statement fraud. An 
evidential reasoning approach using a Bayesian framework to assess fraud risk is presented 
by Srivastava et al. (2009), which needs further empirical analysis to determine probabilities 
for the Bayesian formulas. Using Greek data, Spathis et al. (2002) used discriminant analysis 
and logistic regression as benchmark techniques to show that their multi-criteria decision aid 
model has good detection accuracy. A cutting plan formulation using mathematical 
programming has been tested on Turkish manufacturing data and found to compare 
favourably to a probit model (Dikmen and Küçükkocaoğlu 2010). Using Taiwanese financial 
statement fraud data, Pai et al. (2011) used a support vector machine with some additional 
processing from CART and nearest neighbour techniques that successfully assisted in 
properly allocating audit resources. In recent years, studies (Goel et al. 2010; Glancy and 
Yadav 2011; Gupta and Gill 2013) have begun to investigate analysing the text in financial 
statements, such as in the Management Discussion and Analysis section. An excellent 
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summary of this work is given by Gray and Debreceny (2014). Finally, Zhou and Kapoor 
(2011) propose a self-adaptive framework (based on a response surface model) with domain 
knowledge without any empirical analysis. 
The most relevant studies presented in this section are summarised in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4. Summary of other studies to detect financial statement fraud that assess model performance 
using publicly available US data. The “Consideration of Costs” column refers to whether the study 
considers different values for the cost ratio of falsely missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud. 




Kiehl et al. 
(2005); Hoogs 
et al. (2007) 
Genetic Algorithm Random Holdout No Poor accuracy 








Both have similar 
good accuracy 
 
3.3.7 Comparative Studies 
The following studies compare multiple supervised learning methods for their utility 
in detecting financial statement fraud. 
Liou (2008) found that stepwise logistic regression outperformed a neural network 
and decision tree using a Taiwanese data set, without considering costs or separate test data. 
More recently, a probabilistic neural network and genetic programming (a type of 
evolutionary algorithm) technique were found to outperform logistic regression, a 
backpropagation neural network and another type of neural network, and a support vector 
machine using a Chinese data set (Ravisankar et al. 2011). It is noteworthy that they trialled 
using only variables that were significant according to a simple t-statistic test, but this 
reduced accuracy. Using Greek data, Kirkos et al. (2007) found a Bayesian network to 
outperform an artificial neural network that subsequently outperformed an ID3 decision tree. 
In contrast, another Greek study (Kotsiantis et al. 2007) found that See4.5 decision trees had 
the highest accuracy for a single technique outperforming a Bayesian network, neural 
network, logistic regression, support vector machine and a nearest neighbour and rule-based 
technique. Interestingly, this study also showed that ensemble techniques improved accuracy. 
Specifically, combining the individual model results using a decision tree with linear (not 
univariate) splitting rules was found to be better than simple voting (mode), a nearest 
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neighbour technique and aggregating probabilities of fraud. Combining multiple methods has 
also more recently been found to be useful on a Chinese data set (Song et al. 2014). A voting 
system with varying weights for each base classifier outperformed individual models from a 
backpropagation artificial neural network, See5 decision tree, support vector machine and 
logistic regression. Overall, the lesson from the studies using data from outside the US is that 
ensemble techniques that combine multiple models are worth investigating. 
McKee (2009) also concluded that combining multiple models warranted further 
research from analysing US data comprising 50 fraud cases. He used information from prior 
to the occurrence of fraud (lagged variables), and so his model predicted, rather than 
detected, fraud. The results, however, are still of interest to this study. He found that feeding 
the results of one model into another achieved results superior to any of the individual 
models. Specifically, the ensemble model (referred to as meta-learning model or stacking40 
by McKee) used was produced by the following steps. 
1. Feed the original data41 into a backpropagation neural network with one hidden layer. 
This resulted in accuracy of classifying fraud of 47.8% and classifying legitimate 
statements of 95.6%. Overall, this represents an accuracy of 71.4%. 
2. Feed the original data and the binary classification from the neural network into a logistic 
regression. This notably improved the ability to classify fraud by raising it to 70.7%, 
while the ability to classify legitimate statements dropped to 82.5%. Overall, this 
represented an increase to 76.5% accuracy. 
3. Feed the original data and the binary classification from logistic regression into a See5 
decision tree. This increased the ability to classify fraud further to 92.7%, while the 
ability to classify legitimate statements decreased to 72.5%. Overall, this represented an 
increase to 82.7% accuracy. 
Overall, the results improve with each step. These results also surpassed individual logistic 
regression and decision tree models that achieved a maximum overall accuracy of 70% and 
69% respectively. It is notable that the artificial neural network was the most accurate single 
technique model. McKee also considered cost ratios of missing fraud relative to falsely 
                                                 
 
40 Stacking usually refers to ensemble models aggregated from multiple types of underlying modelling 
techniques. 
41 The original data only contained variables that were statistically significant according to a univariate t-
test.  
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alleging fraud that ranged from 1:1 to 50:1 and found similar superior performance from the 
ensemble models from steps 2 and 3 as measured by a weighted error cost measure. 
However, the reliability of these accuracy estimates and comparisons is unclear. The authors 
state that half the data are partitioned into a holdout sample and it is clear that the individual 
logistic regression is tested using this holdout sample. However, the individual decision trees 
are assessed differently using ten-fold cross-validation. Further to this, the tables reporting 
the ensemble model results include the full data set and so it appears that the accuracy of the 
ensemble methods might be upwardly biased from including results from the training data. 
Using ten-fold cross-validation on data comprising only 51 fraud cases alleged in 
AAERs, Perols (2011)42 found that logistic regression and support vector machines 
performed well compared with artificial neural networks43, See4.5 decision trees44 and two 
ensemble techniques, bagging and stacking. Bagging was performed using 50 See4.5 decision 
trees as the base classifiers, which is far fewer than the number of trees usually used in 
Random Forests and also does not include random subsets of variables. Stacking was 
performed by using a Bayesian classifier to aggregate the results from the other five 
techniques including bagging. It was noted that CART decision trees were a second 
preference to the Bayesian classifier for aggregation. All models were compared using a 
weighted error cost measure for cost ratios of missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud 
that ranged from 1:1 to 1:100. Furthermore, Perols (2011) considered varying cost ratios at 
both the model building and assessment stage; additionally, the cut-off values were 
empirically optimised for each cost ratio as in previously presented research such as by 
Beneish. Overall, Perols acknowledges that these results are surprisingly contrary to many 
previous studies. For example, most other studies of fraud detection and other classification 
problems found neural networks to be at least as good as logistic regression. The fact that 
incorporating varying error costs were incorporated into both the model building and 
assessment stages is cited as one possible reason for the different results. Given that more 
complex methods such as artificial neural networks and decision trees require more training 
data than simpler methods (such as logistic regression), perhaps the small number of fraud 
                                                 
 
42 This paper is based on the earlier dissertation by Perols (2008), which had to be examined for some of the 
details not included in the paper. 
43 The exact artificial neural network used is unclear, but from the discussion in the dissertation it appears 
that it is a standard backpropagation network with one hidden layer. 
44 J48 was the actual decision tree package used, which was developed based on See4.5 version 8. 
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cases in the data set is part of the reason for the unusually poor performance of neural 
networks and decision trees. Consequently, it would be useful to re-test the utility of artificial 
neural networks and decision trees on another data set with more fraud cases, while still using 
varying error costs. 
Using ten-fold cross-validation on a larger sample of 114 fraud companies, Whiting et 
al. (2012) found ensemble techniques to be superior to single technique models. The single 
technique models included probit analysis, logit analysis and partially adaptive estimators 
(using custom-written computer code written by the authors) that are generalisations of probit 
and logit analyses. The ensemble models included Random Forests, stochastic gradient 
boosting and RuleFit, which employs an ensemble of easily understandable rules derived 
from random sampling with replacement (Whiting et al. 2012). The stochastic gradient 
boosting used a learning rate of 0.001 and Random Forests used a variable subset size the 
square root of the number of variables, and both models were aggregated from 1000 trees. 
The three ensemble methods had comparable accuracy, but Random Forests was the best 
overall (82%) and also the best at classifying fraud cases with an accuracy of 81.5%. 
Interestingly, all models were better at classifying legitimate cases compared with fraudulent 
cases, but Random Forests had the most similar performance between the two with 82.5% 
accuracy at classifying legitimate statements. The authors noted that the three ensemble 
methods they chose, particularly the ensemble of rules, were easier to interpret than many 
other ensemble methods. While Whiting et al. (2012) did not consider specific ratios of error 
costs they did assess performance using the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve, which is a popular measure that provides a type of performance averaged over 
possible error cost ratios. Despite its advantage of not requiring knowledge of the actual ratio 
of error costs, Perols (2011) noted that the averaging includes ratios that are not of interest. 
Moreover, Hand (2009b) mathematically demonstrated that using the area under the ROC 
curve is akin to stating that the ratio of error costs depends on the classification technique that 
is used and not the underlying problem, a concept which he claims is absurd (Hand 2009a). 
Consequently, it would be useful to re-test some of these models in a study that considers a 
range of error cost ratios. 
The most relevant studies presented in this section are summarised in Table 3-5 on the 
next page. 
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Table 3-5. Summary of comparison studies that focus on detecting financial statement fraud using US 
data. The last column refers to whether the study considers different values for the cost ratio of falsely 
missing fraud relative to falsely alleging fraud. Information about model accuracy is not included 
because the studies have not presented it in a way that permits comparison between them all. 
Study Techniques Used Test Data Consideration of Costs 
McKee 
(2009) 
Backpropagation Neural Network, 
Logistic Regression, 
See5 Decision Tree, 







Logistic Regression (best), 
Support Vector Machine (best), 
Artificial Neural Network, 
See4.5 Decision Trees, 
Bagging using See4.5, 
Ensemble of the above 
Ten-fold 
Cross-validation 
Considered in both 
model building and 
evaluation, 
Cost ratios 1-100:1, 





Partially Adaptive Estimators, 
Stochastic Gradient Boosting, 









The most relevant studies presented in this chapter are summarised in Table 3-6 
below with their characteristics for ease of comparison. 
Standard regression-based techniques, particularly logistic regression, have been 
widely studied for detecting financial statement fraud and are therefore excellent benchmark 
techniques for future research. The most well-known specific models are the M-score 
(Beneish 1997, 1999a) and F-score (Dechow et al. 2011), both of which are good benchmarks 
for future models to be compared against. Backpropagation artificial neural networks with 
one hidden layer have also been applied to the detection of financial statement fraud with 
encouraging empirical results, and are another technique well-suited for comparing new 
models against. Integrating fuzzy logic into neural networks (and other techniques) has also 
shown promise, as has optimising neural network parameters with evolutionary algorithms. 
However, there is a shortage of studies that assess neural networks over a range of error cost 
ratios and that empirically optimise the cut-offs. The research presented in this dissertation 
will address this issue, as well as use the benchmarks identified and suggested above. 
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Evolutionary algorithms such as genetic algorithms have shown promise, but need 
further study. There would be benefit from comparing them to other techniques in a study 
that considers varying ratios of error costs. There is also a lack of research that uses decision 
tree techniques, particularly CART that has been shown to be superior to other decision tree 
techniques when applied to other classification problems in business. Consequently, CART 
will be used in this research. There are also other techniques that have been proposed for 
financial statement fraud detection that require further empirical analysis, such as Silver 
Means and Bayesian frameworks and text analysis. Overall, there are a lack of studies that 
have more than 100 fraud cases. The research presented in this dissertation will use a larger 
number of fraud cases. 
The comparative studies clearly indicate that ensembles of models, including Random 
Forests and stochastic gradient boosting, perform relatively well at detecting financial 
statement fraud. As a result of the small number of fraud cases, cross-validation has been 
used, so there is an opportunity to test the ensembles further by using data with a larger 
number of fraud cases using a holdout sample that occurs chronologically after the training 
data to give more real-world applicable results. This would also be an opportunity to re-test 
the surprisingly poor results of ensemble methods, decision trees and artificial neural 
networks from the work of Perols (2011), on a data with a larger number of fraud cases and a 
holdout sample, while still considering optimised cut-off values for a wide range of error cost 
ratios. Stochastic gradient boosting (TreeNet) and Random Forests are two ensemble 
techniques that will be used in this research because of their advantages (presented in earlier 
sections), as well as their promising empirical performance from limited application to 
financial statement fraud detection. Other ensemble models are also tested in this research, 
both newly developed and those mentioned earlier in this review including TreeNet, Random 
Forests and feeding the results of one model into another model. Applying a method to 
reduce the number of variables before the final modelling stage was found to be useful in 
many studies, and this finding will be considered when developing the models used in this 
research. For example, using TreeNet to select variables for use in other techniques will be 
trialled because TreeNet provides an excellent ranking of variable importance (as mentioned 
above). Details on the models developed in this research are presented in Chapter 5. 
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Table 3-6. Summary of studies that focus on detecting financial statement fraud detection and that 
assess model performance using publicly available US data. The last column refers to whether the 
study considers different values for the cost ratio of falsely missing fraud relative to falsely alleging 
fraud. Information about model accuracy is not included because the studies have not presented it in a 
way that permits comparison between them all. 
Study Modelling Technique Test Data Consideration of Costs 
Persons (1995) Logistic Regression 
Jackknife 
Cross-validated 
Cost ratios 1-30:1, 
optimised cut-off values 













Cost ratios 1-100:1, 
optimised cut-off values 
Fanning and 
Cogger (1998) 













No No, 0.5 cut-off used 
Lee et al. (1999) Logistic Regression No Cut-offs 0.1,0.2,0.3 
Bell and 
Carcello (2000) 
Logistic Regression Random Holdout 
Cut-offs 0.05-0.95 
in 0.05 intervals 
Feroz et al. 
(2000) 
Neural Network Random Holdout 
Cost ratios 
1-40:1 
Lin et al. (2003) 
Backpropagation Neural 











Kiehl et al. 
(2005); Hoogs et 
al. (2007) 
Genetic Algorithm Random Holdout No 
Bayley and 
Taylor (2007) 
Logistic Regression No 
Cost ratios 20-50:1, 
optimised cut-off values 
Skousen and 
Wright (2008); 






                                                 
 
45 It is assumed that the holdout sample was randomly formed, although the authors did not specify. 
Chapter 3 Review of Modelling Techniques Adrian Gepp 
   Page 69 





See5 Decision Tree, 










Varied F-score cut-off to 




Support Vector Machine, 
Artificial Neural Network, 
See4.5 Decision Trees, 
Bagging using See4.5, 
Ensemble of the above 
Ten-fold 
Cross-validation 
Considered in both 
model building and 
evaluation, 
Cost ratios 1-100:1, 
Optimised cut-off values 












Partially Adaptive Estimators, 






by area under the 
ROC curve 
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Chapter 4 Selection of Explanatory Variables 
Fraud detection models process data, called explanatory or independent variables, 
from both fraudulent and legitimate cases in an attempt to differentiate between the two 
cases. With supervised learning models, the same explanatory variables (data) are collected 
for both fraudulent and legitimate cases. The variables are then analysed to determine 
patterns that indicate whether fraud has likely occurred before a formal investigation has 
occurred to determine with certainty. 
Despite the fact that the selection of variables is crucial to developing a fraud 
detection model, the use of explanatory variables in prior financial statement fraud detection 
research is not standardised by a common overall theory or schema (Perols and Lougee 
2011). In addition to the variables themselves differing between studies, the categories of 
variables also vary, which is likely because there is no overarching theory to guide variable 
selection (Beneish 1997; Kaminski et al. 2004).  
Past studies have evaluated a large number of potential indicators of financial 
statement fraud. Using this past research, only variables that have empirically been found to 
be useful in financial statement fraud detection models will be included in this study. Further 
to this requirement for demonstrated empirical usefulness, variables that have been included 
must also have an underlying theoretical rationale for their association to financial statement 
fraud. That is, variables that have been theoretically proposed as indicators of financial 
statement fraud but have not been supported empirically are not included. The underlying 
rationale or justification for including each variable is derived from prior research, and 
auditing practice and standards. 
Chapter 4 Selection of Explanatory Variables Adrian Gepp 
   Page 71 
The research aims to produce findings that are widely applicable to investors, 
regulators, auditors and other stakeholders (as discussed in Section 2.3.5), and consequently 
only variables that are publicly available and relatively easy to obtain have been included. 
This is consistent with prior research stating that variables too difficult to obtain are unlikely 
to be used in a practical context (Perols 2011). However, it does introduce a challenge, 
because publicly available financial statements are highly summarised and aggregated. 
The overall schema of the explanatory variables is presented first, followed by a new 
theoretical framework called the Fraud Detection Triangle that is based on the famous Fraud 
Triangle (Cressey 1953). The link between the overall schema and the Fraud Detection 
Triangle is also described, before a list of all the explanatory variables is presented. An 
analysis of each individual explanatory variable including the rationale for its inclusion is 
then given. A summary of all the explanatory variables is then provided, together with their 
position within the overall schema and the theoretical Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
Finally, a summary of the data sources is provided. 
4.1  Overall Schema of Explanatory Variables 
In the absence of a standardised approach or representation, an overall schema has 
been constructed from an extensive review of the variables found to be both empirically 
useful in financial statement fraud detection models and that also have an underlying logical 
reasoning for their inclusion. 
The schema of the explanatory variables used in this study to develop financial 
statement fraud detection models is shown in Figure 4-1 below. The schema depicts the 
categories of explanatory variables, and the interrelationships within and between the 
categories. The largest category of explanatory variables is financial, made up of general 
financial variables and those that focus on specific accounts within the financial statements. 
There are also non-financial variables as well as variables that compare the growth of non-
financial variables with the growth of financial variables that measure specific accounts. 
Finally, new variables are added and others are included to control for the matching in the 
data selection process (described more in Section 5.1.2). While not exactly to scale, the size 
of the shapes in Figure 4-1 provides an indication of the relative contribution of each 
category in terms of the number of explanatory variables, except for the new variables 
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category that is disproportionately large to highlight them. The exact size of each category is 
shown in Table 4-1 on the next page and each category is described more below.  
Figure 4-1. Overall schema of explanatory variables, including the categories of variables (financial, 
non-financial, comparison, new and control) and the interrelationships within and between the 
categories. 
 
The categories of explanatory variables follow: 
Financial variables measure specific accounts in the financial statements that are 
common targets of fraud (accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful accounts, 
inventory and sales), as well as general measures that span multiple accounts 
comprising measures of asset composition, accruals, debt and financial distress, 
performance and profitability, and the financing of the company. These general 
measures include accounting information from the financial statements themselves, 
market-based information such as share prices and analyst expectations, and 
comparisons with industry averages. This is the largest category of explanatory 
variables, as has been the case with most previous research. 
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Non-Financial variables consider the key roles and positions both within and 
external to an organisation, including the auditors, board of directors, CEO, CFO and 
other executives. 
Comparison variables measure discrepancies between non-financial variables and 
financial variables measuring specific accounts, because largely different growth rates 
between the two are uncommon and might indicate fraud. 
There are also control variables and new variables as described below. 
Control variables allow for differences in company size, company age, industry 
membership and the exchange on which it is listed. These are control variables 
because they are influential in the sample selection process, specifically the selection 
of legitimate companies that match each fraudulent company. This process is 
described in more detail in Sections 4.5.13 and 5.1.2.  
New variables measure the macro-economy (financial), overall corporate governance 
(non-financial) and the accounting and organisational complexity of the industry 
(non-financial). These variables require more testing to assess their usefulness in 
financial statement fraud detection models and so have been included in this study. 
The justification for the inclusion of these variables is provided in Section 4.5.14 to 
Section 4.5.16. 
Table 4-1. The number of explanatory variables in each category of the overall schema, and the 
relative contribution of each category. 







Financial: Specific Account 14 28% 
Financial: General 20 40% 
Non-Financial 3 6% 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial 6 12% 
Control 4 8% 
New 3 6% 
Total 50 100% 
                                                 
 
46 These numbers exclude sub-types; for example, there are multiple ways of measuring variable V1 that are 
referred to later as V1a, V1b, V1c and so on, but this only counts as one variable in this list. 
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4.1.1 Temporal Nature of Explanatory Variables 
Variables that incorporate information from prior years as well as the year of 
investigation (hereafter referred to as the specified year) are very important to financial 
statement fraud detection models. Information from the year being analysed for fraud allows 
models to look for unusual patterns that occur relative to other companies, which might then 
indicate fraud. The addition of prior information allows models also to find unusual changes 
in patterns that occur over time, which also might indicate fraud. For readers familiar with 
accounting, this means that models are able to perform horizontal analysis (in addition to 
vertical analysis). For readers more familiar with modelling domains, this represents the 
inclusion of temporal information. The inclusion of temporal information is consistent with 
both other research into fraud detection modelling and financial classification problems such 
as predicting the failure of a company. Table 4-2 shows that 58% of the variables in the 
overall schema incorporate temporal information. Additionally, more than 50% of the 
variables in every category of the overall schema incorporate temporal information, except 
for the control and new variables. 
Table 4-2. The temporal nature of explanatory variables in each category of the overall schema. 








Financial: Specific Account 2 (14%) 12 (86%) 
Financial: General 10 (50%) 10 (50%) 
Non-Financial 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 
Control 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 
New 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 
Total 21 (42%) 29 (58%) 
 
The 29 (58%) variables with temporal information are made up of 21 variables (42%) 
that incorporate information from the specified year and one year prior and 8 variables (16%) 
                                                 
 
47 These numbers exclude sub-types, for example, there are multiple ways of measuring variable V1 that are 
referred to later as V1a, V1b, V1c and so on, but this only counts as one variable in this list. 
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utilise information from the specified year, one year prior and from even further back. The 
majority of variables with temporal information compare the specified year with the previous 
year. 
It is notable that the concentration of variables with temporal information is higher 
within the Specific Account section, compared to the General section, of the Financial 
Variables. This could indicate when focusing on individual accounts in the financial 
statements it is more important to study changes over time rather than absolute or relative 
values from the specified year. 
4.1.2 Explanatory Variables with Exogenous Information 
Senior management, who are the most common perpetrators of fraud, are in a position 
to try to conceal fraud in information produced by the company. Consequently, variables that 
incorporate information that comes from outside the company (exogenous) are important 
(Hogan et al. 2008), because senior management do not have direct influence over this 
information. 
Eight (16%) variables within the overall schema incorporate exogenous information. 
These variables comprise 
• One (7%) Specific Account financial variable measuring the difference between the 
company and the industry average,  
• Four (20%) General Financial variables incorporating the share price (two variables), 
analyst forecasts and the difference between the company’s performance and the industry 
average, 
• One (33%) Comparison variable measuring the difference between the company and the 
industry average, and 
• Two (67%) New variables measuring information about the company’s industry and the 
economy. 
The Non-Financial variables that consider or involve decisions influenced by the board of 
directors (that includes some outside directors) might be arguably exogenous to management 
(although not the company itself). However, this was not listed above because senior 
management could have substantial influence, possibly control, over the board of directors in 
some cases. 
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4.2  Fraud Detection Triangle Framework Development 
4.2.1 The Original Fraud Triangle 
Based on interviewing convicted fraudsters in prison, Cressey (1953)48 proposed that 
instances of fraud share three common factors, namely 
• An opportunity to commit fraud, 
• A pressure to commit fraud, and 
• A rationalisation for committing the fraud that is consistent with the perpetrator’s 
personal ethics, sometimes called a willingness to commit fraud. 
This theory has since become famous and is referred to as the Fraud Triangle as shown in 
Figure 4-2 and has been used in numerous prior research and audit standards (Brazel et al. 
2009; Kassem and Higson 2012; Lou and Wang 2009; Skousen and Wright 2008; Skousen et 
al. 2009).  
Figure 4-2. Original Fraud Triangle by Cressey (1953) showing the three factors necessary for fraud 
to occur. 
 
Cressey stated that all three factors had to be present (to some extent) simultaneously 
for a fraud to occur, but professional accounting bodies contend that the presence of only one 
factor is enough for fraud to occur (Skousen et al. 2009). Dorminey et al. (2012) provide 
evidence to support that the presence of one factor is enough, because they point out that 
fraudsters with a predatory nature only require an opportunity to commit a fraud. 
                                                 
 
48 At the time, Cressey was being mentored by Sutherland (1940) who is credited with being the first to 
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Furthermore, Boulter et al. (2013) have mathematically demonstrated that the three factors 
are inherently inter-linked and consequently the presence of one factor can predispose the 
presence of the other two factors. This is further evidence that one factor alone is enough to 
increase the likelihood of a fraudulent act. 
Over the years since Cressey's (1953) publication, there have also been several 
different definitions of the three factors, and different examples given for each (Kassem and 
Higson 2012). One such definition with a set of examples for each factor is given below. 
4.2.1.a The Opportunity Factor 
The opportunity factor requires the fraudster to perceive that there is an opportunity to 
commit fraud. An opportunity arises from situations that provide (Romney et al. 2013): 
1. An opportunity to commit fraud, 
2. An opportunity to conceal or attempt to conceal the fraud, thereby reducing the chance of 
being caught, and 
3. An opportunity to then convert that fraud into gain such as by receiving a bonus. 
The following are examples of conditions that present an opportunity for financial statement 
fraud to occur: 
• New accounting standards that are not yet fully understood by all accountants and 
auditors; 
• Complex or unusual transactions that are not well understood or require subjective 
judgement; 
• Unchallenged management who are dominant over subordinates or auditors; 
• Weak internal control systems, such as a lack of segregation of duties or unjustified 
management overrides to control systems; 
• A lack of monitoring internal controls or response to internal control flags; 
• Ineffective internal auditors; 
• Ineffective board of directors and weak corporate governance; and, 
• Frequent changes of external auditors. 
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4.2.1.b The Pressure Factor 
The pressure factor requires the fraudster to perceive that there is a pressure or 
incentive to commit fraud49. It was originally proposed that the fraudster also needs to 
perceive that they cannot seek help or share their problem, which can be caused by a strong 
sense of ego or pride (Dorminey et al. 2012). The pressure factor can be thought of as another 
triangle of three sub-factors (Romney et al. 2013) that include 
1. Financial pressure; for example, 
• Pressure to meet or exceed earnings expectations of analysts, 
• Cash flow problems and possible difficulty paying interest and accounts payable, 
• Restrictive debt covenants, 
• Unusually rapid growth with the implied pressure for the growth to continue, and 
• Poor overall economic conditions. 
2. Pressures relating to management characteristics; for example, 
• Unrealistic budgets and growth targets, 
• Questionable management ethics and management style, 
• Aggressive earnings forecasts, and 
• Substantial component of compensation linked to performance. 
3. Industry condition; for example, 
• Adverse new industry regulations or tax changes, 
• Declining industry, and 
• Poor performance relative to industry competitors. 
An alternative breakdown of the pressure factor (Kassem and Higson 2012) also considers 
external pressures such as negative publicity as well as personal pressure, both financial such 
as a gambling addiction and non-financial such as greed. 
4.2.1.c The Rationalisation Factor 
The rationalisation factor is about the fraudster being able to commit the fraud whilst 
remaining within their personal moral comfort zone (Dorminey et al. 2012). This factor can 
also take three forms (Romney et al. 2013): 
                                                 
 
49 This factor has also been referred to as “perceived need” (Ramamoorti 2008). 
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1. Justifying that the fraud is not actually an ethical wrongdoing; for example, “I only took 
what I was owed”, “It was for a good cause” or “It is best for the company”. Those 
implicated in the financial statement fraud at HealthSouth Corporation used the 
rationalisation that it was for a good cause because the company was involved in the 
manufacture of medical equipment that saved lives; 
2. An attitude that allows the fraud to be rationalised; for example, “The rules don’t apply to 
me”; 
3. A lack of personal integrity; for example, “What I want is more important than honesty”. 
4.2.2 Extending The Fraud Triangle 
The Fraud Triangle is a useful conceptual model for studying and understanding the 
conditions under which fraud occurs and it is explained in almost all industry and academic 
education on fraud (Dorminey et al. 2012). Although it has been widely used, the Fraud 
Triangle has also been criticised for being inadequate (Kassem and Higson 2012). One such 
criticism is that the pressure and rationalisation factors cannot be directly observed and so 
solely relying on the Fraud Triangle is not sufficient in fraud investigations (Dorminey et al. 
2012). Dorminey et al. (2012) go further to explain that there is a Triangle of Fraud Action 
that looks at the required actions needed to commit fraud, which is useful for investigators 
who require proof because all the elements can be directly observed and documented. As this 
research is looking at identifying cases with higher likelihoods of fraud and not proving fraud 
occurred, the original Fraud Triangle is the most relevant. 
Dorminey et al. (2012) point out that fraud has grown in complexity since the 1940s, 
which might mean that the Fraud Triangle does not capture all of the precursors to fraud. 
Additional models have been proposed that can be considered as extensions to the Fraud 
Triangle (Kassem and Higson 2012). The key contributions of each of the well-known 
alternative models are described below, with a view to incorporating them as incremental 
improvements into the pre-existing Fraud Triangle as a basis for this research. It is also 
important to note that this complexity is also a reason for incorporating the assistance of 
computer models to identify complex patterns and thereby assist in detecting fraud. 
4.2.2.a Extending the Opportunity Factor 
After analysing past fraud cases that revealed that the worst are committed by 
intelligent and experienced people, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) contend that even if there 
were an opportunity, a pressure (or incentive) and a rationalisation to commit fraud, the 
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fraudster also needs the necessary capabilities for the fraud to occur. Consequently, they 
propose a fourth factor, capability, in addition to the three from the Fraud Triangle, thereby 
constructing The Fraud Diamond. Kassem and Higson (2012) also added capability of 
committing fraud as a fourth factor to their New Fraud Triangle model, while Dorminey et al. 
(2012) incorporated it within the existing opportunity factor. It has also been pointed out that 
a fraudster needs to be capable of concealing the fraud (Dorminey et al. 2012), or at least 
perceives that they are capable of concealing it (Hurley and Boyd 2007). 
Opportunities to commit fraud only lead to the committing of it if there are people 
with the capability of exploiting them (Dorminey et al. 2012). Consequently, the opportunity 
factor in the framework used in this research will be referred to as an Exploitable 
Opportunity, which is an opportunity in the presence of people with the capability of 
committing the fraud. Additionally, the concept of concealment (and the perception of it) is 
already incorporated into the broader definition of the opportunity factor presented in the 
previous section based on Romney et al. (2013). 
Senior management are the primary perpetrators of financial statement fraud and it 
would be valuable future research to study how many senior managers have the necessary 
capabilities to commit financial statement fraud (given the opportunity). It would not be 
surprising if the vast majority of senior management were capable of committing fraud given 
the extensive skills and knowledge required to be appointed to such positions. If this were the 
case, limiting the opportunity factor to exploitable opportunities would not be a substantial 
change to the model. However, it is still valuable to acknowledge that capability is an 
important precursor to financial statement fraud and this will be done in the framework in this 
research by focusing on opportunities that are exploitable. 
4.2.2.b Extending the Pressure Factor 
The famous Tyco financial statement fraud case was missing a pressure factor, but 
there was a strong incentive to commit the fraud as evidenced by fraudulent executives 
making $430 million by inflating the share price based on publishing fraudulent information 
(Dorminey et al. 2012). Recent research (Dorminey et al. 2012; Kassem and Higson 2012) 
has also expanded the pressure factor to include a broader set of motivators to commit fraud 
according to the acronym MICE as presented by Kranacher et al. (2011). Inclusion of a wider 
set of motivations also has support in previous research such as done by Beasley et al. (2010). 
MICE stands for Money, Ideology, Coercion and Ego or Entitlement. More money (or 
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financial wealth) and boosting ego are the most common motivators and were present in 
high-profile cases such as Tyco, Enron and WorldCom (Dorminey et al. 2012), all of which 
are part of the sample used in this research. An example of coercion is a mid-level accountant 
in WorldCom being ordered to make false accounting entries (Dorminey et al. 2012). A less-
frequent motivation is ideology. An example of this was the HealthSouth case mentioned 
above where senior management considered that falsification of financial statements helped 
them provide life-saving equipment to hospitals. Overall, MICE is an incomplete explanation 
of fraud motivations (Dorminey et al. 2012), but it does provide some additional and useful 
considerations to be incorporated into the framework used in this research. 
A broader definition of the pressure factor as described above includes incentives and 
in the framework used in this research this factor will be referred to as Pressure/Incentive, 
which incorporates MICE similar to Dorminey et al. (2012) and Kassem and Higson (2012), 
as well as the categories mentioned in the previous section (such as financial and 
management characteristics). Money is captured by financial pressure and incentives, while 
coercion is captured by management characteristic related pressures. Ego and ideology are 
both captured by including incentives as well as pressures, and it is important to note that 
both also play a role in the rationalisation factor. 
4.2.2.c Extending the Rationalisation Factor 
Based on the analysis of information from internal auditors of companies that were 
victims of fraud, The Fraud Scale was proposed by Albrecht et al. (1984). This model 
replaced the rationalisation factor with personal integrity, where the latter is defined as “the 
personal code of ethical behaviour each person adopts”. The importance of personal integrity 
is also stated by Rezaee and Riley (2010). 
When an opportunity occurs along with a pressure or incentive and a rationalisation, a 
generally law-abiding person might succumb to the temptation to commit fraud. However, 
predatory fraudsters only require an opportunity (Dorminey et al. 2012). Consequently, in the 
framework used in this research the presence of one factor is enough to be concerned about 
fraud having occurred. For predators, the pressure and rationalisation factors are replaced by 
arrogance and criminal mindset, which are issues of attitude and personal integrity. 
Furthermore, a broader definition of the rationalisation factor as described above based on 
Romney et al. (2013) already includes the concept of attitude and personal integrity. Attitude 
was also considered as part of rationalisation by previous financial statement fraud modelling 
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research (Brazel et al. 2009; Lou and Wang 2009). Consequently, in the framework used in 
this research the rationalisation factor will be referred to as Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation. 
4.2.2.d An Additional Model 
Rezaee and Riley (2010) used a different model for studying financial statement 
fraud; it is referred to as the 3Cs model. This model states financial statement fraud will 
occur if there are: 
1. Favourable conditions such as pressures and incentives (financial and non-financial), and 
opportunities and motives to commit and conceal fraud, 
2. A corporate culture that provides the opportunity and motivations for senior management 
to commit fraud, and 
3. Senior management that makes the choice to commit fraud and rationalises their decision. 
This model is a different grouping of similar factors to those in the original Fraud 
Triangle, such that conditions and culture are addressed in the pressure and opportunity 
factors, and then choice is addressed by the rationalisation factor. 
4.2.2.e New Suspicious Information Factor 
This study focuses on detecting financial statement fraud and one technique is to 
search for precursors that can also be used as indicators that it might have occurred. This has 
been the focus of the three framework factors presented so far. However, it is also possible to 
detect fraud by finding unusual patterns in figures that often occur as a result of it. 
Consequently, an additional factor called Suspicious Information is proposed. Unlike the 
other factors that are concerned with whether the precursors to fraud exist, Suspicious 
Information occurs as a consequence of fraud. This additional factor allows for the inclusion 
of variables that are not directly related to the precursor factors, but might simply reveal 
suspicious patterns in them when fraud actually occurs. This additional factor also provides a 
theoretical basis for the inclusion of complex interactions between variables that empirically 
might be excellent at detecting fraud even though they might not be clearly related to one of 
the precursor factors to fraud. 
Brazel et al. (2009) included a suspicious accounting factor in their study, but they 
only viewed accounting information that, arguably, could also fall into one of the precursor 
factors. In fact, if a simple standard definition of the word suspicious is used then all 
precursor factors would automatically be included in this category. The reason for this is that 
the existence precursors of fraud are suspicious in terms of fraud having potentially occurred, 
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which is why this framework includes precursor factors. For example, sales growth is related 
to both opportunity and incentive factors (as discussed in detail later), but sales growth could 
also be considered suspicious if it were unusually high. Consequently, to make Suspicious 
Information a meaningful addition it has been defined as occurring as a consequence of fraud. 
4.2.3 The New Fraud Detection Triangle 
There are four factors that will form part of the new Fraud Detection Triangle 
framework. As shown in Figure 4-3 and as defined in the previous section, the factors are 
Exploitable Opportunity (O), Pressure/Incentive (I), Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) 
and Suspicious Information (S). This framework incorporates the extensions of the O, I and R 
factors suggested in previous research, as well as adapting the Fraud Triangle for use in fraud 
detection (rather than explaining the precursors) by the addition of the S factor. It is important 
to note that only one factor in this framework needs to be present for there to be a concern 
that fraud might have occurred. While developed for this study into financial statement fraud 
detection, the framework is not limited to this specific type of fraud and is applicable more 
broadly to fraud detection in general. 
Figure 4-3. The new Fraud Detection Triangle framework50. 
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There have been a few financial statement fraud detection modelling studies that have 
used or incorporated all or part of the original Fraud Triangle. Brazel et al. (2009) considered 
incentive, opportunity, suspicious accounting and other factors, but did not include 
rationalisation and their definition of suspicious factor is very different from the S factor in 
this framework (as described in the previous section). Pressure, opportunity and 
rationalisation factors, but not suspicious information factors, were considered by Lou and 
Wang (2009) using Taiwanese data, and by Skousen and Wright (2008) and Skousen et al. 
(2009) using US data. The use of the new Fraud Detection Triangle in this study represents 
an extension to these prior research studies. 
The number of explanatory variables that are associated with each factor of this 
framework are shown in Table 4-3. The relatively few variables associated with the R factor 
are not an indication that it is unimportant, but rather an indication that less focus has been 
placed on it in prior research, probably because it is the most difficult factor to measure 
(Skousen et al. 2009). For example, Gillett and Uddin (2005) found that while the attitude of 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was an important factor, the compensation of the CFO 
(publicly available information in many cases) was not a useful proxy51. The relative 
contribution of the rationalisation factor was also low in a study by Skousen et al. (2009) 
whose initial set of explanatory variables (totalling 29) comprised 38% measuring 
opportunity, 45% measuring pressure and 10% measuring rationalisation. Furthermore, no 
variables measuring rationalisation were found to be statistically significant at a 15% level. It 
is also expected that the Suspicious Information category is relatively small, because it is a 
new factor to a fraud triangle. 
                                                 
 
51 It should be noted that Gillett and Uddin (2005) also called for more research to be done on the link 
between the compensation of the CFO and financial statement fraud. 
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Table 4-3. The number of explanatory variables that are associated with each factor in the new Fraud 
Detection Triangle framework, and the relative contribution of each category. Variables associated 
with multiple factors are counted in all associated factors. 







Exploitable Opportunity (O) 31 49% 
Incentive/Pressure (I) 24 38% 
Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) 3 5% 
Suspicious Information (S) 5 8% 
 
4.3  The Link between the Framework and the Schema 
The factors from the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework that are associated 
with each category of variables within the overall schema are described below and 
summarised in Table 4-4. In addition, the theoretical rationales for the individual variables 
from the overall schema are presented in Section 4.5 with reference to the Fraud Detection 
Triangle framework for the theoretical justification. 
Table 4-4. The factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework that are associated with each 
category of the overall schema. 
Category of Explanatory Variable Fraud Detection Triangle Factor 
Financial: Specific Account O, I 
Financial: General O, I, R 
Non-Financial O, I, R, S 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial    S 
Control O, I 
New O, I 
 
Financial Variables: Specific Accounts (O, I) 
These are accounts commonly targeted by fraud schemes, because they are difficult to 
audit and involve subjective judgement, and so high values represent an increased 
                                                 
 
52 These numbers exclude sub-types; for example, there are multiple ways of measuring variable V1 that are 
referred to later as V1a, V1b, V1c and so on, but this only counts as one variable in this list. 
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opportunity to commit fraud. Sales are also a key performance indicator for management and 
so this is strongly linked to incentives or pressures to commit fraud. Additionally, not using 
the Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) inventory valuation method is also linked to the incentive 
factor. 
Financial Variables: General – Asset Composition (O) 
These variables measure opportunity factors because they primarily focus on 
aggregate measures of the difficult to audit and subjective judgement accounts considered in 
the specific accounts section. 
Financial Variables: General – General Accrual Measures (O, I, R) 
Accruals are comparatively easier to audit compared with cash items and so represent 
an opportunity to commit fraud. Additionally, positive or increasing prior accruals indicate 
that management has fewer ways to legitimately manage earnings and so there are pressures 
or incentives to turn to fraud. Finally, increased use of discretionary accruals might reflect 
poorly on the integrity of management, who might be more able to rationalise fraud. 
Financial Variables: General - Level of Debt and Financial Distress (O, I) 
Increased debt raises the incentive and pressure to commit fraud. Financial distress 
might also increase the opportunity to commit fraud through lack of controls or lack of 
monitoring or enforcing controls during financially difficult times. 
Financial Variables: General – Performance and Profitability (I) 
Poor performance and profitability can be considered to increase the pressure and 
incentive to commit fraud to hide poor results. 
Financial Variables: General – Financing (I, R) 
New funding or the need for additional funding increases the incentive and pressure to 
commit fraud. Additionally, the use of operating leases as off-balance sheet funding could be 
associated with managers who are more short-term focused and more likely to be able to 
rationalise fraud. 
Non-Financial Variables (O, I, R, S) 
Non-financial variables about the auditor, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CFO and 
board of directors predominantly measure opportunity factors, including the capability of the 
CEO or CFO to exploit the opportunity to commit fraud. However, there is a competing 
Chapter 4 Selection of Explanatory Variables Adrian Gepp 
   Page 87 
theory for changes in CEO and CFO that is linked to the new Suspicious Information factor. 
Additionally, the share ownership of the CEO is related to their incentive and pressure to 
commit fraud, and the number of changes of audit firm is related to the ability to rationalise 
fraud. 
Comparison Variables: Financial and Non-Financial (S) 
Increases in the financial values without corresponding increases in the non-financial 
raises the suspicion of fraud. 
Control Variables (O, I) 
The control variables are also associated with the opportunity and incentive factors. 
New Variables (O, I) 
Variations in the economic conditions, as measured by macroeconomic indicators, are 
hypothesised to change the opportunity and incentive factors associated with fraud. Lower 
overall corporate governance as measured by an index is hypothesised to indicate reduced 
monitoring that correspondingly indicates a greater opportunity to commit fraud. Finally, a 
more complex industry is hypothesised to increase the opportunity to commit and conceal 
fraud as a result of there being complexities that are understood by fewer people. 
4.4  Explanatory Variable Selection Process 
In addition to the theoretical rationale with reference to the new Fraud Detection 
Triangle framework and guided by prior research and auditing practice and standards, the 
empirical usefulness in prior models was a requirement for variable selection as shown in 
Figure 4-4. New variables are also proposed based on auditing practice and research from the 
broader discipline of accounting. The new variables are also justified with reference to the 
Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
Overall, a large initial set of explanatory variables is used, with variables excluded 
(noted in Section 4.5.17) based on similar definitions. This was done in preference to using 
correlation analysis to exclude similar variables as done by Spathis (2002). The reason for 
this preference is because stepwise procedures and other model building techniques that will 
be used in this research can handle empirical similarity when selecting the final set of 
variables to go in the chosen financial statement fraud detection models. This process utilises 
the strengths of people (researchers) to propose many alternative hypotheses and then uses 
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the strength of statistics and computers to analyse data to determine what hypotheses are 
supported empirically. This process is summarised below in Figure 4-4. 
Figure 4-4. Explanatory Variable Selection Process. 
 
4.5  Detailed Analysis of Each Explanatory Variable 
A summary table is presented in the first subsection (4.5.1), followed by an analysis 
one-by-one of each explanatory variable in the overall schema. The analysis of each variable 
includes both empirical and theoretical justification for its inclusion, with reference to the 
new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
The analysis of each variable also includes stating the expected direction (positive or 
negative) of association of each variable with financial statement fraud. It is also important to 
note that linear relationships as well as non-linear relationships and interactions between 
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variables will be analysed. This approach allows for some of the complexity involved in 
financial statement fraud to be modelled, which could not be done without the use of 
computer assisted modelling or with only linear computer models. 
The theoretical justification for some new variables that have yet to be 
comprehensively tested in a cost-sensitive manner will also be discussed before the excluded 
variables are covered. The final subsections cover the excluded variables and the definitions 
for the terms used that should be referred to for clarification of any terms used. 
4.5.1 Summary of Explanatory Variables 
A complete list of the explanatory variables used in this research along with their 
identifiers (IDs) that will be used in future sections is presented in Table 4-5. The variables 
are listed (and discussed in the following sections) within the categories of the overall 
schema, and with reference to their expected direction of association with financial statement 
fraud. The factor or factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework that each variable 
is associated with are also listed. 
Table 4-5. Summary of Explanatory Variables. Definitions of terms are provided in Section 4.5.18 on 
page 126. 
ID Variable Name 
Expected Direction 





Specific Account - Accounts Receivable (see Section 4.5.2 on page 93) 
V1 
   V1a 
   V1b 
   V1c 
Accounts Receivable 
   Value for the specified year 
   Percentage change 
   Was Percentage change > 10%? 
Positive O 
V2 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Sales Positive O 
V3 
Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Total 
Assets 
Positive O 
Specific Account - Allowance for Doubtful Accounts (AFDA) (see Section 4.5.3 on page 94) 
V4 Percentage change in AFDA Negative O 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to Accounts Receivable Negative O 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to Sales Negative O 
Specific Account – Inventory (see Section 4.5.4 on page 95) 
V7 Change in Inventory to average Total Assets Positive O 
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ID Variable Name 
Expected Direction 






   V8a 
   V8b 
Inventory to Sales 
   Value for the specified year 
   Change 
Positive O 
V9 Was Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) inventory valuation used? Negative I 
Specific Account – Sales (see Section 4.5.5 on page 97) 
V10 
   V10a 
   V10b 
   V10c 
   V10d 
   V10e 
Sales Growth 
   Percentage change 
   V10a minus the Industry Average 
   Previous year’s Percentage change 
   Four-year growth rate 
   Previous year’s percentage change in total assets 
Uncertain O, I 
V11 
   V11a 
   V11b 
Sales to Total Assets 
   Value for the specified year 
   Percentage change 
Uncertain O, I 
V12 
   V12a 
   V12b 
Gross Margin to Sales 
   Percentage change 
   Was percentage change > 10%? 
Uncertain I 
V13 
   V13a 
   V13b 
Cash Sales 
   Percentage change 
   Was change < 0? 
Uncertain I 
V14 Were any sales from acquisitions? Positive I 
General Financial - Asset Composition (see Section 4.5.6 on page 101) 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets Positive O 
V16 Net Property Plant & Equipment (PP&E) to Total Assets Negative O 
V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets Positive O 
V18 
Percentage Change in Assets other than Current Assets 
and Net PP&E to Total Assets 
Positive O 
General Financial - General Accrual Measures (see Section 4.5.7 on page 102) 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets Uncertain O 
V20 
Were the specified and the prior year’s  
Total Accruals > 0? 
Positive O, I 
V21 Total Discretionary Accruals Positive O, I, R 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals Positive O, I 
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ID Variable Name 
Expected Direction 





General Financial - Level of Debt and Financial Distress (see Section 4.5.8 on page 104) 
V23 Debt to Total Assets Positive O, I 
V24 Debt to Equity Positive O, I 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress measure (Z-score) Positive O, I 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned Positive O, I 
General Financial - Performance and Profitability (see Section 4.5.9 on page 106) 
V27 
   V27a 
   V27b 
Return on Equity 
   Value for the specified year 
   Industry Average minus Specific Company 
Uncertain I 
V28 
   V28a 
   V28b 
   V28c 
Return on Average Prior Assets 
   Value for the specified year 
   Previous year 
   Change 
Uncertain I 
V29 
   V29a 
   V29b 
Holding Period Return 
   One-year 





Were analyst Earnings Per Share (EPS) forecasts 




General Financial – Financing (see Section 4.5.10 on page 109) 
V31 
   V31a 
   V31b 
Were New Securities issued? 
   Common Stock? 
   Common Stock or Long-term Debt? 
Positive I 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued Positive I 
V33 
   V33a 
   V33b 
   V33c 
Demand for financing 
   Specific Value (ex ante) 
   Was there demand (ex ante)? 






V34 Were there operating leases? Positive R 
Non-financial - Key Roles and Positions (see Section 4.5.11 on page 110) 
V35 Was the auditor a Big Six firm? Negative O 
V36 
Number of changes of audit firm in the most recent four 
financial statements 
Uncertain O, R 
V37 
   V37a 
   V37b 
CEO 
   Tenure 
   Number of changes in the last three years 
Uncertain O or S 
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ID Variable Name 
Expected Direction 





V38 Has the CFO changed in the last three years? Uncertain O or S 
V39 
   V39a 
   V39b 
   V39c 
 
Composition/Holdings of the Board 
   Number of Directors 
   Percentage of Directors who are also Executives 
   Percentage of Director shares owned by those who are 
also Executives 
Positive O 
V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO Uncertain I 
Comparing Financial and Non-financial (see Section 4.5.12 on page 116) 
V41 
Percentage change in the number of Employees minus 
percentage change in Total Assets 
Negative S 
V42 
Percentage change in Sales minus percentage change in 
the number of Employees 
Positive S 
V43 
Percentage Change in Sales to Employees: Specific 
Company minus Industry Average 
Positive S 
Control variables (see Section 4.5.13 on page 117) 
V44 Company Age: Number of years since foundation Negative I 
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets Uncertain O 
V46 
Industry: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
starts with a 3? 
Positive O, I 
V47 
   V47a 
   V47b 
 
 
Stock Exchange listed on 
   NASDAQ stock exchange? 
   New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)? 
(No to both V47a and V47b indicates American Stock 
Exchange [AMEX]) 
Negative O 
New variables - Macroeconomic indicators (see Section 4.5.14 on page 119) 
V48 
   V48a 
   V48b 
   V48c 
Macroeconomic indicators 
   Previous year’s percentage change in annual real GDP 
   Previous year’s percentage change in annual retail sales 






New variables - Corporate governance indices (see Section 4.5.15 on page 120) 
V49 
   V49a 
   V49b 
Corporate governance indices 
   G-Index 
   E-Index 
Positive O 
New variables - Industry complexity measure (see Section 4.5.16 on page 122) 
V50 Accounting complexity of the industry Positive O 
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4.5.2 Financial Variables: Specific Account - Accounts Receivable 
Accounts receivable is a very difficult area to audit because of the subjective 
judgements involved as acknowledged in the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 27 
issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). This difficulty to 
audit creates an opportunity to commit fraud. Prior academic research has also shown that 
accounts receivable is one of the accounts more likely to be fraudulently manipulated, 
particularly by premature revenue recognition that overstates accounts receivable (Fanning 
and Cogger 1998). 
The variables found to be empirically significant along with the studies that presented 
these findings are: 
V1 Accounts Receivable: 
V1a. Value for the specified year (Perols 2011); 
V1b. Percentage change (Green and Choi 1997; Lin et al. 2003); 
V1c. Binary variable indicating whether the percentage change is greater than 10%, 
because analysts and auditors commonly use a 10% change as a threshold for 
material change (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Perols and Lougee 2011). 
V2 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Sales (Beneish 1997; Green and Choi 
1997; Beneish 1999a; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Alden et al. 2012)53: 
• Feroz et al. (2000) and Alden et al. (2012) used absolute change instead of 
percentage change and Green and Choi (1997) used Sales to Accounts Receivable 
(the inverse of this ratio), but these are not material differences and so are not 
considered separate variables, as is consistent with more recent research (Perols 
2011). 
• Feroz et al. (2000) also considered the four-period average and Fanning and 
Cogger (1998) considered the simple value, but these were not considered to be 
separate variables given the number of other studies supporting the percentage 
change. 
                                                 
 
53 Beneish (1997, 1999a) actually used accounts receivable to sales this year divided by last year, but this 
only differs from percentage change by a constant of one; that is, a subtraction of one results in a percentage 
change. Consequently, this has not been considered as an additional variable. 
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• Bayley and Taylor (2007) use a variable that tries to capture the amount of 
manipulated revenue, which in essence analyses the change in sales relative to 
accounts receivable. Again, this variable was not chosen because of the number of 
other studies supporting the simpler percentage change variable. 
V3 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (Green and Choi 1997; Lin 
et al. 2003; Dechow et al. 2011) 
• Dechow et al. (2011) actually used change in accounts receivable divided by 
average total assets, but this is considered an immaterial difference as both 
variables measure the change relative to total assets, which was the theoretical 
intention in all cases. Consequently, this is not considered as a separate variable. 
Lin et al. (2003) and Green and Choi (1997) also stated that prior empirical research 
and auditing practice support the use of V1,V2 and V3. Feroz et al. (2000) used the ratio of 
accounts receivable to sales as a proxy for transactions that are difficult to audit because 
revenue recognition issues are inherent in the measurement of receivables, which is an 
extremely difficult auditing task. The importance of considering difficult to audit transactions 
as an explanatory variable is reinforced in the auditor-oriented red flags from SAS 53. 
Furthermore, as the size of accounts receivable increases relative to total assets (and also to 
sales) the likelihood of reaching the materiality threshold increases (Stice 1991) and 
consequently then so might the likelihood of fraud which requires materiality. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
It is expected that increases in accounts receivable compared to the prior period (V1), 
compared to sales (V2) and compared to assets (V3) indicate a higher likelihood of fraudulent 
manipulation to inflate revenue. For example, an increase in the accounts receivable to sales 
ratio could be the result of a relaxing of credit terms to customers, but it could also be the 
result of fraudulently overstated earnings (Beneish 1999a) as per the improper revenue 
recognition red flag stated above in Section 2.2.4.a. 
4.5.3 Financial Variables: Specific Account - Allowance for Doubtful 
Accounts (AFDA) 
There is an opportunity to commit fraud by manipulating the amount of allowance for 
doubtful accounts, which is a contra account to accounts receivable. The variables found to 
be empirically significant along with the studies that presented these findings are: 
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V4 Percentage change in AFDA (Green and Choi 1997; Lin et al. 2003) 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to Accounts Receivable (Lin et al. 2003; Green and 
Choi 1997) 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to Sales (Green and Choi 1997; Lin et al. 2003) 
Lin et al. (2003) and Green and Choi (1997) found prior empirical research and 
auditing practice support the use of V4 through V5. V4 is included because of its 
involvement in the revenue cycle, which is very susceptible to fraud as established in the 
previous chapter. V5 and V5 measure the contra-asset account (AFDA) against its main 
account (sales and accounts receivable) to standardise any changes in AFDA so that only 
unusual changes are featured. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Understating the true value of doubtful accounts falsely increases the net value of 
accounts receivable, and consequently it is expected that (unusual) decreases in AFDA are 
associated with a higher likelihood of fraud. This theory is supported by the red flag for low 
levels or lack of growth in AFDA being listed as red flags for multiple types of fraud in 
Section 2.2.4. Thus, the expectation is that lower values of V4-V5 will indicate a higher 
likelihood of fraudulent manipulation. 
4.5.4 Financial Variables: Specific Account - Inventory 
Inventory is another account more likely to be fraudulently manipulated because of 
the increased opportunity as a result of its being difficult to audit (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
The variables found to be empirically significant along with the studies that presented these 
findings are: 
V7 Change in Inventory over average Total Assets (Dechow et al. 2011; Whiting et al. 2012) 
• Whiting et al. (2012) actually used a ratio of the specified year’s inventory divided 
by the previous year’s. The justification for this variable was solely about 
measuring the change in inventory, which V7 does. Consequently this is not a 
material difference and so is not considered a separate variable. 
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V8 Inventory to Sales 
V8a. Value for the specified year (Kaminski et al. 2004)54 
V8b. Change (Summers and Sweeney 1998) 
• Inventory to current assets (Kaminski et al. 2004) is excluded because of its 
similarity to this variable, which is consistent with recent research by Perols 
(2011). 
V9 A binary variable indicating whether the inventory method is Last-In, First-Out 
(LIFO) (Fanning and Cogger 1998) 
Dechow et al. (2011) explain that the change in inventory is worth analysing because 
it is an accrual component of earnings, which are the components most used to fraudulently 
misstate earnings. Moreover analysing the change in inventory relative to total assets (V7) 
reduces bias from company size. The ratio of inventory to sales, and any change in this ratio, 
provides additional insight into whether the level of inventory is an accurate valuation or 
incorrectly includes obsolete inventory (Spathis 2002; Kaminski et al. 2004), which is a 
common type of fraud as listed above in Section 2.2.4. This is important because estimating 
obsolete inventory involves subjective judgement and consequently presents an opportunity 
to commit fraud. 
In times of rising prices, using LIFO results in a higher cost of goods sold, and 
consequently reduces earnings. Using LIFO also results in lower values of inventory and 
consequently lower reported assets. There is an incentive for companies that commit fraud 
not to use LIFO, because the fraud is usually being committed to increase earnings and 
assets. Thus, using LIFO is a part of the new Suspicious Information factor. This theory was 
supported empirically by Fanning and Cogger (1998) and assumes prices are generally 
increasing, which was the case during their study and also during this research55. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Consistent with inventory red flags listed above in Section 2.2.4, it is expected that 
increases in inventory and so increases in V7 and V8 indicate a higher likelihood of financial 
                                                 
 
54 There is also evidence from Greek data to support the use of this variable (Spathis 2002). 
55 Given enough data from periods of deflation, future research could study how financial statement fraud 
differs during times of falling prices, such as in 2009. 
Chapter 4 Selection of Explanatory Variables Adrian Gepp 
   Page 97 
statement fraud. In addition, using LIFO (V9) is expected to decrease the likelihood of 
fraudulent manipulation. 
4.5.5 Financial Variables: Specific Account - Sales 
Sales is another account more likely to be fraudulently manipulated because of the 
increased opportunity as a result of its being difficult to audit (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
Furthermore, the sales account is a key performance indicator for management and so it is 
also a pressure factor in fraud. The variables found to be empirically significant along with 
the studies that presented these findings are: 
V10 Sales Growth 
• Sales growth was chosen in preference to asset growth (with the exception of 
V10e), because of the large number of supporting studies. This was also the 
reason why sales growth was also chosen in preference to the ratio of market 
value to book value, which was used by Carcello and Nagy (2004) to measure 
company growth. 
V10a. Percentage change (Beneish 1997; Green and Choi 1997; Beneish 1999a; Lin 
et al. 2003; Brazel et al. 2009)56 
V10b. Percentage change: Specific Company minus Industry Average (Alden et al. 2012) 
• Absolute change was used in prior research, but percentage change has been 
used here for consistency with other variables. 
V10c. Previous year’s percentage change (Erickson et al. 2006; Perols and Lougee 2011) 
• Erickson et al. (2006) used the previous year’s growth for fraudulent 
companies and the specified year’s growth for legitimate companies, but as 
done by Perols and Lougee (2011) this research will be consistent across both 
types of firms because of its matched pair design. 
                                                 
 
56 Beneish (1997, 1999a) actually used the ratio of this year divided by last year, but this only differs from 
percentage change by a constant of one; that is, a subtraction of one results in a percentage change. 
Consequently, this has not been considered as an additional variable. Additionally, Brazel et al. (2009) only 
found this variable significant as a control variable in one of their two models. 
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V10d. Four-year growth rate (Fanning and Cogger 1998) 
• Rapid company growth (Bell and Carcello 2000) is excluded because of its 
similarity to this variable, which is consistent with recent research by Perols 
(2011). The three-year growth rate (Johnson et al. 2009) is also excluded 
because of its similarity to this variable. 
V10e. Previous year’s percentage change in total assets (Abbott et al. 2000; Skousen 
et al. 2009)57 
• This variable measures assets growth instead of sales growth, but is still 
included in this section as the underlying rationale for its association to fraud 
is the same as for sales growth. 
V11 Sales to Total Assets  
V11a. Value for the specified year (Persons 1995; Fanning and Cogger 1998; 
Kaminski et al. 2004; Whiting et al. 2012)58  
V11b. Percentage change59 
V12 Gross Margin to Sales, also known as Gross Margin Percentage60 
V12a. Percentage change (Green and Choi 1997; Beneish 1999a; Lin et al. 2003)61 
V12b. Binary variable indicating whether the percentage change is greater than 10%  
(Fanning and Cogger 1998)62 
                                                 
 
57 Abbott et al. (2000) actually measured the average percentage change over the two years prior, but it was 
not considered a different variable because the authors used V10e when data were not available for this variable.  
58 There is also evidence from Greek data to support the use of this variable (Kirkos et al. 2007). 
59 Percentage change has been included even though it was not used in prior studies because the justification 
still applies (as explained later in this subsection). Percentage change calculations also remove the size bias and 
have been useful for many other variables in the literature. Indeed, many other variables in this study involve 
them. 
60 Perols (2011) also stated that a paper by Chen and Sennetti published in 2005 supported the use of this 
variable, but this paper could not be obtained to verify it. 
61 Beneish (1997, 1999a) actually used the ratio of last year divided by this year, but this only differs from 
percentage change by a constant of one when the ratio is inverted; that is, a subtraction of one from the inverted 
ratio results in a percentage change. Consequently, this has not been considered as an additional variable. 
62 As was the case for V1c, this variable was chosen because analysts and auditors commonly use a 10% 
change as a threshold for material change (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
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V13 Cash Sales 
V13a. Percentage change (Dechow et al. 2011) 
V13b. Binary variable indicating whether the change is less than 0 (Beneish 1997) 
V14 A binary variable indicating whether a portion of sales is from an acquisition 
(Erickson et al. 2006; Brazel et al. 2009) 
Blocher and Cooper (1988) found that the sales trend is useful for detecting fraud in 
the revenue cycle. Lin et al. (2003) and Green and Choi (1997) also found auditing practice 
and prior empirical research support for the use of V10 (Sales Growth). While sales growth 
does not directly imply fraud, it can result in more pressure on managers to maintain 
consistent growth and reach growth targets, and thereby increase the incentives to commit 
fraud (Beneish 1997; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beneish 1999a; Erickson et al. 2006). 
Backed by findings from a government report and prior research, Beneish (1999a) states that 
controls in a company lag behind operations in times of high growth, which might increase 
the opportunity to commit fraud. This finding is also supported by Summers and Sweeney 
(1998) and Bell and Carcello (2000) who also found weak internal controls associated with 
fraudulent financial statements. More recently Johnson et al. (2009) also implied that it is 
more difficult to monitor firms with higher growth as measured by sales growth. They also 
found empirically that higher sales growth was associated with financial statement fraud and 
postulate that it was because of increased opportunity to commit and conceal fraud. 
Higher sales growth is commonly expected to increase the likelihood of fraud, but 
lower sales growth can also indicate management that is under pressure to perform better and 
therefore might consider committing it (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Erickson et al. 2006). As 
a result of the varying hypotheses and prior results with sales growth, three variables 
measuring sales growth (V10a-d) in different ways are considered. V10e (asset growth) is also 
included here because the same growth-related opportunity and pressure factors just mentioned 
in this paragraph apply, even though it measures asset growth, as opposed to sales growth. 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) found that companies operating with lower efficiency in 
terms of sales to total assets were more likely to commit fraud. An earlier study by Persons 
(1995) supports this hypothesis as she found that a lower ratio indicates management are less 
able to cope with competitive situations (as measured by their sales generating ability from 
assets), and consequently they might turn to fraud as a response to the pressure. As this 
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hypothesis is equally applicable if the “lower ratio” is considered as relative to the year prior, 
the percentage change in sales to total assets has also been included in this study. 
Changes in gross margin were listed above as red flags for multiple types of financial 
statement fraud in Section 2.2.4 because it is generally expected by industry professionals 
that the gross margin percentage remains fairly constant over time (ACFE 2013a). The reason 
for this is that while sales fluctuate with business cycles, the margin will stay fairly constant 
as costs fluctuate in a highly correlated way to sales. Citing prior research for further 
evidence, Beneish (1999a) goes further by saying declining gross margin is a signal of poor 
performance that might be associated with pressure to manipulate accounts. 
It was expected that decreases in cash sales would indicate poor performance that 
would then increase the pressure to fraudulently inflate credit sales (Beneish 1997; Dechow 
et al. 2011). Beneish (1997) empirically supported this expectation by finding that a declining 
cash sales binary variable indicated a higher likelihood of fraud. However, more recently 
Dechow et al. (2011) found unexpected contrary results. They found the statistically 
significant result that positive changes in cash sales increased the likelihood of fraud. After 
further investigation, they found that the fraudulent companies were increasing in size overall 
and so cash sales increased simply as a flow-on effect. Furthermore, many companies were 
prematurely recognising revenue (particularly just prior to the end of reporting periods), 
which increased their cash sales, but without properly considering the ability for customers to 
return products. 
Additionally, Erickson et al. (2006) and Brazel et al. (2009) both cite the same prior 
research which states that firms have additional incentives to overstate earnings (using sales) 
before acquisitions. The reason for this is to increase their share price prior to the acquisition 
in order to negotiate more favourable terms of acquisition. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
The expected direction of association is unclear between (cash) sales (V10 and V13) 
and the likelihood of fraudulent manipulation. It is initially expected that low or declining 
efficiency and declining gross margin percentage, and so lower values of V11, V12a and a 
true value of V12b, will indicate a higher likelihood of fraud. However, fraudulently inflated 
sales would result in higher values of these variables and so the direction of their association 
is also uncertain. Finally, V14 measures the presence of an incentive to commit financial 
statement fraud and so is expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of it. 
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4.5.6 Financial Variables: General - Asset Composition 
In addition to variables and ratios involving specific accounts affected by fraud, the 
broad composition of assets on the balance sheet has been shown to be useful in fraud 
detection models. The variables found to be empirically significant along with the studies that 
presented these findings are: 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets (Persons 1995) 
V16 Net Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E)63 to Total Assets (Fanning and Cogger 
1998; Kaminski et al. 2004) 
• Kaminski et al. (2004) actually used Gross, rather than Net, PP&E. However, this 
is not considered a material difference and a specific rationale was not supplied by 
the authors. Consequently, it is not considered a separate variable. The choice of 
Net PP&E in preference to Gross PP&E was made because it was found 
significant in a multivariate study, while Gross PP&E was only found significant 
in a univariate study. 
V17 Assets other than Cash and Net PP&E (termed Soft Assets) to Total Assets (Dechow 
et al. 2011) 
V18 Percentage Change in Assets other than Current Assets and Net PP&E to Total Assets 
(Beneish 1999a)64  
As previously mentioned, accounts receivable and inventory are accounts commonly 
used in cases of financial statement fraud, and so larger proportions of these accounts relative 
to other accounts are thought to be associated with fraudulent manipulation of accounts 
(Persons 1995), the result of increased opportunity. V15 is included to test whether a 
combined measure of accounts receivable and inventory is better able to discriminate 
between fraudulent and legitimate cases. Although PP&E can be manipulated by over-
capitalising costs, assets other than PP&E (such as accounts receivable and inventory) are 
                                                 
 
63 Net PP&E is calculated as Gross PP&E minus Accumulated Depreciation. 
64 Beneish (1999a) actually used the ratio of last year divided by this year (termed Asset Quality Index), but 
this only differs from percentage change by a constant of one; that is, if one is subtracted from the ratio then the 
result is percentage change. Consequently, percentage change is used for consistency with many other 
percentage change variables. 
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more commonly manipulated and so lower proportions of PP&E (V16) might indicate a 
higher likelihood of fraudulently manipulated accounts. 
When firms have more soft assets on their balance sheet, there is more discretion for 
management to change assumptions to meet short-term earnings targets (Dechow et al. 2011). 
However, there is also more opportunity to fraudulently manipulate figures to meet targets. 
Assets other than current assets and Net PP&E are considered to have less certain 
future benefits, and an increased proportion of these assets (as measured by V18) indicate 
more of a disposition towards capitalising and consequently deferring costs (Beneish 1999a), 
which can be done fraudulently and so there is increased opportunity to commit fraud. High 
levels of capitalised expenses were also listed as a red flag for fraud in Section 2.2.4.b. 
Increases in V18 could also be a result of goodwill from acquiring a company, but Beneish 
(1999a) found similar results after removing the influence of goodwill. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
While increases in V15, V17 and V18 are expected to increase the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud, the opposite association is expected for V16.  
4.5.7 Financial Variables: General - General Accrual Measures 
There is a large body of literature going back to Healy (1985) that theorises earnings 
are primarily misstated by manipulating accruals (Dechow et al. 2011). While accrual 
components such as inventory and accounts receivable are represented in other sections, this 
section specifically focuses on variables involving multiple accounts that are specifically 
derived to measure accruals. The variables found to be empirically significant along with the 
studies that presented these findings are: 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets (Beneish 1997, 1999a; Brazel et al. 2009; Whiting et al. 
2012) 
• Total accruals to last year’s total assets or revenue (Lee et al. 1999; McKee 2009; 
Alden et al. 2012) are excluded because of their similarity to this variable. As 
Beneish (1997) found similar results when using discretionary accruals and total 
accruals (without dividing by total assets), discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 
1996; Beneish 1999b) were also excluded because of their similarity to this 
variable, which is again consistent with recent research by Perols (2011). For the 
same reasons, total accruals (Whiting et al. 2012) was not considered a separate 
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variable. Similarly, working capital accruals to total assets (Bayley and Taylor 
2007) was not considered a separate variable with the additional reason that 
Dechow et al. (2011) empirically found V22 below preferable. Finally, V19 and 
V20 were chosen in preference to change in total accruals (McKee 2009), because 
no theoretical justification rationale was provided for its inclusion. 
V20 Binary variable indicating whether Total Accruals are positive in both the specified 
year and the year prior (Beneish 1997) 
V21 Sum of the three prior years of Discretionary Accruals, also known as Total 
Discretionary Accruals  (Perols 2011; Perols and Lougee 2011) 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals as developed by Richardson et al. (2005)  (Dechow et al. 
2011) 
Accruals can increase non-cash income, which should then result in future cash 
inflows for legitimate entries. However, being non-cash items, accruals are easier to 
fraudulently manipulate compared with cash accounts that are easier to audit and so higher 
accruals represent a greater opportunity to commit fraud. The ratio of total accruals65 to total 
assets measures the extent that income is derived from anything other than cash from normal 
operations, and so a positive association is expected between it and fraudulent manipulation. 
The red flag positive income and negative operating cash flows listed for multiple types of 
financial statement fraud in Section 2.2.4 will also be captured in higher values of this 
variable, because total accruals measure the difference between income and operating cash 
flows. 
Companies with fraudulent accounts have been found to have positive accruals 
leading up to and including the year the fraud was committed. Prior positive accruals reduce 
ways to legitimately manage earnings and so may increase the pressure to commit fraud if 
management attempts to avoid accrual reversals or maintain accrual growth as a means to 
improve earnings (Beneish 1997; Perols and Lougee 2011). V20 and V21 both consider prior 
accruals, the former measuring total and the latter measuring discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, discretionary accruals might also indirectly measure management character and 
consequently cover some of the rationalisation aspect of the Fraud Detection Triangle. The 
                                                 
 
65 Bayley and Taylor (2007) found that total accruals were better than various measures of unexpected 
accruals at identifying financial statement fraud. 
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theory behind this is that management’s attitude towards discretionary accruals, which can be 
thought of as a legitimate method to manage earnings and performance, might also be an 
indication of their attitude towards fraud (Perols and Lougee 2011). The concept of using 
accruals to provide insight into the rationalisation factor is also supported by other studies 
(Skousen et al. 2009). In other words, high amounts of discretionary accruals might indicate 
poor management character that also predisposes them to be able to rationalise fraud, which 
makes them more likely to commit fraud. 
Unadjusted RSST Accruals developed by (Richardson et al. 2005) consider prior 
periods in a different way, by focusing on the changes in the past year. It is a complex 
measure of accruals that considers the change in non-cash working capital (WC), the change 
in net non-current operating assets (NCO) and the change in net financial assets (FIN). In 
contrast to Perols (2011), Dechow et al. (2011) found unadjusted measures of accruals had 
more discriminatory power than discretionary accruals. By including both variables in this 
research, a contribution will be made by offering evidence towards clarifying these contrary 
findings. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Prior positive or increasing accruals indicate that management has fewer ways to 
legitimately manage earnings, and so it is expected that V20 and higher values of V21 and 
V22 will indicate a higher likelihood of fraudulently manipulated accounts. However, 
Beneish (1997) casts doubt on the directional expectation of V19 because it found the 
unexpected empirical result that total accruals in the specified year were lower for fraudulent 
companies. This could possibly indicate accrual reversals occurring in the year the fraud is 
committed, rather than after the fraud as originally expected. 
4.5.8 Financial Variables: General - Level of Debt and Financial Distress 
Higher levels of debt increase the incentive and pressure to commit fraud. The 
variables found to be empirically significant along with the studies that presented these 
findings are: 
V23 Debt to Total Assets (Persons 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1997; Lee et al. 
1999; Brazel et al. 2009; Alden et al. 2012) 
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V24 Debt to Equity (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Erickson et al. 2006)66 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress measure (Z-score) (Feroz et al. 2000; Erickson et al. 
2006) 67 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned (Feroz et al. 2000) 
More debt is positively associated with income-increasing accounting policies, but if 
this is not sufficient to avoid breaching debt covenants then there is pressure to fraudulently 
overstate assets or understate liabilities (Persons 1995). This hypothesis is supported by prior 
research that has used debt levels as a proxy for the existence and restrictiveness of covenants 
(Dechow et al. 1996). This all suggests that higher debt might be associated with higher 
likelihood of fraudulent misstatements (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Spathis 2002; Perols and 
Lougee 2011). Debt relative to both assets (V23) and equity (V24) have shown empirical 
promise in the past and so have both been included. Debt ratios are also positively related to 
the demand for equity funding (V33) (Dechow et al. 1996) and financial distress (V25) 
(Erickson et al. 2006) and so also share the rationale for including  these variables. 
When a company is performing poorly and under more financial distress there is 
increased motivation to commit fraud (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Spathis 2002; Beasley et 
al. 2010) to falsely improve the financial situation as presented in the financial statements. 
Previous research also proposes that a poor financial position might indicate weak controls 
that will make it easier for fraud to be perpetrated (Spathis 2002). Furthermore, a critique of 
an early financial statement fraud model suggested adding a financial distress variable 
(Jiambalvo 1996). The Z-score (Altman 1968) is the most widely used and cited financial 
distress model, and although individual components are already included as variables 
elsewhere (such as sales to total assets), including this composite variable (V25) allows for 
testing the relative contribution of an overall distress measure. Another way to consider 
                                                 
 
66 Erickson et al. (2006) used different time periods for fraud companies and non-fraud companies, but just 
like Perols and Lougee (2011) this research will be consistent across both types of firms because of its matched 
pair design. There is also evidence from Greek data to support the use of this variable (Kirkos et al. 2007). 
67 Erickson et al. (2006) actually used an updated calculation of the Z-score (Begley et al. 1996), and Feroz 
et al. (2000) used a four-period average, but the standard Z-score was chosen here as it has long been the 
preference over newer updated versions. It is used in recent research by Perols (2011). Its use is supported by 
Greek data as presented by Spathis (2002); Kirkos et al. (2007), and it is also linked to litigation against auditors 
(Stice 1991). Erickson et al. (2006) also tried a newer financial distress model (Shumway, 2001) without finding 
any difference over the Z-score model. McKee (2009) also used his own bankruptcy model and found it to be a 
useful variable in their financial statement fraud detection models. 
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financial distress is to look at the difficulty changes in interest rates would cause in terms of 
servicing debt, which can be assessed using the times interest earned variable (V26)68. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
More debt and financial distress increases the likelihood of fraud and so higher values 
of V23, V24, V25 and V26 are expected to indicate a higher likelihood of fraudulent 
manipulation. Although previous research has not found the opposite direction of association, 
it is possible. Higher debt levels might be accompanied by increased monitoring and scrutiny 
from creditors (those who are owed money), which would be consistent with agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). This increased scrutiny would then likely reduce the 
opportunity to commit and conceal fraud. 
4.5.9 Financial Variables: General - Performance and Profitability 
Poor performance and profitability have been shown to be a useful factor in detecting 
financial statement fraud as it can be perceived as pressure to fraudulently improve financial 
statements to hide the poor results (Perols and Lougee 2011). The variables found to be 
empirically significant along with the studies that presented these findings are: 
V27 Return on Equity (
=>? @ABCD>
EC?FG BCDDCA >HI@?J) 
V27a. Value for the specified year (Alden et al. 2012) 
V27b. Industry Average minus Specific Company (Feroz et al. 2000; Alden et al. 
2012) 
• Feroz et al. (2000) actually used a four-period average, but consistent with more 
recent research by Perols (2011) the specified year is being used because 
obtaining historical information on return on equity figures for entire industries is 
considered to be difficult to obtain (without access to financial databases, which, 
for example, many investors do not have). Additionally, Alden et al. (2012) 
actually used the ratio of industry to specific company, but this was not considered 
a separate variable because of its similarity. 
                                                 
 
68 The inclusion of variable V26 is also supported by Efendi et al. (2007) who found that the ratio of interest 
to income is empirically associated with the likelihood of financial statements being restated (which is related 
to, but different from, fraud as previously described in Section 2.2.2). 
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V28 Return on Average Prior Assets (
=>? @ABCD>
KL>MFN> ?C?FG FOO>?OPQ&) 
• Past research used either net income (Erickson et al. 2006; Perols and Lougee 
2011) or income before extraordinary items (Summers and Sweeney 1998; Lee et 
al. 1999; Brazel et al. 2009; Dechow et al. 2011) in the numerator of this ratio. Net 
income was chosen as it is also used as the measure of return for V27 above. 
• Past research has used a variety of measurements of assets in the denominator, 
including specified year (Erickson et al. 2006; Perols and Lougee 2011; Ndofor et 
al. 2013), previous year (Lee et al. 1999; Brazel et al. 2009) and average of the 
specified and previous year (Dechow et al. 2011). These two latter concepts of 
previous year and averaging over two years were combined to form an average of 
the two prior years of assets, which is the denominator used in this research. This 
creates a ratio between a current variable (in the numerator) and a past variable 
containing information from two prior years (in the denominator). This comparison 
across multiple years offers more information that might assist in detecting fraud 
(as discussed in Section 4.1.1), and is therefore the reason for the choice. 
V28a. Value for the specified year (Lee et al. 1999; Brazel et al. 2009; Perols and 
Lougee 2011) 
V28b. Previous Year  (Summers and Sweeney 1998; Erickson et al. 2006) 
V28c. Change (Dechow et al. 2011; Ndofor et al. 2013) 
• Studying restatements69, Ndofor et al. (2013) actually used the specified year 
subtracted from the year prior (rather than specified year minus year prior), but 
this only changes the interpretation and because there is no material difference this 
was not considered a separate variable. 
V29 Holding Period Return 
V29a. One-year (Beneish 1999b; Dechow et al. 2011) 
V29b. Previous One-year (Dechow et al. 2011) 
• Dechow et al. (2011) actually measured return in excess of the market return in 
the specified year and the year prior, but this was not considered a separate 
                                                 
 
69 Restatements are related to, but different from, fraud as previously described in Section 2.2.2. 
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variable because this research focuses solely on US public companies that can be 
considered to be part of the same market. 
• Beneish (1997) also measured return in excess of a size-matched, value-weighted 
portfolio, but this was also not considered to be a separate variable because of a 
preference for simplicity, and later research by the same person (Beneish 1999b) 
changed to use a standard holding period return. 
V30 Binary variable indicating whether analyst forecasts were achieved or exceeded for 
earnings per share (Perols 2011; Perols and Lougee 2011) 
Performance can be measured by accounting ratios as well as variables that consider 
market-based performance. Referring to the SAS 53 red flags and documentation from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Feroz et al. (2000) and Alden et al. (2012) used 
return on equity (V27) as an accounting measure of performance, while many other studies 
successfully used variations on return on assets (V28). Both of these are standard accounting 
measures of profitability and performance. In terms of market-based performance, holding 
period return (V29) provides a measure of performance based on the share price. Market-
based performance is often directly linked to management’s performance indicators and 
remuneration. Management can be overly concerned with stock price performance, and the 
analyst forecasts that influence them. Undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections is an 
important factor in misstatements (Bell and Carcello 2000; Brennan and McGrath 2007) and 
whether analyst forecasts are achieved or exceeded (V30) might be a suitable publicly 
available proxy for this information. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Poor performance has been shown to increase fraud on financial statements. However, 
particularly with market-based measures of performance, improved performance can actually 
be an indicator that fraud has occurred to cover up the truth of poor performance as suggested 
by the profitability growth red flags listed for multiple types of financial statement fraud in 
Section 2.2.4. Hence, the expected direction of influence is not certain for these variables, but 
based on prior findings it is more likely that increased market performance (V30 and 
increased V29) likely indicates a higher likelihood of fraudulent manipulation. 
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4.5.10 Financial Variables: General - Financing 
Variables about financing in addition to the debt ratios already covered are 
considered. The variables found to be empirically significant along with the studies that 
presented these findings are: 
V31 Binary variable indicating whether New Securities were issued (in the specified year) 
V31a. Common Stock (Dechow et al. 1996; Lee et al. 1999) 
V31b. Common Stock or Long-term Debt (Dechow et al. 2011)70 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued (Dechow et al. 1996) 
V33 Demand for financing 
V33a. Specific Value (ex ante) (Skousen et al. 2009) 
V33b. Binary variable indicating whether there is demand for financing (ex ante) 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2006) 
V33c. Cash from operating and investment activities (Skousen et al. 2009; Alden et 
al. 2012)71 
• This variable is related to the above demand for financing variables, and so is 
included using the same underlying rationale, which is consistent with prior 
research (Skousen et al. 2009). 
V34 Binary variable indicating whether there are operating leases (Dechow et al. 2011) 
A higher stock price reduces the cost of raising new funds. In the case of equity, it 
directly reduces the cost of raising funds, and in the case of debt it can result in more 
favourable contractual terms. To assist in attaining this higher stock price, management can 
boost earnings and consequently there is also increased incentive to fraudulently increase 
earnings. Raising new funds can be measured by assessing whether there was issuance during 
the year (V31) or the proportion of funds that are new (V32) with the view that the larger 
                                                 
 
70 The inclusion of variable V31b is also supported by Efendi et al. (2007) who found that it was associated 
with a higher likelihood of financial statements being restated (which is related to, but different from, fraud as 
previously described in Section 2.2.2). 
71 Alden et al. (2012) actually used a ratio of this variable to total assets. However, the rationale for its 
inclusion was the study by Skousen et al. (2009) and so the version used by Skousen et al. (2009) was chosen 
for this study. 
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proportions increase the incentives. There might additionally be firms that wanted to raise 
funds, but chose not to as favourable terms could not be secured. V33 captures this issue as it 
measures whether firms have the incentive to raise new funds in the next two years because 
they are close to exhausting their internal funds (Dechow et al. 1996). However, it is 
generally considered that the SEC is more focused on companies actually issuing securities 
(Dechow et al. 2010) and consequently it is possible that this variable might not be significant 
as observed in Dechow et al. (2011). 
Operating leases are the main source of off balance sheet finance and as opposed to 
capital leases their use lowers expenses in the earlier years of the lease (Dechow et al. 2011). 
Lower expenses result in higher earnings, and Dechow et al. (2011) postulate that the use of 
operating leases (V34) could be associated with managers who are more focused on short-
term window dressing. The implication is then that managers with this disposition are more 
likely to commit fraud for the same short-term window dressing incentives and also because 
they are more likely to be able to rationalise the fraud to themselves by focusing on the short-
term. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Issuing or needing to issue new securities and the use of operating leases are 
associated with higher incentives to fraudulently inflate income and so higher values of V32 
and  V31, V33 (except for V33a for which lower values indicate more need for financing) 
and V34 will indicate a higher likelihood of fraudulently manipulated financial statements. 
4.5.11 Non-Financial Variables: Key Roles and Positions 
The non-financial variables consider the key roles and positions both within and 
external to the organisation. The variables found to be empirically significant, along with the 
studies that presented these findings and the theories behind their inclusion, are presented in 
this section. 
V35 Binary variable indicating whether the auditor was a Big Six72 firm (Fanning and 
Cogger 1998; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Perols 2011) 
                                                 
 
72 The Big Six (or Four or Five) audit firms are the largest such international professional services firms that 
offer an auditing service. 
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• The Big Six Audit firms became the Big Five in 1998 when Price Waterhouse 
merged with Coopers & Lybrand, and subsequently the Big Four in 2002 with 
Arthur Anderson’s demise. As my study spans both of these key dates, any firm in 
the Big Six is considered as a positive value in this binary variable. 
Researchers have argued that Big Six auditors limit the opportunities to perform 
earnings management (Hogan et al. 2008) and it is possible that they might also limit the 
opportunities to commit financial statement fraud. Previous research also shows that the Big 
Six Audit firms have smaller under-pricings of initial public offerings and command higher 
fees for audits that possibly indicate they offer a higher quality of audit (Fanning and Cogger 
1998). Consequently, Fanning and Cogger (1998) proposed that fraud might be less prevalent 
in statements audited by any of the Big Six as a result of a decreased opportunity to commit it.   
V36 Number of changes of audit firm in the most recent four financial statements (Feroz et 
al. 2000; Perols 2011) 
• This variable also captures (as a zero value) whether the auditor has been with the 
company for three or fewer years (Carcello and Nagy 2004). 
• This variable was chosen in preference to the number of years the auditor has been 
the same (McKee 2009), because it could lead to biases related to the age of the 
company and multiple studies found this variable to be statistically significant. 
Auditor firm turnover is listed as a red flag in the SAS 53 and above in Section 
2.2.4.a, and Beasley et al. (2010) found more changes of audit firm in companies that had 
committed financial statement fraud relative to those that did not. Stice (1991) also found that 
litigation against auditors decreases after they had the same account for more than three 
years, with the theory being that there is a costly learning curve when auditing a new set of 
accounts and that results in lower quality audits. Myers et al. (2003) made supporting 
findings that the quality of the audit improves as the auditor tenure increases, because the 
longer-term auditors reduce extreme management decisions regarding production of financial 
statements. This theory is further supported by Carcello and Nagy (2004) who found more 
fraud occurs in accounts that have had the same audit firm for three or fewer year when 
analysing an eleven year period from 1990 to 2001 in the US. In addition to a lower quality 
audit, changing audit firm could be related to the opportunity-seeking behaviour known as 
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“opinion shopping”, which is searching for auditors that will give favourable findings in 
preference to auditors who may have concerns of fraudulent manipulation73. Management 
who is engaged in opinion shopping might also indicate an attitude and level of personal 
integrity prone to make it easier for them to rationalise fraud. However, there is also the 
contrary argument that a lack of change leads to complacency and overconfidence, which 
might result in lower quality audits that provide more opportunity to commit fraud (Fanning 
and Cogger 1998). As a result of the contrary theories, the expected direction of association is 
uncertain.  
V37 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
V37a. Tenure (Ndofor et al. 2013)74 
V37b. Number of changes in the last three years (Feroz et al. 2000) 
• These variables were chosen in preference to a similar variable indicating whether 
the CEO was the founder (Dechow et al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2006), which is 
consistent with recent research by Perols (2011). 
Companies in which the founder is the CEO are more prone to financial statement 
fraud, because company founders are likely to have more of an opportunity as they have 
greater influence without scrutiny and are less accountable to the board of directors (Dechow 
et al. 1996). Finkelstein (1992) also states that longer serving CEOs have more power and 
influence. These findings actually support each other because founding CEOs are likely to be 
longer serving CEOs, because there have been no changes in CEO. Because these rationales 
are not directly concerned with founding CEOs but rather about entrenched CEOs (some of 
whom happen also to be founding CEOs), variables assessing CEO tenure and changes in 
CEO are chosen in preference to a variable indicating whether the CEO is a founding CEO. 
Furthermore, it is possible that more entrenched CEOs also have additional knowledge about 
the company that will make them more capable of committing fraud. 
                                                 
 
73 Lennox (2000) provides a discussion of whether companies successfully conduct opinion shopping using 
data from the UK. 
74 Erickson et al. (2006) also found a variable indicating whether there were missing data for CEO tenure to 
be useful, but that variable is reliant on the way the databases collect information, rather than on publicly 
available information. In addition, Ndofor et al. (2013) study restatements, which are related to but different 
from financial statement fraud. 
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Fanning and Cogger (1998) present the contrary argument that CEO changes might 
indicate suspicious behaviour that increase the risk of financial statement fraud, because a 
board of directors might dismiss a CEO if they suspect fraud before it is publicly discovered 
with the view to keep it from public knowledge. This hypothesis is also supported by Land 
(2010) who finds a significant association between CEO changes and companies being 
accused of committing fraud. CEO change has been studied over a one-year and three-year 
prior period, but the three-year variable was found to have the greater discriminatory power 
(Fanning and Cogger 1998).  
As a result of the contrary theories, the expected direction of association is not certain. 
V38 Binary variable indicating whether the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has changed in 
the last three years (Fanning and Cogger 1998) 
• The number of CFO changes (Feroz et al. 2000) is excluded because of its 
similarity to this variable, which is consistent with recent research by Perols 
(2011). 
As is the case with CEO rationales, a longer-term, more entrenched CFO might have 
more power without scrutiny and consequently a greater opportunity to commit fraud. Again 
as is the case with CEO rationales, a more entrenched CFO might also have additional 
knowledge of the company that makes them more capable of committing fraud. 
Contrastingly, a CFO change could also be the consequence of suspicions that the CFO has 
been committing fraud, with the idea that if the CFO is removed perhaps this will stop the 
fraud and keep it from ever becoming public knowledge. Similarly, the CFO might choose to 
leave if concerned the fraud will soon be discovered. Therefore, as with CEO variables, the 
expected direction of association is uncertain. 
V39 Composition and holdings of the board of directors 
V39a. Number of Directors (Beasley 1996; Carcello and Nagy 2004) 
V39b. Percentage of the Directors who are also Executives (Dechow et al. 1996)75 
• Percentage of outside directors (Beasley 1996; Fanning and Cogger 1998; 
Carcello and Nagy 2004; Uzun et al. 2004) and whether there are more than 50% 
insiders on the board (Dechow et al. 1996) are excluded because of similarity to 
                                                 
 
75 A person holding multiple executive positions is only counted once, and this is the same for directorships. 
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this variable, which is consistent with recent research by Perols (2011). The 
number of outside directors (Ndofor et al. 2013), the percentage of directors with 
any business relationship with management (Beasley 1996; Uzun et al. 2004) and 
the percentage of independent directors (Beasley 1996; Uzun et al. 2004) are also 
excluded because of their similarity76. Furthermore, whether the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board of directors (Carcello and Nagy 2004; Erickson et al. 2006; 
O'Connor et al. 2006; Skousen et al. 2009) has been excluded because the 
reasoning is based on CEO influence or CEO power, which is covered by this 
variable and the previous CEO variables. 
V39c. Percentage of Director shares77 owned by those who are also Executives 
(Dechow et al. 1996) 
• Percentage held by outside directors (Beasley 1996) is excluded because of its 
similarity to this variable, which is consistent with recent research by Perols 
(2011). Similarly, percentage held by insiders and percentage held by insiders 
with more than 5% ownership (Skousen et al. 2009) is also excluded because of its 
similarity to this variable and also V40 (that is discussed next). 
• Data from the specified year will be used as is consistent with all the research cited above 
in support of V39 except Dechow et al. (1996) who used the previous year’s data. 
The results from prior research are inconclusive when it comes to the influence of 
board size (that is, the number of directors), and this includes a study that has linked smaller 
boards to company failure and a study that finds board size irrelevant to company 
performance (Fanning and Cogger 1998). A study of restatements found that larger boards 
increased the chance of restatement of the financial statements (Abbott et al. (2004). 
Additionally, the most relevant study showed that increases in the board size increase the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996), which is consistent with the 
theoretical view of Jensen (1993) that smaller boards provide a better controlling function, 
                                                 
 
76 Determining whether directors are truly independent or have a business relationship with management is 
also too complex to fit with the widely applicable aim for this model. 
77 The total number of shares was used because it is more easily accessed compared with the number of 
unrestricted shares that were found by Johnson et al. (2009) to be more appropriate measures of incentive to 
commit fraud. Unrestricted, as opposed to restricted, shares do not have any restrictions on their ability to be 
sold. 
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reducing the opportunity to commit fraud. This is the directional association that is expected 
in this research.  
Monitoring company management is important because without costs being 
associated with behaviour that is detrimental to the company, management act more in their 
personal interests (Fama and Jensen 1983). A specific example of this is that they might 
commit financial statement fraud (Fanning and Cogger 1998) to increase their annual bonus 
or other forms of remuneration. Research has shown that boards with more outsiders are 
more effective at monitoring management (Weisbach 1988; Beasley 1996). The rationale is 
that people who are not executives and are more independent will increase the monitoring 
function of the board and consequently reduce the opportunities for fraud to be committed. 
Also, Dechow et al. (1996) refer to prior research that claims directors who are not 
executives, but do have a large equity holding in the company, play a notable monitoring 
role. Thus, these governance variables (V39b and V39c) are an inverse proxy for board 
vigilance. Larger proportions of, and holdings by, directors who are also executives are 
expected to be associated with more financial statement fraud. 
V40 Percentage of total shares77 owned by the CEO (Ndofor et al. 2013) 
Ndofor et al. (2013) state that the primary method of aligning the desires of 
management and shareholders is through ownership of the company by management. This 
alignment of desires should decrease the incentive to commit fraud. Consistent with agency 
theory, both academics and industry professionals state that increasing the level of ownership 
by top management improves the alignment between the incentives of shareholders (the 
owners or principals) and management (the agents), and this consequently decreases the 
likelihood of financial misconduct, such as restatements (Ndofor et al. 2013) or financial 
statement fraud. However, there are also contrary findings that suggests that higher 
concentration of ownership by top management might unintentionally increase aggressive 
and possibly fraudulent accounting practices (Loebbecke et al. 1989; Desai et al. 2006; 
O'Connor et al. 2006; Ndofor et al. 2013). The reason hypothesised for this is by fraudulently 
improving performance, CEOs can increase the short-term value of their ownership-based 
remuneration. Consequently there is no clear directional expectation associated with this 
variable. 
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4.5.12 Comparison Variables: Financial and Non-Financial 
It is common that financial figures (such as sales) and non-financial figures (such as 
number of employees) will grow or shrink together. However, because it is often difficult to 
fraudulently manipulate both categories simultaneously, discrepancies between the growth 
rates of these two categories can be considered suspicious and indicate fraud. The variables 
found to be empirically significant along with the studies that presented these findings are: 
V41 Percentage change in the number of Employees – percentage change in Total Assets 
(Dechow et al. 2011) 
V42 Percentage change in Sales – percentage change in the number of Employees (Brazel 
et al. 2009) 
V43 Percentage Change in Sales to Employees: Specific Company minus Industry Average 
(Perols and Lougee 2011; Perols 2011) 
Basic economics tells us that inputs into production such as the number of employees 
are correlated with the outputs from production such as the level of sales (Perols and Lougee 
2011). Brazel et al. (2009) support this theory using a case study in which they point out it is 
unlikely for substantial decreases in employee numbers to correspond to increases in sales. 
Because the number of employees is easier to audit and consequently more difficult to 
fraudulently manipulate (Brazel et al. 2009), changes in the difference between employees 
and revenue indicate a higher likelihood of fraud. Dechow et al. (2011) also point out that the 
argument also applies to the employees and company assets, not just employees and sales, as 
managers fraudulently overstating assets are likely not to be correspondingly manipulating 
employee numbers. 
Expected direction (positive or negative) of association with financial statement fraud 
Increases in the financial values (sales, assets) without corresponding increases in the 
non-financial (employees) raises the suspicion of fraud, and so higher V42 and lower V41 are 
expected to indicate higher likelihood of fraudulent manipulation. Furthermore, increases 
above the industry average as measured by V43 are expected to indicate a higher likelihood 
of fraud. 
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4.5.13 Control Variables 
When developing the data set, companies will be selected by a matched pair process 
that matches legitimate companies to known fraud companies. The matching will be done on 
their age, size, industry and the stock exchange on which they are listed. These features will 
also be included as explanatory variables as has been done in other studies, for example, both 
Perols and Lougee (2011) and Erickson et al. (2006) included total assets in their analysis 
even though they matched companies based on their size in terms of assets. While these are 
unlikely to be statistically significant because they will not be good differentiators given the 
matching process, they are still included for two reasons: (1) the matching process is not 
exact and more importantly (2) their inclusion allows for the possibility that these control 
variables might be significant when they interact with other variables. For example, Dechow 
et al. (2011) found that the influence of the variable V17 (Assets other than Cash and Net 
PP&E [termed Soft Assets] to Total Assets) varied with the industry. 
Some justification for the importance of these variables is included here with more 
justification in Section 5.1.2 on page 136 that further details the matching process. 
V44 Company Age, measured as the number of years since foundation (Lee et al. 1999; 
Carcello and Nagy 2004; Erickson et al. 2006; Brazel et al. 2009)78 
This variable controls for the financial incentive to commit fraud in younger firms 
around the period of the initial stock offering (Erickson et al. 2006). Additionally, Beasley 
(1996) suggests that younger firms might not have the controls established to adhere to 
reporting requirements, a point supported by Abbott et al. (2004) who empirically found that 
younger firms were associated with more restatements. 
V45 Company Size, measured by the natural log of Total Assets (Persons 1995; 
McKee 2009) 
V46 McKee (2009) actually used base 10 log, but this was not considered to be a 
significant difference. 
                                                 
 
78 Lee et al. (1999) actually calculated age as the number of years the company had data in the Compustat 
database, but this was not considered a significant difference and was also not chosen because it cannot be used 
by stakeholders who do not have access to Compustat. Additionally, Erickson et al. (2006) and Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) used the length of time the company has been publicly traded.  
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Smaller companies usually have weaker internal controls (Lou and Wang 2009) that 
might increase the opportunity to commit fraud. Correlation between company size and 
fraud-related litigation has been found (Bonner et al. 1998) and fraud has been found to be 
more prevalent in smaller firms (Persons 1995). However, the SEC may have a bias towards 
prosecuting larger companies. 
V47 Industry, specifically a binary variable indicating whether the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code starts with a 3 (Lee et al. 1999) 
• SIC codes starting with a 3 represent a subset of the manufacturing sector that 
comprises the manufacture of rubber and plastic products; leather and leather 
products; stone, clay, glass and concrete products; metals and metal products; 
industrial and commercial machinery, and computer equipment; electronic and 
electrical products; transportation equipment; instruments of measuring, analysing 
and control; and miscellaneous products. 
This variable was included to control for the fact that industry membership is a factor 
affecting the likelihood of fraud (Summers and Sweeney 1998), likely because of differences 
in the opportunities and incentives to commit fraud. This variable was chosen in preference to 
other industry membership variables as it was found to produce superior results by Lee et al. 
(1999) who found fraud more prominent in the industry group of SIC codes starting with a 
three, which are primarily computer companies. 
V48 Stock Exchange (Lee et al. 1999) 
V48a. Binary variable indicating whether the company was listed on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange 
V48b. Binary variable indicating whether the company was listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
• A zero in both of these variables indicates the company was listed on the only 
other exchange in the sample, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). These 
variables will actually be combined into one categorical variable for those 
techniques that can handle categorical variables. 
This variable controls for the fact that audit requirements affecting the opportunity to 
commit fraud vary across stock exchanges. It will also pick up any differences in the type of 
companies that decide to list on each exchange, possibly based on the differences in the 
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opportunity factor. For example, Lee et al. (1999) found less fraud amongst firms listed on 
the AMEX. Jiambalvo (1996) provides further support for the inclusion of these variables as 
binary variables were used to indicate the listing exchange, but this study did not conduct any 
significance tests on the variables. 
4.5.14 New Variables: Macroeconomic Indicators 
The ACFE (2009) revealed that most industry experts believe fraud increased during 
the recent economic slump, a belief that was supported by a Brisbane (Australia) partner of 
Deloitte in a question and answer session79. Furthermore, Rezaee and Riley (2010) imply that 
more financial statement fraud occurs in economic recessions (which can be measured by 
macroeconomic indicators). It is intuitive that poor economic conditions might increase the 
opportunity to commit fraud because control systems are weaker as a result of more emphasis 
upon the economic downturn. Consequently, the inclusion of macroeconomic indicators is 
proposed to allow probability of fraud to vary depending on macroeconomic conditions. This 
will allow for overall macroeconomic conditions mentioned as an opportunity factor by 
Romney et al. (2013) to be incorporated into the model. However, this variable is also 
hypothesised to be involved with the pressure factor as varying economic conditions will 
influence the amount of pressure managers perceive they are under. For example, when the 
economy is in a poor state managers might feel more pressure in line with the more 
pessimistic view that people hold. 
This research and most previous studies use matched observations by year, which 
means that a matched pair of fraud and legitimate companies will always have the same 
macroeconomic indicator and so cannot be differentiated by a macroeconomic indicator. 
However, the inclusion of the macroeconomic indicators does allow for the probability of 
fraud to differ with economic conditions, which could be important when classifying 
companies based on the probability that fraud has occurred. 
The following widely reported co-incident indicators of macroeconomic health will be 
included as explanatory variables80: 
                                                 
 
79 Graham Newton was a speaker at the ACFE’s Brisbane chapter’s fraud lunch on November 14, 2012. 
80 As this research only deals with data from the US, it does not need to be concerned with differences in 
the quality and accuracy of macroeconomic data from country to country. 
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V49 Macroeconomic Indicators 
V49a. Previous year’s percentage change in annual real GDP 
V49b. Previous year’s percentage change in annual retail sales 
V49c. Previous year’s unemployment rate inverted 
The previous year is used because at the time of release of the current year’s financial 
statement, the current year’s macroeconomic indicators might not be available. While the 
unemployment rate is usually considered a lagging indicator, it can also be used as a co-
incident indicator because people lose or gain confidence at the time when higher or lower 
unemployment rates are published (Layton et al. 2012). 
Lower values in any of these variables indicate deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions and so this is expected to be associated with more financial statement fraud, a 
concept supported by Warren Buffet’s famous statement, “Only when the tide goes out do 
you discover who's been swimming naked”81. The nature of fraud might also change with the 
cycle of the economy (Dorminey et al. 2012), in which case variable V48 would contribute 
when it interacts with other variables. Consequently, decision-tree techniques that 
intrinsically model interactions between explanatory variables will be analysed and if 
interactions are found between V48 and other variables, then new interaction variables will 
be added to the initial set of explanatory variables available to other model building 
techniques. 
4.5.15 New Variables: Corporate Governance Indices 
V50 Corporate Governance Index 
V50a. G-Index 
V50b. E-Index 
Past research has shown that weak corporate governance increases the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud (Hogan et al. 2008). The underlying proposition is that less 
monitoring means more opportunity to commit fraud. While a variety of individual corporate 
governance variables such as the percentage of executives on the board have been tested, 
                                                 
 
81 It is possible that the opposite direction of association will be found as Wang et al. (2010) suggest that we 
need to be vigilant against fraud in economic booms as well. 
Chapter 4 Selection of Explanatory Variables Adrian Gepp 
   Page 121 
there has been little empirical testing of corporate governance indices for use in fraud 
detection models. However, Kent et al. (2012) point out that there is support for both 
individual variables and indices for measuring corporate governance in the accounting 
literature. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that financial statement fraud is related to the 
aggregation of many corporate governance initiatives, more than the presence or absence of 
any particular one. The most prominent index is the G-index (Gompers et al. 2003), which 
aggregates the existence of 24 governance provisions82. The G-index will be added as an 
explanatory variable along with the more recently developed E-index (Bebchuk et al. 2009) 
that uses the six (out of the 24) provisions that were found to be the most important83. 
Specifically, the 18 unselected provisions were found to be uncorrelated with either reduced 
firm valuation or negative abnormal returns index (Bebchuk et al. 2009).  
Both indices are calculated simply as the sum of the individual provisions. The 
existence of each provision that restricts shareholder rights (and increases managerial power) 
is represented as 1, while the absence of that provision is represented as 0.  While this method 
of calculation does not reflect the relative influence of each provision, it has advantages of 
transparency and objectivity. Higher scores in either index indicate lower governance and 
monitoring, and weaker shareholder rights. A G-index value less than 6 is referred to as a 
Democracy, compared with a Dictatorship if it is greater than 13 (Gompers et al. 2003).  
One study (Johnson et al. 2009) used logistic regression on a matched-pair sample and 
did not find either index statistically significant, but the sample was only 49 matched pairs 
and this result is yet to be confirmed or contrasted using other supervised learning methods. 
Erickson et al. (2006) also found the G-index not to be significant in a logistic regression 
model, but again it was only one model and only used a limited number (50) of fraud cases. 
                                                 
 
82 The 24 provisions are Antigreenmail, Antigreenmail laws, Blank check preferred stock, Business 
combination laws, Limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, Limits to charter amendments, Control share cash-
out laws, Staggered boards, Compensation plans with changes-in-control provisions, Director indemnification 
contracts, Cumulative voting, Directors' duties provisions, Directors' duties laws, Fair-price provisions, Fair 
price laws, Golden parachutes, Director indemnification, Limitations of director liability, Pension parachutes, 
Poison pills, Secret ballot (or confidential voting), Executive severance agreements, Silver parachutes, Special 
meeting limitations, Supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments, Control-share acquisition 
laws, Unequal voting rights and Limitations on action by written consent. 
83 The E-index is made up of the following subset of 6 provisions: Staggered boards, Limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, Poison pills, Golden parachutes, and Supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments. 
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Because these indices have not been comprehensively tested, both indices will be tested more 
thoroughly by their inclusion as explanatory variables in this study. Furthermore, higher 
values of V49a and V49b represent increased opportunity to commit fraud and so are 
expected to be associated with more fraud. 
4.5.16 New Variables: Industry Complexity Measure 
V51 Accounting complexity of the industry 
The hypothesis being tested is that financial statement fraud is different and more 
prevalent in a more complex industry, presumably because there are more ways to attempt to 
cover up the fraud and fewer people who understand the details. A recent measure of an 
industry’s accounting complexity (Seavey 2011; Francis and Seavey 2012) will be included 
and tested as an explanatory variable, in addition to industry control variable V47. 
Quantifying the complexity of an industry is a difficult task and variable V51 has 
been chosen as the desirable measure of complexity because it is calculated as the mean of 
ten different complexity measures. V51 was also chosen as it attempts to specifically measure 
the accounting complexity of an industry as specified by its two-digit SIC code, which is 
preferential to using an industry concentration measure as a proxy for complexity as done by 
Ndofor et al. (2013)84. Table 4-6 below provides a mapping between 65 two-digit SIC codes 
and V51 complexity values, where a higher value indicates increased complexity. Further 
details about the construction of V47 are provided by Seavey (2011).  
It is also possible that the complexity of the industry will change the other fraud 
indicators in which case the V50 variable will be significant as it interacts with other 
variables. Consequently as with the macroeconomic variables, decision tree techniques that 
intrinsically model interactions will be analysed and if interactions are found between V50 
and other variables, then new interaction variables will be added to the initial set of 
explanatory variables available to other model building techniques. 
                                                 
 
84 Ndofor et al. (2013) also included the number of firms in the industry as an explanatory variable for 
explaining restatements, but the only reason they did this was as a control for the industry concentration 
variable. However, as I am not using this proxy for industry complexity, I have excluded the number of firms in 
an industry. 
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Table 4-6. The accounting complexity measure for each industry based on its two-digit SIC codes as 
per Seavey (2011). 
2-digit SIC code Complexity Measure  2-digit SIC code Complexity Measure 
01 35.9  41 25.4 
02 39.3  42 21.8 
07 33.7  44 36 
08 29.3  45 29.9 
09 32.9  46 34.5 
10 40  47 25.3 
12 40.3  48 40 
13 39.6  49 32.9 
14 33.8  50 23.6 
15 36.9  51 28.9 
16 29.2  52 20.5 
17 30.7  53 17.3 
20 35.1  54 15.7 
21 44.3  55 25.7 
22 31.2  56 18.2 
23 29.4  57 17.6 
24 26.3  58 20.9 
25 31.3  59 27.5 
26 36.1  70 30.2 
27 33.6  72 33 
28 45.4  73 42.6 
29 40.2  75 32.6 
30 35.4  76 36.2 
31 29.7  78 35.5 
32 38.5  79 33.9 
33 40.9  80 31.9 
34 35  81 30.4 
35 41.6  82 33 
36 42  83 23 
37 40.1  87 36.1 
38 41.2  89 42.9 
39 39  99 40.3 
40 26.8    
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4.5.17 Excluded Variables 
This subsection presents and discusses variables that have been excluded from this 
study. If stakeholders such as regulators or auditors have information in addition to the public 
information included in this study, then refinements to the models developed in this study 
could be made for particular stakeholders with additional information, with a view to 
enhancing the ability to detect financial statement fraud. Consistent with the statements by 
Feroz et al. (2000) about their models, the models developed in this research represent a 
minimum level of performance that is obtainable to all users, because refinements given 
additional data would only be made if they improved performance. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter this research aims to produce findings that 
are widely applicable to investors, regulators, auditors and other stakeholders, and 
consequently variables that are relatively difficult to obtain are excluded as they are less 
likely to be used in a practical context. The following variables have been found to be 
significant in prior research, but are excluded primarily because data on them is difficult to 
obtain in practice, which is consistent with the aim of this research and similar recent 
research by Perols (2011) and Dechow et al. (2011):  
• Insider trading factors (Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beneish 1999b) that are not easily 
obtainable in practice; 
• Retained earnings to assets and Market value of Equity to Assets (Lee et al. 1999) are 
also excluded because they were found to be significant in a test that used delisted 
companies85 as the comparison to fraudulent companies, and this is not the focus of this 
research; 
• Whether management lies to or is evasive with auditors and whether there is a weak 
internal control environment (Bell and Carcello 2000), which requires information from  
internal audit reports that are not publicly available; 
• The standard deviation of the volatility of returns over the past 60 months (Erickson et al. 
2006), which requires a large amount of data in addition to the financial statements; 
• The difference between revenue growth and the growth of a complex non-financial 
measure that Brazel et al. (2009) estimated using university students to imitate the 
auditing practice; 
                                                 
 
85 A delisted company is a company that is removed from the exchange on which it trades.  
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• Corporate lobbying factors (Yu and Yu 2011) which are not easily obtainable information 
in practice; 
• Information from analysts in addition to their estimates, specifically whether and when 
coverage or recommendations are dropped for firms, which were related to specific types 
of financial statement fraud (Cotter and Young 2007); 
• Text analysis (Glancy and Yadav 2011) and linguistic cues, for example, the use of more 
pleasantness and less lexical diversity being associated with fraud (Humpherys et al. 
2011);  
• The proportion of the proceeds from newly issued equity that went to insiders in the 
company, whether the company has a bonus plan and whether managers recently 
redeemed their stock appreciation rights (Beneish 1999b), as well as the unexercised 
options (Ndofor et al. 2013) or average stock options (O'Connor et al. 2006) the CEO 
owns86. 
• Information on committees under the board of directors and additional information about 
the directors87, specifically variables indicating the: 
• Existence of an audit committee (Dechow et al. 1996; Uzun et al. 2004) and the 
compensation committee (Dechow et al. 1996) 
• Composition of the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Uzun et 
al. 2004; Johnson et al. 2009; Skousen et al. 2009; Ndofor et al. 2013) and the 
compensation and nominating committees (Uzun et al. 2004)88 
• Number of meetings held by the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2000; O'Connor et al. 
2006; Ndofor et al. 2013), as well as the number of meetings held by the overall board 
of directors as this information is not reliably made public (Johnson et al. 2009; 
Ndofor et al. 2013) 
• The number of additional directorships held by outside directors and the average 
number of years outside directors have spent on the board (Beasley 1996) 
                                                 
 
86 Burns and Kedia (2006) also found the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price and Efendi 
et al. (2007) found CEO compensation measures using salary and options important variables in explaining 
restatements, which are related to, but different from, fraud as previously described in Section 2.2.2. 
87 It is worth stating that one high profile study (Beasley et al. 2010) claims that there is little evidence that 
audit committee characteristics are associated with financial statement fraud.  
88 Beasley (2000) finds variables such as audit committee composition to vary between fraud and legitimate 
companies in certain industries, but no financial statement fraud detection model was constructed. 
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• The age of the CEO (O'Connor et al. 2006); 
• Deferred tax variables (Ettredge et al. 2008); 
• Company complexity as measured by a diversification index that requires the analysis of 
market share for each industry segment the company operates within (Ndofor et al. 2013), 
which is information not easily obtainable in practice. 
4.5.18 Definition of Terms 
The first table defines general terms, while the second defines terms specific to 
particular variables. 
Table 4-7. Definitions of general terms. 
General Term Definition 
Subscript t, t-1… The specified year, previous year… 
Change (absolute) Xt - Xt-1 
Percentage change (Xt - Xt-1)/ Xt-1 
Average (Xt + Xt-1)/2 
Four-year growth rate (Xt/ Xt-3)^0.25 -1 
Binary variable Coded 1 for 'yes', 0 for 'no' 
Four-period average (Xt + Xt-1 + Xt-2 + Xt-3)/4 
Industry average Calculated as the average of the constituents of the S&P50089 at the 
end of the specified year that have the same two-digit industry 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
X inverted 1 / X 
 
Table 4-8. Definitions of terms specific to particular explanatory variables. The data sources are listed 
below in Section 4.6. 
Specific Term Definition 
Variable 
ID 
Gross Margin Sales – Cost of Goods Sold V12 
Cash Sales Sales – change in Accounts Receivable V13 
Were any Sales from 
Acquisitions? 
IF (Mergers & Acquisitions Transactions during previous year > 0)  
THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
V14 
Soft Assets Assets other than Cash and Net PP&E V17 
                                                 
 
89 The constituents of the Wiltshire 5000 were preferred, but this research was not able to acquire this data 
historically. 
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Income before extraordinary items – Net cash flow from operating 
activities (NCFUK)90  V19 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
(Total Accruals + Change in Accounts Receivable − Changes in Sales−Change in NCFUK − Gross Property Plant and Equipment − 1)prior yearrs Total Assets  V21 
Total Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary Accrualst-1 + Discretionary Accrualst-2 + 
Discretionary Accruals t-3 
V21 
RSST Accruals 
Change in WC + Change in NCO + Change in FINAverage Total Assets  
(Richardson et al. 2005) 
V22 
…WC 
(Current Assets – Cash & Short-term Investments) – 
(Current Liabilities – Debt in Current Liabilities) 
…NCO 
(Total Assets – Current Assets – Investments and Advances) –  
(Total Liabilities – Current Liabilities – Long-term Debt) 
…FIN 
(Short-term Investments + Long-term investments) –  





3.3 × Income before taxes and interestTotal Assets + 0.999 × SalesTotal Assets 
+0.6 × Market Value of EquityTotal Liabilities + 1.2 × Working CapitalTotal Assets  
+0.4 × Retained EarningsTotal Assets  
V25 
Times Interest Earned Income before taxes and interest / Interest Expense V26 
Return on Equity Net Income / Total Common Equity V27 
Return on Average 
Prior Assets 
Net Income / Average Total Assetst-1 V28 
One-Year Holding 
Period Return 
Price at Balance Sheet Date –  Price One Year AgoPrice One Year Ago  
Following prior research by Beneish (1999b), if the “Price at 
Balance Sheet Date” is not available because the company is delisted 
the value of V29a is set to -100%. 
V29a 
Were analyst EPS 
forecasts achieved or 
exceeded? 
IF (Actual EPS >= Estimated EPS) THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
where EPS = Earnings Per Share 
V30 
                                                 
 
90  Although there are a variety of ways to estimate accruals (Lee et al. 1999), this research follows previous 
research (Beneish 1997; Lee et al. 1999; Perols 2011) by calculating Total Accruals as Income before 
extraordinary items - Net cash flow from operating activities (). As further support this calculation 
method (Beneish 1997) found similar results in a financial statement fraud modelling situation when total 
accruals were calculated using a different, longer method similar to (Dechow et al. 1996). 
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Specific Term Definition 
Variable 
ID 
Was new common 
stock issued? 
IF (Shares Outstanding > prior year’s Shares Outstanding)  
THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
V31a 
Was new long-term 
debt issued? 
IF (New long-term debt issued > 0) THEN “yes” ELSE “no” V31b 
Proportion of 
common stock that is 
newly issued 
Shares Outstanding –  prior year’s Shares OutstandingShares Outstanding  V32 
Demand for financing 
(ex ante) 
NCFUK – (Average of prior 3 year’s Capital Expenditure)prior year’s Current Assets  V33a 
Was there demand for 
financing (ex ante)? 
IF (Demand for financing (ex ante) < -0.5) THEN “yes” ELSE “no” V33b 
Cash generated from 
operating and 
investment activities 
NCFUK – Cash Dividends – Capital Expenditure V33c 
Were there operating 
leases? 
IF (Future operating lease obligations > 0)  
THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
V34 
Was the auditor a Big 
Six firm? 
IF (Auditor = Arthur Andersen, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG or Coopers Lybrand) 
THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
V38 
Number of changes of 
audit firm in the most 
recent four financial 
statements 
IF(Auditort ≠ Auditort-1) THEN 1 ELSE 0  
+ IF(Auditort-1 ≠ Auditort-2) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
+ IF(Auditort-2 ≠ Auditort-3) THEN 1 ELSE 0
91 
V39 
CEO Tenure Balance Sheet Date – CEO Start Date (in days) V40a 
Number of CEO 
changes in the last 
three years 
The number of new CEOs that  started between timet and timet-3 + 
IF(an existing CEO leaves without replacement during timet and 
time t-3) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
V40b 
CFO changed in the 
last three years? 
IF(a new CFO started or an existing CFO left without replacement 
between timet and timet-3) THEN “yes” ELSE “no” 
V41 
Percentage of 
Directors who are 
also Executives92 
Number of directors who are also executives at time8Number of directors at time8  V42b 
Percentage of 
Director shares owned 
by those who are also 
Executives92 
Shares owned by directors who are also executives at time8Shares owned by directors at time8  V42c 
 
                                                 
 
91 Both auditor values had to be non-blank for it to be considered a change in auditor.  
92 Those people without any date information are not counted. 
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4.6  Data Sources 
The primary data source is the Capital IQ database using original filings at the balance 
sheet date and not restated filings, because restated filings would not be available at the 
balance sheet date when the fraud detection model is designed to be used. The data field is 
from Capital IQ unless otherwise specified, while the corresponding Compustat field (where 
known) has also been included for convenience for those who have access to that database. 
Data Data field 
Corresponding 
Field (if known) 
Accounts receivable IQ_AR 2 
Total assets IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS 6 
AFDA IQ_ALLOW_DOUBT_ACCT 67 
Sales IQ_REV 12 
Inventory IQ_INVENTORY 3 
Inventory method IQ_INV_METHOD 59 




Net cash flow from 
operating activities (NCFUK) IQ_CASH_OPER 308 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment (Gross) 
IQ_GPPE 7 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment (Net) 
IQ_NPPE 8 
Current Assets IQ_TOTAL_CA 4 
Cash & Short-term 
Investments 
IQ_CASH_ST_INVEST 1 
Current Liabilities IQ_TOTAL_CL 5 
Debt in Current Liabilities IQ_CURRENT_PORT_DEBT 34 
Long-term Investments IQ_LT_INVEST 32 
Total Liabilities IQ_TOTAL_LIAB 181 
Long-term Debt IQ_LT_DEBT 9 
Short-term Investments IQ_ST_INVEST 193 
Preferred Stock IQ_PREF_EQUITY 130 
Income before taxes and 
interest 
IQ_NI_AVAIL_EXCL + IQ_INC_TAX + 
IQ_INTEREST_EXP 
18 + 16 + 15 
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Data Data field 
Corresponding 
Field (if known) 
Interest Expense IQ_INTEREST_EXP 15 
Market Value of Equity 
 
Order of preference93: 
1. HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP (Bloomberg) 
2. IQ_CLOSEPRICE × 
 IQ_SHARESOUTSTANDING 
3. PX_LAST (Bloomberg) × 
 IQ_SHARESOUTSTANDING 
25×199 
Retained Earnings IQ_RE 36 
Working Capital IQ_WORKING_CAP 179 
New Long-term Debt 
Issued 
IQ_LT_DEBT_ISSUED 111 
Capital Expenditure IQ_CAPEX 128 
Cash Dividends IQ_TOTAL_DIV_PAID_CF  
Shares Outstanding IQ_SHARESOUTSTANDING 25 
Net Income IQ_NI 172 
Price PX_LAST (Bloomberg) 199 
Estimated EPS IQ_EPS_EST I/B/E/S Database 
(Perols, 2011) 
Actual EPS IQ_EST_ACT_EPS I/B/E/S Database 
(Perols, 2011) 
Mergers & Acquisitions 
Transactions 
“M&A Transactions” in 
IQ_TRANSACTION_LIST_MA 
249 





Number of Employees IQ_TOTAL_EMPLOYEES 29 
Auditor (Audit Firm) IQ_AUDITOR_NAME 149 
CEO & CFO changes Analysed from 




                                                 
 
93 Bloomberg used in preference as it was much more complete for price and market capitalisation 
information. 
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Data Data field 
Corresponding 
Field (if known) 
CEO Start Date Analysed from 




(Ndofor et al., 
2013) 
Balance Sheet Date IQ_PERIODDATE_BS  
Number of Directors Analysed from 




Number of Directors who 
are also Executives 
Analysed from 




Shares owned by the two 
groups above 
IQ_INSIDER_SHARES for CEO 




Shares owned by CEO IQ_INSIDER_SHARES for CEO 
(using Macros in Excel) 
CRSP,Compustat 
or Execucomp 
(Ndofor et al., 
2013) 
Year of Foundation IQ_YEAR_FOUNDED94  
SIC code IQ_PRIMARY_SIC_CODE  
Listing Exchange IQ_EXCHANGE  
Percentage change in 
annual real GDP 
IQ_REAL_GDP_GROWTH  
Percentage change in 
annual retail sales 
IQ_RETAIL_SALES_YOY_PCT  
Unemployment rate IQ_UNEMPLOY_RATE  
G-Index Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) - freely available 
information 
E-Index Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) - freely available 
information 
Operational and accounting 
complexity of the industry 




                                                 
 
94 A small number of blanks were filled in from multiple sources through Internet searches. 
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Chapter 5 Modelling and Results 
This chapter presents the results from comparing multiple modelling techniques to 
detect financial statement fraud, after first describing the data and then the methodology 
being used. The specific research questions being addressed are 
• RQ1 “Which supervised-learning modelling techniques are the most accurate at detecting 
financial statement fraud under varying assumptions about prior fraud probabilities and 
ratios of misclassification error costs?” and  
• RQ2 “Which supervised-learning modelling technique is the best overall at detecting 
financial statement fraud, considering the entire range of assumptions investigated in 
RQ1?” 
The motivation and benefits for this type of research are summarised in Section 2.3.5 
of Chapter 2. The literature review in Chapter 3 highlights the need for further research into 
models for detection of financial statement fraud. The literature review also guides the 
selection of modelling techniques and other methodological decisions to utilise findings from 
prior research and make new contributions to the field. The research presented in this chapter 
uses the variables selected in the previous chapter using the variable selection process 
(described in Section 4.4) that is based on the newly developed schema (Section 4.1) and 
theoretical Fraud Detection Triangle framework (Section 4.2). An analysis of the importance 
of each explanatory variable follows in the next chapter. 
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5.1  Data 
This study focuses on public companies listed on US stock exchanges. The study was 
restricted to publicly listed companies to promote homogeneity in the data in order to focus 
on differences between fraudulent and legitimate financial statements. The Over-The-Counter 
(OTC) markets have been excluded because there is less data transparency and availability, 
and a lack of required standards for companies listing on them (SEC 2014). The data were 
also restricted to publicly listed companies in order to be consistent with the aim of the study, 
which is to produce research findings that will be widely applicable to investors, regulators, 
auditors and other stakeholders. However, it is important to note that the methodology used to 
develop and evaluate models (as described later in Section 5.2) could be used on data from 
different types of organisations that produce financial statements. Investigating fraud in both 
private companies and those traded in the OTC markets is also worthwhile research. 
Consequently, the methodology used in this research is portable to future research on such 
companies, as well as not-for-profit organisations. 
The US region was chosen because data are more readily accessible from there. 
However, the methodology that is used in this study can easily be adapted to other countries 
where financial statement fraud is also a problem. The ACFE (2012) found few differences 
across regions of the globe, and consequently models developed in this study might be able to 
be used in different countries without adaptation. There is a precedent for this in the field of 
business failure prediction where Altman’s (1968) Z-score model estimated on US data has 
been widely used in many other countries. 
The selection of the fraudulent and legitimate cases used in this research is discussed 
next, followed by the selection of the final data set and univariate analysis of it. The 
explanatory variables that were defined and selected in the previous chapter are collected for 
each of these fraudulent and legitimate cases. 
5.1.1 Determination of Fraud Observations 
It is very important to establish benchmark data sets so that research into new 
techniques and explanatory variables can be compared with one another. Dechow et al. 
(2011) provide details on such a data set which is available through the Centre for Financial 
Reporting and Management at the Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley. The data set has 
been constructed from fraudulent misstatements in financial statements as alleged by the US 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and disclosed in Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs), and it has been periodically updated. This data set is used 
for this research and comprises data from AAERs issued from when they first started in 1982 
until August 31, 2012. Even though these are only cases of alleged fraud, they will simply be 
referred to as cases of fraud in order to simplify the text. This is a procedure that has been 
followed in other studies of fraud. 
AAERs are the most popular resource for empirical studies of financial statement 
fraud and most prior research has used it (Feroz et al. 1991; Persons 1995; Beasley 1996; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1997; Green and Choi 1997; Fanning and Cogger 1998; Beneish 
1999a, 1999b; Feroz and Kwon 1999; Lee et al. 1999; Feroz et al. 2000; Kaminski et al. 
2004; Kiehl et al. 2005; Erickson et al. 2006; Bayley and Taylor 2007; Cotter and Young 
2007; Hoogs et al. 2007; Ettredge et al. 2008; Skousen and Wright 2008; Brazel et al. 2009; 
Johnson et al. 2009; McKee 2009; Skousen et al. 2009; Beasley et al. 2010; Goel et al. 2010; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Perols 2011; Perols and Lougee 2011; Wang et al. 2011; Alden et al. 
2012; Whiting et al. 2012; Cao et al. 2015). The benefits and drawbacks of using data from 
AAERs are discussed in the following subsection. 
5.1.1.a  An Analysis of the Use of Data from AAERs 
SEC enforcement actions are an objective method for identifying companies with 
fraudulent financial statements, and as such AAERs provide an advantage over alternative 
measures of earnings management, such as restatements or accrual levels, in which 
accounting fraud may not exist (Cotter and Young 2007). AAERs are also publicly available, 
unlike data held by auditing firms that are rarely made available for research (Fanning and 
Cogger 1998). AAERs are one of the most comprehensive sources of detected cases of fraud 
and no better publicly available source exists (Beasley et al. 2010). Karpoff et al. (2014) 
analysed the most popular financial misconduct databases and found AAERs to be the best in 
terms of having a comprehensive scope, which is to say they excluded the smallest number of 
relevant cases. Data sets comprising fraud cases listed in AAERs are also free of such 
researcher classification bias that results from researchers themselves deciding which 
accounting errors are deemed fraudulent.  
There is no perfect method of identifying firms that engage in accounting fraud 
(Erickson et al. 2006). There are limitations with an AAER data set, but the benefits outweigh 
them. One of the issues with fraud data sets is the reliability of the fraudulent classifications. 
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Karpoff et al. (2014) point out that AAERs include many cases that do not involve financial 
statement fraud and removing these extraneous cases is required before analysing the data. 
This is what has been done to produce the data set used in this research. Dechow et al. (2011) 
explain how only fraud cases were included in the data set by reading every AAER in the 
sample. The advantage of fraud cases from AAERs is that the reliability of the SEC 
allegations is very high, meaning that there is little chance that financial statements alleged to 
be fraudulent are in fact legitimate. The SEC has limited resources and is therefore most 
likely to pursue cases that have a greater assurance of fraud and less ambiguity (Dechow et 
al. 2010). It is important to note that there is a small chance that some companies do not 
dispute incorrect SEC allegations of fraud as they view it as their path of least cost (Fanning 
and Cogger 1998).  
While there is little risk from false identification of fraudulent cases, there is no doubt 
that the SEC misses some frauds (Dyck et al. 2013; Karpoff et al. 2014) on account of their 
limited resources. One global fund manager wrote in a blog95 on January 5, 2013, “I had 
reported many frauds to the SEC. Sometimes the SEC acted. Mostly it did not. When it acted 
it was often after the stock had gone to zero.” This comment also highlights the long lag 
between the occurrence of fraud, and its detection and disclosure by the SEC in AAERs. This 
finding is consistent with Karpoff et al.’s (2014) analysis of financial misconduct databases. 
It also supports the need for models to speed up the detection of financial statement fraud. 
Because some frauds are missed, there is a risk that when choosing legitimate 
observations a truly fraudulent observation may be chosen, even though there is no AAER 
issued against the company. Unfortunately, it is mostly an unavoidable problem with this 
type of research and it highlights the importance of not training overly-complex models that 
become too specific to the training data as they may contain some errors96. It is important to 
recall that techniques such as TreeNet and Random Forests (see Section 3.3.5 on page 56) 
that utilise random samples of the training data are much less likely to produce models 
overly-specific to the training data as they never use all of the training data together. 
Despite firms of all sizes being vulnerable to fraud, there is some evidence that 
AAERs are biased towards larger companies (Dechow et al. 2011), presumably because their 
                                                 
 
95 The blog is written by John Hempton and is currently available at http://brontecapital.blogspot.com.au/. 
96 Wang (2013) does present an alternative research framework that attempts to address the issue of 
undetected fraud being omitted. 
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fraud schemes could do more harm to more people, and also because there is more scrutiny 
from analysts and the press. This bias is also consistent with the SEC’s duty to protect 
investors that probably means they more closely analyse repeat offenders and companies that 
are raising money (Dechow et al. 2010). The fact that the bias towards cases that could do 
more harm to more people will flow through into models developed using data from AAERs 
is arguably a benefit as the models will be trained to detect the costliest frauds. Additionally, 
a bias in detecting fraud that the SEC deems to be the most important is informative because 
an SEC investigation is a very important event for any company (Beasley et al. 2010). 
5.1.2 Selection of Legitimate Companies 
Supervised learning methods need to be trained on both fraudulent and legitimate cases, and 
therefore a matching set of legitimate companies has been chosen from those with no AAER 
issued against them. The matching process is important as it controls for external and 
unobservable factors (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Johnson et al. 2009). The matching was 
done one-to-one as a matched-pairs design, which selected one legitimate company for each 
fraudulent company. The vast majority of studies have used one-to-one matching to select 
legitimate observations. Although one-to-one matching is vastly different from real-world 
data sets that comprise all companies, it allows models to learn patterns without bias towards 
one particular class which may increase their discriminating ability (Alden et al. 2012). 
Consequently, matching is appropriate for classification problems such as financial statement 
fraud detection (McKee 2009) to improve the models’ ability to effectively discriminate 
between fraudulent and legitimate statements (Persons 1995). 
Matching has been performed in this study based on year of alleged fraud, industry 
and stock exchange, age of company and company size. Matching based on year, industry 
and size is common in the literature (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Green and Choi 
1997; Fanning and Cogger 1998; Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello and Nagy 
2004; Kaminski et al. 2004; Uzun et al. 2004; Erickson et al. 2006; Bayley and Taylor 2007; 
Ettredge et al. 2008; Skousen and Wright 2008; Beasley et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2011; Alden 
et al. 2012). Matching using these parameters is intended to limit unwanted signals (noise) 
from seasonal earning patterns, unique industry effects in terms of business environment and 
reporting requirements, and company size. Matching was also performed on the age of the 
company as  undertaken in previous research (Beneish 1999b; Desai et al. 2006; Perols and 
Lougee 2011) because the SEC, supported by prior academic research, more closely 
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scrutinises younger companies as it perceives them to have a higher likelihood of financial 
statement fraud (Beneish 1999b). Matching has also been performed according to the stock 
exchange the fraudulent company is listed on, in order to control for changes in reporting 
requirements between exchanges. This is consistent with previous research (Beasley 1996; 
Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Beasley et al. 2010). 
In summary, using the company screening tool in the Capital IQ database97, matched 
legitimate companies are chosen based on their 
• Existence in the specified year (Year), 
• Being from the same industry according to two-digit SIC codes (Industry), 
• Listing on the same stock exchange and reporting in US dollars (Exchange), 
• Being in the same age range: over ten years old, five to ten years old and younger than 
five years (Age), 
• Having the closest (non-zero and non-blank) size according to total assets (Size), and 
• Not having financial statements alleged to be fraudulent in an AAER. 
If a match could not be found using all of the criteria listed above, then the Age criterion was 
progressively relaxed until a match was found. For each company that produced fraudulent 
annual financial statements in consecutive years, a matching legitimate company is found for 
the first fraud year. The same legitimate company was used then as the matching company 
for the subsequent fraud years. 
5.1.3 Selection of the Time Period to Study 
The data set described in Section 5.1.1 contains information from all AAERs released 
until August 31, 2012. However, there is a long, multiple-year lag between the occurrence of 
the fraud and its disclosure in an AAER (Beneish 1997; Cotter and Young 2007; Beasley et 
al. 2010; Karpoff et al. 2014). Beasley et al. (2010) studied AAERs issued between 1998 and 
2007 inclusive, but were not confident of drawing conclusions relating to frauds that occurred 
four years earlier than 2007 because of this time lag. Consequently, the end date of this study 
                                                 
 
97 To complete this process, the details about the fraud companies listed in the AAER data set had to be 
obtained from the Capital IQ database. An automated script was run to match the company names in the AAER 
data set with those in the Capital IQ database, and in the case of any uncertainty manual conversion was done 
using additional information such as the nature of the business and the location of the headquarters to confirm 
the correct company was selected. 
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was chosen to be the end of 2007, which is slightly more than four years prior to August, 
2012. This decision reduces the likelihood that AAERs issued after August 31, 2012 refer to 
fraud in the chosen time period and thereby influence the results of this study. There is 
further evidence to support choosing 2007 as the endpoint, because there is major concern 
that the years that follow are still incomplete with reference to fraud alleged in AAERs. This 
is because 2008, 2009 and 2010 are the only years in the data set that have more than a 50% 
decline in the number of frauds from the previous year. In future when data from 2008 
onwards are more complete, it would be interesting to include the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) that began in the second half of 2007 and continued for several years. Testing models 
developed in this current research on data from during the GFC would give valuable insight 
into whether their accuracy is retained during a major financial crisis. 
Longer time periods are preferred as they provide larger samples, but shorter time 
periods are preferable to exclude older fraud cases that are less relevant for current detection. 
To balance these competing preferences, a ten-year time period from 1998 to 2007 was 
chosen98. The ten-year period of this current study includes 464 fraudulent financial 
statements as alleged in AAERs, which increases the validity of results compared with many 
other studies that used smaller data sets. Using a larger number of fraud cases is important as 
it assists techniques such as logistic regression to reduce bias in estimates, and helps the more 
complicated techniques such as neural networks and decision trees to learn more effectively. 
5.1.4 The Final Data Set 
Within the entire data set created from AAERs in 1982 through to August, 2012, there were 
789 businesses allegedly involved in producing 1838 fraudulent annual financial statements. 
From this, the final sample of 138 fraudulent businesses that produced 464 fraudulent 
financial statements was selected after the exclusions listed in the dot points below99. This 
process is also summarised in Table 5-1 below on page 140. 
                                                 
 
98 The study also included both fraud schemes that started in the study time period and extended beyond it, 
and fraud schemes that occurred in the study time period but started earlier. This involved 44 company-years of 
fraud occurring outside the 1998-2007 range. 
99 Some studies also excluded banking, insurance and finance companies because they are subject to 
different reporting requirements, but these have been included in this study because explanatory variables 
measuring differences between industries have been included. These variables will allow models to cater for the 
differences between these industry sectors if they are important for distinguishing fraudulent from legitimate 
cases. 
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• 410 businesses were excluded because they were outside the selected time period of 
1998-2007; 
• A further 42 businesses were excluded because there were no data available, which was 
defined as no data on total assets, net income and equity; 
• A further 190 businesses were excluded because they were not public companies listed on 
a stock exchange; 
• A further 4 companies that did not report in US dollars were excluded, consistent with 
previous research (such as by Perols [2011]), because they are foreign companies that 
substantially differ from the rest of the sample. Given their small number, their exclusion 
reduces unwanted noisy data that would dilute the learning opportunity from the other 
data; 
• A further 3 companies were excluded because a matched legitimate company could not 
be found, even when the Age and Exchange matching criteria (as defined in Section 
5.1.2) were removed; 
• Finally, 24 financial statements were excluded because they related to fraudulently 
understating (as opposed to overstating) financial performance or financial position. This 
was consistent with previous research such as by Dechow et al. (2011). The expected 
direction of association of the explanatory variables in understated cases is likely to be 
opposite to that for the more common overstated cases (which were presented in the 
previous chapter). As there is only a relatively small number of these cases, they have 
been excluded to allow models to concentrate on detecting more homogeneous fraud 
cases involving overstatement of financials. These 24 financial statements were from 10 
different businesses, but there is only a drop by two in Table 5-1 as the other 8 committed 
fraud using overstatement in other years. 
Unlike in the work of Perols (2011) who removed companies less than four years old (as 
some of their explanatory variables required four years of data), such companies have not 
been excluded in this study so not to limit and bias the results towards older companies. This 
will result in some missing values, but statistical techniques will be used to handle these and 
will be explained later. 
The number of fraudulent businesses is smaller than the number of fraudulent 
financial statements because some businesses in the data set have produced more than one 
fraudulent financial statement. Figure 5-1 below reveals that the largest number of fraudulent 
businesses in the final data set produced only one fraudulent set of annual financial 
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statements. However, many businesses also produced fraudulent annual financial statements 
in two, three, four or more years; this was done in consecutive years for all but three 
businesses. The median number of fraudulent financial statements produced by a fraudulent 
business is three. This is not surprising given that an earlier study by Beasley et al. (2010) 
found that financial statement fraud schemes lasted a median of two years and the trend at 
that time was that they were becoming longer. Overall, this means that models trained on this 
data will detect fraudulent statements from companies committing fraud once in isolation or 
from those who are repeat offenders. 
Table 5-1. Summary of process to select the final fraud data set. 
 Total number of alleged fraudulent 
 Businesses 
Financial Statements 
produced by those businesses 
Annual fraud in the entire data set created from 
AAERs in 1982 through to August, 2012 
789 1838 
   Less: Not within the time period (1998-2007) -410 -810 
   Less: Data not available -42 -105 
   Less: Not publicly listed on a stock exchange -190 -428 
   Less: Not reporting in US dollars -4 -4 
   Less: No matched company found -3 -3 
   Less: Fraud by understatement -2 -24 
Final Fraud Data set 138 464 
 
Figure 5-1. The relative number of fraudulent businesses from the final data set that have produced 
fraudulent annual financial statements in one, two, three, four or more years. 
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Table 5-2. Industry breakdown of fraudulent businesses in this study as compared to another recent 
study as well as the entire population of businesses. 
Industry Category 
Percentage of Fraudulent 
Businesses in 
Percentage of Businesses 
in Overall Population 
(from Dechow et al. 
(2011)) This Study 
Dechow et al. 
(2011) 
Agriculture 0% 0% 0% 
Mining and Construction 1% 3% 3% 
Refining and Extractive 2% 1% 5% 
Food and Tobacco 4% 3% 2% 
Textile and Apparel 2% 3% 2% 
Lumber, Furniture and Printing 1% 2% 3% 
Chemicals 3% 2% 2% 
Pharmaceuticals 4% 3% 3% 
Durable Manufacturers 19% 19% 19% 
Computers 30% 20% 11% 
Transportation 4% 5% 6% 
Utilities 1% 2% 3% 
Retail 9% 13% 10% 
Banks and Insurance 14% 12% 21% 
Services 8% 13% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 5-2 above reveals the proportion of fraudulent businesses according to industry 
categories using the breakdown specified by Frankel et al. (2002)100, which has also been 
used by Dechow et al. (2011). The proportions in this study are highly correlated (with a 
coefficient of correlation of 0.93) with those in Dechow et al. (2011). The latter found the 
industry categories of Computer, Retail and Services contained notably more financial 
statement fraud relative to their proportion in the overall population of businesses. However, 
                                                 
 
100 Industries are based on the following Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes: Agriculture 0100-
0999; Mining and Construction 1000-1299,1400-1999; Refining and Extractive 1300-1399,2900-2999; Food 
and Tobacco 2000-2141; Textiles and Apparel 2200-2399; Lumber, Furniture and Printing 2400-2796; 
Chemicals 2800-2824,2840-2899; Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836,3829-3851; Durable Manufacturers 3000-3569, 
3580-3669, 3680-3828,3852-3999; Computers 3570-3579,3670-3679,7370-7379; Transportation 4000-4899; 
Utilities 4900-4999; Retail 5000-5999; Banks and Insurance 6000-6999, Services 7000-7369,7380-9999. 
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in the data set used in this research, only the Computers industry category was 
overrepresented for fraud. The reason for this fact is likely that businesses in the Computers 
industry frequently overstate their sales by recognising premature and fictitious revenue 
(Dechow et al. 2011). This fact also justifies the use of an explanatory variable that measures 
industry representation primarily from technology and computer companies, such as V46 
from the previous chapter. Overall, Table 5-2 reveals that the data set to be used in this study 
contains fraud that occurs across a broad range of industries. This is consistent with research 
findings that fraud does in fact take place across different industries (Beasley et al. 2010). 
Table 5-3 below also shows that the fraudulent financial statements are fairly 
uniformly distributed across the range of business sizes according to their total assets. The 
smallest 50% of businesses produced 52% of the fraudulent financial statements. Similar to 
those of Dechow et al. (2011), these results were obtained by ranking businesses according to 
their size from when they first produced fraudulent financial statements. An even more 
uniform distribution was obtained when using market capitalisation (as was used by Dechow 
et al. [2011]) instead of total assets. The fact that fraud occurs across the range of business 
sizes during the time period selected for this study is consistent with other research 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Beasley et al. 2010). 
Table 5-3. The frequency of fraudulent financial statements for varying business sizes. 
Size of the Fraudulent Businesses 
By total assets in the first year fraud was committed 
Number of Fraudulent Financial 




Smallest 10%: 0-10% 34 7% 7% 
Next Largest 10%: 10-20% 55 12% 19% 
Next Largest 10%: 20-30% 69 15% 34% 
Next Largest 10%: 30-40% 41 9% 43% 
Next Largest 10%: 40-50% 44 9% 52% 
Next Largest 10%: 50-60% 51 11% 63% 
Next Largest 10%: 60-70% 49 11% 74% 
Next Largest 10%: 70-80% 40 9% 83% 
Next Largest 10%: 80-90% 44 9% 92% 
Largest 10%: 90-100% 37 8% 100% 
Total 464 100%  
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Together Tables 5-2 and 5-3 show that financial statement fraud occurs across a range 
of industries and company sizes in the final data set used in this research, which suggests that 
models developed in this current research can be applied to a broad range of companies in 
terms of their size and industry representation. 
5.1.5 Partitions of the Data for Training and Testing 
The final data set of fraudulent financial statements along with their matched 
legitimate statements was then partitioned in two. As stated in Chapter 3, chronologically 
partitioning the data set is desirable because it results in more realistic accuracy estimates as 
models are tested on data further into the future. Consequently, one partition comprising data 
from 1997 until 2002 is used for training models and the other partition from 2003 to 2007 is 
used as holdout data for testing models. Table 5-4 summarises the size of the data sets for 
training and testing that respectively contain 295 (63.6%) and 169 (36.4%) fraudulent 
financial statement cases, which is more than many other studies that used fewer than 100 
cases. This partitioning allocates approximately one-third of the data for testing, which is 
common in modelling studies. 
Table 5-4. Size of the data sets used in this research. 
Data set 
Number of Financial Statements 
Fraudulent Legitimate Total 
Training (≤ 2002) 295 295 590 (63.6%) 
Holdout for Testing (≥ 2003) 169 169 338 (36.4%) 
All 464 464 928 (100%) 
 
5.1.6 Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis provides further information about the final data, as well as an 
indication of the statistical significance of each explanatory variable on its own to 
differentiate fraudulent and legitimate financial statements. Tests on the entire final data set 
(not just the training data set) have been conducted to see if there is a statistically significant 
difference between means of individual variables for fraudulent and legitimate financial 
statements. For example, the mean of variable V1a for fraudulent statements will be 
compared with the mean of V1a for legitimate statements. The null hypothesis for each 
variable is that there is no significant difference in the means and the alternative hypothesis is 
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that they are significantly different. P-values closer to zero indicate more support for the 
alternative hypothesis.  
The first test that has been conducted is a standard t-statistic test for comparing 
means. Cases with missing values have been excluded, and consequently the number of data 
points for each test varies according to the number of missing values. As an alternative, the 
missing values have been replaced using a neutral value procedure outlined in the following 
subsection, and then an F-statistic one-way analysis-of-variance test has been used to 
compare means without any data loss from missing values. According to the Central Limit 
Theorem, violation of the normality assumption of these tests is not a practical concern 
because of the size of the data set. 
5.1.6.a Replacement of Missing Values 
Based on the concept used by Beneish (1999a), the neutral value of variables was 
used as the default replacement for missing values101. 
• The neutral value for variables involving percentage or absolute change calculations is 
zero, which represents that no change has occurred. 
• The neutral value for variables that involve specific values of ratios, such as V28a Return 
on Average Assets, is one (as used by Beneish [1999a]), which represents the numerator 
being equal to the denominator. 
• Similarly, the neutral value for variables calculated as the difference between an industry 
average and the company’s figure is zero, which indicates the company has the same 
value as the industry average. 
For the remaining variables, the mean is used as the default replacement for a missing value, 
except where specific neutral values have been identified from prior research. These 
exceptions (for V25, V33a and V50), along with all the replacements for all missing values, 
are described in Table 5-7 on page 150. 
There are no missing values for binary variables such as V9 Was Last-In, First-Out 
inventory valuation used?, because their value is “no” unless there is evidence for a “yes” 
answer. In addition, variables V39c Percentage of Director shares owned by those who are 
also Executives, V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO and V49b Corporate 
                                                 
 
101 Missing values have occurred when the variable calculation involved trying to divide a non-zero number 
by zero, as well as when there are no data available. 
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Governance E-Index have been excluded from the missing value replacement process 
because more than 80% of their data are missing. Consequently, only t-statistic tests that 
exclude missing values have been performed on these variables, except for variable V49b 
which is removed altogether as it only has 29 (3%) non-missing values. 
5.1.6.b Results from Univariate Tests 
The results of all univariate analyses are presented in Table 5-7 (at the end of this 
section, on page 150) and a discussion of these results follows. It is clear that the results from 
the t-statistic that excludes missing values are almost identical to the F-statistic test that 
replaces missing values, because of the similarity in their p-values for each variable102. 
Therefore, for simplicity, the following analysis will refer only to the p-values corresponding 
to the t-test.  
The explanatory variables that are statistically significant at a 10% level of 
significance are discussed in the following dot points according to their category in the 
overall schema presented in Section 4.1 (page 71). It is important to note that for variables 
with an expected direction of association with fraud (as presented in Section 4.5 starting on 
page 88) one-sided p-values are used as only one side is relevant. These one-sided p-values 
are calculated by dividing the two- p-values (that are presented in Table 5-7) by two. 
Financial: Specific Account 
• Accounts Receivable: Only V1a Accounts Receivable is statistically significant with a 
one-sided p-value for an expected positive association with fraud of 0.000. As expected, 
higher levels of accounts receivable have occurred in fraudulent financial statements. 
• Allowance for doubtful accounts: No variables from this category are statistically 
significant. 
• Inventory: Only V8a Inventory to Sales is statistically significant with a one-sided p-
value for an expected positive association with fraud of 0.000. As expected, higher levels 
of inventory relative to sales have occurred in fraudulent financial statements. 
• Sales: Only V14 Sales from Acquisitions is statistically significant in the expected 
direction with a one-sided p-value for a positive association with fraud of 0.000. As 
expected, acquisitions have more often been a contributor to sales in fraudulent financial 
                                                 
 
102 In addition to comparing p-values, if comparing the t-statistic to the F-statistic then note that the 
relationship is  = . 
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statements. In addition, V10b and V10d measuring Sales Growth and V11a Sales to Total 
Assets are statistically significant with two-sided p-values ranging from 0.003 to 0.067. 
While their expected directions of association with fraud were uncertain, these variables 
showed higher sales growth, but lower sales relative to total assets occurred in fraudulent 
financial statements. 
Financial: General 
• Asset Composition: Only V16 Net Property Plant & Equipment (PP&E) to Total Assets 
and V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets are statistically significant in their expected directions 
of association with fraud, having one-sided p-values of 0.006 and 0.044 respectively. As 
expected, lower values of PP&E and higher levels of soft assets, relative to total assets, 
have occurred in fraudulent financial statements. 
• General Accrual Measures: Only V20 Positive Accruals is statistically significant in the 
expected direction with a one-sided p-value for a positive association with fraud of 0.000. 
In addition, V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets with an uncertain expected direction of 
association with fraud is statistically significant with a two-sided p-value of 0.057. 
Fraudulent financial statements had higher levels of total accruals and more often were 
produced by companies with positive accruals in both the specified year and the year 
prior. 
• Level of Debt and Financial Distress: Only V26 Times Interest Earned is statistically 
significant in the expected direction with a one-sided p-value for a positive association 
with fraud of 0.004. As expected, more fraudulent financial statements were issued by 
companies with more difficulty in handling changes in interest rates in terms of servicing 
debt. In addition, V23 Total Debt to Total Assets was found to be statistically significant 
with a two-sided p-value of 0.021. However, surprisingly, the direction of association that 
was found indicated that fraudulent financial statements had lower levels of debt. 
Although this was not as expected, one possible reason for it is that the levels of debt 
have been fraudulently lowered to improve the financial position of the company. 
• Performance and Profitability: All variables from this category have uncertain expected 
directions of association with fraud, but only V27a and V27b measuring Return on Equity 
(ROE) are statistically significant with two-sided p-values of 0.038 and 0.050 
respectively. These variables showed that fraudulent financial statements had lower ROE 
values and lower ROE relative to the industry average. 
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• Financing: All variables from this category are statistically significant in the expected 
direction of association with fraud with one-sided p-values ranging from 0.000 to 0.097. 
As expected, issuing or needing to issue new securities and the use of operating leases 
have been associated with more fraudulent financial statements. 
Non-Financial 
• Only V39b Percentage of Directors who are also Executives is statistically significant 
with a one-sided p-value for a positive association with fraud of 0.038. As expected, there 
was a greater percentage of directors who were also executives in companies that 
produced fraudulent financial statements. In addition, V36 Changes of Audit Firm and 
V37b Changes in CEO with uncertain expected directions of associations with fraud are 
statistically significant with two-sided p-values of 0.079 to 0.046 respectively. These 
variables showed companies that produced fraudulent financial statements had fewer 
recent changes of audit firm, but more recent changes in CEO. 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial 
• No variables from this category are statistically significant. 
Control 
• No variables from this category are statistically significant, except for V45 Company Size 
that has an uncertain expected direction of association with fraud and is statistically 
significant with a two-sided p-value of 0.001. This variable suggests that financial 
statement fraud occurred more in larger companies, but it may be the result of an SEC 
bias towards investigating larger companies. The fact that there was a statistically 
significant control variable also indicates that the matching process was not exact. 
New 
• No variables from this category are statistically significant, but many of the variables 
were only expected to be statistically significant in multivariate models and also those 
that include variable interactions. 
The Sales and Financing Financial categories and the Non-Financial category have 
the largest number of statistically significant variables. Furthermore, all subcategories of the 
General Financial category contain statistically significant variables. Table 5-5 reveals that 
relatively more variables in the General Financial and Non-Financial categories are 
statistically significant when compared to their contribution to the set of all chosen 
explanatory variables. Table 5-6 on the next page also shows that the statistically significant 
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variables represent the four factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework 
(Exploitable Opportunity, Incentive/Pressure, Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation and 
Suspicious Information) in approximately the same proportions as the set of all chosen 
explanatory variables. 
Table 5-5. The proportion of all chosen explanatory variables and those that are statistically 
significant from univariate analysis by variable category. 




All Chosen Variables 
from Table 4-1 
Significant Variables 
from Univariate Analysis 
Financial: Specific Account 28% 25% 
Financial: General 40% 55% 
Non-Financial 6% 15% 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial 12% 0% 
Control 8% 5% 
New 6% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Table 5-6. The proportion of all chosen explanatory variables and those that are statistically 
significant from univariate analysis by each factor in the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 




All Chosen Variables 
from Table 4-3 
Significant Variables 
from Univariate Analysis 
Exploitable Opportunity (O) 49% 52% 
Incentive/Pressure (I) 38% 37% 
Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) 5% 7% 
Suspicious Information (S) 8% 4% 
 
                                                 
 
103 Consistent with Chapter 4, these calculations exclude sub-types. For example, there are multiple ways of 
measuring variable V1 (V1a, V1b and V1c), but this only counts as one variable in this list. 
104 Variables that are associated with multiple factors are counted in all of them. 
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The ten most statistically significant variables according to two-sided p-values in both 
univariate tests are, in order from most significant (lowest p-value) to least significant 
(highest p-value): 
1. V31b New Common Stock or Long-term Debt Issued? 
2. V20 Were the specified and the prior year’s Total Accruals > Zero? 
3. V31a New Common Stock Issued? 
4. V8a Inventory to Sales 
5. V33a Demand for financing 
6. V14 Were any Sales from Acquisitions? 
7. V1a Accounts Receivable 
8. V45 Company Size 
9. V11a Sales to Total Assets 
10. V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned 
Nine of them are financial variables comprising three from the Financing and two 
from the Sales categories, which is consistent with the finding above that these categories had 
more statistically significant variables. Despite there being many statistically significant non-
financial variables, none of them have made the ten most statistically significant listed above. 
Interestingly, only the three underlined variables contain temporal information despite more 
than 50% of all chosen explanatory variables containing temporal information (as shown 
previously in Table 4-2). This result is surprising given the usefulness of temporal 
information as previously discussed in Section 4.1.1, but again this result may change with 
the use of multivariate analysis. 
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Table 5-7. Results from univariate tests (t-statistic and F-statistic) comparing means of individual variables for fraudulent and legitimate financial statements. The null 
hypothesis for each variable is that the means are equal and the alternative hypothesis is that they are different, and so p-values closer to zero indicate more support for the 
alternative hypothesis. The t-test excludes cases with missing values, and the number of missing values for each explanatory variable in the final data set is shown in this 
table. The F-test uses all data whereby missing values are replaced with the replacement values shown in this table. Finally, the actual and expected direction of association 
with fraud is presented, such that a positive value indicates that higher values of the specified variable are associated with fraudulent financial statements, and negative values 





Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
Specific Account - Accounts Receivable 
V1 
   V1a 
   V1b 
   V1c 
Accounts Receivable 
   Value for the specified year 
   Percentage change 

























V2 Percentage change in Accounts 
Receivable to Sales 
10 (1%) 0 0.694 (0.488) 0.486  (0.486) Negative Positive 
V3 Percentage change in Accounts 
Receivable to Total Assets 
8 (1%) 0 1.036 (0.301) 1.078  (0.299) Negative Positive 
Specific Account - Allowance for doubtful accounts (AFDA) 
V4 Percentage change in AFDA 36 (4%) 0 -1.291 (0.197) 1.731  (0.189) Positive Negative 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to 
Accounts Receivable 
36 (4%) 0 -0.982 (0.326) 0.987  (0.321) Positive Negative 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to 
Sales 
38 (4%) 0 -1.169 (0.243) 1.403  (0.236) Positive Negative 
Specific Account - Inventory 
V7 Change in Inventory to average 
Total Assets 
0  -0.979  (0.328) 0.958  (0.328) Positive Positive 
V8 
   V8a 
   V8b 
Inventory to Sales 
   Value for the specified year 








-4.035  (0.000) 
-0.535  (0.593) 
 
16.283 (0.000) 







V9 Was Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) 
inventory valuation used? 
0  -0.311  (0.756) 0.096  (0.756) Positive Negative 
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Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
Specific Account - Sales 
V10 
   V10a 
   V10b 
   V10c 
   V10d 
   V10e 
Sales Growth 
   Percentage change 
   V10a minus the Industry Average 
   Previous year’s Percentage change 
   Four-year growth rate 
   Previous year’s percentage change 














-1.561  (0.119) 
-1.874  (0.061) 
-1.674  (0.094) 
-2.03  (0.043) 
-0.352  (0.725) 
 
2.398  (0.122) 
3.372  (0.067) 
2.689  (0.101) 
3.812  (0.051) 














   V11a 
   V11b 
Sales to Total Assets 
   Value for the specified year 




















   V12a 
   V12b 
Gross Margin to Sales 
   Percentage change 




















   V13a 
   V13b 
Cash Sales 
   Percentage change 



















V14 Were any sales from acquisitions? 0  -3.375 (0.001) 11.389 (0.001) Positive Positive 
General Financial - Asset Composition 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets 0  -1.010 (0.313) 1.019 (0.313) Positive Positive 
V16 Net PP&E to Total Assets 0  2.540 (0.011) 6.452 (0.011) Negative Negative 
V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets 0  -1.707 (0.088) 2.914 (0.088) Positive Positive 
V18 Percentage Change in Assets other 
than Current Assets and Net PP&E 
to Total Assets 
6 (1%) 0 1.387 (0.166) 1.945 (0.164) Negative Positive 
General Financial - General Accrual Measures 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets 0  -1.909 (0.057) 3.644 (0.057) Positive Uncertain 
V20 Were the specified and the prior 
year’s Total Accruals > 0? 
0  -4.393 (0.000) 19.295 (0.000) Positive Positive 
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Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
V21 Total Discretionary Accruals 23 (2%) Mean 0.221 (0.825) 0.049 (0.825) Negative Positive 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals 0  -0.542 (0.588) 0.294 (0.588) Positive Positive 
General Financial - Level of Debt and Financial Distress 
V23 Debt to Total Assets 0  2.319 (0.021) 5.379 (0.021) Negative Positive 
V24 Debt to Equity 0  1.244 (0.214) 1.546 (0.214) Negative Positive 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress 
measure (Z-score) 
95 (10%) 2.675105 -0.430 (0.667) 0.318 (0.573) Positive Positive 
V26 Four-period average of Times 
Interest Earned 
119 (13%) Mean -2.649 (0.008) 6.999 (0.008) Positive Positive 
General Financial - Performance and Profitability 
V27 
   V27a 
   V27b 
Return on Equity 
   Value for the specified year 





















   V28a 
   V28b 
   V28c 
Return on Average Prior Assets 
   Value for the specified year 
   Previous year 


























   V29a 
   V29b 
Holding Period Return 
   One-year 



















V30 Were analyst Earnings Per Share 
forecasts achieved or exceeded? 
0  -0.526 (0.599) 0.277 (0.599) Positive Uncertain 
                                                 
 
105 The value of 2.675 was chosen as the neutral value because it was the cut-off value chosen by Altman (1968) as the best for his model to distinguish between predictions of 
company failure and non-failure. 
106 Holding Period Return is essentially a percentage change calculation and so zero is its missing replacement value. 
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Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
General Financial - Financing 
V31 
   V31a 
   V31b 
Were New Securities issued? 
   Common Stock? 

















V32 Proportion of common stock that is 
newly issued 
0  -2.490 (0.013) 6.203 (0.013) Positive Positive 
V33 
   V33a 
   V33b 
   V33c 
Demand for financing 
   Specific Value (ex ante) 
   Was there demand (ex ante)? 

























V34 Were there operating leases? 0  -1.613 (0.107) 2.601 (0.107) Positive Positive 
Non-financial - Key Roles and Positions 
V35 Was the auditor a Big Six firm? 0  -0.744 (0.457) 0.553 (0.457) Positive Negative 
V36 Number of changes of audit firm in 
the most recent four financial 
statements 
0  1.761 (0.079) 3.102 (0.079) Negative Uncertain 
V37 
   V37a 
   V37b 
CEO 
   Tenure 




















                                                 
 
107 Using -0.5 as the neutral value for this variable is appropriate because -0.5 is used as the cut-off value to determine whether there is demand for financing in V33b and prior research 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2006). 
108 Zero is used in preference to the mean, as it indicates no changes in CEO, which is an appropriate neutral value over a three year period given the average CEO tenure in the data set is 
over 7 years. 
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Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
V38 Has the CFO changed in the last 
three years? 
0  -0.404 (0.686) 0.163 (0.686) Positive Uncertain 
V39 
   V39a 
   V39b 
 
   V39c 
Composition/Holdings of the Board 
   Number of Directors 
   Percentage of Directors who are 
also Executives 
   Percentage of Director shares 
































V40 Percentage of total shares owned by 
the CEO 
781 (84%) Exclude 0.919 (0.359) Excluded Negative Uncertain 
Comparing Financial and Non-financial 
V41 Percentage change in the number of 
Employees minus percentage 
change in Total Assets 
97 (10%) 0 -0.915 (0.360) 0.767 (0.381) Positive Negative 
V42 Percentage change in Sales minus 
percentage change in the number of 
Employees 
97 (10%) 0 0.363 (0.717) 0.107 (0.744) Negative Positive 
V43 Percentage Change in Sales to 
Employees: Specific Company 
minus Industry Average 
118 (13%) 0 0.597 (0.551) 0.323 (0.57) Negative Positive 
                                                 
 
109 The mean was used in preference to zero, because zero has an important specific meaning of no directors also being executives. 
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Univariate Test Results 
Statistic ( p-value) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
Number Replacement T-statistic F-statistic Actual Expected 
Control variables 
V44 Company Age: Number of years 
since foundation 
0  1.250 (0.212) 1.563 (0.212) Negative 
 





V45 Company Size: natural log of Total 
Assets 
0  -3.234 (0.001) 10.461 (0.001) Positive 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a 3? 0  -0.069 (0.945) 0.005 (0.945) Positive 
V47 
   V47a 
   V47b 
Stock Exchange listed on 
   NASDAQ? 















   V48a 
 
   V48b 
 
   V48c 
 
Macroeconomic indicators 
   Previous year’s percentage change 
in annual real GDP 
   Previous year’s percentage change 
in annual retail sales 








 No univariate results as the means are exactly the same because of 
the matching procedure. These variables will only be considered in 
multivariate models with variable interactions. 
 
V49 
   V49a 
   V49b 
Corporate governance indices 
   G-Index 



















V50 Accounting complexity of the 
industry 
136 (15%) 32.7110 -0.563 (0.574) 0.687 (0.408) Positive Positive 
                                                 
 
110 32.7 is the mean value of the accounting complexity measure from Seavey (2011) who introduced the measure, and so is an appropriate neutral value to be used as a missing value. 
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5.2  Modelling Methodology 
This section describes the methodology to develop and assess a variety of models to 
detect financial statement fraud. It includes detailing the model-building techniques and the 
metric used to evaluate their performance. The evaluation of the models is conducted over a 
range of error cost ratios and prior probabilities (as specified later in this section) and is 
consistent with recent advances in methodology used by Perols (2011). 
5.2.1 Performance Metric 
Consistent with standard practice in previous cost-sensitive research (Persons 1995; 
Beneish 1997, 1999a; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Bayley and Taylor 2007; Perols 
2011), the following Weighted Error Cost (WEC) metric is used to evaluate accuracy. 
 =  	
 × 	
 × () + 	 × 	 × ()   where, 
• 	
 = the proportion (or percentage) of fraudulent statements incorrectly classified 
=   ++8 +% %8 8%88  %8 8%88  , such that 0 ≤  	
 ≤ 1; 
• 	 = the proportion (or percentage) of legitimate statements incorrectly classified 
=   ++8 +% 8%8 8%88  8%8 8%88  , such that 0 ≤  	 ≤ 1; 
• 	
 / 	 = the cost of incorrectly classifying a truly fraudulent/legitimate statement. The 
ratio of these two costs (	
: 	) is the relevant information and consequently 	 is set to 
1 and 	
 is varied to represent different ratios, which is consistent with past research 
(Persons 1995; Beneish 1997, 1999a; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Bayley and 
Taylor 2007; Perols 2011); 
• () = the proportion of fraudulent statements in the real world population (not the 
sample data set), where 0 < () < 1. () is also known as the prior probability or a 
priori probability of fraud in financial statements; and, 
• () = the proportion of legitimate statements in the real world population, where 
0 < () < 1 and () = 100% −  (). 
Simpler performance metrics would be either the overall percentage accuracy or the 
percentage accuracy for fraudulent statements (1 − 	
) and for legitimate statements 
(1 − 	). However, WEC is preferred as it also considers differing costs of misclassification 
errors 	
 and 	 and the proportion of fraudulent statements in the real world [()]. These 
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considerations are vital for two reasons. The first is that 	
 > 	 in the real world. In 
addition, the proportion of fraudulent financial statements in the real world [()] is less than 
the 50% proportion in the one-to-one matched sample used in this research. 
WEC is also preferred to using the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve which averages performance over the range of possible ratios of 
misclassification error costs. The area under the ROC curve is not being used in this study 
because it includes ratios that might not be relevant to financial statement fraud detection 
(Perols 2011). It is important to note there has been mathematical demonstration (Hand 
2009a; Hand 2009b) that it is inappropriate to use the area under the ROC curve to compare 
multiple models, because this assumes the costs (	
 and 	) depend on the choice of model 
(rather than the underlying problem), which is absurd according to Hand. 
The procedure for optimising the cut-off value for different ratios of error costs 
(	
:	) and prior probabilities of fraud [()] is discussed in the next subsection. The 
values of 	 and 	
 depend on the accuracy of the models, while the values of 	
, 	 and 
() are discussed in the subsequent subsections. 
5.2.1.a Optimisation of Cut-off Values 
Each model generates output values, commonly a probability of being fraudulent, that 
when compared to a cut-off value determines whether each financial statement is classified as 
legitimate or fraudulent. For example, values of less than 0.5 could be classified as legitimate, 
while values greater than or equal to 0.5 are classified as fraudulent. Instead of using a default 
cut-off value such as 0.5, this current research uses the methodological improvement 
employed by Beneish (1997, 1999a) that has also been used by other researchers (Persons 
1995; Bayley and Taylor 2007; Perols 2011). This improved methodology involves 
empirically determining the optimal cut-off values for each ratio of error costs (	
:	) and 
prior probability of fraud [()] as the value which minimises the weighted error cost 
(WEC) on the training data set. As cut-off values are optimised based on the same training 
data used to develop models, the presence of any sample selection bias would be common to 
both processes and consequently not troublesome (Skogsvik 2005). Because of this fact and 
in order to be consistent with prior research in the field, cut-off values have been empirically 
optimised in this study. The corresponding optimal cut-off value will then be used for making 
classifications on the holdout data set that has not been used during this optimisation process. 
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5.2.1.b Selection of the Ratios of Error Costs ( ¡: ¢) 
While it is broadly agreed that missing fraud is the more costly error, the quantifiable 
difference in misclassification error costs varies depending on the particular conditions and 
stakeholders. Consequently, as suggested in Chapter 3, the analysis that follows will evaluate 
models using ratios of the cost of missing fraud relative to the cost of falsely alleging fraud 
(	
:	) that range from 1:1 to 100:1. 
Specifically, the values of 	
:	 are 1:1, 10:1, 20:1, 30:1, 40:1, 50:1, 60:1 and 100:1. 
This decision is based on the summary in Table 3-6 (from the review in Chapter 3) that 
shows the ratio of error costs range between 1:1 and 1:100 in studies that are relevant to this 
research (Persons 1995; Beneish 1997, 1999a; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Bayley and 
Taylor 2007; McKee 2009; Perols 2011). Table 3-6 further reveals that most of the studies do 
not consider ratios greater than 50:1, and consequently no ratios in-between 60:1 and 100:1 
are considered, which is consistent with research conducted by Beneish (1997, 1999a). 
5.2.1.c Determination of the Prior Probabilities of Fraud [£(¡)] 
Based on the percentage of audits that involved fraud, 0.6% of financial statements 
were estimated to be fraudulent (Loebbecke et al. 1989; Bell and Carcello 2000), which is 
also a reminder of the inexperience of auditors in detecting fraud. Other estimates of the 
proportion of financial statements that are fraudulent based on fraud alleged in AAERs have 
included 2% (Persons 1995), 1% (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 
2003; McKee 2009), and most recently approximately 0.4% using AAERs between 1979 and 
2002 (Dechow et al. 2011). A similar proportion of 0.69% was estimated using AAERs 
between 1982 and 1988 and an analysis of news articles (Beneish 1997). It is interesting to 
note that auditors themselves provide the lowest proportion of fraud within financial 
statements, estimated at 0.43% (Bernardi 1994), which could be part of the reason for 
auditors’ poor ability to detect fraud (as was discussed in Chapter 2). 
Wang (2013) noted that estimates such as those above exclude fraud that goes 
undetected. Dyck et al. (2013) go further and estimate the proportion of statements that are 
fraudulent, including those that often go undetected, at a substantially larger value of 14.5%, 
with a conservative lower bound of 5.6%. These figures were derived by estimating that the 
total proportion of fraudulent statements is nearly four times that of detected fraudulent 
statements, which explains their substantially larger estimate. The multiple of four was 
calculated using the natural experiment of the failure of Arthur Andersen (a former top 
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accounting firm) that forced all its clients to appoint new auditors. Dyck et al. (2013) argue 
that the new auditors of these enforced auditor turnover cases “cleaned house” and conducted 
very thorough audits, detecting fraud that usually went undetected. They found 
approximately four times more fraudulent financial statements than were usually uncovered, 
and consequently used the multiple of four for estimating total fraud. It is questionable 
whether companies audited by the failed Arthur Andersen were representative of all 
companies, which would influence the validity of these estimates, but Dyck et al. also 
conducted other tests to further validate their estimate of 14.5% the lower bound. 
There is no standardised way of handling these varying estimates. For example, Perols 
(2011) handled the varying estimates of the proportion of statements that are fraudulent 
[()] by using values of 0.3%, 0.6% and 1.2%, while Bayley and Taylor (2007) considered 
values of () of 1%, 2%, 3% and 4%. This concept of considering multiple values of () 
is extended in this current analysis to include the substantially larger estimates by Dyck et al. 
(2013) that have not been considered by previous financial fraud detection modelling studies. 
From this discussion, the prior probability of fraud [()] estimates used in this current 
analysis were decided to be: 
• 0.4%, as the lowest estimate with credible evidence; 
• 1%, as the most-used estimate in prior research; and 
• 5.5% (= 5.6% rounded to the nearest 0.5%) and 14.5%, as the new largest estimates. 
5.2.1.d  Ratio of Error Costs Adjusted for Prior Probability of Fraud 
In addition to optimising the cut-off value, some modelling techniques, such as 
decision trees and ensembles of them, can incorporate different ratios of error costs (	
:	) 
and prior probabilities of fraud [()] into the development of the model itself. Instead of 
varying both of these values, Perols (2011) showed that one of them can be varied to 
represent changes in both. While Perols chose to vary only the prior probability of fraud 
using undersampling of legitimate statements, this current study manipulates only the relative 
cost of missing fraud (adjusted for prior probabilities) during model development to retain the 
advantages of the one-to-one matched data set (as mentioned in Section 5.1.2), and because 
costs are more easily interpreted than prior probabilities. The cost of missing fraud relative to 
falsely alleging fraud that is adjusted for the prior probability of fraud is calculated according 
to the following equation. 
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()100% − () 
For example, a ratio of error costs of 40:1 indicates that missing a fraud is 40 times 
more costly than a false allegation of fraud. However, if only 5.5% of financial statements are 
fraudulent then missing fraud is 
©0
 × ª.ª%00%6ª.ª% = 2 times worse than falsely alleging fraud. 
The value of two also represents a ratio of error costs of 10:1 with 14.5% of financial 
statements being fraudulent as shown in Table 5-8, which presents all the prior-adjusted 
relative costs of missing fraud. In total there are 18 different values to be used ranging from 
0.004 to 17, where larger numbers indicate higher costs of missing fraud (relative to falsely 
alleging fraud) or a larger prior probability of fraud, or both. The 18 different values are 
0.004, 0.01, 0.04, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 17. 
Table 5-8. The corresponding prior-adjusted relative cost of missing fraud (	
) for each 
combination of ratio of error cost and prior probability of fraud. Values appearing more than once 
have been shaded in the same colour. 
Ratio of Error Costs ( ¡: ¢) 
(missing fraud: falsely alleging fraud) 
Prior probability of fraud [£(¡)] 
0.40% 1.00% 5.50% 14.50% 
1:1 0.004 0.01 0.1 0.2 
10:1 0.04 0.1 0.6 2 
20:1 0.1 0.2 1 3 
30:1 0.1 0.3 2 5 
40:1 0.2 0.4 2 7 
50:1 0.2 0.5 3 8 
60:1 0.2 0.6 3 10 
100:1 0.4 1 6 17 
 
The prior-adjusted relative costs of missing fraud (	
) are also used for 
presenting results in future sections because this enables the use of simpler graphs that 
facilitate improved readability and interpretability. As a consequence of cost and prior 
information being incorporated into 	
, the results can be presented in two-dimensional 
graphs, with 	
 on the horizontal axis and  on the vertical axis. Table 5-8 can then 
be used to find the appropriate prior-adjusted relative cost of missing fraud (	
) for a 
desired prior probability of fraud [()] and ratio of error costs (	
:	). The way 	
 is 
incorporated into the WEC performance measure is explained below. 
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As stated above, 
 =  	
 × 	
 × () + 	 × 	 × () and 
	
  = 	
	 ×
()() 




= °%±¯¬­   . 
Consequently, WEC can be reduced to 	
 × 	
 + 	, or more conveniently 
 =  ² «¬­   (   «¬® × &³´µ¶¬­         °%±¯¬­·
«¬­ × °%±¯¬­   (   «¬®        °%±¯¬­¸    . 
The definition of WEC is split in this manner so that the weight of the least costly 
error (	 when 	
 ≥ 1 and 	
 when 	
 < 1) is one, which results in greater 
standardisation across different values of 	
. This is also consistent with methods used 
in modern classification software such as CART decision trees. An example is a naïve model 
that classifies all financial statements as 
• Fraudulent when 	
 ≥ 1 and 
• Legitimate when 	
 < 1. 
This naïve model will always have a WEC value of one, because 
 =  º 00% (  0% × &³´µ¶¬­  »          °%±¯¬­·
0% × °%±¯¬­ ( 00%  »           °%±¯¬­¸   . 
This facilitates more intuitive assessment of performance, because WEC values less than one 
indicate performance better than a naïve model and WEC values greater than one indicate 
inferior performance. 
5.2.2 Benchmark Models: M-score and F-score 
Two benchmark models, selected from the review in Chapter 3, are used as estimated 
in previous studies. For both models, larger values indicate more evidence of the financial 
statement being fraudulent. 
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The first is the widely known and cited M-score model produced by Beneish (1999a) 
using probit analysis, which is defined below. Larger values of the M-score indicate a higher 
likelihood of financial statement fraud being present. 
M‐score =  −4.84 + 0.92DSR + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI + 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI −
0.172SGAI − 0.327LEVI + 4.679TATA  where 
• DSR = 
++8 ±+À%P Á%P⁄++8 ±+À%PQ& Á%PQ&⁄ = Ã2 + 1 in this current research; 
• GMI = 
Ä Å%PQ& Á%PQ&⁄Ä Å%P Á%P⁄ = (Æ% in this current research; 
• AQI = 
 (6¯8 8P6°°&ÈP) É8% 8P⁄ (6¯8 8PQ&6°°&ÈPQ&) É8% 8PQ&⁄ = Ã18 + 1 in this current research; 
• SGI = 
Á%PÁ%PQ& = Ã10 + 1 in this current research; 
• DEPI = 
 Ê«+%8111PQ& (Ê«+%8PQ&(°°&ÈPQ&)Ë Ê«+%8P (Ê«+%8P(°°&ÈP)⁄  
112; 
• SGAI = 
Á%,Ä% % 8%8À È'«113P Á%PËÁ%,% % %8%8À '«PQ& Á%PQ&⁄  
112; 
• LEVI =  
 (68 Ê8P(¯8 %8P) É8% 8P⁄ (68 Ê8PQ&(¯8 %8PQ&) É8% 8PQ&⁄  
112; 
• TATA = 
É8% ++%PÉ8% 8P =  V19 in this current research. 
The second model is the more recent F-score model produced by Dechow et al. 
(2011) using logistic regression, which was chosen because the authors have been widely 
cited in the field and the study uses a relatively large sample. The authors actually developed 
three F-score models, but their Model 2 is chosen as representative in this current study 
because all three models reportedly produced similar results114. The F-score for Model 2 is 
calculated as shown below, where larger values indicate a higher likelihood of financial 
statement fraud being present. 
                                                 
 
111 The depreciation value was obtained through Capital IQ as field IQ_DA minus field 
IQ_GW_INTAN_AMORT, while in Computat it is field 14 minus field 65. 
112 This variable is not used in this current research as it was not statistically significant in Beneish’s study.  
113 The sales, general and administrative expense value was obtained through Capital IQ as field IQ_SGA, 
while in Computat it is field 189. 
114 Model 2 was chosen for two reasons. First, it includes non-financial variables. In addition, it excludes 
two variables requiring an estimate of the “annual buy-and-hold value-weighted market return”, because there is 
some ambiguity to its calculation, which might introduce calculation error that will bias the F-score’s performance. 
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‐#$ = $
8 Ì1 + $
8ÍË()  
where () is the prior probability of fraud as defined above and  
Ffirst =  −8.252 + 0.665RSST + 2.457CREC + 1.393CINV + 2.011SOFT +
0.159CCSS − 1.029CROA + 0.983ISSU − 0.15ABEE +
0.419OLEAS  where 
• RSST = RSST Accruals = Ã22 in this current research; 
• CREC = 
¯Ï%  ++8 ±+À%
 À% É8% 8 , similar to V3 in this current research; 
• CINV = Change in Inventory = Ã7 in this current research; 
• SOFT = Percentage of Soft Assets = Ã17 in this current research; 
• CCSS = Percentage Change in Cash Sales = Ã13 in this current research; 
• CROA = Change in Return on Assets = V28c in this current research; 
• ISSU = Existence of New Equity or Long-term Debt = Ã31 in this current research; 
• ABEE = Abnormal change in employees = Ã41 in this current research; 
• OLEAS = Existence of Operating Leases = Ã34 in this current research; 
The cut-off values that determine the classification (fraudulent or legitimate) for the 
M-score were empirically optimised by Beneish (1999a) as mentioned in Section 5.2.1.a 
above. Although Dechow et al. (2011) did not optimise the cut-off values for the F-score, cut-
off values are optimised for both the M-score and F-score in this research to allow fair 
comparisons115. For both models, missing values are handled in the same way that was used 
in the univariate analysis presented in Section 5.1.6 and Table 5-7 (which was in part based 
on the way Beneish handled missing values for his M-score model). However, the difference 
is that for variables being replaced by the mean, the replacement value was calculated as the 
mean of data only from the training set to retain the testing set as a true holdout sample.  
5.2.3 Model Building Techniques and Determining Parameters 
The details and parameters of each of the model building techniques used in this study 
are presented in the following sub-sections. Only the training data are used for model 
development and setting parameters. The holdout data set is exclusively used to evaluate 
                                                 
 
115 Optimising the cut-off values improved results on the holdout sample for both models. 
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model performance, which results in more realistic accuracy estimates that are not upwardly 
biased. Furthermore, all models exclude variables V39c Percentage of Director shares owned 
by those who are also Executives, V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO and 
V49b Corporate Governance E-Index as they contain too many missing values. This is 
consistent with the methods used in Section 5.1.6 Univariate Analysis. With these exclusions, 
the total number of explanatory variables is 71, representing 49 of the main variable types 
(V1-V50) except V40. 
5.2.3.a Standard Regression-based Models 
Discriminant analysis and logistic regression models do not automatically handle 
missing values, and so missing values were replaced in the same way as they were for the 
benchmark models (as specified above in Section 5.2.2). This is preferable to removing 
financial statements that have at least one missing value, because this procedure (known as 
list-wise deletion) radically reduces the number of data points available to construct the 
model (Myrtveit et al. 2001). 
Standard regression-based models are more influenced by outliers than other 
techniques such as decision trees. Therefore, some prior studies (Beneish 1999a; Bayley and 
Taylor 2007; Dechow et al. 2011) have winsorized explanatory variables at 1% and 99% to 
mitigate outliers and extreme values that could be created by small denominators in ratio 
variables116. Winsorizing at 1% and 99% involves replacing all data below the 1st percentile 
with the 1st percentile, and all data above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile. The use 
of winsorizing in this study was empirically evaluated using standard discriminant analysis 
and logistic regression on the training data. Winsorizing the data at 1% and 99% resulted in 
similar, although reduced, ability to classify both fraudulent and legitimate statements for 
cases in the training data and also when cross-validation was used. Consequently, winsorizing 
has not been implemented in this study. 
Both discriminant analysis and logistic regression models were produced using IBM’s 
SPSS Statistics package. The probability of fraud is the output used for all models. Five 
thousand potential cut-off values were evaluated for each of the 18 values of 	
 for 
                                                 
 
116 Removing outliers and mean-adjusting variables have also been evaluated in prior research (Skousen and 
Wright 2008; Skousen et al. 2009), but it did not yield improved results and so has not been used in this current 
study. 
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every model and the one that produced the lowest WEC on the training data was chosen. The 
five thousand values were equally distributed between zero and one.  
Table 5-9 summarises the different models that have been developed. These models 
are based on prior studies that were reviewed in Chapter 3. Each model differs with the 
selection of explanatory variables, and models that use the following variables have been 
developed: 
• All variables, as undertaken by multiple prior studies (Lee et al. 1999; Kaminski et al. 
2004; Bayley and Taylor 2007); 
• Only variables that are statistically significant at a 15% level in univariate tests, as were 
undertaken by Skousen and Wright (2008) and Skousen et al. (2009)117, neither of whom 
specified a reason for using a 15% level instead of the more common 5% or 10% level. 
These univariate tests only use the training data, but are otherwise the same as those 
discussed above in Section 5.1.6; 
• Only variables that are statistically significant at the 15% level in both univariate tests and 
logistic regression (as undertaken by Skousen and Wright (2008) and Skousen et al. 
(2009)117); 
• Only one variable from each main variable (V1-V50), selected as the most statistically 
significant sub-type from univariate tests. For example, there are multiple ways of 
measuring variable V1 (V1a, V1b and V1c), but only the most statistically significant 
sub-type is included in this model. The exception is V37a and V37b that are both binary 
variables required to describe the exchange on which the company is listed. 
• Variables selected by stepwise techniques as used in prior research (Persons 1995; Bell 
and Carcello 2000; Dechow et al. 2011). The maximum level of significance for entry 
was set at 5% and the minimum level of significance for removal was set at 10%, as was 
shown to be useful in business failure prediction and insurance fraud detection (Gepp and 
Kumar 2008; Gepp et al. 2012; Gepp and Kumar 2014). 
                                                 
 
117 Skousen et al. used these variable selection techniques to produce a discriminant analysis model, but this 
research has extended their use to logistic regression models to test their usefulness as well. 
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Table 5-9. Standard Regression-based Models developed in this research. 
Model Code Model Details 
Discriminant Analysis (DA) 
DA_All Inclusion of all variables (except the missing value exclusions) 
DA_U15% Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in univariate tests 
DA_U15%LR Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in the LR_U15% model 
DA_U1 Only the most statistically significant variable from each main variable (V1-V50) 
DA_Step Stepwise variable selection 
Logistic Regression (LR) 
LR_All Inclusion of all variables (except the missing value exclusions) 
LR_U15% Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in univariate tests 
LR_U15%LR Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in the LR_U15% model 
LR_U1 Only the most statistically significant variable from each main variable (V1-V50) 
LR_Step Stepwise variable selection 
New Multi-stage Logistic Regression (LR_MS) 
LR_MS_S Multi-stage model using the overall schema of explanatory variables 
LR_MS_F Multi-stage model using the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework 
 
Based on the multi-stage logistic regression used by Summers and Sweeney (1998), 
two new multi-stage logistic regression models have also been developed in this research. 
1. The first model (LR_MS_S) utilises the newly constructed overall schema for 
explanatory variables (presented in Section 4.1), which comprises Financial, Non-
Financial, Comparison, Control and New categories. In the first stage, five logistic 
regression models are estimated, each using explanatory variables from a different 
category. In the second stage, the LR_MS_S logistic regression model is estimated from 
the probability outputs of the first stage models. That is, the LR_MS_S model uses 
Pr(F)
%+%, Pr(F)Ð6
%+%, Pr(F)¯«%, Pr(F)¯8 and Pr(F)ÐÑ as 
explanatory variables, where Pr(F)' is the probability of fraud estimated using a logistic 
regression with explanatory variables from the  category. 
2. The second model (LR_MS_F) utilises the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework 
(presented in Section 4.2), which now includes Exploitable Opportunity (O), 
Incentive/Pressure (I), Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) and Suspicious Information 
(S) factors. As is the case with the LR_MS_S model, the first stage involves four logistic 
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regression models being estimated, each one using explanatory variables from a different 
factor118. The LR_MS_F model is then estimated using logistic regression with Pr(F), 
Pr(F)	, Pr(F)± and Pr(F)Á as explanatory variables.  
5.2.3.b Artificial Neural Network Models 
As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 3, artificial neural networks are 
better than standard regression-based models at handling outliers and at selecting important 
explanatory variables from a large set of variables. Consequently, artificial neural network 
models are built using all explanatory variables with missing values being replaced as they 
were for other models above. However for neural network models, data from each 
explanatory variable is normalised, so that all data values range between 0 and 1. This data 
transformation is performed to assist the learning efficiency of the neural networks (Feroz et 
al. 2000) and is consistent with past research (Feroz et al. 2000; Green and Choi 1997; Perols 
2011). Normalising is performed independently for each explanatory variable according to 
the following formula: 
" § − Ò§Ò!Ò ¥!$   ##$" $§ ¥$§¨$ (ÒÒ!Ò − Ò§Ò!Ò) ¥!$   ##$" $§ ¥$ . 
Normalising has no influence on binary variables, because their minimum value is zero and 
range is one and so the formula becomes 
%8% «860
 = " §. 
Table 5-10. Artificial Neural Network Models developed in this research. 
Model Code Model Details 
NN_BK Backpropagation neural network with one hidden layer containing four neurons 
NN_GA_1 
Backpropagation neural network optimised by a genetic algorithm with the 
minimum learning rate set to 0.1 
NN_GA_5 
Backpropagation neural network optimised by a genetic algorithm with the 
minimum learning rate set to 0.5 
 
Table 5-10 above summarises the artificial neural network models that are used in this 
research, which are explained in more detail in the remainder of this subsection. The pseudo 
probability of fraud is the model output used. This output is similar to a probability in that it 
normally lies between zero and one, and larger values indicate a higher likelihood of fraud. 
                                                 
 
118 Variables that are associated with more than one factor are included in all associated factors. 
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However, it cannot be interpreted as a probability and is consequently termed pseudo because 
the values can be marginally outside the range of zero to one. Five thousand potential cut-off 
values between the minimum and maximum pseudo probability were evaluated for each of 
the 18 values of 	
, which is consistent with procedure for the standard regression-
based models. 
As stated in the literature review in Chapter 3, backpropagation artificial neural 
networks with one hidden layer have had encouraging empirical results in prior studies and 
consequently are used as another benchmark technique against which to compare newer 
models developed in this research. The backpropagation neural network (NN_BK) developed 
in this research used IBM’s SPSS Statistics package’s “Multilayer Perceptron” model, which 
is a feed-forward backpropagation network. The parameters of the neural network are 
described in the following dot-points. 
• The commonly used sigmoid function is used for both the activation and transfer 
function, because it is generally the most useful (Shih 1994) and was empirically found to 
be the most useful by Feroz et al. (2000), as well as also being consistent with Green and 
Choi (1997). 
• The number of hidden layers was one, consistent with prior research (Green and Choi 
1997; Feroz et al. 2000). 
• The weights are updated after each case as was done by Green and Choi (1997). 
• Based on the methodology in prior research (Green and Choi 1997; Feroz et al. 2000; 
Perols 2011), three values (0.1, 0.3 and 0.5) were evaluated for the learning rate and 
momentum parameters, while four values (4, 8, 12 and 16) were evaluated for the number 
of neurons in the hidden layer. This totals 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 alternative configurations that 
were evaluated on a randomly chosen 30% sample of the training data that is partitioned 
off during model development. The configuration that was chosen had the best 
classification accuracy percentage. This configuration had a 
• Learning rate of 0.5, 
• Momentum of 0.1, and 
• Four neurons in the hidden layer. 
A model that optimised the parameters of a neural network with a genetic algorithm 
(NN_GA) has also been developed, because using a genetic algorithm is likely to be the best 
way to optimise neural networks (Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). Encouraging results have also 
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been found using a similar approach in a prior study (Fanning and Cogger 1998). 
Furthermore, the use of a genetic algorithm removes the need to evaluate additional 
configurations of the standard backpropagation algorithm because, by the principle of natural 
selection, only the most optimal configuration is expected to survive the genetic algorithm 
optimisation (Bhattacharya et al. 2011b). The software program Neuralyst (version 1.4) that 
executes within Microsoft Excel was used to develop the genetically optimised neural 
network. The underlying neural network still uses backpropagation and sigmoid functions. 
However, the genetic algorithm selects which explanatory variables to include, and optimises 
the parameters of the neural network. These parameters include the number of hidden layers, 
the number of neurons in each hidden layer, the learning rate and the momentum rate. The 
maximum momentum rate parameter for the genetic algorithm was set to the default value of 
1.0, because this is already greater than the maximum momentum value used in prior research 
(Perols 2011). The default value for the minimum learning rate is 0.5, which is greater than 
the lowest value of 0.1 used in prior research (Green and Choi 1997; Perols 2011). 
Consequently, two models were developed, one optimised with a minimum learning rate of 
0.1 (NN_GA_1) and the other 0.5 (NN_GA_5). Both optimised neural networks had two 
hidden layers, the first with 30 neurons and the second with 10 neurons. The remainder of the 
genetic algorithm settings were set to Neuralyst’s default values because Bhattacharya et al. 
(2011b) used them and stated that tweaking  the parameters is unlikely to have much of an 
effect on the classification accuracy of the evolved neural network. These default genetic 
algorithm parameters include 10 as the generation count, 1 as the number of crossover points, 
0.1 as the mutation rate and the error on the training data as the fitness criterion. Further 
details of the genetic algorithm used by Neuralyst are provided in the User’s Guide (Shih 
1994).  
5.2.3.c Explanatory Variables for Decision Trees and Ensembles of Them 
Decision trees treat numerical variables as ranked or ordinal data, because they use 
splitting rules that partition the data based on an explanatory variable being ≤ or > a 
particular value. As a result, some of the variable sub-types are redundant and have been 
removed when developing the decision tree models; these are: 
• V1c Was Percentage change in Accounts Receivable > 10% because it is equivalent to 
V1b Percentage change in Accounts Receivable and a split point of 10%. 
• V12b Was Percentage change in Gross Margin to Sales > 10% because it is equivalent to 
V12a Percentage change in Gross Margin to Sales and a split point of 10%. 
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• V13b Was change in Cash Sales <0 because it is equivalent to V13a Percentage change 
in Cash Sales and a split point of 0%. 
• V33b Was there demand for financing (ex ante) because it is equivalent to V33a Demand 
for financing and a split point of -0.5. 
As decision trees can also easily model categorical variables, a new categorical variable 
(V47c) that can take on three values (NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX) was used in place of the 
two existing binary variables (V47a and V47b) that indicate the exchange on which each 
company is listed. Overall, this reduced by five the number of explanatory variables from 71 
to 66.  
5.2.3.d Individual Decision Tree Models 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a lack of research that uses decision tree 
techniques, particularly CART decision trees that have performed well on a Chinese data set 
(Bai et al. 2008) and have performed better than other decision trees in other classification 
problems in business. Consequently, CART decision tree models will be developed in this 
study using version 7 of Salford Predictive Modeler (SPM) by Salford Systems. CART 
decision trees are grown to their full extent and then they are pruned to result in the tree with 
the lowest cost (WEC) as determined by cross-validation on the training data set. Cut-off 
values between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.01 were trialled and the optimal cut-off value for the 
probability of fraud output was determined as the one that produced the lowest cross-
validated WEC119. 
The best parameter settings for CART decision trees were empirically determined by 
thousands of cross-validated trials on the training data set. The following CART parameters 
were varied.  
• MINCHILD: the minimum number of data points allowed in a child node, which is any 
node other than the root node. Values above one limit the size of the tree, which can 
sometimes improve classification accuracy on holdout samples because nodes with a 
small number of cases can be unreliable when classifying new data. The following eight 
values were trialled for the MINCHILD parameter: 1, 2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 and 200. 
                                                 
 
119 Intervals of 0.01 were the smallest available in the Salford Systems software used. 
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• ATOM: the minimum number of data points allowed in a parent (non-leaf) node. Similar 
to the effect of MINCHILD, values of ATOM above 2 limit the size of the tree, which 
sometimes improves classification accuracy. Because the minimum limits of MINCHILD 
and ATOM only affect small nodes that are likely to be in the lower levels of the tree, 
they generally only have small effects on classification accuracy (Steinberg 2014). The 
following eight values were trialled for the ATOM parameter: 2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 200 
and 500. 
• CV: the number of folds in the cross-validation on the training data set. Cross-validation 
with 5, 20 and 50 folds were trialled to determine whether any of them improved 
classification accuracy as compared with using 10 folds. 
• RULES: the impurity function used to determine the best splitting rule at each node. 
CART trees are grown by searching for the best splitting at each node from all 
explanatory variables and all possible split points in the learning data, and there are 
multiple ways to determine the best splitting rule. Specifically, the best is chosen as the 
one that has the lower impurity according to an impurity function. The Gini, Entropy and 
Twoing functions are standard impurity functions, but Twoing is equivalent to Gini for 
two-class (fraud and legitimate) classification problems such as in this study. 
Consequently, only the Gini and Entropy functions are evaluated120. Unlike the Gini 
function, Entropy places emphasis on splitting rules that produce subsets of similar sizes 
(in terms of the number of data points or financial statements). Although the choice of 
splitting rule does not make much difference for two-class classification problems 
(Breiman et al. 1984; Breiman 1996b), empirical investigation was conducted to 
determine whether there was a superior function when working with financial statement 
fraud data. More detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of different splitting rules is 
provided by Breiman et al. (1984) and Breiman (1996b). 
The best settings were then chosen for each value of the Prior-adjusted Relative Cost 
of Missing Fraud (	
) as that which minimised the weighted error cost (WEC) using 
cross-validation on the training data set. These chosen settings are summarised in Table 5-11. 
The MINCHILD parameter was predominantly set to one, which does not influence the 
                                                 
 
120  Ò! (Ó§) =  2 × () × () and 
  Ò! (§) =  −() × log () − () × log (), 
  where (/) is the proportion of fraud/legitimate cases in the node. 
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development of the tree models. The ATOM parameter was mostly set to 10, which is the 
CART’s default value, while the CV parameter varies between 5, 10 and 20 folds. The 
RULES are mostly Gini, while the Entropy impurity function is best when 	
 is 0.4, 0.5 
or 0.6. 
Table 5-11. The CART parameters that result in the decision tree with the smallest cross-validated 
WEC on the training data. MINCHILD = the minimum number of data points allowed in a non-root 
node; ATOM = the minimum number of data points allowed in a non-leaf node; CV = the number of 
folds in cross-validation; RULES = the impurity function used to determine the splitting rules (G = 
Gini and E = Entropy). The shaded regions are those for which the best tree on the training data set 
classifies all statements the same way. 
Parameter 
ÕÖ×ØÖ − ÙÚÛÜÝÞßÚ àßáÙÞ×âß ØÝÞ Øã ä×ÝÝ×åæ ¡ÖÙÜÚ (ÕÙà ¡) 
.004 .01 .04 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
MINCHILD     1 1 1 1 1 1 5 25 1 1 1 1   
ATOM     500 10 10 10 10 2 10 50 10 10 10 10   
CV     10 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 5 5 5 5   
RULES     G G E E E G G G G G G G   
 
While it is desirable to have univariate splitting rules for ease of interpretation and 
analysis, using linear combinations of variables in splitting rules was investigated to 
determine whether it would improve classification accuracy and lower the WEC. Trials for all 
of the parameter settings above were repeated for trees allowing linear splitting rules, but no 
decrease in WEC on the training data set was found for any value of 	
. Hence, only 
models with exclusively univariate splits were used. CART’s Missing Value Indicator (MVI) 
parameter was also modified to investigate the usefulness of penalising the inclusion of 
variables with missing values. The use of the MVI parameter also did not improve any 
models and so has not been incorporated into any final model. 
Two final models using CART decision trees have been developed as shown in Table 
5-12. The first, DT_Mult, is a suite of cost-sensitive CART decision trees, one for each value 
of 	
. Each decision tree uses the optimal parameters for the corresponding specific 
value of 	
 as per Table 5-11, as well as incorporates that cost (	
) into the model 
development process. However, it is not certain that differences in these parameters result in 
substantially improved performance. Therefore, in order to investigate the value of 
developing a decision tree for each value of 	
, a second model, DT_One, was 
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developed. DT_One is a single cost-insensitive CART decision tree used for all values of 
	
. This decision tree is the tree from DT_Mult where 	
 = 1.  
Table 5-12. Individual Decision Tree Models developed in this research. 
Model Code Model Details 
DT_Suite Suite of cost-sensitive CART decision trees, one for each value of 	
 
DT_One One cost-insensitive CART decision tree used for all values of 	
 
 
Missing Values for Individual CART Decision Trees 
Missing values were treated differently in CART models, compared to all other 
models. The reason is that CART provides a sophisticated way of handling missing values 
using surrogates. When CART encounters a missing value at a particular node in the tree, it 
replaces the splitting rule at that node with a back-up surrogate splitting rule that is the most 
similar to the original splitting rule. The surrogate splitting rule is the most similar in action 
to the chosen rule, which is not necessarily the second best rule at reducing node impurity. 
That is, a surrogate splitting rule is that which most closely mimics the original rule in terms 
of partitioning the data into left and right child nodes. This process is performed at every 
node of the tree, which means that the surrogate splitter is akin to imputing each missing 
value on a case-by-case basis. This allows cases (financial statements) with a missing value 
for the same variable to be handled differently depending on the values of the other 
explanatory variables. This arguably results in better characterization of the data (Steinberg 
2012) that may assist in improving accuracy and so this method for handling missing values 
has been used for all CART models121. 
5.2.3.e Ensembles of Decision Trees: Random Forests and TreeNet 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Random Forests and stochastic gradient boosting have 
shown promise in detecting financial statement fraud. However, in prior studies neither has 
been tested using a separate holdout sample or over a range of varying ratios of error costs, as 
has been done in this research. The models developed in this research are summarised in 
Table 5-13. 
                                                 
 
121 The CART setting for the number of surrogates to calculate was set to five. 
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Version 7 of SPM, the software also used for CART decision trees, has been used to 
develop these models, where TreeNet is the program used to perform stochastic gradient 
boosting. The sophisticated method for replacing missing values in CART is not available in 
Random Forests or TreeNet, presumably because it would be too computationally difficult 
given that a large number of trees need to be developed for these ensemble techniques. 
Table 5-13. Ensemble Decision Tree Models developed in this research. 
Model Code Model Details 
Random Forests (RF) 
RF_8 Random Forests with 1000 trees and variable subset size of 8 
RF_66 Random Forests with 1000 trees and variable subset size of 66 
TreeNet (TN) 
TN TreeNet with 0.01 learning rate and maximum number of nodes per tree of 12 
 
Random Forests Parameters 
Random Forests uses bootstrap samples such that each individual tree ignores 37% of 
the data, which is referred to as out-of-bag data (Salford Systems 2012a). Similar to cross-
validation, results on out-of-bag training data can be used to empirically determine the best 
parameters. There are two main parameters required for Random Forests models, which were 
set as described below.  
1. One thousand decision trees were grown, the same as grown by Whiting et al. (2012). 
Growing additional trees was investigated, but there was no noticeable improvement in 
performance on the training data set and so the parameter was left at 1000. 
2. The size of the variable subset available at each node was set to eight, which is the square 
root of the total number of explanatory variables (√66 ≈ 8). This is suggested by prior 
research (Bhattacharya et al. 2011a) and the same as performed by Whiting et al. (2012). 
Empirical investigations were also performed to investigate whether other values were 
preferable. Values of 1, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56 and 66 were trialled, and surprisingly 
the value of 66 produced the best results on out-of-bag training data. This is unexpected 
as 66 represents 100% of the explanatory variables, which removes the randomness 
associated with only having a limited subset of variables available at each node (the 
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random subspace method). Consequently, two models were developed, one with the size 
of the variable subset to 8 (RF_8) and the other to 66 (RF_66)122. 
Additionally, the minimum number of cases in a parent node was set to 2 to grow the trees to 
their maximum size according to the theoretical discussion of Random Forests in 
Section 3.3.5123. 
As with other models, the probability of fraud is the output used. As is the case with 
the CART models, cut-off values between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.01 were trialled and the 
optimal cut-off value for the probability of fraud output was determined as the one that 
produced the lowest out-of-bag WEC124. 
TreeNet Parameters 
Ten-fold cross-validation was performed to develop the final model and determine the 
best parameters. The choice of 10-folds was because it has been used by the only prior 
research in the field (Whiting et al. 2012), it was found to be the best for the individual 
decision tree DT_One model and because the use of 10-folds is common in the modelling 
literature. The subsampling rate was set to the default value of 0.5, because the value used in 
prior research in the field was not published, and very small values can reduce accuracy 
(Salford Systems 2012b). This means that a sample of only 50% of the data is used by each 
individual tree. The three parameters that were empirically determined were the learning rate, 
the number of trees and the size of the individual trees. The different values trialled for these 
parameters are explained in the following bullet points. 
• A learning rate of 0.001 was used by Whiting et al. (2012) in the only financial statement 
fraud detection research that uses stochastic gradient boosting. Because 0.001 represents a 
very slow learning rate, values of 0.005 and 0.01 were also trialled.  
• One thousand decision trees were grown by Whiting et al. (2012), which appears to be 
insufficient given the extremely low learn rate of 0.001. The following trials empirically 
confirmed that growing more trees is desired. The maximum number of trees (20,000) 
was grown for every trial in TreeNet, and then the number of trees that resulted in the 
                                                 
 
122 Creating individual models for each value of 	
 by varying the “class weights” parameter was 
briefly investigated, but it did not result in improved performance and so was not implemented. 
123 Random Forests also requires other minor parameters to be set. This was done at their default values. In 
addition to this, the Gini impurity function was used to develop individual decision trees, as this was the best in 
the majority of the individual CART decision tree trials. 
124 Intervals of 0.01 were the smallest available in the Salford Systems software used. 
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smallest cross-validated training WEC was chosen. For the trials with a learning rate of 
0.001, the number of trees with the best results ranged between 12,368 and 19,984 trees. 
The maximum number of nodes per tree with the best results also varied from 12 (with 
12,368 trees) to 2 (with 19,984 trees). The number of trees required decreases as the 
number of nodes in each tree increases, because each individual tree becomes more 
complex. Although fewer trees are also required for higher learning rates, the maximum 
number of trees is grown because the only downside is the computation time. 
• TreeNet and stochastic gradient boosting uses smaller trees. Whiting et al. (2012) limited 
the size of trees to three-way interactions between explanatory variables, which visually 
corresponds to limiting trees to having 4 levels (including the level comprising the root 
node). TreeNet controls tree size differently, by specifying the maximum number of 
terminal nodes. Three-way interactions can occur in trees with between four and eight 
terminal nodes. However, the choice was made to investigate a wider range of nodes 
between two and twelve, where two terminal nodes represents zero interactions between 
explanatory variables and higher numbers indicate that more complex interactions are 
possible.  
These trials clearly indicated that interactions between the explanatory variables exist, 
because the cross-validated WEC was substantially lower for the trials with larger trees. The 
models with a maximum of 3-node trees, allowing a small amount of interaction, resulted in 
an average decrease in WEC of 12% compared to 2-node tree models. Furthermore, the 
maximum of 12-node trees that allowed much more interaction decreased the WEC by a 
further 18.5% on average. Overall, the chosen parameters that minimised the cross-validated 
WEC on the training data were a learn rate of 0.01, a maximum of 12 nodes per tree and 
1,184 trees. A learn rate of 0.05 and either a maximum of 9 or 12 nodes per tree yielded the 
same minimum WEC, but these parameters were not preferred as they used more complicated 
trees, in accordance with the principle of parsimony125. 
                                                 
 
125 For completeness, TreeNet models with a learn rate of 0.05 and a maximum of 9 or 12 nodes were tested 
on the hold out data, but performed worse than the chosen TreeNet model. This is empirical support for the use 
of the principle of parsimony when choosing between alternative model configurations.  
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Varying the value of 	
 did not change the model output, and so one TreeNet 
model has been used for every value of 	
126. The probability of fraud output was used 
and the optimal cut-off values were chosen in the same way as for the CART models. 
5.2.3.f Ensembles involving multiple modelling techniques 
In addition to ensembles of decision trees, ensemble models involving multiple 
modelling techniques have been developed and are discussed below and summarised in 
Table 5-14. 
Table 5-14. Summary of ensemble models involving multiple modelling techniques developed in this 
research. 
Model Code Model Details 
NN_LR 
Classifications from NN_BK included as an additional explanatory 
variable in the LR_All model 
DT_LR 
Classifications from DT_One included as an additional explanatory 
variable in the LR_All model 
DTnode_LR_Step 
Terminal node assignments from DT_One included as additional 
explanatory variables in the LR_Step model 
NN-DTnode_LR_Step 
Classifications from NN_BK included as an additional explanatory 
variable in the DTnode_LR_Step model 
Vote5 Majority Vote between DT_One, TN, RF_8, NN_BK and LR_All 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and DT_One 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and DA_All 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and NN_BK 
AV5_NoNN Average between DT_One, TN, RF_8, LR_All and DA_All 
AV2_RF_TN Average between TN and RF_8 
AV3_RF_TN_DT Average between TN, RF_8 and DT_One 
DT_One_DA 
Discriminant analysis (based on DA_All) performed as a second stage on 
the riskier classifications from DT_One 
 
                                                 
 
126 Creating individual models for each value of 	
 by varying the “class weights” rather than the 
“costs” parameter was briefly investigated, but it did not result in improved cross-validated performance on the 
training data set and so was not implemented. 
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Models Proposed by McKee 
Two ensemble models have been included based on the models developed by McKee 
(2009). 
1. NN_LR: A logistic regression model the same as LR_All, but with an additional 
explanatory variable, the classification from NN_BK when 	
 = 1. A fraud 
classification from the NN_BK model was found to have a statistically significant 
positive effect on the probability of fraud in the resulting NN_LR model at the 1% 
significance level. 
2. An individual decision tree model the same as DT_One, but with an additional 
explanatory variable, the classification from NN_LR when 	
 = 1. This resulted in 
a simple tree that only used the NN_LR output, which is equivalent to NN_LR when 
	
 = 1. However, this new decision tree ensemble model is less able to adapt to 
different values of 	
 and so has not been included in the results section. The reason 
that it is less able to adapt is that it only has two terminal nodes that produce only two 
distinct probability of fraud outputs. This reasoning is further explained in the next 
subsection.  
New Ensembles Developed from Analysing McKee’s Models 
The order of combining models was selected by McKee without a theoretical rationale 
being presented. Consequently, new ensembles with a different ordering of underlying 
techniques have been developed to utilise the theoretical strengths of each modelling 
technique. 
A strength of logistic regression is that it produces a probability of fraud output that is 
continuous. A small change in an explanatory variable results in a small change in probability 
in a logistic regression model, unlike a decision tree that produces a discontinuous probability 
of fraud output. Individual decision trees assign the same probability to all financial 
statements allocated to the same terminal node and consequently cannot differentiate between 
them. For example, a tree with only six terminal nodes can only produce six different 
probabilities to the entire data set. In addition to this, the NN_BK neural network model only 
produces a pseudo-probability of fraud that cannot be interpreted as a probability. As a result, 
logistic regression will be used in the final stage of the new ensemble models that are 
proposed below because of its advantageous output. 
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DT_LR is a logistic regression model the same as LR_All, but with an additional 
explanatory variable, the classification from DT_One. The decision tree classification 
variable was found to have a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of fraud 
in the resulting DT_LR model at the 1% significance level. Adding the NN_BK classification 
as an explanatory variable to the DT_LR model was trialled, but the additional variable was 
not statistically significant even at the 15% level and there was no improvement in the 
classification accuracy on the training data set. 
There is also an opportunity to use more information from a decision tree than simply 
the classification of either fraud or legitimate. Decision trees partition data into a collection of 
terminal nodes, each with a homogeneous subset of the original data. This information allows 
a logistic regression model to include specific effects from the homogeneous subset in each 
terminal node. Additionally, the logistic regression model would also have access to the 
original explanatory variables, allowing it to detect and incorporate patterns that are common 
across all nodes in the decision tree, which CART cannot easily do given its tree structure. 
Consequently, a new model DTnode_LR_Step has been developed where the terminal node 
assigned by DT_One is fed into a logistic regression. The terminal node information is 
provided by a set of binary dummy variables, one for each terminal node, that indicates 
whether each financial statement was assigned to a specific terminal node. This drastically 
increases the number of explanatory variables, and consequently stepwise logistic regression 
(LR_Step) was used. 
As McKee also proposed integrating a neural network, adding the NN_BK 
classification as an additional explanatory variable to the DTnode_LR_Step was also trialled. 
The additional variable was found to be statistically significant even at the 1% level. The 
resulting model, termed NN-DTnode_LR_Step, also has slightly improved classification 
accuracy on the training data set. 
Ensembles using Majority Vote 
Combining techniques using a Majority Vote has shown promise on Greek and 
Chinese data (as per the review in Chapter 3). In a Majority Vote, the final classification is 
determined as the classification that has been assigned the most times (the mode) by a set of 
underlying models. For example, if two models classified a statement as fraudulent and three 
classified it as legitimate, then legitimate would be the final classification because three is 
bigger than two. The Greek study (Kotsiantis et al. 2007) actually found that combining the 
individual model results using a decision tree (with linear splitting rules) was superior to 
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Majority Vote. This was trialled in this study, but it was found to be inappropriate. The 
reason is that TreeNet and Random Forests models have a 100% accurate classification on 
the training set. This means that a decision tree (even with linear splitting rules) will revert to 
solely using either of those two models and consequently no ensemble is created. Hence, 
majority voting is used with either three or five underlying models. An odd number of 
underlying models is used to remove the possibility for both fraudulent and legitimate 
classifications to receive the same number of votes. 
Vote5 is a Majority Vote model with the following five underlying models: 
1. A decision tree, DT_One, which was chosen in preference to DT_Suite as it resulted in a 
voting ensemble that is more accurate on the training data; 
2. The TreeNet model, TN; 
3. A Random Forests model, RF_8, which was chosen in preference to RF_66 because it 
had slightly better performance on the training data at extreme values of 	
; 
4. The standard neural network, NN_BK; and, 
5. A standard regression-based model, either a discriminant analysis or logistic regression 
model, but not both, to limit the ensemble to five models. The reason that either 
discriminant analysis or logistic regression is omitted is that their outputs have the highest 
coefficient of correlation. As stated in Chapter 3, ensemble models work well when the 
underlying models are diverse and so only one standard regression model has been 
included. The logistic regression model with the best training performance is LR_All, 
while DA_All is the best discriminant analysis model. LR_All was chosen in the end 
because it resulted in a voting ensemble that is slightly more accurate on the training 
data127. 
Vote3 are Majority Vote models with three underlying models. Many different 
combinations of the models from the Vote5 model were trialled as the three underlying 
models. DA_All and LR_All were not included in the same Vote3 model because of their 
similarity. The chosen models all incorporate both TN and RF_8, because performance on the 
training data was noticeably improved if they were included128. The three Vote3 models are: 
                                                 
 
127 The choice of DA_All or LR_All is not very important as they both result in very similar voting 
ensemble performance on both the training and holdout data sets. 
128 For completeness, models that did not include both TN and RF_8 were assessed on the hold out data too, 
and once again their performance was inferior to Vote3 models that included both TN and RF_8. 
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• Vote3_RF_TN_DT comprising TN, RF_8 and DT_One, which resulted in slightly better 
training performance than using DT_Suite; 
• Vote3_RF_TN_DA comprising TN, RF_8 and DA_All, which resulted in slightly better 
training performance than using LR_All; and, 
• Vote3_RF_TN_NN comprising TN, RF_8 and NN_BK. 
Ensembles using Averaging 
Ensembles are also developed by averaging the (pseudo) probability of fraud outputs 
from a set of underlying models. The resulting average probability is then compared to the 
averaged cut-off values to obtain a classification. This technique for developing ensembles 
had encouraging results on Greek data (Kotsiantis et al. 2007). 
Unlike Majority Vote, there is no reason to have an odd number of underlying 
models. Additionally, the process of averaging is not negatively influenced by including both 
DA_All and LR_All with highly correlated outputs. Initially, using all six of the models 
mentioned for majority voting was trialled. Using DT_One instead of DT_Suite again 
resulted in an ensemble with better training performance. The training performance of the 
ensemble model improved by removing the weakest individual model, NN_BK. The resulting 
average of five models is the AV5_NoNN model that is based on the DT_One, TN, RF_8, 
DA_All and LR_All models. Two other ensembles were developed by averaging the 
probability outputs of underlying models: 
1. AV2_RF_TN that includes the TreeNet model and a Random Forests (RF_8) model, 
which are the two best performers on the training data; and, 
2. AV3_RF_TN_DT that includes a single decision tree (DT_One) in addition to the TN and 
RF_8 models.  
Other Ensembles 
Nagadevara (2010) studied the classification problem of whether or not customers 
were going to change their telecommunications provider. He found encouraging empirical 
results from using a decision tree to classify the data and then using discriminant analysis to 
classify the customers predicted to change by the decision tree. Based on this concept, the 
DT_One_DA model has been developed in this research. This involves using discriminant 
analysis (as per DA_All) to further classify the riskier classifications from the DT_One 
model. The riskiest classifications are those that could result in the more costly error; 
specifically, the riskier classifications are 
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• Legitimate when 	
 > 1, because it could result in the more costly error of missing 
fraud, and 
• Fraud when 	
 < 1, because it could result in the more costly error of falsely 
alleging fraud. 
When 	
 = 1, the DT_One_DA model is equivalent to the DT_One model. As the 
classifications of DT_One change with 	
, a separate discriminant analysis model was 
developed for each value of 	
. 
A summary of all the models developed is provided in Table 5-15 on the next page. 
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Table 5-15. Summary of the models developed in this research. 
Model Code Model Details 
Benchmark Models as estimated in prior research 
M-score Probit analysis model developed by Beneish (1997, 1999a) 
F-score Stepwise logistic regression model developed by Dechow et al. (2011) 
Discriminant Analysis (DA) and Logistic Regression (LR) 
DA_All Inclusion of all variables (except the missing value exclusions) 
DA_U15% Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in univariate tests 
DA_U15%LR Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in the LR_U15% model 
DA_U1 Only the most statistically significant variable from each main variable 
DA_Step Stepwise variable selection 
LR_All Inclusion of all variables (except the missing value exclusions) 
LR_U15% Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in univariate tests 
LR_U15%LR Only variables statistically significant at the 15% level in the LR_U15% model 
LR_U1 Only the most statistically significant variable from each main variable 
LR_Step Stepwise variable selection 
LR_MS_S Multi-stage LR model using the overall schema of explanatory variables 
LR_MS_F Multi-stage LR model using the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework 
Artificial Neural Network (NN) 
NN_BK Backpropagation neural network with 1 hidden layer containing 4 neurons 
NN_GA_1 Backpropagation neural network optimised by a genetic algorithm with a 
minimum learning rate of 0.1 (NN_GA_1) or 0.5 (NN_GA_5) NN_GA_5 
Decision Trees (DTs) and Ensembles of them: Random Forests (RF) and TreeNet (TN) 
DT_Suite Suite of cost-sensitive CART decision trees, one for each value of 	
 
DT_One One cost-insensitive CART decision tree used for all values of 	
 
RF_8 Random Forests with 1000 trees and variable subset size of 8 
RF_66 Random Forests with 1000 trees and variable subset size of 66 
TN TreeNet with 0.01 learning rate and maximum number of nodes per tree of 12 
Ensembles involving multiple modelling techniques 
NN_LR NN_BK classifications included as an additional explanatory variable in LR_All 
DT_LR DT_One classifications included as an additional explanatory variable in LR_All 
DTnode_LR_Step 
Terminal node assignments from DT_One included as additional explanatory 
variables in the LR_Step model 
NN-
DTnode_LR_Step 
NN_BK classifications included as an additional explanatory variable in the 
DTnode_LR_Step model 
Vote5 Majority Vote between DT_One, TN, RF_8, NN_BK and LR_All 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and DT_One 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and DA_All 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN Majority Vote between TN, RF_8 and NN_BK 
AV5_NoNN Average between DT_One, TN, RF_8, LR_All and DA_All 
AV2_RF_TN Average between TN and RF_8 
AV3_RF_TN_DT Average between TN, RF_8 and DT_One 
DT_One_DA 
Discriminant analysis (based on DA_All) performed as a second stage on the 
riskier classifications from DT_One 
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5.3  Results 
The results are presented in the order of some general findings, an analysis by 
modelling technique and then an overall comparative analysis. In addition, appendices A and 
B tabulate the WEC values for every model on the holdout and training data respectively, and 
appendices C and D tabulate the percentage accuracy of classifying fraudulent, legitimate and 
all financial statements on the holdout and training data respectively. In the analysis, lower 
Weighted Error Cost (WEC) values are preferred because they indicate better performance 
from a reduced cost of classification errors. 
5.3.1 General Findings 
5.3.1.a A Comparison of Training, Cross-validated and Holdout Performance 
The summary Table 5-15 above contains 34 models that have each been evaluated for 
all 18 different values of 	
 on both the training and holdout data sets. Out of the total 
of 34 × 18 = 612 evaluations, the weighted error cost (WEC) was lower on the training data 
set in 606 cases. The six exceptions were the DA_Step and LR_Step models for the three 
lowest values of 	
. A t-test for comparing the means of a matched pairs sample 
indicated that the WEC is lower on the training data set (compared to the holdout data set), 
even at a statistical significance level of 0.001%. The associated t-statistic with 611 degrees 
of freedom for holdout WEC minus training WEC was  = 6.©.éª √ê⁄ = −6.05. 
Superior performance on the training data, as indicated by lower values of WEC, was 
expected because these models have been designed on the training data and the cut-off values 
have been optimised for the training data. The substantially different performance between 
the training and holdout data reinforces the value in using holdout data sets that provide more 
realistic estimates of model performance. This difference is illustrated in Table 5-16. This 
table also shows that although NN_GA_5 has substantially superior performance on the 
training data, it is inferior on the holdout data. This illustrates the fact that the best model on 
the training data is not necessarily the best model on the holdout data. This fact further 
substantiates the importance of testing models on a holdout data set. 
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Table 5-16. Illustration of the potential difference between training and testing performance. 
Model 
ÕÙà ¡ = ë 
Training WEC Holdout WEC 
LR_All 0.48 0.76 
NN_GA_5 0.05 0.85 
 
The decision tree, Random Forests and TreeNet models were all developed based on 
cross-validation. This provided an opportunity to compare cross-validated performance with 
performance on the holdout data set. Although the cross-validated WEC is higher than 
training WEC, a t-test for comparing the means of a matched pairs sample indicated that the 
cross-validated WEC is lower than the holdout WEC, even at a statistical significance level 
of 0.001%. The associated t-statistic with 89 degrees of freedom for holdout WEC minus 
cross-validated WEC is  = 60.ì0.í √é0⁄ = −7.80. Although many prior studies (discussed in 
Chapter 3) used cross-validation to estimate real-world accuracy, this result highlights that 
using holdout data sets provides more accurate estimates, particularly those that occur 
chronologically after the training data as happens in real-world scenarios. The use of such a 
holdout data set in this research provides a valuable contribution to the evaluation of 
previously used modelling techniques, as well as new techniques. 
5.3.1.b A Comparison of Performance in This Research with That in Prior Research 
Comparing the performance of models that have been obtained from different data 
sets can be misleading because of differences in the data sets. Models and techniques from 
previous studies have been included in this research, so that comparisons of their 
performance can be made using the same data. This also allows model performance in this 
research to be compared with that found in prior research. These comparisons, which are 
discussed below, indicate that models have found that fraud is more difficult to detect in the 
data used in this research. The statistics presented in this subsection are percentages instead 
of WEC values for easier interpretability and comparability because many prior studies did 
not use a WEC performance measure, mostly because they did conduct cost-sensitive 
research. 
The M-score (Beneish 1997, 1999a) and F-score (Dechow et al. 2011) models have 
been used as they were presented in the original research, including using the same variable 
coefficients. Furthermore, both models were originally evaluated on holdout data sets that 
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occurred chronologically after the training data, which is consistent with this research. This 
enabled useful comparisons of the data sets to be made. The accuracy of the M-score model 
decreases by almost 20% on average on the current data, across a range of different ratios of 
error costs (	
: 	) as demonstrated in Table 5-17. The M-score model was originally 
evaluated on only 24 cases of fraud compared with 169 in this study. The larger number of 
fraud cases in this study might include a more diverse range of fraud cases than the limited 
original study. Increased diversity usually results in more difficulty in classification, and so 
this could be a contributor to the M-score’s reduced accuracy on the data used in this study. 
The difference in accuracy might also indicate that the detection of fraudulent financial 
statements has become more difficult over time, as this study was published 16 years prior to 
this dissertation. This could be as a result of fraudsters becoming more sophisticated and 
better at concealing fraud. 
Table 5-17. The accuracy of the M-score model in this research compared to its original study. 
Scenario129 Study Percentage Accuracy 
Fraud Legitimate Overall 
	
: 	 = 10: 1, () = 2.84% ∴ 	
 = 0.3 
Original 38% 94% 67% 
This research 0% 99% 50% 
	
: 	 = 20: 1, () = 2.84% ∴ 	
 = 0.6 
Original 50% 93% 71% 
This research 1% 98% 49% 
	
: 	 = 40: 1, () = 2.84% ∴ 	
 = 1 
Original 54% 91% 73% 
This research 56% 50% 53% 
 
Similar to the M-score, the accuracy of the F-score model reduced substantially on the 
data set used in this research as shown in Table 5-18. On this data set, the F-score model has 
reduced accuracy for detecting both fraudulent and legitimate statements when using the 
same cut-off value as the original study. Furthermore, if the cut-off is varied so that the 
accuracy of detecting fraud is the same, then the accuracy of detecting legitimate statements 
is nearly half of the accuracy in the original study. The F-score does however retain its 
relatively superior ability to detect fraudulent financial statements, compared with legitimate. 
Unlike the M-score, it was evaluated on many more fraud cases (107). This means that the 
                                                 
 
129 The corresponding 	
 was calculated using the same equation as above, 	
  = ¯¬­¯¬® × «(
)«(). 
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size of the data set is less likely to explain the difference in performance between the F-score 
in the original study and in this research. However, the F-score was originally tested on 
holdout data from 1999 to 2002, which is still earlier than the current holdout data set from 
2003 to 2007. Consequently, the reduced performance of the F-score might also be associated 
with fraud becoming more difficult to detect over time. 
Table 5-18. The accuracy of the F-score model in this research compared to its original study. 
Study 
Percentage Accuracy 
Fraud Legitimate Overall 
Original 74% 62% 68% 
This research: same cut-off as original study 59% 47% 53% 
This research: cut-off varied so fraud accuracy is 74% 74% 33% 53% 
 
There is another potential reason for the reduced performance of the M-score and F-
score models in this current research. If the nature of fraud and consequently the indicators of 
fraud have changed, then these models developed on older data might be searching for 
outdated patterns that no longer relate to fraud. Consequently, their performance would be 
reduced on the more recent data in this study. This highlights the importance of regularly 
updating models and re-assessing their accuracy. This was also empirically shown on a 
related problem of financial distress prediction, where newer updated models clearly 
outperformed the most famous and widely-used, older model (Gepp and Kumar 2014). 
The performance of models as recorded in their original study has been compared 
with the performance of models developed using the same modelling technique on the 
training data in this study. Unlike the M-score and F-score models, these comparisons are not 
subject to the influence of potentially searching for outdated patterns. Nevertheless, similar 
results have been found, as shown in Table 5-19. Accuracy on the data used in this study is 
consistently worse than that presented in the corresponding original study. Potential reasons 
for this are that: 
• The original studies, with the exception of Whiting et al. (2012), tested their models on 
far fewer fraud cases than the 169 used in this research. As stated above, this might make 
detection in the current study more difficult. However, it is also more similar to the real 
world and so results in more accurate estimates of performance in this study; 
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• Some of the original studies have not used holdout data that occur chronologically after 
the training data to obtain more realistic real-world performance assessments. This would 
have caused their performance levels to be inflated; 
• Fraud may be becoming more difficult to detect over time, which would cause reduced 
accuracy in this study because it uses more recent data than these prior studies. This is 
actually an advantage of this study, because the results are more applicable to today even 
if the reported accuracy is lower. 
Table 5-19. A comparison of the performance of modelling techniques in their original study with the 
performance in this research (indicated by shading). 
Study Test Data 
Accuracy: Fraud, 
Legitimate, Overall 
F L O 
Standard regression-based 
From review in Chapter 3 Varied Overall: 67% to 73% 
This research (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout Overall: 57% to 62% 
Backpropagation Neural Network 
Green and Choi (1997) Random holdout 74% 68% 71% 
McKee (2009) Unclear 48% 96% 71% 
NN_BK (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout 57% 56% 59% 
Optimised Neural Network 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) Chronological holdout 66% 59% 63% 
NN_GA_5 (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout 65% 50% 58% 
Ensemble: Neural network and logistic regression 
McKee (2009) Unclear 71% 83% 77% 
NN_LR (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout 51% 70% 61% 
Ensemble: Random Forests (¥$ #!#$ #ï$ =  ð§!Ò$   ¥$#) 
Whiting et al. (2012) Cross-validation 82% 83% 82% 
RF_8 (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout 67% 64% 66% 
Ensemble: TreeNet / Stochastic Gradient Boosting 
Whiting et al. (2012) Cross-validation 74% 84% 79% 
TN (	
 = 1) Chronological holdout 55% 80% 67% 
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Overall, it is clear that models find it more difficult to detect fraud in the data used to 
evaluate model performance in this study than the data used in prior studies. Directly 
comparing results from this research with that in prior research is therefore likely to be 
misleading. To increase the validity of comparisons, models developed using techniques from 
previous studies have been included in this research so that comparisons that use the same 
data set can be made. 
5.3.2 Analysis by Modelling Technique 
The accuracy of the models measured by WEC on the holdout data are discussed 
according to the modelling technique used. Lower values of WEC indicate better 
performance. As stated in Section 5.2.1.d, a naïve model that classifies all statements as 
fraudulent when 	
 ≥ 1 and all statements as legitimate when 	
 < 1 always has a 
WEC of one. Consequently, WEC values lower than one indicate accuracy that is superior to 
a naïve model that could be practically useful. Performance on the holdout data is the most 
important result, but performance on the training data is also included to assist interpretation 
and explanation of the holdout performance. 
5.3.2.a Benchmark Models 
The performance of the M-score and F-score models are shown in Figure 5-2. Their 
WEC values are the same for high values of 	
, but the M-score model has much higher 
WEC for low values of 	
. The performance is relatively similar for mid-range values 
of 	
. It is not surprising that the two models respond differently to varying values of 
	
, because they are based on different explanatory variables (as previously defined in 
Section 5.2.2). The F-score model responds to relatively high and low levels of 	
 with 
a stable WEC of one. More importantly, the only time the WEC is lower than one for either 
model is when 	
 is one. In this case, the WEC is 0.94 and 0.96 for the M-score and F-
score model respectively. This means that neither model is practically useful when the 
	
 is not equal to one, as a naïve model is superior. 
Although the M-score is superior to the F-score when 	
 is 0.5, 0.6, 1 or 3, the 
F-score model more consistently has lower WEC. Hence, the F-score model is used in figures 
hereafter when only one benchmark model is presented in order to reduce the complexity of 
figures. 
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Figure 5-2. A comparison of the holdout performance of the benchmark models. The M-score model 
is not shown when 	
 = 0.004 because it has a WEC of 2.48. 
 
Figure 5-3. The training performance of the benchmark models compared to two standard regression-
based models. 
 
5.3.2.b Standard Regression-based Models 
Benchmark, DA_All and LR_All Models 
Figure 5-3 above illustrates that standard regression-based models, including the 
benchmark models, perform better on the training data when 	
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shown by smaller values of WEC as 	
 approaches one, which creates a v-shape. The 
performance of the discriminant analysis model DA_All and the logistic regression model 
LR_All are similar with the former being better for lower values of 	
 and the latter for 
higher values of 	
. The figure also shows that the accuracy of benchmark models on 
the training data is substantially inferior with much higher WECs. This is expected as the 
benchmark models, unlike all other models, have not been developed on the training data and 
so it is more akin to holdout data for the benchmark models. The fact that both data sets are 
new to the benchmark models is illustrated by their performance on the holdout data in 
Figure 5-2 being similar to their performance on the training data in Figure 5-3. The main 
difference is that the M-score does not have higher WECs at low levels of 	
 on the 
training data (Figure 5-3), because the cut-off values were optimised on that data. 
The performance on the holdout data is illustrated in Figure 5-4. The performance of 
DA_All and LR_All is drastically different on the holdout data, which highlights the 
importance of its use. It is again demonstrated that models perform best when 	
 
approaches one. However, on the training data, the benchmark models were inferior in all 
cases, but they are actually superior on the holdout data when 	
 ≤ 0.3 or 	
 ≥ 2. 
The LR_All model has the lowest WEC when 	
 equals 1 or 0.4. Nevertheless, the 
DA_All model is the best model overall when 0.4 ≤ 	
 ≤ 1.  
Figure 5-4. The holdout performance of the benchmark models compared to two standard regression-
based models. The DA_All, LR_All and M-score models are not shown for some low values of 	
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Discriminant Analysis (DA) Models 
The performance of all the discriminant analysis models on the holdout data is shown 
in Figure 5-5. Once again, the models perform best (lower WEC) when the value of 	
 
approaches one. The performance is similar overall with no model standing out as the worst 
or the best. The best model varies depending on the situation in terms of 	
. Every 
model is the best in at least one situation, as well as the worst in at least one situation. 
DA_U15%LR is the only model to be best in only one situation (	
 = 3), but in that 
situation it is noticeably superior and the only model with a WEC lower than one. At the 
same time, this model is the worst in many other situations and so the choice of model can be 
important depending on the value of 	
. Overall, the WECs are above one for much of 
the graph, which means that in many cases a naïve model that classifies all statements the 
same way would be superior. At least one of the models has a WEC lower than one in 8 out 
of the 18 values of 	
, specifically when 	
 ≤ 0.04, 0.4 ≤ 	
 ≤ 1 and when 
	
 = 3. 
Figure 5-5. A comparison of the holdout performance of the discriminant analysis models. When 	
 = 0.004, the DA_All (WEC = 2.44), DA_U1 (WEC = 3.92) and DA_U15%LR (WEC = 
3.95) models are not shown. When 	
 = 0.01, the DA_U1 (WEC = 2.15) and DA_U15%LR 
(WEC = 2.17) models are also not shown. The models are ordered below from most number of 
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Logistic Regression (LR) Models 
The performance of all the logistic regression models on the holdout data is shown in 
Figure 5-6. Again, the models perform best when 	
 approaches one and the results are 
similar overall without an obvious best model. There are also other findings that are 
consistent with those made from discriminant analysis models: 
• The best model varies depending on the situation in terms of 	
; 
• Every model is the worst and the best in at least one situation, except the LR_U15%LR 
model that has at best the second lowest WEC when 	
 = 3. This is the same 
situation in which the corresponding DA model DA_U15%LR performed best; and, 
• The Step and U15% models are the best for the lower values of 	
, and the U1 
model is the best when 	
 = 1. 
Figure 5-6. A comparison of the holdout performance of the logistic regression models. When 	
 = 0.004, the LR_All (WEC = 3.93), LR_U1 (WEC = 2.45) and LR_U15%LR (WEC = 3.95) 
models are not shown. When 	
 = 0.01, the LR_All (WEC = 2.16) and LR_U15%LR (WEC = 
2.17) models are also not shown. The models are ordered according to the number of explanatory 
variables they use, from most (left) to least (right). 
 
DA and LR models do not always produce relatively similar results when the same 
(number of) variables are used. For example, the All model is the best DA model for the 
largest values of 	
, but the All model is the worst LR model in the same situation. 
Overall, the WEC values are again above one for much of the graph. At least one of the 
models has a WEC lower than one in 9 out of the 18 values of 	
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	
 ≤ 0.01 and when 0.4 ≤ 	
 ≤ 2. Similar to the DA model results, some LR 
models find it easier to adjust to lower (rather than higher) values of 	
, while some 
models appear unable to adjust with extremely high WEC values that are too high to be 
shown in Figure 5-6. 
Multi-stage Logistic Regression (LR_MS) Models 
Although they are not consistently superior, the multi-stage logistic regressions have 
similar performance to other logistic regression models, as illustrated in Figure 5-7. The three 
comparison logistic regression models were chosen as the models using the largest, median 
and smallest number of explanatory variables. Similar to some of the LR and DA models, the 
LR_MS models have extremely high WEC at the lowest levels of 	
. When compared 
with all the logistic regression models, LR_MS_F has the lowest WEC when 	
 is 7 or 
8 and LR_MS_S has the lowest WEC when 	
 is 0.3. Overall, the LR_MS_F model has 
a WEC lower than a naïve model that classifies all statements the same way (WEC = 1) when 
	
 is 0.5, 0.6 or 1, while this only occurs for the LR_MS_S model when 	
 is 1. 
Once again, all the models have lower WECs as 	
 approaches one. 
Figure 5-7. The holdout performance of the multi-stage logistic regression models compared with 
other logistic regression models. The LR_All, LR_MS_F and LR_MS_S models are not shown for 
values of 	
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A Comparison of Discriminant Analysis (DA) and Logistic Regression (LR) Models 
The performance of both discriminant analysis and logistic regression models on the 
holdout data is shown in Figure 5-8. Some of the models were not included because 
displaying all of them results in an overly complex graph that is very difficult to interpret and 
additional models were not needed to illustrate the comparison between DA and LR models. 
The Step and U15% models were included as they have more stable WECs in Figures 5-6 and 
5-7. Furthermore, amongst all the DA models, the Step and U15% models were the best two 
according to the average of ranking the techniques according to: 
• The number of values of 	
 for which the WEC is less than one (more is better), 
which measures how many times the model is superior to a naïve model classifying all 
statements the same way; 
• The number of values of 	
 for which the WEC is the lowest model (more is better), 
which measures how many times the model is the best model; and, 
• The average ranking between the models across all values of 	
, which measures 
performance across all values of 	
. 
The same is true for the Step and U15% models amongst all the LR models, including the 
multi-stage LR models. 
Figure 5-8. A comparison of the holdout performance of discriminant analysis and logistic regression 
models. The LR_All, LR_MS_F and LR_MS_S models are not shown for values of 	
 ≤ 0.01 


































Prior-Adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (PaRCIF)
DA_U15% LR_U15% DA_Step LR_Step
Chapter 5 Modelling and Results Adrian Gepp 
   Page 196 
Figure 5-8 reveals that overall the logistic regression and discriminant analysis 
models have very similar performance in terms of WEC (as also occurred between the 
DA_All and LR_All models in Figure 5-4). All models have a V-shape near where 	
 is 
one, where the best performance occurs. Additionally, both logistic regression and 
discriminant analysis are better when 	
 is lower, rather than greater, than one. This is 
highlighted by no model having a WEC less than one when 	
 > 1. The most notable 
exception to similar performance is when 	
 is equal to three. 
Overall, the performance is similar between both discriminant analysis and logistic 
regression models. However, it is useful to select one model as the best. This model is to be 
used for comparisons with other models. LR_Step has been chosen as the best model out of 
the four presented in Figure 5-8 as it produces the most consistent relatively-low WEC. The 
LR_Step model has the best average ranking across three criteria; specifically it has: 
3. A WEC less than one for six values of 	
, which is the second best;  
4. The lowest WEC for five values of 	
, which is the second highest amount; and, 
5. An average ranking of 2.3 across all values of 	
, which is the best. 
It is noteworthy that all of the models compared in this subsection, including the 
representative LR_Step model, use a subset of the total number of explanatory variables. This 
suggests that variable reduction techniques, such as selection by statistical significance 
according to univariate analysis or stepwise selection, assist in developing discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression models for detecting financial statement fraud. Using 
univariate analysis to select variables for a discriminant analysis model has been trialled in 
previous research (Skousen et al. 2009). This research has shown that this variable selection 
technique also works well for a logistic regression model. On the other hand, stepwise 
variable selection has been trialled for logistic regression in multiple prior studies (Persons 
1995; Bell and Carcello 2000; Dechow et al. 2011), and this research has shown that stepwise 
variable selection also works well for discriminant analysis models that detect financial 
statement fraud. 
5.3.2.c Artificial Neural Network (NN) Models 
The performance of the three neural network models on the training and holdout data 
is shown in Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 respectively. The results on the training data indicate 
the consistent result of superior performance (as indicated by lower WEC) when 	
 =
1. It was expected that the genetically optimised neural network (NN_GA) models would 
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have more accurate training results. This was true for the NN_GA_5 model that has a 
substantially lower WEC in all cases when compared with the standard backpropagation 
NN_BK model. This result is shown in Figure 5-9 that also reveals the NN_GA_1 model 
predominantly produced classifications with higher WEC on the training data. This poor 
performance also extended to the holdout data as shown in Figure 5-10. The holdout WEC 
for the NN_GA_1 model is never below one, which means that the model is not practically 
useful because a naïve model classifying all statements the same way is superior in all cases. 
Thus, changing the minimum learning rate of the NN_GA model from the default of 0.5 (as 
used in NN_GA_5) to 0.1 as used in NN_GA_1 is not recommended when developing 
models to detect financial statement fraud. 
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Figure 5-10. A comparison of the holdout performance of the artificial neural network models. The 
NN_BK and NN_GA1 models are not shown for the lowest two values of 	
 as their WEC 
ranges between 2.16 and 5.42. Most of the NN_GA5 model is not shown because its WEC is too high, 
ranging up to 43.62 when 	
 is 0.004. 
 
The NN_BK and NN_GA_5 models only have a WEC less than one when 	
 is 
one. In that situation, the WEC of the genetically optimised NN_GA_5 model is 0.846, 
slightly lower than NN_BK’s WEC of 0.852. However, the WEC of the NN_GA_5 model 
quickly becomes relatively high for 	
 values that differ from one. This is an important 
result that extends previous encouraging findings from optimised neural network models that 
did not consider differing values of 	
 (Fanning and Cogger 1998). The poor 
performance of the genetically optimised neural networks is unexpected. Although the 
NN_GA_5 model more accurately learnt patterns in the training data set, those patterns have 
not persisted into the future holdout data. This highlights the importance of choosing models 
based on their holdout performance and not their training performance alone.  
Overall, the genetically optimised neural networks have not been useful in detecting 
financial statement fraud on the data set used in this research. The only advantage revealed 
was the reduced time and effort required to develop them, which was also found by Fanning 
and Cogger (1998). Although the NN_GA_5 model is slightly better when 	
 = 1, the 
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5.3.2.d Individual Decision Tree (DT) Models 
The performance of the two decision tree models on both the training and holdout 
data is shown in Figure 5-11. Both models, particularly DT_One, have low WEC on the 
training data for the middle range of 	
 values. Both models also have a WEC equal to 
one for the highest and lowest values of 	
, both on the training data and holdout data. 
Although this only represents performance equivalent to a naïve model for extreme values of 
	
, it is relatively good performance compared to most of the other models with WECs 
of greater than one. The WEC of the DT_One model is less than one when 	
 is 0.5, 0.6 
or 1, while this is only true for the DT_Suite model when 	
 is 1 (when the two models 
are identical). The only WEC above one for the DT_One model is 1.05 when 	
 is 2, 
which makes it the most stable model analysed so far in terms of WEC. Overall, it is clear 
that DT_One is superior to DT_Suite because it has equal or lower WECs in every case on 
both the training and holdout data. 
DT_Suite comprises a set of cost-sensitive decision tree models, a tree developed for 
each value of 	
, while DT_One utilises the tree developed for 	
 = 1 in all 
scenarios. That is, integrating different misclassification costs into the model development 
process is a feature of CART that has been utilised by DT_Suite. However, the DT_Suite 
model has been outperformed by the DT_One model. It illustrates that for this financial 
statement fraud detection data set, changing values of 	
 is better modelled by 
manipulating the cut-off values on a single cost-insensitive tree. A possible reason for this 
can be found when analysing the complexity of the decision trees in the DT_Suite model, 
which is shown in Table 5-20 below. The most complex tree is used when 	
 = 1, 
which means that the DT_One model always uses the most complex tree from DT_Suite. 
Therefore, less complex trees performed better on the training data when 	
 ≠ 1. 
However, the additional complexity of the DT_One resulted in a substantially smaller 
reduction in accuracy when moving to the holdout data. Thus, the more complex DT_One 
model performed better on the holdout data. 
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Figure 5-11. A comparison of the training and the holdout performance of the decision tree models.  
 
Table 5-20. The complexity of the decision trees in the DT_Suite model, as measured by the number 
of terminal nodes. The shaded regions indicate the situations in which the model did not develop a 
tree, but rather reverted to the naïve model of classifying all financial statements the same way. 
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5.3.2.e Ensembles of Decision Trees: Random Forests (RF) and TreeNet (TN) 
All three decision tree ensembles have very low WECs as shown in Figure 5-12. In 
fact, they have perfect accuracy (WEC = 0) for values of 	
 between 0.3 and 5. It is 
clear that the models have accurately learnt patterns in the training data. However, unlike 
genetically optimised neural networks, many of these patterns have persisted into the future 
holdout data as evidenced by many holdout WECs less than one as shown in Figure 5-13. 
These models, particularly the TN model, adapt relatively well to higher values of 	
. 
They are the first models with multiple WEC values below one when 	
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Figure 5-12. A comparison of the training performance of the decision tree ensembles.  
 
Figure 5-13. A comparison of the holdout performance of the decision tree ensembles. The RF_8 and 
RF_66 models are not shown when 	
 = 0.004 as their WECs are 2.46 and 2.43 respectively. 
 
The importance of using holdout data for evaluation is again apparent. While the TN 
model is the worst on the training data, it is arguably the best overall on the holdout data. The 
TN model has a WEC less than one the largest number of times (11). The TN model also has 
the lowest WEC in 9 situations, which is more than either RF model. Furthermore, TN has 
more stable results over the different values of 	
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WEC, it usually has a WEC comparable with the lowest WEC. While the TN model is the 
best overall, the RF_66 model is noticeably superior in some situations, the most notable 
being when 	
 is 3. In contrast, Whiting et al. (2012) previously found Random Forests 
to outperform stochastic gradient boosting (used in the TN model), but this was using cross-
validated evaluation. The methodological improvements used to develop the TN model 
(described in Section 5.2.3.e) could also explain this different result. 
The RF_66 model has a lower WEC than RF_8 for 14 out of the 18 values of 	
. 
However, the RF_66 is noticeably inferior in the other 4 cases that occur when 	
 is 
between 0.4 and 2. The superiority of the RF_66 model, albeit minor, is unexpected. RF_66 
incorporates only one random element by random sampling (with replacement) the data. In 
contrast, the RF_8 model incorporates an additional random element as suggested in prior 
research (Bhattacharya et al. 2011a) by randomly selecting a subset of 8 variables available 
for consideration at every tree node. Overall, the results are not conclusive about the best size 
of the random variable subset to be used when developing Random Forests models. Because 
of its accuracy in this research, it is advised that future research include a Random Forests 
model that has all variables available at every tree node. 
Figure 5-14 provides insight into the performance of ensembles of decision trees 
relative to an individual decision tree. While the single decision tree (DT_One) is rarely the 
best technique, it does have comparable performance for many values of 	
. DT_One 
has varied performance relative to the two RF models, but it is outperformed by TreeNet 
most of the time. DT_One only has a lower WEC than TreeNet for three values of 	
. 
However, it should be noted that DT_One is not practically useful when 	
 is outside of 
the range 0.5 to 2 as it reverts to classifying all financial statements the same way. The tree 
ensemble models on the other hand provide classification models that function for all values 
of 	
, and which have WEC values lower than one in many cases. Overall, TreeNet 
remains the best individual or ensemble decision tree model.  
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Figure 5-14. The holdout performance of ensembles of decision trees compared with a single decision 
tree (DT_One).  
 
5.3.2.f Ensembles involving multiple modelling techniques 
Ensembles using Majority Vote (Vote) 
The WEC of the four ensembles that use Majority Vote on the holdout data are very 
similar, as shown in Figure 5-15 below. Visually, the Vote5 and Vote3_RF_TN_NN models 
stand out the most for having relatively high WEC values indicating comparatively worse 
performance. 
A number of measures (the same as used in Section 5.3.2.b) were calculated to 
compare overall performance, and are presented in Table 5-21 below. 
• The number of values of 	
 for which the WEC is less than one, measuring how 
many times the model is superior to a naïve model classifying all statements the same 
way; 
• The number of values of 	
 for which the WEC is the lowest model, measuring how 
many times the model is the best model; and, 
• The average of the ranking (where lower WEC is preferred) for each value of 	
, 
measuring performance across all values of 	
. 
In a Majority Vote ensemble, increasing the number of underlying models from three 
in the other models to five in the Vote5 model offers little advantage. The four models have 
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overall performance. The Vote3_RF_TN_DT model was the only Majority Vote model with 
underlying models that were exclusively decision-tree based (TN, RF_8 and DT_One). 
Figure 5-15. A comparison of the holdout performance of the ensemble models using Majority Vote. 
 
Table 5-21. A comparison of the holdout performance of the ensemble models using Majority Vote. 
Model 
WEC Measure across all values of ÕÙà ¡ 
(Ranking: 1 is best – 4 is worst) 
Final 
Average 
Rank WEC < 1 Lowest WEC Average Rank 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 16 (rank 1) 7 (rank 1) 1.9 (rank 1) 1 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 11 (rank4) 7 (rank 1) 2.4 (rank 2) 2.33 
Vote5 15 (rank 2) 5 (rank 3) 2.6 (rank 3) 2.67 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 12 (rank 3) 5 (rank 3) 2.6 (rank 4) 3.33 
 
Ensembles using Averages (AV) 
The holdout performance of the four ensembles that use averages are also very 
similar, as shown in Figure 5-16. The AV5_NoNN model is clearly the best for the lowest 
levels of 	
. Visually the AV5_NoNN model is also probably the best model overall, 
which is a finding supported by all the measures in Table 5-22. Unlike the Majority Vote 
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number of underlying models has increased. The best model (AV5_NoNN) averages over the 
largest number (5) of underlying models: DA_All, LR_All, DT_One, RF_8 and TN models.  
Figure 5-16. The holdout performance of the ensemble models using averages. 
 
Table 5-22. A comparison of the holdout performance of the ensemble models using averages. 
Model 
WEC Measure across all values of ÕÙà ¡ 
(Ranking: 1 is best – 3 is worst) 
Final 
Average 
Rank WEC < 1 Lowest WEC Average Rank 
Av5_NoNN 15 (rank 1) 7 (rank 1) 1.8 (rank 1) 1 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 11 (rank 2) 5 (rank 2) 1.9 (rank 2) 2 
AV2_RF_TN 9 (rank 3) 2 (rank 3) 2.4 (rank 3) 3 
 
Other Ensembles Models 
The performance on the holdout data of the models proposed by McKee (2009) and 
new models developed from analysing his model are presented in Figure 5-17 below. The 
DTnode_LR_Step, NN-DTnode_LR_Step and DT_LR models have almost identical 
performance in Figure 5-17, although they do differ in the cases that have a WEC too high to 
be shown in the figure. It isn’t noticeable visually, but the DTnode_LR_Step model has the 
lowest WEC of the three models in all cases shown on the graph and in 14 out of the 18 
values of 	
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theoretical analysis (from Section 5.2.3.f) to include the more rich information provided by 
terminal node classifications from a decision tree model rather than simply the overall 
classification used by McKee (2009). However, all three McKee-related models are 
outperformed by the DT_One_DA model, which uses discriminant analysis in a second stage 
after the DT_One model. The DT_One_DA model has extremely similar performance when 
PaRCòó is between 0.5 and 2, but then has a stable WEC for more extreme values of PaRCòó 
when the other models become ineffective with very high WECs. 
Figure 5-17. A comparison of the holdout performance of other ensemble models. The majority of the 
first three models are not shown with high WECs that range up to 66.96 when 	
 is 0.004. 
 
5.3.3 Overall Analysis 
5.3.3.a Best Model(s) for Each Value of ôõö÷øù 
The model with the lowest WEC depends on the value of 	
. This demonstrates 
that considering different values of 	
 is important, because no model has the lowest in 
every value of 	
. 
Table 5-23 below lists the best model(s) (out of all 34) for each value of 	
, as 
well as any models that are within 2% of the lowest WEC. This table summarises the answer 
to research question RQ1 (defined on page 132) and can be used to select the most 
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Table 5-23. The best model(s) according to the lowest holdout Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for each 
Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (	
). 
ÕÙà ¡ 
Best Model(s) with the Lowest Holdout WEC 
F/L: Accuracy at Detecting Fraud/Legitimate 
Model(s) within 
2% of the Lowest WEC 
WEC F L Model Code 
0.004 0.964 4% 100% DA_U15% 
LR_U15% (within 1%) 
LR_Step 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
0.01 0.964 4% 100% DA_U15% 
LR_U15% (within 1%) 
LR_Step 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
0.04 0.964 4% 100% DA_U15% 
LR_U15% (within 1%) 
LR_Step 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
0.1 0.970 3% 100% LR_U15% 
AV5_NoNN (within 1%) 
Vote5 
0.2 0.935 9% 99% AV5_NoNN AV3_RF_TN_DT 
0.3 0.913 28% 94% RF_66 AV5_NoNN 
0.4 0.805 28% 96% AV3_RF_TN_DT 
 
0.5 0.763 50% 87% Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
 
0.6 0.720 50% 87% Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
 
1 0.580 66% 76% Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
 
2 0.834 85% 46% AV5_NoNN 
 











M-score / F-score 
NN_GA_1 
DT_One / DT_One_DA 
AV5_NoNN 
Vote5 
6 0.899 98% 21% 
TN 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT  
7 0.917 98% 21% TN 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
8 0.935 98% 21% TN 





10 0.876 100% 12% RF_66 Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
17 0.876 100% 12% RF_66 
 
 
As stated earlier in Section 5.2.1.d, the value of 	
 can be estimated from the 
proportion of fraudulent statements in the real-world population [also known as the prior 
probability of fraud, ()] and the cost of missing fraud relative to the cost of falsely 
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alleging fraud (	
:	). The calculation is 	
 =  ¯¬­¯¬®  ×  «(
)«()  =  ¯¬­¯¬®  ×  «(
)6«(
) . 
Alternatively, Table 5-24 be used to obtain the corresponding value of 	
 for given 
values of () and 	
:	. The estimates of () from prior research is discussed above (in 
Section 5.2.1.c), but the ratio 	
:	 varies depending on the stakeholder. As an example, 
Beneish (1999a) estimates that 	
:	 is likely to be in the range between 20:1 and 30:1 for 
investors. 
Table 5-24. (Table 5-8 reproduced.) The corresponding prior-adjusted relative cost of missing fraud 
for each combination of ratio of error cost and prior probability of fraud. Values appearing more than 
once have been shaded in the same colour. 
Ratio of Error Costs ( ¡: ¢) 
(missing fraud: falsely alleging fraud) 
Prior probability of fraud [£(¡)] 
0.40% 1.00% 5.50% 14.50% 
1:1 0.004 0.01 0.1 0.2 
10:1 0.04 0.1 0.6 2 
20:1 0.1 0.2 1 3 
30:1 0.1 0.3 2 5 
40:1 0.2 0.4 2 7 
50:1 0.2 0.5 3 8 
60:1 0.2 0.6 3 10 
100:1 0.4 1 6 17 
 
Table 5-23 on the previous page reveals that the lowest WECs are less than one, 
except when 	
 is equal to five the lowest WEC is equal to one. That means that in 
every other case, a model developed in this research is superior to a naïve model (defined 
above in Section 5.2.1.d) that classifies all financial statements the same way. Consistent with 
all previous results, it is also evident in Table 5-23 that the WEC when 	
 is equal to 
one is noticeably lower than any other WEC. When 	
 increases above one, models 
compensate by correctly detecting more fraud at the expense of correctly detecting legitimate 
financial statements. The opposite occurs when values of 	
 are less than one. It is also 
noticeable that for the mid-range values of 	
, no models are within 2% of the best, as 
indicated by the last column being empty. However, for the more extreme values of 	
 
(high and low) there are usually models that have a WEC within 2% of the best model. 
The discriminant analysis and logistic regression models DA_U15% and LR_U15% 
have the lowest WEC for the lowest values of 	
. These two models only used variables 
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that were statistically significant at the 15% level in univariate analysis. Ensemble models 
dominate the remainder of the values of 	
 and decision tree techniques, and ensembles 
of them, often have the lowest WEC. Ensembles that use Majority Vote (Vote) and averages 
(AV) also have the lowest WEC (or within 2% of the lowest) in many cases, particularly for 
values of 	
 between 0.4 and 1 when ensembles of TreeNet, Random Forests and a 
CART decision tree (RF_TN_DT) have the lowest WEC. In addition to Random Forests 
(RF_66) being the best model when 	
 is equal to 0.3 and 3, it along with TreeNet are 
the best for the highest values of 	
. 
5.3.3.b Selection of the Best Model Overall 
The best models from each modelling technique (from Section 5.3.2) are compared in 
the following subsections across all values of 	
 to determine the best model overall, 
which addresses research question RQ2 (defined on page 132). 
The analysis presented in the following subsections shows that the AV5_NoNN is the 
best model when considering the whole range of 	
 values analysed in this study. 
Consequently, it would be an excellent model to choose when the value of 	
 is 
unknown. Table 5-25 below presents the percentage accuracy and Weighted Error Cost 
(WEC) of the AV5_NoNN model for each value of 	
. As the relative cost of missing 
fraud increases, indicated by larger values of 	
, the percentage of fraud detected 
increases at the expense of a decline in the percentage of legitimate detected. At the extreme 
values of 	
, the AV5_NoNN is able to detect either fraud or legitimacy with perfect 
accuracy while still maintaining a small (non-zero) percentage accuracy of detecting the 
other. The overall percentage accuracy declines as the value of 	
 moves further away 
from one, either above or below. This further illustrates that fraud is easiest to detect when 
	
 is equal to one. 
Although AV5_NoNN is the best model overall, it is not the best model for every 
specific value of 	
. Table 5-25 also reveals in the last column how the AV5_NoNN 
model compares to lowest WEC (of any model) for each value of 	
. The AV5_NoNN 
model is comparable in most situations and has the lowest WEC in three, when 	
 is 
equal to 0.2, 2 and 5. However, its WEC is more than 10% higher than the lowest for four 
values of 	
: 0.6, 6, 7 and 17. Consequently, if the value of 	
 is known then it is 
better to use the best model for that particular value of 	
, as presented in the previous 
section in Table 5-23. 
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Table 5-25. The holdout performance of the best model overall, AV5_NoNN, and a comparison to the 
lowest WEC (of any model) for each value of 	
. 
ÕÙà ¡ WEC Percentage Accuracy Comparison with WEC of the Best Model for each ÕÙà ¡ Fraud Legitimate Overall 
0.004 0.988 1% 100% 51% 2% higher WEC 
0.01 0.988 1% 100% 51% 2% higher WEC 
0.04 0.988 1% 100% 51% 2% higher WEC 
0.1 0.976 2% 100% 51% 1% higher WEC 
0.2 0.935 9% 99% 54% Equal WEC 
0.3 0.923 14% 98% 56% 1% higher WEC 
0.4 0.858 20% 98% 59% 7% higher WEC 
0.5 0.828 30% 93% 62% 9% higher WEC 
0.6 0.797 33% 92% 63% 11% higher WEC 
1 0.592 75% 66% 70% 2% higher WEC 
2 0.834 85% 46% 66% Equal WEC 
3 0.953 89% 37% 63% 5% higher WEC 
5 1.000 98% 12% 55% Equal WEC 
6 1.006 99% 7% 53% 12% higher WEC 
7 1.018 99% 7% 53% 11% higher WEC 
8 0.941 100% 6% 53% 1% higher WEC 
10 0.959 100% 4% 52% 9% higher WEC 
17 0.988 100% 1% 51% 13% higher WEC 
 
The analysis to determine that the AV5_NoNN is the best model overall now follows. 
A Comparison of Individual (non-ensemble) Models 
The three individual (non-ensemble) models that performed the best in the previous 
section were a logistic regression model (LR_Step), a neural network (NN_BK) and a 
decision tree (DT_One). Figure 5-18 reveals that the decision tree DT_One clearly has the 
lowest holdout WEC overall, although LR_Step has a slightly lower WEC for four values of 
	
 (0.004, 0.01, 0.04 and 0.5). A neural network had previously outperformed ID3 
decision trees on Greek data (Kirkos et al. 2007), but this result was clearly reversed using 
CART decision trees in this more comprehensive comparison. 
This research also provides more clarity on the relative accuracy of logistic regression 
and neural networks for financial statement fraud detection. Although Feroz et al. (2000) 
found a logistic regression and neural network model comparable, Perols (2011) found that 
logistic regression was superior using cross-validated results. Liou (2008) also found a 
similar result on Taiwanese data without considering differing error costs. The superior 
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results of logistic regression compared to a neural network have been substantiated in this 
study with increased reliability because a holdout data set from the US has been used. As 
illustrated in Figure 5-18, the LR_Step model is superior to NN_BK for 12 out of the 18 
values of 	
, including when 	
 is one (which is equivalent to ignoring the effects 
of error costs and priors). 
Figure 5-18. A comparison of the holdout performance of different individual (non-ensemble) 
models. 
 
The Best Individual Model Is Outperformed by the Ensemble Model DT_One_DA 
The WEC of the best individual model, DT_One, can be very slightly reduced by 
using discriminant analysis as a second stage classifier, as shown in Table 5-26. The 
DT_One_DA model uses discriminant analysis as a second stage classification motivated by 
the work by Nagadevara (2010). However, unlike the substantial improvements found by 
Nagadevara on a different classification problem, the improvements over a standard decision 
tree (DT_One) are extremely small, as shown in Table 5-26. DT_One_DA’s improvements in 
WECs are so small that they could be considered to be outweighed by the negative of the 
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Table 5-26. A comparison of the holdout WEC for the DT_One and DT_One_DA models. 
Model 
ÕÖ×ØÖ − ÙÚÛÜÝÞßÚ àßáÙÞ×âß ØÝÞ Øã ä×ÝÝ×åæ ¡ÖÙÜÚ (ÕÙà ¡) 
≤ 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 ≥ 3 
DT_One 1 0.953 0.858 0.669 1.053 1 
DT_One_DA 1 0.947 0.856 0.669 1.041 1 
 
A Comparison of Ensemble Models: DT_One_DA 
Consistent with previous research (presented in Chapter 3), the best models in this 
study are ensembles of multiple models. The best model so far, DT_One_DA, is compared in 
Figure 5-19 with the remaining ensemble models that performed best in the previous section. 
It can be seen that these models have WECs less than one far more often than in previous 
graphs. However, there are too many models in Figure 5-19 to be able to select the best 
model, so the comparison measures in Table 5-27 are used. 
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Table 5-27. A comparison of the holdout performance of different ensemble models. 
Model 
WEC Measure across all values of ÕÙà ¡ 
(Ranking: 1 is best – 5 is worst) 
Final 
Average 
Rank WEC < 1 Lowest WEC Average Rank 
AV5_NoNN 15 (rank 1) 8 (rank 1) 2.0 (rank 1) 1 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 11 (rank 2) 4 (rank 2) 2.5 (rank 2) 2 
TN 11 (rank 2) 3 (rank 4) 2.7 (rank 3) 3 
RF_66 9 (rank 4) 4 (rank 2) 3.7 (rank 5) 3.67 
DT_One_DA 3 (rank 5) 1 (rank 5) 3.4 (rank 4) 4.67 
 
Although DT_One_DA rarely has the highest WEC, there are models with a lower 
WEC than DT_One_DA in all situations in Figure 5-19 except for when 	
 = 5. 
Furthermore, the comparison with AV5_NoNN in Figure 5-20 clearly shows that 
DT_One_DA has a higher WEC overall. The DT_One_DA model is also the worst model 
(lowest rank) according to all the measures in Table 5-27. As is the case with the standard 
decision tree DT_One, DT_One_DA it is only better than a naïve model (WEC < 1) three 
times and so it only has practical use in these situations. 
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A Comparison of Ensemble Models: Decision Tree Ensembles 
There have been mixed results when comparing Random Forests (or bagging using 
decision trees) and logistic regression using cross-validation. Perols (2011) found logistic 
regression to be superior, while Whiting et al. (2012) found Random Forests to be the better 
technique. Additional clarity on this comparison is provided in this study by using a holdout 
sample, instead of cross-validation. The results in Table 5-27 above show that Random 
Forests (RF_66) has outperformed DT_One_DA in terms of WEC, which in turn 
outperformed the non-ensemble models including logistic regression. Thus, the results 
support the finding of Whiting that overall Random Forests are superior to logistic regression 
at detecting financial statement fraud. 
It is clear from Figure 5-19 above that while Random Forests (RF_66) performs really 
well with low WEC in some cases, it is the more volatile in terms of the WEC varying greatly 
across different values of 	
. TreeNet, the other decision tree ensemble, is, however, 
more consistent with its relatively good performance and WECs less than one. Thus, as 
mentioned above in Section 5.3.2.e, TreeNet is likely to be the better choice over the whole 
range of values of 	
. However, the comparison between TN and Vote3_RF_TN_DT in 
Figure 5-21 below reveals that the TreeNet model is not the best as it has equal or higher 
WEC for most values of 	
. Nevertheless, when excluding the ensemble models that 
use averages and Majority Vote (which incorporate both TreeNet and Random Forests), 
ensembles of decision trees are the best techniques. 
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Figure 5-21. The holdout performance of Vote3_RF_TN_DT compared with TN. 
 
A Comparison of Ensemble Models: Ensembles that use Majority Vote or Averages 
Table 5-27 (on page 213 above) clearly shows that the best model overall is the 
ensemble AV5_NoNN. This ensemble model averages the outputs of five other models: 
Random Forests, TreeNet, a CART decision tree, discriminant analysis and logistic 
regression. The second best model is the ensemble Vote3_RF_TN_DT that takes the Majority 
Vote between Random Forests, TreeNet and a CART decision tree. It is interesting to note 
that the ensemble formed using averages (AV5_NoNN) uses a larger, broader selection of 
models, while the Majority Vote ensemble (Vote3_RF_TN_DT) utilises only decision trees 
and ensembles of them. Both the AV5_NoNN and Vote3_RF_TN_DT models, particularly 
the former, predominantly outperform the benchmark F-score model, as shown in Figure 5-22 
below. This figure also shows graphically that the AV5_NoNN model is the best overall with 
a more consistently lower WEC than the Vote3_RF_TN_DT model. As shown in Table 5-27 
above, the AV5_NoNN model’s WEC is below one for 15 out of the 18 values of 	
. In 
the remaining three situations, it has a WEC equal to one once and slightly greater than one 
twice, as shown above in Table 5-25. 
Figure 5-23 below illustrates that the best model overall, AV5_NoNN, has a WEC 
lower than both benchmark models in every situation except when 	
 is equal to 6 or 7, 
when it is slightly higher. This figure also illustrates that the AV5_NoNN model has the 
lowest WEC when 	
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Thus, models find it easier to detect fraud when the prior-adjusted relative cost of missing 
fraud is roughly equal to the prior-adjusted relative cost of falsely alleging fraud, as indicated 
by a 	
 value of one. 
Figure 5-22. The holdout performance of the best two models compared to the best benchmark model 
(F-Score). 
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5.3.3.c A Comparison of Models When ÕÙà ¡ is Equal to One 
The analysis so far has considered different values of 	
 that represent varying 
error costs and prior probabilities. This is more applicable to the real world than many prior 
studies that present results ignoring these considerations. To assist a complete interpretation 
of results, an analysis of results when 	
 is equal to one follows, because it is equivalent 
to ignoring these considerations. An advantage of this analysis is that results can be presented 
in terms of percentage accuracy, which is more intuitive than the WEC measure. However, 
the following analysis is limited to those occasions when 	
 is estimated to be close to 
or equal to one. 
Table 5-28 below lists the percentage of both fraudulent statements and legitimate 
statements that each model classifies correctly from the holdout data set, as well as the 
average overall accuracy. The results in the table are ordered from highest overall accuracy to 
the lowest and reveal that: 
• Ensemble models, particularly those involving multiple modelling techniques, are the 
most accurate. In addition, CART decision trees are the most accurate non-ensemble 
technique. This is the same result as found in the overall analysis of different 	
 
values presented in Section 5.3.3.b; 
• The model with the highest overall accuracy is the ensemble model Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
that averages the probability outputs of a Random Forest model, a TreeNet model and a 
CART decision tree; 
• There are two models with equal second highest overall accuracy, which are AV5_NoNN 
and AV3_RF_TN_DT. The latter model is also the most accurate at detecting fraud with 
an accuracy of 78%. These two models were also the best models overall as presented in 
Section 5.3.3.b above; 
• AV5_NoNN is one of only five (out of 34) models that correctly detected more fraudulent 
than legitimate statements. This result is consistent with many prior studies (discussed in 
the review in Chapter 3); 
• The genetically optimised neural network NN_GA_1 classifies the most legitimate 
statements correctly, but at the expense of having the lowest rate of correctly detecting 
fraud. It is the worst model with the lowest overall classification accuracy of 50%; and, 
• The benchmark models, F-score and M-score, had the next lowest overall accuracy, 
which reveals that all models developed in this research except NN_GA_1 are more 
accurate than the benchmark models when 	
 is equal to one. 
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Table 5-28. The accuracy of models on the holdout data set when 	
 = 1. The order is from 
highest to lowest overall accuracy, and shading indicates the maximum in that column. 
Model 
Accuracy: Fraud, Legitimate, Overall 
F L O 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 66% 76% 71% 
AV5_NoNN 75% 66% 70% 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 78% 62% 70% 
Vote5 60% 76% 68% 
TN 55% 80% 67% 
AV2_RF_TN 57% 76% 67% 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 60% 75% 67% 
DTnode_LR_Step 63% 72% 67% 
DT_Suite 62% 72% 67% 
DT_One 62% 72% 67% 
DT_One_DA 62% 72% 67% 
NN-DTnode_LR_Step 63% 70% 67% 
DT_LR 62% 71% 66% 
RF_66 63% 69% 66% 
RF_8 67% 64% 66% 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 60% 70% 65% 
LR_Step 47% 76% 62% 
LR_U1 56% 69% 62% 
LR_All 55% 69% 62% 
DA_U1 59% 65% 62% 
DA_All 50% 72% 61% 
DA_Step 50% 71% 61% 
NN_LR 51% 70% 61% 
LR_MS_S 49% 71% 60% 
DA_U15%LR 49% 69% 59% 
LR_MS_F 51% 66% 59% 
LR_U15%LR 54% 64% 59% 
NN_GA_5 65% 50% 58% 
DA_U15% 49% 66% 57% 
LR_U15% 49% 66% 57% 
NN_BK 56% 59% 57% 
M-score 56% 50% 53% 
F-score 31% 72% 52% 
NN_GA_1 15% 85% 50% 
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5.3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented analyses of models to detect fraud in the financial 
statements of publicly listed companies in the US. The analyses have used a data set with 
substantially more fraud cases than most previous studies and an extensive set of explanatory 
variables. Furthermore, the data used can act as a benchmark data set for future research. 
Unlike many prior studies, a holdout data set that occurred chronologically after the training 
data has also been used to provide results that are more applicable to the real world. 
Compared to such a holdout data set, analyses in this chapter also revealed that using cross-
validation did not provide similar results, which is an important finding for future research. 
The analyses in this chapter has been conducted over the widest range of estimates for 
the prior probability of fraud, compared with earlier studies. This range includes a 
substantially higher estimate of 14.5% from recent research (Dyck et al. 2013) that has not 
been incorporated into previous financial statement fraud detection modelling studies. As the 
ratio of error costs depends on the stakeholder, ratios have been considered ranging from 1:1 
to 1:100 for the cost of missing fraud relative to the cost of falsely alleging fraud. Consistent 
with best practice in previous cost-sensitive research, models have been compared using a 
weighted error cost measure after their cut-off values have been empirically optimised. 
Overall, models were most accurate when the cost of missing fraud was equal to the cost of 
falsely alleging fraud after adjusting for the prior probability of fraud. 
Finally, a total of 32 models have been developed after analysing many more in order 
to choose the parameters for each model. Some of the models were based on those in prior 
studies such as discriminant analysis, logistic regression, artificial neural network and 
ensemble models. New models have also been developed. For example, variable selection 
techniques, previously trialled exclusively for either discriminant analysis or logistic 
regression models, were used for both modelling techniques in this research. Two new multi-
stage logistic regression models were also developed in addition to new models based on 
CART decision trees, Random Forests and TreeNet with more refined parameters. New 
ensembles were also developed including two-stage models incorporating CART decision 
trees and logistic regression, as well as ensembles that used Majority Vote and averaging 
individual model outputs. All 32 models have been developed and tested on the same data so 
that valid comparisons could be made. An additional two benchmark models (F-score and M- 
score), exactly as developed in their original studies, were also included for comparison. 
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Discriminant analysis and logistic regression models had very similar accuracy, and 
both were superior to artificial neural network models. Despite the fact that decision trees 
were not evaluated in prior research using US data, a CART decision tree was the most 
accurate non-ensemble modelling technique overall. However, none of the non-ensemble 
models adjusted well to differing values of prior probabilities and error costs. 
Ensemble models predominantly outperformed non-ensemble models. The ensemble 
models Random Forests and TreeNet outperformed a single CART decision tree. All three of 
these models used cross-validation on the training data, which is designed to prevent models 
from learning patterns specific to the training data that do not persist in holdout data. The 
comparatively good performance of these models on the holdout data suggests the use of 
cross-validation in model development has worked well. Ensembles that combined multiple 
modelling techniques with Majority Vote or averaging of probability outputs were the most 
accurate at detecting financial statement fraud on this data set. However, the best ensembles 
all included both a TreeNet and Random Forests model, and many also included a CART 
decision tree as underlying models. 
Many models had a lower weighted error cost than the benchmark F-score and M-
score models, which indicates that improved performance over existing models is possible. 
Overall, the best model is the ensemble AV5_NoNN, which outperforms both benchmark 
models. This ensemble model averages the probability outputs of five other models: Random 
Forests, TreeNet, a CART decision tree, discriminant analysis and logistic regression. It is a 
good choice of model when the prior probability and ratio of error costs is unknown. 
However, as the best model varies with these values, if they are known, Table 5-23 can be 
used to select the model best suited to the circumstances, which might not be the AV5_NoNN 
model. The fact that no model is superior in all contexts illustrates the importance for 
research to consider a variety of prior probabilities and ratio of error costs. 
Although ensemble models were the most accurate, they are more complex and 
consequently more difficult to interpret and analyse than non-ensembles such as decision 
trees, logistic regression and discriminant analysis. Furthermore, variable reduction 
techniques, such as stepwise selection or using univariate analysis, benefited discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression models in their ability to detect financial statement fraud. 
Whether a relatively less complex model using a reduced set of variables can be comparable 
to the weighted error cost of the best ensemble models presented above is investigated in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Analysis of Variables and Development of 
Simpler Models 
The previous chapter addressed the first two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) by 
investigating which modelling techniques are the most accurate at detecting financial 
statement fraud. It is also of interest to investigate the explanatory variables that were used in 
these models. This chapter addresses research question RQ3, which is “Which explanatory 
variables are the most useful in models that detect financial statement fraud?” The results 
from this analysis form the basis for developing less complex models, and subsequently for 
investigating research question RQ4, which is “How do simpler models compare with the 
those developed for the first two research questions (as presented in Chapter 5) in their ability 
to detect financial statement fraud?” This is an important question because simpler models 
are sometimes preferred to more complex ones, in accordance with the principle of 
parsimony that states that the simpler of two competing theories is preferred. 
6.1  Analysis of Explanatory Variables 
This section addresses research question RQ3. It analyses explanatory variables in 
terms of their number in each model, followed by their statistical significance and direction 
of association with financial statement fraud. The statistical significance of variables is then 
evaluated relative to the overall schema of explanatory variables and then the new Fraud 
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Detection Triangle framework130. The relative importance of variables in models that allow 
interactions is then analysed. 
This research has used a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables than prior 
studies. Further to this, the number of fraud cases in the training sample in this research is 
larger, often more than double that used in prior studies. Additionally, both standard 
regression-based models and models that allow complex interactions between explanatory 
variables are analysed. Consequently, the results presented in this section contribute greatly 
to better understanding the variables that are important in models that detect financial 
statement fraud and how they associate with fraud. 
6.1.1 Number of Variables in Each Model 
Decision trees, ensembles of decision trees and genetically optimised neural networks 
all have in-built processes to select the most appropriate variables to use. As these processes 
differ, the number of variables used in these models varies. More details on the way these 
models rank the importance of variables are provided later in Section 6.1.5.a. Standard 
regression-based models that use differing numbers of explanatory variables were also 
developed in Chapter 5, which enables further investigation into whether that number 
influences model performance.  
Table 6-1 shows the number of variables used by each model from the analysis in 
Chapter 5. The following models were excluded from the table: 
• Benchmark models because they were not developed using the same data and have 
already been discussed in Section 5.2.2; 
• Ensembles of multiple modelling techniques as they combine two or more models from 
this table; and, 
• DT_Suite because the model was never superior to the other decision tree model 
(DT_One). Furthermore, it should be noted that the number of variables for DT_Suite 
varies with the prior-adjusted relative cost of missing fraud (	
). 
The total number of explanatory variables available, including variable sub-types131, 
is 71, except for decision trees and ensembles of them that had 66 variables available. Some 
                                                 
 
130 The new Fraud Detection Triangle framework is based on Cressey’s (1953) Fraud Triangle, as detailed 
in Section 4.2, starting on page 77. 
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variables were omitted for decision-tree based models as they are equivalent to each other 
from a decision tree’s perspective (refer to Section 5.2.3.c for more details). 





Standard Regression-based Models using variables selected by 
All variables (DA_All, LR_All and multi-stage models LR_MS_S and LR_MS_F) 
One variable from each main type (DA_U1 and LR_U1) 
Univariate Analysis (DA_U15% and LR_U15%) 
Univariate Analysis and Logistic Regression (DA_U15%LR and LR_U15%LR) 






13 and 14 
Artificial Neural Networks 
 Standard backpropagation network (NN_BK) 
 Genetically-optimised backpropagation network (NN_GA_1 and NN_GA_5) 
 
71 
35 and 45 
One CART Decision Tree (DT_One) 56 
Ensembles of Decision Trees (RF and TN models) 66 
 
Some standard regression-based models used all explanatory variables that were 
available and others used the smallest number. The models identified as the better overall 
performers in Chapter 5, the Step and U15% models, used a reduced number of variables 
ranging between 13 and 25. Meanwhile, the CART decision tree that performed relatively 
well in Chapter 5 used a large number of variables (56), because its model building algorithm 
found them to be useful in discriminating between fraudulent and legitimate statements. 
Furthermore, the superior performance of the ensembles of decision trees in Chapter 5 is 
likely the result of better classifications close to region boundaries as a consequence of using 
more variables (all 66 available) and a large number of trees. This is consistent with the 
theoretical analysis presented above in Section 3.3.5. 
Overall, there are inconsistent results in terms of the number of explanatory variables 
that were used. The standard regression-based models benefited from a reduced set of 
variables. In contrast, a decision tree and particularly ensembles of trees were able to gain 
benefit from using more explanatory variables. Meanwhile, all the neural network models 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
131 These calculations include sub-types. For example, there are multiple ways of measuring variable V1, 
V1a, V1b and V1c, and each of these sub-types counts as a separate variable. 
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performed relatively poorly regardless of the number of variables used. This suggests that the 
in-built feature of the decision trees (and ensembles of them) to select the most appropriate 
variable for each stage of the tree performs relatively well on this financial statement fraud 
data set. However, this does not guarantee that the ensembles of decision trees would have 
drastically reduced performance if they used a reduced set of variables. This will be 
investigated later in this chapter.  
As pointed out in the review in Section 3.3.1, multicollinearity is an issue for all the 
standard regression-based models. The use of stepwise variable selection substantially 
reduces the likelihood of multicollinearity occurring, which may explain the good results (in 
Chapter 5) of the Step models relative to the other standard regression-based models. In 
contrast, decision tree techniques do not suffer from problems of multicollinearity, which 
helps to explain why they are better able to handle a larger number of variables. 
6.1.2 Analysis of Statistical Significance and Direction Using Standard 
Regression-based Models 
This section extends the univariate analysis of variables (in Section 5.1.6) to 
multivariate analysis that takes other variables into account when investigating the influence 
of a particular variable. 
Standard regression-based models are used because they are easier to interpret than 
the neural networks and decision tree ensembles that contain complex interactions amongst 
explanatory variables and for which the internal logic is often more hidden. For standard 
regression-based models, statistical tests are also available to evaluate the contribution of an 
individual variable to a specified level of statistical significance. Although easy 
interpretability is an advantage of relatively small decision trees, the DT_One model has 70 
terminal nodes, which makes it far too large to interpret easily. 
Logistic regression models are used instead of discriminant analysis models because 
they have fewer underlying assumptions that are likely violated (as stated in Section 3.3.1). 
Variable coefficients in a logistic regression model are also relatively straightforward to 
interpret as they influence the odds of fraud occurring, which is a concept explained in the 
next subsection before its use in those that follow. 
Chapter 6 Analysis of Variables and Development of Simpler Models Adrian Gepp 
   Page 225 
6.1.2.a  Odds of Fraud 
Changes in the odds of fraud are relatively easy to interpret because if the odds 
increase (or decrease), the probability also increases (or decreases). Specifically, the 
""#    !" =     !" !§¨    !" § !§¨ =     !"1 −     !" , 
which can be re-arranged as 
    !" = ""#    !"1 + ""#    !" . 
As an example, when the probability of fraud is 75% the odds of fraud occurring equate to 
í0%
6í0% = 4 (to 1). The odds of 1 (to 1) equate to a ( = 50% probability, and higher (or 
lower) odds result in a higher (or lower) probability. 
Although odds and probability are positively correlated, the percentage change in 
odds is always greater than the percentage change in probability. Moreover, the difference 
between the percentage changes is greater when larger values are involved. For example, if 
the odds increase by 20% from: 
• 1 to 1.1, then the probability increases by 9.09% from 0.5 to 0.55; 
• 4 to 4.8 (larger values), then the probability increases by 3.45% (bigger difference from 
20%) from 0.8 to 0.83. 
6.1.2.b  Results 
Table 6-2 presents details on the variables in the stepwise logistic regression model 
(LR_Step). LR_Step was chosen because it was selected as the best overall standard 
regression-based model in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.2.b) and it is not likely to suffer from 
multicollinearity issues because of the stepwise variable selection. This is important because 
multicollinearity reduces the reliability of interpretations of variable coefficients. 
Table 6-3 presents results from all the logistic regression models, as well as stepwise 
discriminant analysis132. Only statistically significant variables are included, which is defined 
as those that are statistically significant at a 10% level in at least one model. Variables that 
are exclusively statistically significant in the LR_All model are also excluded, because of the 
                                                 
 
132 The stepwise discriminant analysis model is included because it is unlikely to have multicollinearity 
problems and it serves as an alternative technique to logistic regression. 
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increased likelihood of multicollinearity (from using all variables) that reduces the reliability 
of the results. Overall, this table shows that the direction of association that variables have 
with fraud is often consistent across these models. Further analysis of these variables 
according to the categories in the overall schema of explanatory variables is presented on 
page 234 following the tables below. 
Details of the variables in the LR_All model are presented in Table 6-4 for 
completeness, because LR_All provides information on every explanatory variable. However, 
findings from Table 6-4 should not be heavily relied upon because of the high likelihood of 
problems associated with multicollinearity. 
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Table 6-2. An analysis of the stepwise logistic regression model (LR_Step), where 5 values are the estimated variable coefficients. For each increase by one 
in a variable, the odds of a financial statement being fraudulent change by $3 − 1, holding constant all other explanatory variables. For example, for each 
increase in V33a by one, the odds of a financial statement being fraudulent decrease by 44.5%. Wald is the test statistic associated with the null hypothesis 
that a variable’s coefficient (5) is zero and the alternative hypothesis that 5 is not zero, which indicates that the variable contributes to the model. Wald is 
calculated as 5 -3⁄ , where SE is the standard error. The Chi-square distribution (with one degree of freedom) is then used to calculate the p-value for this 
test statistic, where values closer to zero indicate more support for the alternative hypothesis. Finally, the direction of association with fraud is summarised, 
along with the expected direction according to the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4. A positive value indicates that higher values of the specified variable are 
associated with a higher probability of fraudulent financial statements, and negative values indicate the opposite. Shading indicates that a variable is 




Logistic Regression (LR_Step) 
Direction of Association 
with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_Step Expected 
V8a Inventory to Sales  2.785  15.202  7.928  0.005 Positive Positive 
V11a Sales to Total Assets -0.412 -0.338  10.537  0.001 Negative Uncertain 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets  1.266  2.547  3.845  0.050 Positive Uncertain 
V20 Were the specified and the prior year’s Total Accruals > 0?  1.564  3.778  14.990  0.000 Positive Positive 
V24 Debt to Equity -0.083 -0.079  14.913  0.000 Negative Positive 
V27a Return on Equity -0.772 -0.538  13.789  0.000 Negative Uncertain 
V28a Return on Average Prior Assets  0.886  1.426  4.132  0.042 Positive Uncertain 
V31b Was New Common Stock or Long-term Debt Issued?  1.383  2.986  12.139  0.000 Positive Positive 
V33a Demand for financing (ex ante) -0.589 -0.445  8.053  0.005 Negative Negative 
V34 Were there operating leases?  0.737  1.090  7.470  0.006 Positive Positive 
V39b Percentage of Directors who are also Executives  1.394  3.029  4.038  0.044 Positive Positive 
V44 Company Age: Number of years since foundation -0.010 -0.010  13.605  0.000 Negative Not expected to be 
significant given the 
matching procedure 
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets  0.389  0.476  41.632  0.000 Positive 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a three? -0.486 -0.385  4.336  0.037 Negative 
Constant  -3.966  36.419 -0.981  0.000   
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Table 6-3. The direction of association between fraud and the logistic regression models and stepwise discriminant analysis. Shading, * and ** indicate a 




Direction of Association with Fraud 
DA_Step LR_Step LR_U15%LR LR_U15% LR_U1 LR_All Expected 
V8a Inventory to Sales Positive** Positive** Positive* Positive* Positive* Positive* Positive 
V10c Previous year’s Percentage change in Sales   Positive Positive  Positive Uncertain 
V11a Sales to Total Assets Negative** Negative** Negative* Negative* Negative** Negative* Uncertain 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets  Positive*  Positive Positive* Positive Uncertain 
V20 
Were the specified and the prior year’s Total 
Accruals > 0? 
Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive 
V24 Debt to Equity Negative** Negative**   Negative** Negative** Positive 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned   Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
V27a Return on Equity Negative** Negative**   Negative** Negative* Uncertain 
V28a Return on Average Prior Assets Positive* Positive*   Positive Positive Uncertain 
V31b 
Was New Common Stock or Long-term Debt 
Issued? 
Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive* Positive** Positive* Positive 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued Positive*   Positive Positive Positive Positive 
V33a Demand for financing (ex ante) Negative** Negative** Negative** Negative* Negative* Negative* Negative 
V34 Were there operating leases?  Positive** Positive* Positive Positive* Positive** Positive 
V36 
Number of changes of audit firm in the most 
recent four financial statements 
  Negative Negative Negative Negative Uncertain 
V39b Percentage of Directors who are also Executives Positive* Positive* Positive* Positive* Positive Positive Positive 
V44 
Company Age: Number of years since 
foundation 






V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive* Positive** Positive** 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a three?  Negative*   Negative Negative* 
V48a 
Previous year’s percentage change in annual 
real GDP 
    Negative* Negative 
V49a Corporate Governance G-Index Positive**  Positive** Positive** Positive Positive Positive 
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Table 6-4. An analysis of the logistic regression model using all variables (LR_All). The column definitions are the same as for the previous table. Shading 




Logistic Regression (LR_All) Direction of Association with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_All Expected 
Specific Account - Accounts Receivable 
 V1 Accounts Receivable             
   V1a    Value for the specified year 0.000 0.000 0.328 0.567 Positive Positive 
   V1b    Percentage change -1.006 -0.634 4.326 0.038 Negative Positive 
   V1c    Was Percentage change > 10%? -0.690 -0.498 5.912 0.015 Negative Positive 
V2 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Sales 0.463 0.588 0.590 0.442 Positive Positive 
V3 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Total Assets 1.110 2.035 3.275 0.070 Positive Positive 
Specific Account - Allowance for doubtful accounts (AFDA) 
V4 Percentage change in AFDA 0.112 0.119 0.257 0.612 Positive Negative 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to Accounts Receivable 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.958 Positive Negative 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to Sales -0.214 -0.193 0.420 0.517 Negative Negative 
Specific Account - Inventory 
V7 Change in Inventory to average Total Assets 1.294 2.646 0.310 0.578 Positive Positive 
V8 Inventory to Sales         
  
   V8a    Value for the specified year 2.759 14.782 5.460 0.019 Positive Positive 
   V8b    Change -0.189 -0.172 0.433 0.511 Negative Positive 
V9 Was Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) inventory valuation used? 0.347 0.415 0.888 0.346 Positive Negative 
Specific Account - Sales 
V10 Sales Growth         
  
   V10a    Percentage change 1.951 6.034 3.294 0.070 Positive Uncertain 
   V10b    V10a minus the Industry Average -0.054 -0.053 0.004 0.947 Negative Uncertain 
   V10c    Previous year’s Percentage change 0.240 0.271 1.995 0.158 Positive Uncertain 
   V10d    Four-year growth rate -0.778 -0.541 0.926 0.336 Negative Uncertain 
   V10e    Previous year’s percentage change in total assets -0.040 -0.039 0.233 0.629 Negative Uncertain 
Chapter 6 Analysis of Variables and Development of Simpler Models  Adrian Gepp 




Logistic Regression (LR_All) Direction of Association with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_All Expected 
V11 Sales to Total Assets         
  
   V11a    Value for the specified year -0.455 -0.366 4.532 0.033 Negative Uncertain 
   V11b    Percentage change -1.637 -0.805 8.628 0.003 Negative Uncertain 
V12 Gross Margin to Sales         
  
   V12a    Percentage change -0.036 -0.035 0.562 0.453 Negative Uncertain 
   V12b    Was percentage change > 10%? -0.400 -0.330 1.676 0.195 Negative Uncertain 
V13 Cash Sales         
  
   V13a    Percentage change -0.189 -0.172 0.321 0.571 Negative Uncertain 
   V13b    Was change < 0? 0.215 0.239 0.516 0.473 Positive Uncertain 
V14 Were any sales from acquisitions? 0.382 0.465 2.368 0.124 Positive Positive 
General Financial - Asset Composition 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets -0.353 -0.298 0.124 0.724 Negative Positive 
V16 Net Property, Plant & Equipment (PP&E) to Total Assets -0.528 -0.410 0.139 0.709 Negative Negative 
V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets 0.369 0.446 0.107 0.743 Positive Positive 
V18 
Percentage Change in Assets other than Current Assets and 
Net PP&E to Total Assets 
-0.008 -0.007 0.118 0.731 Negative Positive 
General Financial - General Accrual Measures 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets 1.714 4.554 3.115 0.078 Positive Uncertain 
V20 Were the specified and the prior year’s Total Accruals > 0? 1.832 5.247 15.089 0.000 Positive Positive 
V21 Total Discretionary Accruals -0.051 -0.050 0.344 0.558 Negative Positive 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals -1.087 -0.663 1.679 0.195 Negative Positive 
General Financial - Level of Debt and Financial Distress 
V23 Debt to Total Assets -1.394 -0.752 4.362 0.037 Negative Positive 
V24 Debt to Equity -0.082 -0.078 11.363 0.001 Negative Positive 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress measure (Z-score) 0.001 0.001 0.064 0.801 Positive Positive 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned 0.001 0.001 2.619 0.106 Positive Positive 
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Logistic Regression (LR_All) Direction of Association with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_All Expected 
General Financial - Performance and Profitability 
V27 Return on Equity         
  
   V27a    Value for the specified year -1.436 -0.762 4.883 0.027 Negative Uncertain 
   V27b    Industry Average minus Specific Company -0.657 -0.482 1.139 0.286 Negative Uncertain 
V28 Return on Average Prior Assets         
  
   V28a    Value for the specified year 0.462 0.587 0.293 0.588 Positive Uncertain 
   V28b    Previous year 0.320 0.377 0.178 0.673 Positive Uncertain 
   V28c    Change 0.337 0.400 0.186 0.666 Positive Uncertain 
V29 Holding Period Return         
  
   V29a    One-year 0.045 0.046 0.263 0.608 Positive Uncertain 
   V29b    Previous One-year -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.986 Negative Uncertain 
V30 
Were analyst Earnings Per Share forecasts achieved or 
exceeded? 
-0.120 -0.113 0.205 0.651 Negative Uncertain 
General Financial - Financing 
V31 Were New Securities issued?         
  
   V31a    Common Stock? 0.228 0.256 0.679 0.410 Positive Positive 
   V31b    Common Stock or Long-term Debt? 1.186 2.274 6.021 0.014 Positive Positive 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued 0.794 1.212 1.261 0.261 Positive Positive 
V33 Demand for financing         
  
   V33a    Specific Value (ex ante) -0.771 -0.537 5.714 0.017 Negative Negative 
   V33b    Was there demand (ex ante)? -2.663 -0.930 5.440 0.020 Negative Positive 
   V33c    Cash from operating and investment activities 0.000 0.000 1.141 0.285 Positive Positive 
V34 Were there operating leases? 0.863 1.371 6.916 0.009 Positive Positive 
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Logistic Regression (LR_All) Direction of Association with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_All Expected 
Non-financial - Key Roles and Positions 
V35 Was the auditor a Big Six firm? 0.067 0.069 0.025 0.874 Positive Negative 
V36 
Number of changes of audit firm in the most recent four 
financial statements 
-0.662 -0.484 3.838 0.050 Negative Uncertain 
V37 CEO         
  
   V37a    Tenure (days) 0.000 0.000 1.061 0.303 Positive Uncertain 
   V37b    Number of changes in the last three years 0.174 0.190 0.425 0.514 Positive Uncertain 
V38 Has the CFO changed in the last three years? 0.191 0.211 0.637 0.425 Positive Uncertain 
V39 Composition/Holdings of the Board         
  
   V39a    Number of Directors -0.040 -0.040 3.089 0.079 Negative Positive 
   V39b    Percentage of Directors who are also Executives 1.529 3.612 3.175 0.075 Positive Positive 
   V39c 
   Percentage of Director shares owned by those who are 
also Executives 
Excluded because of insufficient data Positive 
V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO Excluded because of insufficient data Uncertain 
Comparing Financial and Non-financial 
V41 
Percentage change in the number of Employees minus 
percentage change in Total Assets 
-0.094 -0.090 0.236 0.627 Negative Negative 
V42 
Percentage change in Sales minus percentage change in the 
number of Employees 
-0.164 -0.151 0.398 0.528 Negative Positive 
V43 
Percentage Change in Sales to Employees: Specific 
Company minus Industry Average 
-0.015 -0.015 0.041 0.839 Negative Positive 
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Logistic Regression (LR_All) Direction of Association with Fraud 
ú ßú − ë Wald P-value LR_All Expected 
Control variables 
V44 Company Age: Number of years since foundation -0.010 -0.010 8.079 0.004 Negative 




V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets 0.349 0.417 9.718 0.002 Positive 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a three? -0.688 -0.498 5.223 0.022 Negative 
V47 Stock Exchange listed on         
 
   V47a    NASDAQ? 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.994 Positive 
   V47b    NYSE? -0.256 -0.226 0.007 0.934 Negative 
New variables 
V48 Macroeconomic indicators         




   V48a    Previous year’s percentage change in annual real GDP -7.102 -0.999 0.163 0.686 Negative 
   V48b    Previous year’s percentage change in annual retail sales -0.791 -0.546 0.027 0.870 Negative 
   V48c    Previous year’s unemployment rate inverted -0.042 -0.041 0.392 0.531 Negative 
V49 Corporate governance indices         
  
   V49a    G-Index 0.082 0.085 3.755 0.053 Positive Positive 
   V49b    E-Index Excluded because of insufficient data Positive 
V50 Accounting complexity of the industry -0.003 -0.003 0.023 0.881 Negative Positive 
Constant -0.111 -0.105 0.001 0.977  
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6.1.2.c  Analysis of Financial Variables That Measure Specific Accounts 
Inventory 
The inventory to sales ratio (V8a) is statistically significant at a 1% level in the 
stepwise logistic regression model (LR_Step) with a p-value of 0.5% (see Table 6-2), as well 
as being statistically significant at a 5% level in all the other models in Table 6-3133. Larger 
values of V8a increased the probability of financial statement fraud, which is consistent with 
increased opportunity to fraudulently overvalue inventory by including obsolete inventory 
(see Section 4.5.4). According to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, for each 
increase by one in the inventory to sales ratio, the odds that financial statement fraud has 
occurred increases by 1520%, holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model. 
This appears extremely high, but the inventory to sales ratio is extremely unlikely to increase 
by one; for example, from 15% to 115%. A more relevant interpretation is for each increase 
by 0.01 in the inventory to sales ratio, the odds of financial statement fraud having occurred 
increases by 2.82%, holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model. This 
2.82% value is calculated as (1 + 1520%)% − 1 or $.ûíª∗0.0 − 1, where 2.785 is the 
coefficient of V8a in the LR_Step model. 
Sales 
Sales growth in the previous year (V10c) is statistically significant at a 10% level only 
in one model (LR_U15%) in Table 6-3. It had a positive association with the probability of 
financial statement fraud in this model. This offers limited support for the theory that high 
sales growth in the prior period both increases pressure on managers to achieve that growth 
rate again and increases opportunities to commit fraud through reduced controls and 
monitoring (see Section 4.5.5).  
The sales to total assets ratio (V11a) is statistically significant at a 1% level in the 
stepwise logistic regression model (LR_Step) with a p-value of 0.1%, as well as being 
statistically significant at a 5% level in all the other models shown in Table 6-3. However, in 
contrast to V10c, V11a has a negative association with fraud, such that larger values 
decreased the probability of financial statement fraud. Larger values of V11a indicate greater 
efficiency and ability to generate sales from assets, which decreases the pressure to 
fraudulently improve performance (see Section 4.5.5). According to the LR_Step model 
                                                 
 
133 No other inventory variables were listed in Table 6-3. 
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presented in Table 6-2, for each increase by 0.01 in the sales to assets ratio, the odds of 
financial statement fraud having occurred decrease by 0.41%, holding constant all other 
explanatory variables in the model; the relevant calculation is (1 − 33.8%)% − 1 =
−0.41%. 
The expected direction of association of sales variables was largely uncertain because 
of mixed results and theories in past research (see Section 4.5.5). This current research adds 
additional empirical evidence to better understand the influence of the sales variables. 
Overall, sales growth from the prior year increased the probability of fraud, possibly through 
increased pressure and opportunity to commit fraud. However, sales from the specified year 
that occurred with greater efficiency relative to total assets reduced the probability of fraud 
having occurred, likely through decreased pressure to inflate sales. 
Accounts Receivable 
The percentage change in both accounts receivable (V1b and V1c) and accounts 
receivable to sales (V3) are statistically significant variables at a 10% level in the LR_All 
model (see Table 6-4 above). V3 is positively associated with fraud as expected, but V1b and 
V1c are both unexpectedly negatively related to the probability of fraud. The conflicting 
result could indicate the theory underlying them (see Section 4.5.2) needs adjustment, but it is 
more likely the result of multicollinearity problems in LR_All and should not be relied upon. 
Although accounts receivable variables were statistically significant in the LR_All 
model, no accounts receivable variables are listed in Table 6-3. This indicates that none of 
them are statistically significant at a 10% level in other models, despite their use in many 
prior studies (as presented in Section 4.5.2). The main reason for their inclusion was the 
increased opportunity to commit fraud because accounts receivable is an account relatively 
difficult to audit. This research is more comprehensive than previous research in terms of the 
number of explanatory variables used. Consequently, these variables might not be statistically 
significant because other variables that measure the opportunity to commit fraud are 
preferred, such as inventory variables V8a and accrual variables V19 and V20. This would 
explain why V1a measuring accounts receivable is statistically significant at a 1% level with 
the expected positive direction of association in univariate analysis (see Section 5.1.6), but it 
was not the case in this multivariate analysis. 
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Allowance for Doubtful Accounts (AFDA) 
None of the AFDA variables are statistically significant at a 10% level in Tables 6-2, 
6-3 and 6-4. These variables had previously been used by two studies that used artificial 
neural networks (Green and Choi 1997; Lin et al. 2003), but no tests were conducted to assess 
the individual contribution of these variables. While the earlier study cited the variables’ use 
in auditing as a reason for inclusion, it was acknowledged that there was no supporting 
theory. Furthermore, this research empirically finds that the AFDA variables do not 
contribute to models to detect financial statement fraud at a 10% level of statistical 
significance. 
6.1.2.d Analysis of General Financial Variables 
Asset Composition 
While one variable (V16) is statistically significant at a 10% level in univariate 
analysis (in Section 5.1.6), no asset composition variables are statistically significant at a 
10% level in multivariate analysis presented in Tables 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4. This indicates that 
the useful information contained in these variables is better captured by variables that 
measure specific asset accounts and other variables that measure opportunity for fraud to 
occur. 
General Accrual Measures 
The total accruals to total assets ratio (V19) is statistically significant at a 5% level in 
both the LR_Step and LR_U1 models, as well as at a 10% level of significance in the LR_All 
model (see Table 6-3). Larger values of this ratio increased the probability of financial 
statement fraud, supporting the theory that this results in an increased opportunity to 
manipulate the non-cash accruals (see Section 4.5.7). According to the LR_Step model 
presented in Table 6-2, for each increase by 0.01 in the total accruals to total assets ratio, the 
odds of financial statement fraud having occurred increased by (1 + 255%)% − 1 =
1.27%, holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model. 
Variable V20 measures whether there were positive accruals in the specified year as 
well as the prior year. It is statistically significant at a 1% level in the LR_Step model with a 
p-value of 0.01%, as well as being statistically significant at a 1% level in all the other 
models in Table 6-3. Prior accruals reduce legitimate ways to manage earnings and 
consequently increase the pressure to turn to fraud (see Section 4.5.7). Consistent with this 
theoretical expectation and the findings for V19 (above), V20 increased the probability of 
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financial statement fraud. Specifically, according to the LR_Step model presented in Table 
6-2, the odds of the financial statement fraud having occurred increase by 378% when there 
are positive accruals in both the specified year and the year prior, holding constant all other 
explanatory variables in the model. 
There have been mixed results in prior studies in terms of which measures of accruals 
are best for financial statement detection models. Consistent over a range of standard 
regression-based models, this study shows that measures of total accruals were significant, 
while variables using either discretionary accruals or RSST unadjusted accruals were not 
statistically significant at a 10% level of significance. 
Level of Debt and Financial Distress 
The debt to equity ratio (V24) is statistically significant at a 1% level in both stepwise 
models (DA_Step and LR_Step) as well as LR_U1 and LR_All. Based on prior research, 
increased debt levels were expected to be associated with more pressure to commit fraud (see 
Section 4.5.8). However, higher debt levels (relative to equity) decreased the probability of 
financial statement fraud having occurred, although only by a relatively small amount. 
According to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, for each increase by 0.01 in the debt 
to equity ratio, the odds of financial statement fraud having occurred decreased by 0.08%, 
holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model; the relevant calculation is 
(1 − 7.9%)% − 1 = −0.08%. 
Although the finding of a negative association between debt and fraud was contrary to 
previous fraud detection research, it was not completely unexpected. As discussed in Section 
4.5.8, higher debt levels are likely to increase monitoring and scrutiny from creditors (those 
who are owed money), which is consistent with the well-established agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). This increased scrutiny then reduces the opportunity to commit and 
conceal fraud. This new empirical result, which is supported by well-established theory, 
might have been revealed in this research as a consequence of using a more comprehensive 
set of explanatory variables. Furthermore, the number of fraud cases in the training sample in 
this research is larger, usually more than 100% larger, than any of the prior studies that found 
the contrary result. 
In addition to the size of debt (relative to equity), financial distress as measured by the 
difficulty that changes in interest rates would cause in terms of making debt repayments 
(V26) was found to be statistically significant at a 10% level, but only in the LR_U1 model. 
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As expected, more financial distress was associated with more fraud, which is consistent with 
increased pressure and incentive to commit fraud.  
Performance and Profitability 
Accounting measures of profitability are statistically significant at a 10% level (see 
Table 6-3), in contrast to the market-based measures of performance and the comparison to 
an industry average. This indicates that accounting measures of profitability contributed more 
to standard regression-based models when detecting financial statement fraud. 
Return on equity (V27a) is statistically significant at a 1% level in both stepwise 
models (DA_Step and LR_Step) and LR_U1, as well as at a 5% level of significance in the 
LR_All model. More return on equity decreased the probability of financial statement fraud. 
According to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, for each increase by 0.01 in return 
on equity, the odds of financial statement fraud having occurred decreased by 0.77%, holding 
constant all other explanatory variables in the model; the relevant calculation is (1 −
53.8%)% − 1 = −0.77%. 
Return on average prior assets (V28a) is also statistically significant, at a 5% level in 
both stepwise models (DA_Step and LR_Step) and at a 10% level in the LR_U1 model. 
However, in contrast to V27a, more return on average prior assets increased the probability of 
financial statement fraud. According to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, for each 
increase by 0.01 in return on average prior assets, the odds of financial statement fraud 
having occurred increased by (1 + 143%)% − 1 = 0.89%, holding constant all other 
explanatory variables in the model. 
The probability of fraud decreasing with larger returns on equity is consistent with 
reduced pressure to fraudulently improve financial statements during times of good 
profitability (see Section 4.5.9). In contrast, higher profits relative to prior assets increased 
the probability of fraud. To understand these differing results, it is important to note that the 
only difference between them is their denominators: equity in the specified year for V27a and 
average prior assets for V28a. The denominator of V28a being a measurement of prior years 
could be a key consideration. These findings are consistent with higher current profitability 
(V27a) reducing fraud (from reduced pressure), but higher profitability relative to past 
resources (V28a) is suspicious and more likely to be fraudulent. Thus, V28a might be related 
to the new Suspicious Information (S) factor of the Fraud Detection Triangle, unlike V27a 
that is related to the Pressure/Incentive (I) factor. 
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Financing 
The financing category has the largest number of statistically significant variables at a 
10% level and they all have the expected direction of association with fraud, which is 
consistent with the univariate analysis (presented in Section 5.1.6). 
Variable V31 measures whether new common stock or new long-term debt was issued 
and is statistically significant at a 1% level in the LR_Step model with a p-value of 0.05%, as 
well as being statistically significant at least at a 5% level in all the other models shown in 
Table 6-3. V31b increased the probability of financial statement fraud. According to the 
LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, the odds of the financial statement fraud having 
occurred increase by 299% when there are positive accruals in both the specified year and the 
year prior, holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model. In addition, the 
proportion of common stock that is newly issued (V32) is also statistically significant at a 5% 
level in the stepwise discriminant analysis model DA_Step. Consistent with V31b, a higher 
proportion of newly issued equity indicated a higher probability of fraud. 
The demand for financing (ex ante) (V33a) is also statistically significant, at a 1% 
level in both stepwise models (DA_Step and LR_Step) and LR_U15%LR, and at a 5% level 
in the other models in Table 6-3. The probability of fraud increased when the demand for 
financing was higher, as indicated by lower values of V33a. According to the LR_Step model 
presented in Table 6-2, the odds of the financial statement fraud having occurred increases by 
44.5% for each decrease by one in V33a (which indicates an increased demand for 
financing), holding constant all other explanatory variables in the model. 
Variable V34 measures whether operating leases have been used and is statistically 
significant at a 1% level in the LR_Step and LR_All models, as well as being statistically 
significant at least at a 10% level in the other logistic regression models in Table 6-3. The 
probability of financial statement fraud increased if operating leases are being used. 
Specifically, according to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, the odds of the 
financial statement fraud having occurred increase by 109% when operating leases have been 
used. 
The findings for the V31b, V32 and V33a variables support the view that there is an 
increased incentive to fraudulently improve financials when new securities are being issued, 
or are likely to be needed to be issued in the near future. Additionally, the results for V34 
support the view that the use of operating leases is associated with managers who are more 
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likely to commit fraud as they find it easier to rationalise fraud by focusing on the short-term 
(see Section 4.5.10). 
6.1.2.e  Analysis of Non-Financial Variables 
The number of changes of audit firm in the most recent four financial statements 
(V36) is statistically significant at a 10% level in all models in Table 6-3 except for the 
stepwise models. More changes decreased the probability of financial statement fraud. This 
offers some support for the theory that changes of audit firm help to avoid the complacency and 
the overconfidence that lead to lower quality audits. This is contrary to the argument that the 
quality of audit improves as the auditor tenure increases, and that changes of audit firm can 
indicate management more prone to rationalise fraud as they are more likely to be engaged in 
auditor “opinion-shopping” (see Section 4.5.11). The expected direction of association of this 
variable was uncertain because of competing theories. Consequently, this finding is 
additional empirical evidence to better understand the influence of changes of audit firm. 
The percentage of directors who are also executives (V39b) is statistically significant 
at a 5% level in the stepwise logistic regression model with a p-value of 4.4% (see Table 
6-2), as well as being at least statistically significant at a 10% level in all the other models in 
Table 6-3. A larger percentage increased the probability of financial statement fraud. This 
supports the theory that directors who are also executives are less independent and more of 
them result in a reduced monitoring from the board of directors. This reduction in monitoring 
creates more opportunities for management to commit and conceal financial statement fraud 
(as per Section 4.5.11). According to the LR_Step model presented in Table 6-2, for each 
increase by 0.01 in the percentage of directors who are also executives, the odds of financial 
statement fraud having occurred increase by (1 + 303%)% − 1 = 1.4%, holding constant 
other explanatory variables in the model. 
Overall, the occurrence of financial statement fraud decreased with more changes of 
audit firm, and fewer directors who are also executives.  
6.1.2.f  Analysis of Variables That Compare Financial and Non-Financial Information 
No variables comparing financial and non-financial information are statistically 
significant at a 10% level in multivariate analysis (see Tables 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4) or univariate 
analysis (see Section 5.1.6). The motivation for including these variables was that increases 
in sales or assets (financial) without corresponding increases in the number of employees 
(non-financial) raises the suspicion of fraud, because sales or assets are much easier to 
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fraudulently manipulate than the number of employees. Nevertheless, these variables were 
not a good signal of fraud in these models. Further, these variables are not important in 
models that allow interactions with other explanatory variables, as presented later in Section 
6.1.5. For future research, it is recommended that the financial and non-financial information 
being compared should be different from sales (or assets) and the number of employees.  
6.1.2.g  Analysis of Control Variables 
Company age (V44) is statistically significant at a 1% level in all of the models in 
Table 6-3. Company size (V45) is also statistically significant at a 1% level in all the models 
except LR_U15%, in which it is statistically significant at a 5% level. Industry membership 
(V46) is also statistically significant at a 5% level in LR_Step and LR_All. The findings are 
revealing, because these control variables were not expected to be significant because of the 
matching procedure. First, this means that these variables are important when detecting 
financial statement fraud. Secondly, it reveals that the matching procedure was not exact, 
which was acknowledged previously in Section 4.5.13 and was part of the reason for 
including these variables in the first place. An example of the matching being inexact is that 
companies were only matched based on being more than ten years old, five to ten years old 
and younger than five years. Furthermore, this criterion was relaxed in some cases to enable a 
matching company to be found (see Section 5.1.2). 
Younger companies were associated with more fraud, which is consistent with the 
theory that there are more incentives to commit fraud around the time of the initial public 
offering (as per Section 4.5.13). Larger companies were also associated with more fraud. This 
finding is contrary to the thought that smaller firms have weaker internal controls and so 
there is more opportunity to commit fraud within them. Consequently, this could indicate that 
larger firms have weaker controls or it could possibly indicate that the US Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has a bias to prosecute larger firms (as suggested in Section 
5.1.1.a). Finally, firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes starting with a 3, 
which are primarily computer companies, committed less fraud in this study. This is the 
opposite finding of previous research, and indicates this result might be purely an empirical 
result specific to the time period being studied. 
6.1.2.h  Analysis of New Variables 
The new accounting complexity variable V50 is not significant in any model in Table 
6-3, including LR_All. This does not provide support for the use of the new variable V50 in 
Chapter 6 Analysis of Variables and Development of Simpler Models Adrian Gepp 
   Page 242 
fraud detection models. Further to this, V50 is not important in artificial neural network and 
decision-tree based models that incorporate interactions between explanatory variables, as 
shown later in Section 6.1.5. 
A macroeconomic variable measuring the change in annual real GDP (V48a) is 
statistically significant at a 5% level in the LR_U1 model. This indicates that in this model 
V48a was able to assist in distinguishing fraudulent statements from legitimate statements 
that are not their matched counterparts134. This is very limited support for the use of 
macroeconomics variables. Similarly limited backing for the use of macroeconomic variables 
is also provided by neural network models that incorporate interactions (see Section 6.1.5). 
Weaker corporate governance, as indicated by larger values of the G-index (V49a), 
were associated with more financial statement fraud. This variable is statistically significant 
at a 1% level in DA_Step, LR_U15% and LR_U15%LR, as well as at a 10% level in LR_U1 
and LR_All, as shown in Table 6-3. This result is in contrast to prior studies that did not find 
the G-index to be statistically significant using a much smaller number of fraud cases (as per 
Section 4.5.15). Overall, using a larger number of fraud cases, this research has found 
empirical support for the hypothesis that financial statement fraud is related to the 
aggregation of many corporate governance initiatives, not just the presence or absence of a 
particular one. 
6.1.2.i  Summary of Variable Analysis 
This section summarises the variables most statistically significant in the multivariate 
analysis presented above. This is defined as those variables that are statistically significant at 
a 10% level in at least two models in Table 6-3, providing that at least one is a stepwise 
model because they are the least affected by the problem of multicollinearity. 
Overall, the analysis above reveals that the probability a financial statement is 
fraudulent is increased by: 
• Higher levels of inventory relative to sales (V8a); 
• Lower levels of sales relative to total assets (V11a); 
• Larger total accruals relative to total assets (V19) and positive total accruals in the 
specified year and the one prior (V20); 
                                                 
 
134 These variables could not distinguish between a fraudulent statement and its matched counterpart 
because they are from the same year and consequently have the same annual macroeconomic information. 
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• Lower levels of debt relative to equity (V24), contrary to results in prior studies; 
• Smaller profits relative to equity (V27a) and larger profits relative to the average asset 
base in the prior two years (V28a); 
• New securities (common stock or long-term debt) being issued (V31b) and likely to be 
needed to be issued in the near future (V33a); 
• The use of operating leases (V34); 
• A larger proportion of directors also being executives (V39b); 
• Younger and larger companies (V44 and V45); and 
• Weaker corporate governance as measured by more provisions that restrict shareholder 
rights (V49a). 
6.1.3 Analysis According to the Overall Schema of Explanatory Variables 
The variables that are most statistically significant, as listed above in the previous 
section, include measures of specific financial accounts (inventory and sales), general accrual 
measures, debt, accounting profitability (in preference to market or industry based 
profitability), financing needs and activities, composition of the board of directors (non-
financial), company characteristics (age and size) and overall corporate governance. These 
variables represent a variety of categories within the overall schema of explanatory variables 
as shown in Table 6-5 below. This table also compares the most statistically significant 
variables with the set of all variables in terms of their proportions in each category. The 
general financial variables represent the largest proportion in both cases, but that proportion 
is larger for the most statistically significant variables. There is also a greater proportion of 
control variables, and a lower proportion of financial variables measuring specific accounts, 
amongst the most statistically significant variables. Despite having many missing values, the 
corporate governance G-index is the statistically significant variable in the New category. 
This provides a strong case for its future use in financial statement fraud detection models. 
The comparison category is the only one not represented in the most statistically 
significant set of variables. However, these variables might be important contributors when 
they interact with other explanatory variables, which is investigated later in Section 6.1.5. In 
addition, other comparison variables could be investigated in future research (as suggested in 
Section 6.1.2.f). 
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Table 6-5. The proportion of all explanatory variables and those that were the most statistically 
significant from multivariate analysis by category within the overall schema. 
Category within the Overall Schema of 
Explanatory variables 




from Table 4-1 
Most statistically significant 
from Section 6.1.2.i 
Financial: Specific Account 28% 14% 
Financial: General 40% 57% 
Non-Financial 6% 7% 
Comparison: Financial and Non-Financial 12% 0% 
Control 8% 14% 
New 6% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
6.1.3.a Analysis of the Multi-stage Logistic Regression Model That Utilises the Overall 
Schema of Explanatory Variables 
The multi-stage logistic regression model LR_MS_S utilises the categories within the 
overall schema of explanatory variables. Consequently, an analysis of it provides insight into 
the contributions that each category (as a whole) makes towards detecting financial statement 
fraud. 
In the first stage of the LR_MS_S model, five logistic regression models are 
estimated, each using explanatory variables from a different category: Financial (Finc), Non-
Financial (Non-Finc), Comparison (Comp), Control (Ctrl) and New. In the second stage, the 
LR_MS_S logistic regression model is estimated from the probability outputs of the first 
stage models, as shown below where Pr(F)' is the probability of fraud estimated using a 
logistic regression with explanatory variables from the  category. The estimated coefficients 
and results from testing their statistical significance are then shown in Table 6-6. 
Pr(F)±_ÅÁ_Á = $þCN _CO®µ__1 + $þCN _CO®µ__ ,ℎ$$ 
Log _odds±_ÅÁ_Á = 50 + 5Pr(F)
+ + 5Pr(F)Ð6
+ + 5ìPr(F)¯« + 5©Pr(F)¯8 + 5ªPr(F)ÐÑ. 
                                                 
 
135 Different sub-types of the same main variable, such as V1a and V1b are only counted as one variable. 
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Table 6-6. An analysis of the multi-stage logistic regression model based on the overall schema 
(LR_MS_S). The column definitions are the same as for Table 6-2 with the following exception. For 
each increase by 0.01 in a variable, the odds of the financial statement being fraudulent change by $0.03 − 1, holding constant all other explanatory variable. For example, for each increase by 0.01 in 
the probability of fraud according to the first stage Financial model (()
%+%), the odds of a 
financial statement being fraudulent increase by 5%. 
Variable 
LR_MS_S 
ú ß.ëú − ë Wald P-value 
Pr(F)
%+% 4.848 (5) 0.050 96.934  0.000  
Pr(F)Ð6
%+% 3.384 (5) 0.034 5.510  0.019  
Pr(F)¯«% 5.734 (5ì) 0.059 0.575  0.448  
Pr(F)¯8 2.724 (5©) 0.028 7.974  0.005  
Pr(F)ÐÑ 3.707 (5ª) 0.038 2.697  0.101  
Constant -10.207 (50) -0.097 5.970  0.015  
 
As expected, all the variable coefficients are positive, indicating that a higher 
estimated probability of fraud in each first stage model translates to a higher probability of 
fraud in the second stage model. The outputs from the first stage models based on the Control 
and Financial variables were statistically significant at a 1% level and also had the greatest 
magnitude of influence by having the largest $0.03 − 1 values in Table 6-6. The output from 
the Non-Financial variables model was also statistically significant at a 5% level. Consistent 
with the results presented above, the output from the model using Comparison variables was 
not statistically significant at a 10% level with a p-value of 44.8%. Furthermore, no variable 
in the first stage model using Comparison variables was statistically significant at a 10% level 
as all of their p-values were greater than 45%. Finally, the output from the model using the 
New variables contributes to the second stage model at a statistical significance level of 15% 
(but not 10%) with a p-value of 10.1%. Consistent with prior results the G-index variable is 
the only one in the first stage model using New variables that is statistically significant at a 
10% level. 
Overall, the LR_MS_S model provides additional support for the use of the overall 
schema of explanatory variables, except for the comparison category. 
6.1.4 Analysis According to the New Fraud Detection Triangle Framework 
Table 6-7 shows the proportion of the most statistically significant variables (as listed 
above in Section 6.1.2.i) that are associated with each factor of the new Fraud Detection 
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Triangle framework. The proportions are similar to those for all the explanatory variables, 
which are also shown in Table 6-7. The most statistically significant variables are primarily 
associated with the Exploitable Opportunity (O) and Incentive/Pressure (I) factors, and a 
small proportion is associated with the Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) factor. This 
supports the use of explanatory variables that in total measure the O, I and R factors. Beyond 
this, there is an opportunity for further research into variables that measure the R factor. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.3, “the relatively few variables associated with the R factor are not 
an indication that it is unimportant, but rather an indication that less focus has been placed on 
it in prior research, probably because it is the most difficult factor to measure (Skousen et al. 
2009)”. 
Table 6-7. The proportion of all explanatory variables and those that were the most statistically 
significant from multivariate analysis by each factor in the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
The final column represents an adjustment to the most statistically significant column based on the 
findings from Section 6.1.2. 
Fraud Detection Triangle Factor 




from Table 4-3 
Most statistically significant 
from Section 6.1.2.i 
With 
Adjustments 
Exploitable Opportunity (O) 49% 47% 47% 
Incentive/Pressure (I) 38% 47% 40% 
Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) 5% 6% 7% 
Suspicious Information (S) 8% 0% 7% 
 
The major difference between the proportions for all variables and the most 
statistically significant variables is that none of the latter set are associated with the new 
Suspicious Information (S) factor, because it is a new factor. However, the findings from 
analysing each variable’s direction of association with fraud (in Section 6.1.2 above) indicate 
that there were some changes to the factors that each variable is associated with; these 
changes are: 
• More debt (V24) was found to be associated with reduced opportunity to commit fraud, 
rather than with increased pressure to commit fraud to satisfy creditors. Consequently, 
variable V24 was adjusted from being associated with both the O and I factors to being 
solely associated with the O factor; 
• Larger values of V11a indicate greater ability to generate sales from assets. This 
decreased the pressure to fraudulently improve performance, rather than increased the 
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opportunity to commit fraud from higher levels of sales, which is a relatively difficult 
account to audit. Consequently, variable V24 was adjusted from being associated with 
both the O and I factors to being solely associated with the I factor. Thus, this change 
offsets the change for V24 above from a proportion perspective in Table 6-7; 
• While higher current profitability (V27a) indicated reduced pressure to commit fraud, 
higher profitability relative to past resources (V28a) was found to be suspicious 
information and associated with more fraud. Consequently, variable V28a was adjusted 
from being associated with the I factor to being associated with the S factor. 
When adjustments are made for these new findings, the most statistically significant variables 
do include a measurement of the S factor, as shown by the final column of Table 6-7. 
Furthermore, the proportions of all categories very closely approximate the proportions in the 
set of all explanatory variables. The relatively few variables associated with the S factor do 
not necessarily indicate that this factor is relatively unimportant, but is a likely consequence 
of relatively few variables having been tested, given that it is a new factor proposed in this 
research. Overall, there is support for the use of variables that measure the S factor and 
further research into such variables would be beneficial. 
Overall, the adjusted results in Table 6-7 show that all factors of the newly proposed Fraud 
Detection Triangle framework have contributed to models to detect financial statement fraud. 
This is empirical evidence to support the use of this framework during the variable selection 
process for such models. 
6.1.4.a Analysis of the Multi-stage Logistic Regression Model That Utilises the 
Framework 
The multi-stage logistic regression model LR_MS_F utilises the new Fraud Detection 
Triangle framework. Consequently, an analysis of it provides insight into the contributions 
that each framework factor (as a whole) makes towards detecting financial statement fraud. 
In the first stage of the LR_MS_F model, four logistic regression models are 
estimated, each using explanatory variables from a different factor: Exploitable Opportunity 
(O), Incentive/Pressure (I), Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) and Suspicious Information 
(S). In the second stage, the LR_MS_F logistic regression model is estimated from the 
probability outputs of the first stage models, as shown below where Pr(F) is the probability 
of fraud estimated using a logistic regression with explanatory variables from the  factor. 
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The estimated coefficients and results from testing their statistical significance are then 
shown in Table 6-8. 
Pr(F)±_ÅÁ_
 = $þCN _CO®µ__­1 + $þCN _CO®µ__­ ,ℎ$$ 
Log _odds±_ÅÁ_
 = 50 + 5Pr(F) + 5Pr(F)	 + 5ìPr(F)± + 5©Pr(F)Á 
Table 6-8. An analysis of the multi-stage logistic regression model based on the new Fraud Detection 
Triangle (LR_MS_F). The column definitions are the same as for Table 6-2 with the following 
exception. For each increase by 0.01 in a variable, the odds of the financial statement being fraudulent 
change by $0.03 − 1, holding constant all other explanatory variables. For example, for each increase 
by 0.01 in the probability of fraud according to the O model, the odds of a financial statement being 
fraudulent increase by 3%. 
Variable 
LR_MS_F 
ú ß.ëú − ë Wald P-value 
Pr(F)È'«8% ««88 () 2.972 (5) 0.030 27.538  0.000  
Pr(F)	+8À/° (	) 3.653 (5) 0.037 42.689  0.000  
Pr(F)	88/888/±%8%%8 (±) 3.680 (5ì) 0.037 5.313  0.021  
Pr(F)Á«+ 	%8 (Á) 1.692 (5©) 0.017 0.283  0.595  
Constant -5.985 (50) -0.058 11.438  0.001  
 
As expected, all the variable coefficients are positive, indicating that higher estimated 
probability of fraud in each first stage model translates to higher probability of fraud in the 
second stage model. The output from the first stage models based on the O and I factors were 
statistically significant at a 1% level, while that based on the R factor was statistically 
significant at a 5% level. The I and R factors also had the largest magnitude of influence as 
shown by having the largest $0.03 − 1 values in Table 6-8. 
The output from the S-factor based model was not statistically significant with a p-
value of almost 60%. No variable in the S-factor based model was statistically significant at a 
10% level as all their p-values were greater than 35%. It is noteworthy that the comparison 
variables that were found not to be statistically significant (in Section 6.1.2.f) are all 
associated with the S factor. However, the results in Table 6-8 do not include the adjustments 
made in the previous section that associates V28a with the S factor. 
Overall, the LR_MS_S model provides additional support for the use of the new 
Fraud Detection Triangle Framework, except for the S factor. However, if the LR_MS_F 
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model is re-estimated using the entire data set, not just the training data, the S-factor based 
model becomes statistically significant at a 15% level. This provides preliminary empirical 
support for the newly proposed S factor being useful to financial statement fraud detection 
models. It is also possible that the S factor is becoming more useful as time progresses, 
because it was more statistically significant when using the entire data set that contains more 
recent data than the training data set. 
6.1.5 Analysis of Models That Incorporate Interactions between Variables 
The fact that the TreeNet (TN) model comprised trees with twelve terminal nodes in 
preference to fewer indicates that there are useful interactions amongst the explanatory 
variables because more nodes allow for more interactions. The artificial neural network and 
decision-tree based models used in this research automatically incorporate interactions 
between explanatory variables. Consequently, an analysis of the variables in these models 
provides insight into what variables are most important when interactions between them are 
possible. This analysis is presented after an explanation of the format of the results and then 
the results themselves in Table 6-9. 
6.1.5.a  Evaluating Variable Importance in Models Incorporating Interactions 
Unlike the standard regression-based techniques, there aren’t standardised statistical 
tests for determining the significance of variables. The results for the contribution of 
individual variables to the artificial neural network and decision-tree based models are 
presented in Table 6-9 below and varies between the different modelling techniques: 
• The backpropagation neural network model (NN_BK) was developed using the statistics 
software package SPSS. Sensitivity analysis for each explanatory variable is conducted in 
SPSS to determine the magnitude of its influence on the output, which is then used to 
compute an importance score. Each importance score is then divided by the largest score 
to obtain a relative importance score that ranges between 0 (unimportant) and 100% 
(most important). 
• The backpropagation neural network optimised by a genetic algorithm (NN_GA_1 and 
NN_GA_5) was developed using the software package Neuralyst. This package provides 
the list of variables that were included in the final model. It uses a process akin to the 
evolutionary process of natural selection whereby the variables that survive through the 
generations are those having the best “genetic fitness”, that is, they contribute the 
maximum amount of information in classifying financial statements as fraudulent or 
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legitimate. No further information is provided on the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables, which is a disadvantage of genetically optimised neural networks 
developed in Neuralyst. 
• The decision-tree based models (DT_One, TN, RF_8 and RF_66) were developed using 
Salford Systems’ SPM software package. As was done with the NN_BK model, raw 
importance scores from the decision-tree based models are divided by the largest score to 
obtain a relative importance score that ranges between 0 and 100%. However, these raw 
importance scores were calculated based on how many splitting rules use each variable, 
what fraction of the data passes through those splitting rules and how well those splitting 
rules perform (Salford Systems 2012a). For the individual CART decision tree model 
(DT_One) there is only one tree to examine136, but for TreeNet (TN) and Random Forests 
(RF_8 and RF_66) the importance scores are summed across many trees. 
In Table 6-9, the relative importance scores are colour-coded for each model; A higher 
ranking in terms of variable importance is indicated by a colour that is more green (than 
yellow) followed by more yellow (than red); the greater the difference in colour, the greater 
the difference in the ranking. 
 
                                                 
 
136 Instead of only considering variables in the tree, a feature of CART is its use of surrogates to assess the 
contribution of variables in the model as well as the contributions that variables would have had if they were 
included (as discussed in Section 3.3.4). 
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Table 6-9. The relative importance of each variable in the artificial neural network and decision-tree based models. The values range from 0 (unimportant) to 
100% (most important), except for genetically optimised neural networks (NN_GA_5 and NN_GA_1) that only indicate whether each variable was included 
in the model. For each model, the most important is coloured green, the median is coloured yellow and the least important is coloured red; other values are 
mixtures of these colours depending on their ranking in terms of importance. Colours can be compared between models such that a higher ranking in terms of 
variable importance is indicated by a colour that is more green (than yellow) followed by more yellow (than red). Blank cells indicate that the variable was 




Measure of importance in the following models 
NN_BK NN_GA_5 NN_GA_1 DT_One TN RF_8 RF_66 
 Specific Account - Accounts Receivable 
 V1 Accounts Receivable   
  
        
   V1a    Value for the specified year 37% included included 66% 96% 84% 73% 
   V1b    Percentage change 4% included included 75% 86% 47% 29% 
   V1c    Was Percentage change > 10%? 44% included included         
V2 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Sales 2% 
  
48% 65% 21% 11% 
V3 Percentage change in Accounts Receivable to Total Assets 20% included 
 
50% 74% 41% 28% 
 Specific Account - Allowance for doubtful accounts (AFDA) 
V4 Percentage change in AFDA 23% included included 54% 57% 21% 8% 
V5 Percentage change in AFDA to Accounts Receivable 11% included included 29% 52% 19% 8% 
V6 Percentage change in AFDA to Sales 8% 
  
59% 50% 12% 5% 
 Specific Account - Inventory 
V7 Change in Inventory to average Total Assets 12% 
  
77% 57% 27% 11% 
V8 Inventory to Sales   
  
        
   V8a    Value for the specified year 46% included included 56% 93% 38% 28% 
   V8b    Change 12% included 
 
71% 67% 25% 16% 
V9 Was Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) inventory valuation used? 10% 
  
1% 6% 1% 0% 
 Specific Account - Sales 
V10 Sales Growth   
  
        
   V10a    Percentage change 9% included 
 
64% 62% 36% 12% 
   V10b    V10a minus the Industry Average 13% included included 74% 67% 38% 14% 
   V10c    Previous year’s Percentage change 6% included included 43% 95% 70% 56% 
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Measure of importance in the following models 
NN_BK NN_GA_5 NN_GA_1 DT_One TN RF_8 RF_66 
   V10d    Four-year growth rate 7% included 
 
65% 70% 57% 28% 
   V10e    Previous year’s percentage change in total assets 8% included included 62% 63% 31% 10% 
V11 Sales to Total Assets   
  
        
   V11a    Value for the specified year 80% included included 78% 97% 87% 52% 
   V11b    Percentage change 19% included included 39% 67% 24% 10% 
V12 Gross Margin to Sales   
  
        
   V12a    Percentage change 12% included included 25% 74% 35% 14% 
   V12b    Was percentage change > 10%? 24% 
  
        
V13 Cash Sales   
  
        
   V13a    Percentage change 17% included included 29% 60% 38% 8% 
   V13b    Was change < 0? 13% included included         
V14 Were any sales from acquisitions? 33% included included   21% 4% 3% 
 General Financial - Asset Composition 
V15 Current Assets to Total Assets 13% included included 62% 87% 30% 17% 
V16 Net PP&E to Total Assets 32% included 
 
56% 95% 88% 82% 
V17 Soft Assets to Total Assets 31% included included 85% 83% 50% 28% 
V18 
Percentage Change in Assets other than Current Assets and Net PP&E 
to Total Assets 
13% included included 21% 70% 28% 17% 
 General Financial - General Accrual Measures 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets 31% included included 40% 88% 100% 91% 
V20 Were the specified and the prior year’s Total Accruals > 0? 98% included included 8% 51% 25% 18% 
V21 Total Discretionary Accruals 25% included included 34% 80% 33% 13% 
V22 RSST (unadjusted) Accruals 2% included included 18% 66% 20% 6% 
 General Financial - Level of Debt and Financial Distress 
V23 Debt to Total Assets 37% 
  
20% 64% 34% 16% 
V24 Debt to Equity 25% 
  
19% 55% 29% 9% 
V25 Altman’s (1968) financial distress measure (Z-score) 4% 
  
10% 81% 44% 30% 
V26 Four-period average of Times Interest Earned 32% 
  
37% 82% 30% 14% 
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Measure of importance in the following models 
NN_BK NN_GA_5 NN_GA_1 DT_One TN RF_8 RF_66 
 General Financial - Performance and Profitability 
V27 Return on Equity   
  
        
   V27a    Value for the specified year 37% 
  
62% 69% 31% 17% 
   V27b    Industry Average minus Specific Company 2% 
  
34% 73% 41% 22% 
V28 Return on Average Prior Assets   
  
        
   V28a    Value for the specified year 2% 
  
49% 79% 34% 19% 
   V28b    Previous year 35% 
  
49% 82% 51% 26% 
   V28c    Change 21% 
  
33% 68% 31% 17% 
V29 Holding Period Return   
  
        
   V29a    One-year 3% 
  
5% 62% 15% 9% 
   V29b    Previous One-year 2% 
  
10% 73% 21% 10% 
V30 Were analyst Earnings Per Share forecasts achieved or exceeded? 13% 
  
  16% 1% 0% 
 General Financial - Financing 
V31 Were New Securities issued?   
  
        
   V31a    Common Stock? 40% included included   15% 2% 0% 
   V31b    Common Stock or Long-term Debt? 100% included included 13% 40% 1% 1% 
V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued 34% included included 6% 86% 91% 100% 
V33 Demand for financing   
  
        
   V33a    Specific Value (ex ante) 62% included included 17% 80% 73% 40% 
   V33b    Was there demand (ex ante)? 19% 
  
        
   V33c    Cash from operating and investment activities 22% included included 44% 67% 33% 12% 
V34 Were there operating leases? 29% included included   29% 2% 1% 
 Non-financial - Key Roles and Positions 
V35 Was the auditor a Big Six firm? 27% included included   19% 1% 0% 
V36 Number of changes of audit firm in the most recent 4 financial statements 48% included included 4% 20% 2% 1% 
V37 CEO   
  
        
   V37a    Tenure 21% included included 71% 88% 32% 27% 
   V37b    Number of changes in the last three years 3% included 
 
5% 15% 1% 0% 
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Measure of importance in the following models 
NN_BK NN_GA_5 NN_GA_1 DT_One TN RF_8 RF_66 
V38 Has the CFO changed in the last three years? 20% included 
 
  23% 1% 0% 
V39 Composition/Holdings of the Board   
  
        
   V39a    Number of Directors 22% 
  
16% 73% 17% 10% 
   V39b    Percentage of Directors who are also Executives 84% 
  
23% 86% 46% 38% 
   V39c    Percentage of Director shares owned by those who are also Executives 
Excluded because of insufficient data 
V40 Percentage of total shares owned by the CEO 
 Comparing Financial and Non-financial 
V41 
Percentage change in the number of Employees minus percentage 
change in Total Assets 
3% 
  
12% 76% 38% 19% 
V42 




18% 71% 31% 15% 
V43 




10% 56% 21% 6% 
 Control variables 
V44 Company Age: Number of years since foundation 59% 
  
14% 88% 47% 25% 
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets 59% 
  
77% 100% 78% 53% 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a 3? 27% 
  
  22% 1% 0% 
V47 Stock Exchange listed on   
  
        
   V47a    NASDAQ? One categorical variable for DT_One, 
TN, RF_8 and RF_66 
16% included included 
 
27% 2% 1% 
   V47b    NYSE? 8% included included 
 New variables 
V48 Macroeconomic indicators   
  
        
   V48a    Previous year’s percentage change in annual real GDP 4% included 
 
  26% 3% 1% 
   V48b    Previous year’s percentage change in annual retail sales 13% included included   33% 3% 0% 
   V48c    Previous year’s unemployment rate inverted 12% included 
 
8% 28% 2% 1% 
V49 Corporate governance indices   
  
        
   V49a    G-Index 32% included 
 
100% 68% 36% 31% 
   V49b    E-Index Excluded because of insufficient data 
V50 Accounting complexity of the industry 56% included included 18% 53% 8% 4% 
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6.1.5.b Analysis of Results 
The results shown in Table 6-9 indicate that the variables found to be important 
(indicated by green shading) by the neural network models are largely different from those 
found by decision-tree based models. The findings are more similar between the decision-tree 
based models, although the TreeNet (TN) and Random Forests (RF_8 and RF_66) models are 
most similar in terms of their relative importance scores. The following subsections analyse 
the importance of the individual variables in Table 6-9 relative to their statistical significance 
in standard-regression based models without interactions (see Section 6.1.2). 
Analysis of the most statistically significant variables from models without interactions 
(see Section 6.1.2) 
The most statistically significant variables from Section 6.1.2 are evaluated in the 
following dot points in terms of their importance to models that allow interactions. All of 
these variables were at least moderately important (as indicated by some green in the colour 
coding in Table 6-9) in one of the models, except for the ratio of debt to equity (V24). 
• V8a Inventory to Sales is particularly important in the TN model. It was also moderately 
important in the other models, having been included in the NN_GA models and having 
mostly green (with some yellow) shading for the other models; 
• V11a Sales to Total Assets is important in all models as indicated by the green shading; 
• V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets is very important in the ensembles of decision trees, 
including being the most important variable in the TN model. This variable was less 
important in DT_One and NN_BK, but it was also included in the NN_GA models; 
• V20 Were the specified and the prior year’s Total Accruals > 0? is very important in the 
neural network models, but was not in the decision-tree based models with yellow, orange 
and red shading; 
• V24 Debt to Equity is relatively unimportant in all the models as indicated by red shading 
allowing interactions in contrast to the standard regression-based models; 
• V27a Return on Equity is moderately important with yellow shading and some green, but 
it is not included in the NN_GA models; 
• V28a Return on Average Prior Assets is not important in the neural networks, but was 
moderately important in the decision-tree based models with yellow and green shading. 
Interestingly, V28b (the value of V28a one year prior) was equally or more important in 
every model; 
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• V31b Was New Common Stock or Long-term Debt issued? is the most important to the 
neural networks, but it was relatively unimportant in the decision-tree based models; 
• V33a Demand for financing (ex ante) is reasonably important in all models, except 
DT_One; 
• V34 Were there operating leases? is not included or not important to the decision-tree 
based models, but was somewhat important to the neural networks; 
• V39b Percentage of Directors who are also Executives is important in the TN and 
NN_BK models, moderately important in the RF models, but relatively unimportant in 
DT_One and not used by the NN_GA models; 
• V44 Company Age is important in the TN and NN_BK models, reasonably important in 
the RF models and relatively unimportant in DT_One; 
• V45 Company Size is very important in all models, including being the most important in 
the TN model; 
• V49a Corporate Governance G-Index is the most important variable in the DT_One 
model, but only slightly important in the other models. 
Analysis of variables that were not the most statistically significant in models without 
interactions (see Section 6.1.2), but are important in models with interactions 
Some variables are important in models that incorporate interactions, even though 
they were not the most statistically significant in Section 6.1.2. The following dot points list 
these variables. Amongst the techniques that incorporate interactions, the decision-tree based 
models performed relatively well at detecting financial statement fraud (in Chapter 5), while 
the neural network models did not. Consequently, only variables that are important in 
decision-tree based models (DT_One, TN and RF models), as indicated by consistently green 
shading in Table 6-9, are listed. Results from ensembles of decision trees (TN and RF 
models) were given additional weight when determining important variables (as indicated by 
green shading) from Table 6-9. The reason for this is that each variable ranking in these 
models is aggregated over many opportunities to be used (as a result of many trees). 
• V1a Accounts receivable is important in all models, and was most important variable 
measuring accounts receivable. This in contrast to the multivariate analysis without 
interactions (see Section 6.1.2.c) in which no accounts receivable variable is statistically 
significant at a 10% level; 
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• V10c Previous year’s Percentage change in Sales is important in the ensembles of 
decision trees, in addition to its being statistically significant at a 10% level in the 
LR_U15% model (see Section 6.1.2.c); 
• V16 Net PP&E to Total Assets is consistently important, particularly in the ensembles of 
decision trees. Other variables from the asset composition category are also relatively 
important, but V16 was the most important according to the ensembles of decision trees. 
This is in contrast to no asset composition variables being statistically significant at a 
10% level in the multivariate analysis without interactions (see Section 6.1.2.d); 
• V32 Proportion of common stock that is newly issued is very important in the ensembles 
of decision trees including being the most important in the RF_66 model, although it is 
not so important in other models. This variable was also statistically significant at a 5% 
level in the DA_Step model (see Section 6.1.2.d); 
• V37a CEO Tenure is important in the decision tree (DT_One) and TreeNet models, 
although not so in the Random Forests models; 
• V41 is the most important variable that compares financial and non-financial information, 
but it was only moderately important in the TreeNet model and relatively unimportant in 
the other models. 
Other findings in models with interactions that are supported by those in models 
without interactions (see Section 6.1.2) 
The results in Table 6-9 from models that incorporate interactions indicate the 
following variables are relatively unimportant to financial statement fraud detection models. 
• Variables (V4-V6) measuring the allowance for doubtful debts (AFDA), although they 
are somewhat important in the decision tree model DT_One; 
• Newly proposed variables measuring macroeconomic conditions (V48) and accounting 
complexity (V50), although they are somewhat important in neural network models; 
• Discretionary accruals or RSST unadjusted accruals, which are less important than 
measures of total accruals; 
• Market-based measures of performance, which are less important than accounting-based 
measures. 
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6.2  Simpler Models 
Financial statement fraud detection models are widely applicable to investors, 
regulators, auditors and other stakeholders (as discussed in Section 2.3.5). Considering this 
wide range of stakeholders, it is likely that some will prefer simpler models, of course 
conditionally upon their being relatively accurate. The term simple applies to both models 
that use fewer variables and less complex modelling techniques that are easier to interpret. 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) indicated that simpler models would be useful to auditors. 
Simpler models could also facilitate their wider use, akin to the widespread application of 
Altman’s Z-score model for predicting financial distress and bankruptcy in companies. 
Altman’s Z-score model is a relatively simple discriminant analysis model that uses five 
explanatory variables. Models with fewer variables might also be preferred by users to make 
the data collection and calculation easier and faster. It is also possible that models with fewer 
variables could have better classification accuracy. For example, the standard regression-
based models already developed were more accurate when they used a reduced number of 
variables (see Section 6.1.1). However, it is not that simple because fewer variables could 
also result in poorer classification accuracy. Given that the analyses in Chapter 5 investigated 
accuracy without regard for complexity, it is clearly useful to develop and evaluate simpler 
models, which addresses research question RQ4 (defined on page 221). 
6.2.1 The Role for the More Complex Models Already Developed 
All the explanatory variables used in this research were selected because of their 
public availability and ease of access; variables too difficult to obtain are unlikely to be used 
in a practical context (Perols 2011). Furthermore, all models in this research could be 
implemented as computer software that automatically evaluated new financial statements and 
periodically updated the fraud detection model being used. Once developed, such automated 
systems could handle more complex models just as easily as simpler models. Consequently, 
the accuracy of a model is likely to be its key factor regardless of its complexity. 
It should also be noted that some people might be more willing to rely on models with 
more variables because they can be perceived to be more sophisticated, as was found in an 
experiment with senior auditors (Boatsman et al. 1997). For such people, the more complex 
models developed in Chapter 5 are more appropriate than the simpler models presented in the 
next section. 
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6.2.2 Development of Simpler Models 
Three modelling techniques are considered for developing simpler models: TreeNet, 
logistic regression and an individual CART decision tree. 
Ensembles involving multiple modelling techniques were the best models overall at 
detecting financial statement fraud (see Section 5.3.3.b). However, these models are 
relatively difficult to automate because they are developed using a number of different 
software packages. Therefore, these models are too complex to be used for developing 
simpler ones. In contrast, decision tree-based models such as TreeNet are relatively easy to 
develop into automated systems, particular when using software produced by Salford 
Systems. Further to this, the TreeNet model TN was the best model overall aside from the 
ensembles of multiple modelling techniques (see Section 5.3.3.b). Hence, using a reduced 
number of variables in a TreeNet model is investigated in the next subsection. 
Even with a reduced number of variables, a TreeNet model is difficult to interpret 
because it is still an ensemble model. Consequently, using fewer variables in less complex 
non-ensemble models is also investigated. Logistic regression models are also trialled 
because they have interpretation advantages (see Section 6.1.2) and have shown their 
classification accuracy can improve as a result of reducing the number of variables (see 
Section 6.1.1). A less complex CART decision tree is also evaluated, because a CART 
decision tree was the best non-ensemble model in Section 5.3.3.b. 
6.2.2.a TreeNet Models with Fewer Explanatory Variables 
The TreeNet model developed above (in Chapter 5) used all 66 available variables. 
The TN_90%_6 model was instead developed using the six variables that had a minimum 
importance score of 90% in the TN model. Alternative thresholds of 85% and 80% were also 
trialled, resulting in the use of 13 and 18 variables respectively. However, the additional (7 or 
12) variables did not result in a consistently lower WEC and so the model with the fewest 
variables (TN_90%_6) was chosen according to the principle of parsimony. 
The six variables in the TN_90%_6 model are all important as shown in Table 6-10, 
but they only measure the O and I factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
Adding the most important variable (according to the TN model) from each of the R and S 
factors was also trialled. Once again, it did not result in a consistently lower Weighted Error 
Cost (WEC) and so the additional variables were not included in future analysis. 
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Table 6-10. The relative importance of the explanatory variables included in the TN_90%_6 model. 
Variable ID Variable Name Relative Importance 
V1a Accounts Receivable 95% 
V8a Inventory to Sales 89% 
V10c Previous year’s Percentage change in Sales 92% 
V11a Sales to Total Assets 97% 
V16 Net PP&E to Total Assets 100% 
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets 92% 
 
Another model TN_4 was also developed and evaluated. It used only four variables; 
the most important variable (according to the TN model) from each of the four factors (O, I, 
R and S) of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. However, Figure 6-1 below reveals 
that TN_90%_6 has higher classification accuracy on the holdout data as indicated by lower 
WEC values, except when the Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (	
) is 
greater than five137. Both models have WEC values greater than one when 	
 is greater 
than five. This indicates they are both worse than a naïve model (WEC = 1) that classifies all 
financial statements the same way. Consequently, as a result of greater accuracy, TN_90%_6 
is chosen as the best TreeNet model that uses relatively few explanatory variables. 
Compared to the TN_90%_6 model that uses six variables, the model that uses all 66 
variables (TN) has a noticeably lower WEC in many cases, particularly for high values of 
	
. This indicates that overall there has been a loss in accuracy from reducing the 
number of variables. However, the model with fewer variables has similar accuracy for some 
values of 	
 and better accuracy (lower WEC) when 	
 is less than 0.3 or equal to 
three. 
 
                                                 
 
137 In addition to the results presented in the rest of this section, appendices A and B tabulate the WEC 
values for every model on the holdout and training data respectively, and appendices C and D tabulate the 
percentage accuracy of classifying fraudulent, legitimate and all financial statements on the holdout and training 
data respectively. 
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Figure 6-1. The holdout performance of the TreeNet model using all available explanatory variables 
(TN) with those using a reduced number of explanatory variables (TN_90%_6 and TN_4). 
 
6.2.2.b Logistic Regression Models with Fewer Explanatory Variables 
LR_Step uses only 14 variables and was the best standard regression-based model 
overall (see Section 5.3.2.b). Three logistic regression models were developed using even 
fewer variables. 
LR_Step_11 Model 
LR_Step_11 uses 11 of the 14 variables found in the LR_Step model. The remaining 
11 variables still measure all four factors of the new Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
The three variables that have been removed are138: 
• The accrual measure V19 because it is less statistically significant (lower p-value in Table 
6-2) than the other accrual measure (V20) in LR_Step; 
• The demand for financing measure V33a because it is less significant (lower p-value in 
Table 6-2) than another financing variable that is also associated with the I factor of the 
Fraud Detection Triangle framework. This other variable measures whether new 
securities have been issued (V31b). Another financing variable (V34) that measures 
whether operating leases have been used is retained because it measures the R factor, 
rather than the I factor; 
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• The industry membership measure V46, because it was the only variable that was not 
statistically significant at a 5% level when V19 and V33a were removed. 
LR_TN_6 Model 
LR_TN_6 only uses variables with a minimum of 90% as their importance score in 
the TN model, as is the case for the TN_90%_6 model. TreeNet was chosen to select the 
variables for two reasons. First, it averages each variable’s importance score over many trees 
(see Section 6.1.5.a). Secondly, from extensive consulting experience, the CEO of Salford 
Systems said139 this often achieves results as good as, if not better than, a model performing 
its own variable selection. 
LR_Int_11 Model 
The use of interaction terms in logistic regression was investigated to develop this 
model, because there is evidence (see Section 6.1.5.b) to support the presence of useful 
interactions between explanatory variables. 
The set of the 14 most statistically significant variables as listed in Section 6.1.2.i on 
page 242 was used as a starting point to investigate potential interaction terms. Section 
6.1.5.b on page 255 identifies that some of these 14 variables are also important in models 
that incorporated interactions, particularly V11a, V19 and V45 (which are defined again in 
the next paragraph). Some variables were also identified as being important in models 
incorporating interactions even though they were not in the set of 14; specifically, V1a, V10c, 
V16, V28b, V32 and V37a (defined again below). These variables that are important in 
models that incorporate interactions might contribute to a logistic regression model in terms 
of an interaction term. Consequently, the following interactions between explanatory 
variables were investigated.  
• CEO tenure (V37a) is thought to be associated with increased opportunity and capability 
to commit fraud (see Section 4.5.11). The extent of this association may increase with: 
• Increased pressure to fraudulently improve financials because of high prior sales 
growth (V10c); 
• Increased incentive to commit fraud from issuing new securities (V32); 
                                                 
 
139 Personal communication during his visit to Bond University in September 2012 to present a seminar. 
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• Increased opportunity to commit fraud as measured by higher levels of accounts 
receivables (V1a) or total accruals (V19); 
• Increased opportunity to commit fraud from weaker internal controls in smaller 
companies (V45140) or 
• Suspiciously high returns relative to asset levels in prior periods (V28b). 
• The amount that the probability of fraud increases with the incentive from a need for 
financing (V33a140) might increase with an additional pressure from low operating 
efficiency (V11a140) or increased opportunity to commit fraud (V16140). 
These interactions were empirically tested by adding them one at a time to the set of 
14 most statistically significant individual variables (see 6.1.2.i). Specifically, this was done 
by adding an interaction term, which is the multiplication of the two interacting variables, as 
well as adding the individual variables themselves if they are not already one of the original 
14. None of the interaction terms were statistically significant at a 10% level, apart from the 
interaction between company size (V45) and CEO tenure (V37a). This model was then 
reduced to 11 variables using the same process as for the LR_Step_11 model that involved 
removing (one variable at a time) the less significant of two similar variables and removing 
those not statistically significant at a 5% level. A 5% level was chosen instead of 10% to 
promote a simpler model with fewer variables. 
Comparison of Simpler Logistic Regression Models 
Table 6-11 below reveals that the coefficients of variables are fairly stable across the 
simpler logistic regression models. The coefficients are also consistent with the results and 
findings from the analysis of the statistical significance of each variable (presented in Section 
6.1.2), which improves the reliability of those findings. The models shown in Table 6-11 also 
use similar variables except for the LR_TN_6 model. This is not surprising given that the 
variables are selected by a different modelling technique, TreeNet. 
 
                                                 
 
140 This statement is indicated by a lower value in this variable. 
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Table 6-11. The coefficients of variables in the simpler logistic regression models. All variables are 




Coefficients of variables in the following models 
LR_Step LR_Step_11 LR_Int_11 LR_TN_6 
V1a Accounts Receivable    0.000 
V8a Inventory to Sales 2.785** 2.421** 2.409* 2.579** 
V10c Previous year’s Percentage change in Sales    0.232 
V11a Sales to Total Assets -0.412** -0.333** -0.256** -0.224* 
V16 Net PP&E to Total Assets    -0.985 
V19 Total Accruals to Total Assets 1.266*    
V20 
Were the specified and the prior year’s 
Total Accruals > 0? 
1.564** 1.888** 1.968**  
V24 Debt to Equity -0.083** -0.062** -0.054**  
V27a Return on Equity -0.772** -0.551** -0.402**  
V28a Return on Average Prior Assets 0.886* 0.9*   
V31b 
Was New Common Stock or Long-term 
Debt Issued? 
1.383** 1.349** 1.346**  
V33a Demand for financing (ex ante) -0.589**    
V34 Were there operating leases? 0.737** 0.714** 0.701**  
V37a CEO Tenure (years)   0.243**  
V39b 
Percentage of Directors who are also 
Executives 
1.394* 1.762**   
V44 
Company Age: Number of years since 
foundation 
-0.010** -0.008** -0.009**  
V45 Company Size: natural log of Total Assets 0.389** 0.353** 0.484** 0.083 
V46 Industry: SIC code starts with a 3? -0.486*    V37a × V45 Interaction term   -0.030**  
Constant  -3.966 -4.383 -5.190 -0.664 
 
All models reveal that more fraud occurs in larger firms (V45), which is probably a 
result of the SEC bias towards larger companies (see Section 5.1.1.a). Interestingly, the 
V37a × V45 interaction term in LR_Int_11 is also statistically significant at a 1% level. 
Although CEO tenure (V37a) was not statistically significant without this interaction term, 
the LR_Int_11 model indicates that longer serving CEOs are associated with increased levels 
of fraud. Furthermore, this effect is magnified for smaller companies as indicated by the 
negative coefficient of the V37a×V45 interaction term. This could mean that the CEO is 
more capable of exploiting the opportunity to commit fraud as a result of weaker internal 
controls, which would be consistent with the Exploitable Opportunity (O) factor of the new 
Fraud Detection Triangle framework. 
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The holdout performance of the LR_Step, LR_Step_11, LR_Int_11 and LR_TN_6 
models is shown in Figure 6-2. Most models perform comparably apart from LR_TN_6 being 
the best (lowest WEC) for lower values of 	
, LR_Int_11 being the best when 	
 is 
equal to 3 or 5 and LR_Step 11 being the best for the highest values of 	
. The 
comparable performance of the LR_Int_11 model provides additional support for the use of 
an interaction term between variables measuring company size (V45) and CEO tenure 
(V37a).  
Figure 6-2. The holdout performance of the logistic regression models that use relatively few 
explanatory variables. 
 
A naïve model that classifies all statements the same way has a constant WEC of one 
(see Section 5.3.2). Consequently, models are only practically useful if they have WEC 
values lower than one. While LR_TN_6 is preferred in terms of the fewest variables, Figure 
6-2 shows that the only time its WEC is substantially less than 1 is when 	
 is equal to 
one. At this point, LR_TN_6 and LR_Int_11 have the equal highest WEC, while the LR_Step 
model’s WEC is 13% lower and the LR_Step_11 model’s WEC is 8% lower again. As 
LR_Step_11 is simply LR_Step with three variables removed, this is further evidence that 
standard regression-based models can benefit from using fewer explanatory variables. 
Overall, the WECs of the LR_Step model and the LR_Step_11 model are comparable for 
most values. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of parsimony, the LR_Step_11 is 
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6.2.2.c A CART Decision Tree with Reduced Complexity 
The individual CART decision tree model DT_One included 56 variables and 70 
terminal nodes. A smaller tree was developed by further pruning the DT_One tree until it had 
only nine terminal nodes. The resulting tree used seven explanatory variables. However, the 
only time its holdout WEC was substantially lower than one was when 	
 is equal to 
one. Furthermore, at this point its WEC is 0.78, which is 10% higher than LR_Step_11 
(0.71). Thus, the decision tree did not respond well to using fewer variables, and 
consequently the LR_Step_11 model is preferred. 
6.2.3 Analysis of the Simpler Models 
The TN_90%_6 and LR_Step_11 models were chosen in the previous section as the 
best simpler models. In this section, they are analysed in terms of their performance on the 
holdout dataset, followed by an analysis of the explanatory variables they use. 
6.2.3.a  Evaluation of Holdout Performance 
Table 6-3 below compares the holdout performance of these simpler models, 
TN_90%_6 and LR_Step_11, with AV5_NoNN, the best model overall in Chapter 5 (see 
Section 5.3.3.b). It is clear that the more complex ensemble of multiple modelling techniques, 
AV5_NoNN, has better accuracy as indicated by lower WEC. However, as mentioned the 
two simpler models have advantages in terms of easier implementation and interpretability.  
When comparing TN_90%_6 and LR_Step_11 it is clear that the former has lower 
WECs for lower values of 	
, while the latter has substantially lower WECs for the 
highest values of 	
. However, as presented in Chapter 5, it is again clear that models 
are better (have lower WEC) at detecting financial statement fraud when 	
 is close to 
one.  
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Figure 6-3. A comparison of holdout performance of the best simpler models (LR_Step_11 and 
TN_90%_6) and the best model overall (AV5_NoNN). 
 
The WEC of TN_90%_6 is noticeably lower than one when 	
 is equal to 0.6, 1 
or 2. This only occurs when 	
 is equal to 1 for LR_Step_11, but in that case it has a 
lower WEC than TN_90%_6. Because models are not practically useful when WEC is equal 
to or greater than one (see Section 5.3.2), 
• The TN_90%_6 model is best only used when 	
 is between 0.6 and 2; while, 
• The LR_Step_11 model is best only used when 	
 is equal to or close to one. 
Thus, the TreeNet model that only uses six variables (TN_90%_6) is useful for a wider range 
of values of 	
 than LR_Step_11. Importantly, both models are substantially more 
accurate than the benchmark models, F-score and M-score as shown in Table 6-12 below. 
These models were only compared to the benchmark models when 	
 is equal to one, 
because that was the only case in which the benchmark models were useful with a WEC 
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Table 6-12. The accuracy of the chosen simpler models (LR_Step_11 and TN_90%_6) on the holdout 
data set when 	
 = 1. The best model overall from Chapter 5 (AV5_NoNN) and the benchmark 
models (M-score and F-score) are provided as a comparison. 







TreeNet models are more complex and cannot be interpreted as easily because they 
are ensemble models. Consequently, TN_90%_6 might be well-suited for a context where the 
use of a small number of variables is strongly preferred. However, if interpretability is more 
important then the LR_Step_11 model is the best suited. In either case, the limitations on 
their use as listed in the dot points above should be acknowledged. If, however, classification 
accuracy is a more important consideration than complexity, then the AV5_NoNN model 
remains the best overall. Alternatively, if the value of 	
 can be reasonably estimated 
then the best model for that value of 	
 should be used, as per Table 5-23 on page 207. 
Models are designed to be used for classifying or ranking financial statements 
Both the TreeNet and logistic regression models have the probability of fraud as an 
output. However, interpreting this figure as a standard probability estimate is unreliable. The 
reason is that models have been evaluated and chosen based on their classifications, 
specifically those that result in the lowest WEC. Furthermore, it has been shown that accurate 
classification does not necessarily imply unbiased models with precise probability estimates 
(Friedman 1997; Hand 2009a). It has also been claimed that one-to-one matched pairs 
studies, as used in this research, result in biased probability estimates (Skogsvik 2005). 
However, this bias does not negatively influence the ranking of financial statements 
according to their probability of fraud. Consequently, these, and all other models presented in 
this research, are best suited for classifying fraudulent statements or ranking them according 
to their probability of being fraudulent. 
6.2.3.b Analysis of Explanatory Variables Used in the Simpler Models 
TN_90%_6 uses the same variables as the LR_TN_6 model. Hence, Table 6-11 above 
can also be used to compare the variables used in the LR_Step_11 and TN_90%_6 models. 
These two models use very different variables. The TN_90%_6 model is primarily made up 
of financial variables measuring specific accounts, while the LR_Step_11 model uses mostly 
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general financial variables. LR_Step_11 also includes a non-financial measure unlike 
TN_90%_6. While the TN_90%_6 model only measures the O and I factors of the new Fraud 
Detection Triangle framework, the LR_Step_11 model includes variables that also measure 
the other factors, R and S. 
There is a similarity between these models in terms of exogenous and temporal 
variables that were suggested as potentially useful (in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). 17-18% of 
the variables used in these models incorporated information from different time periods, 
which supports the inclusion of variables incorporating the additional information provided 
by measuring multiple time periods. However, neither model used any variable with 
exogenous information. 
Further Analysis of the LR_Step_11 Model 
One advantage of the LR_Step_11 model, which is defined below, is the simpler 
interpretation of the model compared with TN_90%_6. 
Log _odds = −4.38 + 2.42V8a − 0.33V11a + 1.89V20 − 0.06V24 − 0.55V27a + 0.9V28a
+ 1.35V31b + 0.71V34 + 1.76V39b − 0.01V44 + 0.35V45 
and the Probability of Fraud = $þCN _CO®µ_P_&&1 + $þCN _CO®µ_P_&& 
According to the LR_Step_11 model the probability of fraud increases with: 
• Increased opportunities to commit fraud as measured by higher levels of inventory (V8a 
Inventory to Sales) and more directors also being executives (V39b);  
• Increased opportunity and increased pressure from high levels of current and prior 
accruals (V20); 
• Increased incentives facing companies that have just issued new securities (V31b) and 
facing younger firms around the period of the initial stock offering (lower values of V44 
Company Age); 
• Managers who focus on the short-term, which might make it easier to rationalise fraud 
(V34 Were operating leases used?); 
• Suspiciously higher returns relative to asset levels in prior periods (V28a Return on 
Average Prior Assets); 
• Larger firms (V45 Company Size), which probably reflects an SEC bias in prosecution; 
Chapter 6 Analysis of Variables and Development of Simpler Models Adrian Gepp 
   Page 270 
And decreases with: 
• Reduced pressure from increases in efficiency of generating sales from assets (V11a Sales 
to Assets) and increases in accounting profitability (V27a Return on Equity); and 
• Reduced opportunity from increases in monitoring from creditors (V24 Debt to Equity). 
Testing the Influence of Major Events That Occurred During the Study Period 
Some noteworthy fraud-related events occurred during the time period of the study 
(1998-2007). These events could be thought to have substantially influenced the results in 
this research, but the following paragraphs show that this was not the case. 
The first notable event was the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
enforced major changes to corporate governance and financial practice requirements in US 
organizations. One outcome from the Act was hoped to be a reduction in the amount of 
financial statement fraud. Some data do not support the effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Deloitte 2008; Hogan et al. 2008; Deloitte 2009). However, even if it has not been effective 
at reducing the quantity of financial statement fraud, it is possible that the nature (and 
consequently the indicators) of fraud might have changed. This proposition was tested in this 
research by including a dummy variable indicating before or after Sarbanes-Oxley. This test 
was performed by Wang et al. (2011), who did not find it statistically significant in a logistic 
regression model. Consistent with this finding, the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy variable is not 
statistically significant even at a 15% level with a p-value of 19.6% in the LR_Step_11 model 
using all the data. The full data set was used, because there are no data after 2002 in the 
training data set. This finding is supported by the TN_90%_6 model, because the Sarbanes-
Oxley dummy variable has an importance score of less than 25%, while the other variables’ 
scores are all greater than 90%. 
The second notable event was the large number of frauds from 1998-2000 related to 
the internet company (dot-com) crash (Dechow et al. 2011). As a result, a dummy variable set 
to one only during 1998-2000 was used to test whether this period is fundamentally different 
and had unduly influenced results in this study. The dot-com dummy variable is not 
statistically significant even at a 15% level with a p-value of 40% in the LR_Step_11 model 
using all the data. The p-value was even higher at 73% if only the training data set was used. 
This finding is again supported by the TN_90%_6 model, because the dot-com dummy 
variable has an importance score of less than 27%, while the other variables’ scores are all 
greater than 90%. 
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It is also noteworthy that all the variable coefficients in the LR_Step_11 model 
remained similar and statistically significant at a 10% level during all of these robustness 
tests. This finding increases the reliability of the interpretation of the model’s variable 
coefficients discussed in this chapter. 
6.3  Summary 
The analysis of variables presented in this chapter used a more comprehensive set of 
explanatory variables than prior studies. The number of fraud cases analysed is often more 
than double that which is used in prior studies. In addition, both standard regression-based 
models and models that allow complex interactions between explanatory variables are 
analysed. Importantly, the main findings are also consistent across multiple models. 
Consequently, the findings greatly contribute to a better understanding of the important 
variables in models that detect financial statement fraud and also of the way these variables 
are associated with fraud. 
There is empirical evidence to support the use of the new Fraud Detection Triangle 
framework to assist in the selection of variables for models to detect financial statement 
fraud. Variables from all factors of the framework have been useful to such models, 
particularly the Exploitable Opportunity (O) and Incentive/Pressure (I) factors. Additional 
research into variables that measure the Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R) and Suspicious 
Information (S) factors would be beneficial as less focus has been placed on them in prior 
research. 
Some notable findings relating to individual variables are listed below. 
• Contrary to findings in prior studies, higher debt levels (relative to equity) reduce fraud. 
This is likely to be the result of a decrease in the opportunity to commit and conceal fraud 
because of increased monitoring and scrutiny from creditors. This new empirical finding 
is consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) well-established agency theory. 
• Weaker corporate governance as measured by a corporate governance index (G-index) is 
associated with more financial statement fraud. This is the first study to provide empirical 
support for the hypothesis that financial statement fraud is related to the aggregation of 
many corporate governance initiatives, not just the presence or absence of a particular 
one. This is also consistent with the outcome of a large fraud case at Tyco International 
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Limited, where improving overall corporate governance was made the number one 
priority after the fraud was uncovered (Farber 2005); 
• Longer serving CEOs are associated with increased levels of fraud. Further to this, the 
effect is magnified for smaller companies as indicated by a statistically significant 
interaction with company size. This possibly indicates that the CEO is more capable of 
exploiting any opportunities to commit fraud that result from weaker internal controls in 
smaller companies, which would be consistent with the O factor of the new Fraud 
Detection Triangle framework. This is the first study to propose or test this new 
interaction variable; 
• Larger firms are associated with increased levels of fraud, which empirically supports the 
theory that the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has a bias to prosecute larger 
firms (as suggested in Section 5.1.1.a); 
• While mixed results have occurred in prior studies, measures of total accruals were 
noticeably more important than measures of discretionary or unadjusted accruals; and 
• Accounting-based measures of performance are more useful to fraud detection models 
than market-based measures. 
Overall, variables from a variety of categories were found to be useful. This includes 
both financial and non-financial variables, but variables comparing financial and non-
financial measures were not found to be useful to financial statement fraud detection models. 
Future research could investigate variables that compare financial information other than 
sales (or assets) with non-financial information other than the number of employees. 
Additional findings that are useful when developing financial statement fraud 
detection models include: 
• The variables that are most statistically significant in standard regression-based models 
are general financial measures, particularly those relating to financing. In contrast, the 
decision trees and ensembles of them that incorporate interactions find more financial 
measures of specific accounts (accounts receivable, sales and inventory) to be important; 
• Standard regression-based techniques benefit from having fewer explanatory variables, 
but decision trees and ensembles of them benefit from having a larger number of 
variables. This is probably due to the fact that decision-tree based models do not suffer 
from multicollinearity problems; and 
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• The relative ranking of variable importance provided by TreeNet has shown promise for 
selecting the explanatory variables to be used by a different modelling technique. 
Less complex fraud detection models were also developed and evaluated. The two 
best models were a TreeNet model that uses only six variables, TN_90%_6, and a logistic 
regression that uses 11 variables, LR_Step_11. TN_90%_6 might be well-suited for a 
situation where collected data on only a small number of variables is strongly preferred. 
However, TreeNet models are relatively difficult to interpret because they are ensemble 
models. Consequently, when interpretability is more important, the LR_Step_11 model is the 
better-suited. Both models only achieved useful levels of classification accuracy when the 
Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (	
) is close to one, particularly the 
LR_Step_11 model, and so their use should be limited to those circumstances.  
Finally, if model complexity is not as important as accuracy then the AV5_NoNN 
model developed in Chapter 5 remains the best overall. Alternatively, if the value of 	
 
can be reasonably estimated then the best model for that value of 	
 should be used, as 
per Table 5-23 on page 207. 
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Chapter 7 Overall Conclusions and Future Work 
Fraud is ubiquitous (ACFE 2014) and financial statement fraud in particular continues 
to be extremely costly to society. Financial statement fraud is difficult to detect and better 
decision aids are needed to assist in making its detection more effective. Fraud detection 
models are an example of such an aid, and have been investigated in this research. 
Beneficiaries of statistically reliable fraud detection models include: 
• Those that have a responsibility to detect or deter fraud including auditors, regulators, 
company management, the board of directors and its audit committee. Detection models 
can assist all of them in deciding whether to investigate a certain set of financial 
statements further. 
• Victim entities including investors, financiers, employees, customers, suppliers, analysts 
and other stakeholders. Detection models can assist all of them in trying to avoid 
association with fraudulent companies. 
The major conclusions and contributions of this research are presented next, followed 
by suggestions for future work. 
7.1  Conclusions and Contributions of This Research 
Consistent with the aims of this project, this research has advanced the field of 
detecting financial statement fraud in terms of a better understanding of the: 
• Most appropriate modelling techniques and their best parameter settings; 
• Suitability and performance of different detection models, both new and existing; and, 
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• Explanatory variables that are important for use in detection models and how these 
variables are associated with fraud. 
New theory and corresponding supporting empirical evidence were also presented. This 
theory can assist in the selection of explanatory variables for future research. The 
contribution of this research is strengthened because: 
• It is the first study to evaluate models both on separate holdout data for accurate 
evaluation of model performance and under varying assumptions about prior fraud 
probabilities and ratios of misclassification error costs; 
• Models are evaluated on holdout data that occur chronologically after the training data 
used to develop them, which results in more realistic estimates of model performance; 
• The number of fraud cases used in this research is substantially greater than in most prior 
studies, and is often more than double that used previously; 
• The set of explanatory variables used in this research is more comprehensive than any 
prior studies; 
• More than 35 different models have been compared, after initially analysing many more 
in order to choose the parameters for each model; and, 
• All models have been developed and tested on the same data so that comparisons between 
them are valid. Additional benchmark models have also been included for comparison; 
these models are used exactly as they were developed in their original studies. 
The following subsections discuss the main findings according to the four main 
research questions driving this research. 
7.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
RQ1: Which supervised-learning modelling techniques are the most accurate at 
detecting financial statement fraud under varying assumptions about the prior probability of 
fraud and ratios of misclassification error costs? 
The best model to detect financial statement fraud, as indicated by the lowest 
Weighted Error Cost (WEC), varies depending on the assumptions about prior fraud 
probabilities and ratios of misclassification error costs. This is illustrated in the number of 
different model codes in the last column of Figure 7-1. The fact that no model is superior 
under all assumptions illustrates the need for research to consider a variety of prior 
probabilities and ratio of error costs, as has been done in this research. 
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The cost of missing fraud relative to falsely alleging it differs depending on the 
circumstance and the stakeholder. Beneish (1999a) estimated that the loss associated with 
investing in a company that produces fraudulent financial statements is 20 to 30 times higher 
than the lost opportunity to invest in a company because it was falsely accused of being 
fraudulent. Using this estimate, the ratio of the cost of missing fraud to the cost of falsely 
alleging it (	
:	) is between 20:1 and 30:1 for investors. As a hypothetical case, consider 
an investor who faces a ratio of error costs of 20:1 and who agrees with recent estimates that 
the prior probability of fraud [()] is 14.5% (Dyck et al. 2013). As indicated in Figure 7-1, 
the smaller table would be used to calculate the corresponding value of the prior-adjusted 
relative cost of missing fraud (PaRCòó), which is equal to three. Alternatively, the formula 
	
  = ¯¬­¯¬® × «(
)00%6«(
) could be used. This value would then be used in the second table 
in Figure 7-1 to select the best model (as indicated by the lowest WEC) for this hypothetical 
investor to use, which is RF_66. The RF_66 model is a Random Forests model that uses 1000 
trees and all of the available variables. 
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Figure 7-1. An illustration of how to select the model with the lowest Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for 
a given ratio of error costs (	
:	) and prior probability of fraud [()]. This figure is an 
amalgamation of Tables 5-23 and 5-24. 
 
 
While their use in prior studies is limited, ensembles of decision trees were the best 
model on numerous occasions in this research, particularly for high values of 	
. This is 
shown in the larger table in Figure 7-1 by the occurrence of model codes starting with RF 
(Random Forests) or TN (TreeNet). As indicated by the occurrence of model codes beginning 
with Vote or AV, newly developed ensembles of multiple modelling techniques including 
both Random Forests and TreeNet are also the best models on numerous occasions. This 
provides strong empirical support for the use of ensembles of decision trees on their own, as 
well as in ensembles with other modelling techniques. 
As illustrated in Table 7-1, using the best model for each value of 	
 is an 
improvement over using either of the benchmark models (M-score or F-score). The holdout 
WEC of the best model is lower than both benchmark models on every occasion with the 
exception of the WEC being equal when 	
 is equal to five. 
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Table 7-1. The holdout performance of the best model for each value of 	
 compared to the 
benchmark models. 
ÕÙà ¡ 
Percentage improvement (decrease) in WEC 
of the best model compared to 
M-score F-score 
0.004 61% lower WEC 4% lower WEC 
0.01 39% lower WEC 4% lower WEC 
0.04 16% lower WEC 4% lower WEC 
0.1 8% lower WEC 3% lower WEC 
0.2 9% lower WEC 7% lower WEC 
0.3 10% lower WEC 9% lower WEC 
0.4 21% lower WEC 20% lower WEC 
0.5 25% lower WEC 29% lower WEC 
0.6 30% lower WEC 31% lower WEC 
1 38% lower WEC 40% lower WEC 
2 23% lower WEC 17% lower WEC 
3 9% lower WEC 13% lower WEC 
5 Equal WEC Equal WEC 
6 10% lower WEC 10% lower WEC 
7 8% lower WEC 8% lower WEC 
8 7% lower WEC 7% lower WEC 
10 12% lower WEC 12% lower WEC 
17 12% lower WEC 12% lower WEC 
 
7.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
RQ2: Which supervised-learning modelling technique is the best overall at detecting 
financial statement fraud, considering the entire range of assumptions investigated in RQ1? 
When the ratio of error costs and prior probability of fraud cannot be reliably 
estimated, 	
 is unknown. In this case, the approach outlined above (under RQ1) does 
not work and the AV5_NoNN model should be used, because it is the best model considering 
all investigated values of 	
. This newly developed ensemble model averages the 
probability outputs of five other models: a Random Forests, TreeNet, CART decision tree, 
discriminant analysis and a logistic regression model. This is the first study of financial 
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statement fraud to create an ensemble of multiple modelling techniques that incorporate 
TreeNet or Random Forests141. 
Overall, the AV5_NoNN model is a considerable improvement on the benchmark 
models (M-score and F-score) with lower WECs in almost all cases, as shown in Table 7-2. 
Nonetheless, when the value of 	
 can be reasonably estimated then the best model for 
that particular value (see Figure 7-1 above) should be used in preference to AV5_NoNN as it 
often results in even lower WECs. 
Table 7-2. The holdout performance of the AV5_NoNN model compared to the benchmark models. 
ÕÙà ¡ 
Percentage improvement (decrease) in WEC 
of the best model compared to 
M-score F-score 
0.004 60% lower WEC 1% lower WEC 
0.01 38% lower WEC 1% lower WEC 
0.04 14% lower WEC 1% lower WEC 
0.1 8% lower WEC 2% lower WEC 
0.2 9% lower WEC 7% lower WEC 
0.3 9% lower WEC 8% lower WEC 
0.4 15% lower WEC 14% lower WEC 
0.5 18% lower WEC 23% lower WEC 
0.6 22% lower WEC 24% lower WEC 
1 37% lower WEC 39% lower WEC 
2 23% lower WEC 17% lower WEC 
3 5% lower WEC 9% lower WEC 
5 Equal WEC Equal WEC 
6 1% higher WEC 1% higher WEC 
7 2% higher WEC 2% higher WEC 
8 6% lower WEC 6% lower WEC 
10 4% lower WEC 4% lower WEC 
17 1% lower WEC 1% lower WEC 
 
                                                 
 
141 Perols (2011) created an ensemble that included a model that used bagging and See4.5 decision trees, 
which is similar to, but not the same as, Random Forests (see Section 3.3.7). 
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Research from RQ1 and RQ2 also yielded additional findings, the most notable being: 
• Decision trees were the best individual modelling technique, when compared with 
discriminant analysis, logistic regression and artificial neural networks. This is in contrast 
to research by Perols (2011) who found logistic regression to be superior. However, 
unlike Perols, this study used a data set with more than 100 fraud cases and holdout data 
that occurred chronologically after the training data. This research was also the first to 
evaluate decision trees using data comprising more than 100 cases of fraud and the first to 
use CART decision trees with US data; 
• The AV5_NoNN model benefited from excluding neural networks, both standard 
backpropagation and genetically optimised networks. This is consistent with the fact that 
neural networks were found to be the worst modelling technique in this research, which 
was the first to evaluate neural networks over numerous ratios of error costs using a 
relatively large holdout data set that is chronologically after the training data set. The 
neural networks did successfully identify patterns in the training data, but those patterns 
did not consistently persist into the holdout data; 
• Ensemble models were better at detecting financial statement fraud than individual 
models. Furthermore, combining multiple modelling techniques through majority 
voting142 or averaging model outputs resulted in the best models overall. The decision tree 
ensemble TreeNet (that uses stochastic gradient boosting) is the next best model. In 
contrast to its sole usage in previous research (Whiting et al. 2012), this modelling 
technique benefited from using more than 1000 trees and a faster learning rate (0.01 
compared to 0.001). All of these ensembles were superior to models that included the 
results from one model as an explanatory variable in another model, such as those 
proposed by McKee (2009) who only tested them on data comprising 50 fraud cases; 
• The relatively poor performance of the two benchmark models (M-score and F-score), 
developed using older data, supports the importance of regularly updating fraud detection 
models over time instead of using static models. This is expected because both business 
and fraudsters change over time. 
                                                 
 
142 As an example of majority voting, if three models classified a financial statement as fraudulent and two 
classified it as legitimate then the final classification would be fraudulent because three is greater than two. 
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7.1.3 Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
RQ3: Which explanatory variables are the most useful in models that detect financial 
statement fraud? 
An aim of this research is to produce findings that are widely applicable to investors, 
regulators, auditors and other stakeholders. Consequently, all explanatory variables used in 
this research are publicly available, because variables too difficult to obtain are unlikely to be 
used in a practical context (Perols 2011). Overall, variables from a variety of categories were 
found to be useful to financial statement fraud detection models. This includes both financial 
and non-financial variables. 
The selection of variables is crucial to developing fraud detection models, but their 
selection in prior financial statement fraud detection research is not standardised by an 
overall theory (Perols and Lougee 2011). Consequently, a new theoretical framework has 
been developed for this purpose, which is illustrated in Figure 7-2 and based on Cressey’s 
(1953) famous Fraud Triangle. This new Fraud Detection Triangle framework indicates that 
the probability of financial statements being fraudulent increases with either (or both) 
• the presence of any of the precursors to fraud: Exploitable Opportunity (O factor), 
Pressure/Incentive (I factor) or Integrity/Attitude/Rationalisation (R factor); 
• the presence of Suspicious Information (S factor) that might have occurred as a 
consequence of fraud (even though it is not a precursor to fraud). 
Variables from all factors of the new framework have been useful to such financial statement 
fraud detection models, particularly the O and I factors as shown in Table 7-3. In addition, 
the following variables were very important in terms of complex interactions with other 
variables: level of accounts receivable (O factor), net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets (O factor), previous year’s percentage change in sales (O and I factor) and the 
proportion of common stock that is newly issued (I factor). Additional research into variables 
that measure the R and S factors would be beneficial as less focus has been placed on them in 
prior research. 
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Figure 7-2. (Figure 4-3 reproduced.) The new Fraud Detection Triangle framework143. 
 
Table 7-3. The most statistically significant variables according to the factors of the new Fraud 
Detection Triangle framework. The probability of financial statements being fraudulent increases with 
company size, but this is likely the result of the US Securities Exchange Commission’s prosecution 
bias towards larger companies. * indicates a variable that is associated with both the O and I factors. 
Bold indicates a variable with new empirical support. 
 The probability of financial statements being fraudulent increases with   
 Higher levels of… Lower levels of… 
O Factor 
òAL>A?CMJ
FG>O    EC?FG KBBMIFGO
EC?FG KOO>?O    
Percentage of directors who are also executives 
Positive total accruals (current & prior)* 
CEO tenure, at a larger rate for smaller companies 
	>
?
HI@?J   
 
Overall corporate governance 
(indicated by larger G-Index values) 
I Factor 
New equity or long-term debt having been issued 
Demand for financing (ex ante) 
=>? òABCD>
EC?FG CDDCA HI@?J  
FG>O
EC?FG KOO>?O   
 
Company age 
R Factor The use of operating leases  
S Factor 
=>? òABCD>
KL>MFN> M@CM KOO>?O    
                                                 
 
143 It is acknowledged that the layout of this diagram is very similar to the model presented by Kassem and 
Higson (2012). 
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Table 7-3 also illustrates the following main findings relating to individual variables: 
• Contrary to findings in prior studies, higher debt levels (relative to equity) were 
associated with fewer frauds. This is likely to be the result of a decrease in the 
opportunity to commit and conceal fraud because of increased monitoring and scrutiny 
from creditors. This new empirical finding is consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) well-established agency theory. 
• Weaker corporate governance, as measured by larger values of the corporate governance 
G-index, is associated with more fraud. This is the first study to provide empirical support 
for the hypothesis that financial statement fraud is related to the aggregation of many 
corporate governance initiatives, not just the presence or absence of a particular one; 
• Longer serving CEOs are associated with increased levels of fraud and this effect is 
magnified for smaller companies. This possibly indicates that the CEO is more capable of 
any exploiting opportunities to commit fraud that result from weaker internal controls in 
smaller companies. This is the first study to propose or test this new interaction variable; 
• While mixed results have occurred in prior studies, measures of total accruals were 
noticeably more important than a measure of discretionary or unadjusted accruals. Future 
research could investigate this further by trialling other measures of accruals such as 
discretionary accruals that include industry averaged measures; and 
• Accounting-based measures of performance are more useful to fraud detection models 
than market-based measures. 
7.1.4 Research Question 4 (RQ4) 
RQ4: How do simpler models compare with those developed for the first two research 
questions in their ability to detect financial statement fraud? 
Considering the wide range of stakeholders, it is likely that some have a preference 
for simpler models provided they are still relatively accurate. For these stakeholders, simpler 
models have been developed that are easier to interpret and that use fewer explanatory 
variables. In terms of the fewest variables, a TreeNet model that uses six variables 
(TN_90%_6) was the best. In terms of the model easiest to interpret, a logistic regression 
model that uses 11 variables (LR_Step_11) was the best. The LR_Step_11 model was 
developed by starting with the stepwise logistic regression model with 14 variables and 
removing three variables that were theoretically similar according to the new Fraud Detection 
Triangle framework. Interestingly, reducing the number of variables using the new 
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framework improved the performance of logistic regression, which is further empirical 
support for the use of it when selecting explanatory variables. Overall, standard regression-
based techniques benefited from having fewer explanatory variables, but decision trees and 
ensembles of them benefit from having a larger number of variables. This is probably 
because decision-tree based models do not suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
Table 7-4. (Table 6-12 reproduced.) A comparison of the holdout accuracy of the simpler models 
(LR_Step_11 and TN_90%_6), the best model overall (AV5_NoNN) and the benchmark models (M-
score and F-score) when 	
 = 1. 







The results presented in Table 7-4 above show that the simpler models TN_90%_6 
and LR_Step_11 are at least 10% more accurate than the benchmark models when 	
 is 
equal to one. However, this same table also reveals that they are less accurate than the 
AV5_NoNN model. Furthermore, to avoid low levels of classification accuracy and high 
WECs, 
• The TN_90%_6 model is most appropriately used when 	
 is between 0.6 and 2; 
and, 
• The LR_Step_11 model is most appropriately used when 	
 is equal to or close to 
one. 
Thus, the simpler models are suitable for people who prefer simplicity with the trade-off of 
slightly reduced classification accuracy, so long as they can estimate their value of 	
 to 
be within the ranges shown above. However, they are not appropriate for situations where 
classification accuracy with the lowest WEC is preferred. 
It is important to note that even the most complex ensemble models developed in this 
research can be automated. While not precisely recorded, all of the models with the lowest 
WEC presented above in Figure 7-1 took less than one hour to run using a computer with an 
Intel® Core™ i7 2.50GHz processor and 8MB of RAM, once the parameters were chosen. 
This is substantially faster than waiting for the SEC to formally allege and prosecute fraud, 
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which has historically taken several years. Given that fraud schemes become more costly the 
longer they go undetected, models that speed up the process would assist in mitigating the 
costs of financial statement fraud. According to a blog post published by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, when a fraud occurs the best thing that can be done is to detect it 
as quickly as possible. (Warren 2012). 
7.2  Future Work 
The ultimate goal is to have models that are able to detect financial statement fraud 
with perfect accuracy. Since this goal is realistically unattainable there is always scope for 
additional research into better models to detect financial statement fraud. The results 
presented in this research can be used as benchmarks for future research. 
Some specific suggestions follow for future research that is related to the research 
presented in this dissertation. In addition, suggestions have also been made in other sections 
of the dissertation. 
7.2.1 Extending This Research with New Data 
This research uses publicly available information that is relatively easy to obtain 
because its aim was to produce widely applicable findings. However, stakeholders who have 
access to additional information, such as regulators, might benefit from incorporating their 
private information into the models developed in this research144. 
This research is limited to publicly listed companies in the US, but the methodology 
that was used is portable to future research on other entities that produce financial statements, 
conditional upon the availability of data. For example, fraudulent financial reporting also 
affects companies outside of the US, as well as private companies, not-for-profit 
organisations and companies traded in the Over-The-Counter markets. This research could 
also be extended to incorporate quarterly filings, in addition to annual financial statements.  
In future when fraud data from 2008 onwards are more complete, it would be 
interesting to include the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that began in the second half of 2007 
and continued for several years. Evaluating models developed in this current research on data 
                                                 
 
144 Section 4.5.17 on page 125 provides a list of explanatory variables that were excluded from this 
research, largely because they were relatively difficult to obtain. 
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from during the GFC would give valuable insight into their accuracy during a major financial 
crisis. In addition, given that high-value financial frauds could very well be endogenous to a 
financial crisis, impartial classification models such as those developed in this research might 
be particularly beneficial additional to detection solely by human experts. 
Obtaining information about the magnitude of the loss associated with each instance 
of fraud is a serious challenge because the SEC in the US does not consistently report the 
magnitude of fraud (Wang et al. 2011). However, if this challenge were to be overcome then 
it would be very useful to incorporate the magnitude of fraud into models so that only frauds 
above a certain threshold of magnitude (set by the stakeholder) would be considered. 
However, it is important to note that models developed in this research are already likely to 
be biased towards larger frauds, because they are developed from fraud alleged by the SEC 
which is commonly thought to be biased in that way. 
7.2.2 Using This Research to Assist in Predicting Company Failure 
The concepts of financial statement fraud and company failure are linked. Beasley et 
al. (2010) found that companies accused of committing financial statement fraud by the SEC 
were more than twice as likely to fail. Another study (Deloitte 2008) found that there is three 
times more fraud alleged by the SEC amongst failed companies compared with those that did 
not fail. 
It would be interesting to investigate whether the output of a model to detect financial 
statement fraud (developed in this research) could be used to improve a model to predict 
company failure. Promising results have been found using a similar approach with neural 
network models (Yang 2008). This is particularly encouraging given that many of the models 
in this research outperformed neural network models. Finally, this type of research would 
also help address the unanswered question identified by Beaver et al. (2010) about whether 
accounting quality affects the utility of financial ratios to assist models to predict company 
failure. 
7.2.3 Models as Decision Aids 
Computerised models to detect financial statement fraud complement, not replace, 
human experts such as auditors and forensic investigators. It might be beneficial to develop 
an aid, such as a simple automated questionnaire, to assist people in determining their 
appropriate ratio of error costs (failing to detect fraud to falsely alleging fraud). This 
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information can then be used to help them select the most appropriate financial statement 
fraud detection model. 
Despite research showing decision aids mostly have a positive effect, decision makers 
are often reluctant to rely on them (Eining et al. 1997). Consequently, valuable research 
questions include how to best present and explain to stakeholders the models developed in 
this research, whether there is a preference for simpler models, and how the answers to these 
questions differ between stakeholder groups. That is, there is an opportunity for future 
research to investigate ways to improve the interaction between computerised models of 
financial statement fraud detection and human users. 
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Appendix A. The Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for all the models on the holdout data. 
 Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Naïve 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
F-score 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.077 1.049 0.964 1.000 1.041 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
M-score 2.479 1.592 1.148 1.059 1.030 1.020 1.015 1.012 1.024 0.941 1.083 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DA_All 2.444 1.556 1.112 1.154 1.219 1.065 0.970 0.917 0.892 0.787 1.213 1.438 1.101 1.189 1.237 1.089 1.124 1.077 
DA_U15% 0.964 0.964 0.964 1.071 1.154 1.065 1.074 1.000 0.951 0.858 1.284 1.148 1.130 1.101 1.118 1.136 1.172 1.296 
DA_U15%LR 3.947 2.172 1.284 1.107 1.189 1.187 1.089 1.071 1.022 0.828 1.296 0.982 1.089 1.107 1.130 1.154 1.201 1.367 
DA_U1 3.923 2.148 1.260 1.231 1.195 1.079 1.053 0.976 0.925 0.757 1.024 1.302 1.095 1.112 1.148 1.183 1.254 1.272 
DA_Step 0.988 0.988 0.988 1.260 1.083 1.024 0.994 0.988 0.949 0.787 1.130 1.408 1.083 1.118 1.118 1.142 1.189 1.166 
LR_All 3.93 2.16 1.27 1.11 1.20 1.04 0.96 1.05 0.97 0.76 1.09 1.30 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.21 1.29 1.58 
LR_U15% 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.08 1.05 1.05 0.99 0.95 0.85 1.27 1.02 1.15 1.21 1.27 1.14 1.17 1.30 
LR_U15%LR 3.95 2.17 1.28 1.11 1.21 1.11 1.12 1.05 0.98 0.82 1.27 1.03 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.16 1.21 1.37 
LR_U1 2.45 1.56 1.12 1.06 1.25 1.09 1.12 1.01 0.94 0.75 0.93 1.18 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.14 1.02 1.07 
LR_Step 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.20 1.08 1.04 1.03 0.93 0.89 0.77 1.11 1.23 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.17 1.23 1.00 
LR_MS_S 2.444 1.556 1.112 1.024 1.083 1.034 1.130 1.030 1.002 0.805 1.290 1.231 1.089 1.118 1.148 1.178 1.237 1.444 
LR_MS_F 8.349 3.911 1.692 1.249 1.160 1.152 1.038 0.970 0.925 0.822 1.024 1.059 1.154 1.219 1.059 1.083 1.130 1.296 
NN_BK 5.420 2.757 1.426 1.160 0.994 1.276 1.195 1.124 1.051 0.852 1.272 1.089 1.266 1.355 1.030 1.036 1.047 1.089 
NN_GA_1 3.935 2.160 1.272 1.095 1.036 1.016 1.006 1.041 1.037 1.006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NN_GA_5 43.615 40.621 10.444 5.148 2.751 1.953 1.553 1.314 1.154 0.846 1.195 1.497 2.148 2.473 2.799 3.124 3.775 5.669 
DT_Suite 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.225 1.030 1.337 1.124 1.134 0.669 1.160 1.160 1.112 1.142 1.172 1.201 1.000 1.000 
DT_One 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.953 0.858 0.669 1.053 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RF_8 2.456 1.568 1.124 1.036 1.053 0.982 0.864 0.840 0.791 0.686 0.905 1.089 1.320 1.473 1.308 1.402 0.947 0.941 
RF_66 2.426 1.538 1.095 1.006 0.964 0.913 0.997 0.982 0.880 0.675 1.012 0.905 1.083 1.172 1.260 1.349 0.876 0.876 
TN 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.036 1.000 0.986 0.905 0.834 0.779 0.651 0.917 1.124 1.112 0.899 0.917 0.935 0.970 0.964 
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Appendix A. The Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for all the models on the holdout data. 
 Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
NN_LR 3.929 2.154 1.266 1.266 1.089 1.053 0.985 0.899 0.842 0.787 1.225 1.071 1.053 1.083 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 
DT_LR 33.166 13.639 7.633 3.284 1.834 1.351 1.109 0.964 0.868 0.675 1.059 1.444 2.095 2.450 2.805 3.160 3.870 6.355 
DTnode_LR_Step 65.491 26.438 6.911 3.225 1.805 1.331 1.095 0.953 0.858 0.651 1.018 1.385 2.118 2.231 2.550 2.870 3.432 5.586 
NN-DTnode_LR_Step 66.964 27.024 7.053 3.059 1.864 1.371 1.124 0.976 0.878 0.669 1.041 1.414 2.160 2.533 2.905 3.278 3.775 6.178 
Vote5 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.933 0.837 0.787 0.748 0.639 0.970 0.976 1.012 0.994 0.947 0.947 0.959 0.988 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.047 1.053 0.994 0.879 0.763 0.720 0.580 0.888 1.000 1.071 0.899 0.929 0.947 0.905 0.970 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 0.982 0.982 0.982 1.024 0.988 0.947 0.834 0.799 0.773 0.657 0.941 1.136 1.118 1.059 1.065 1.036 0.888 0.970 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 0.988 0.988 0.988 1.047 1.030 0.966 0.864 0.834 0.789 0.692 0.893 1.012 1.118 1.118 0.929 0.947 0.899 0.970 
AV5_NoNN 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.976 0.935 0.923 0.858 0.828 0.797 0.592 0.834 0.953 1.000 1.006 1.018 0.941 0.959 0.988 
AV2_RF_TN 2.473 1.586 1.142 1.036 0.982 0.937 0.891 0.811 0.759 0.669 0.852 1.018 1.166 1.018 1.000 1.041 0.935 0.959 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 2.473 1.586 1.142 1.041 0.953 0.957 0.805 0.781 0.753 0.609 0.858 0.959 1.059 1.000 0.976 1.000 0.982 0.982 
DT_One_DA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.947 0.856 0.669 1.041 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Simpler Models (discussed in Chapter 6) 
TN_90%_6 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.947 1.041 1.086 0.970 0.893 0.740 0.923 1.041 1.278 1.154 1.213 1.272 1.391 1.089 
TN_4 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 1.485 1.258 1.157 1.172 1.081 0.929 1.166 1.172 1.101 1.124 1.148 1.172 1.219 1.385 
LR_Step_11 0.988 0.988 0.988 1.148 1.083 1.073 1.038 0.982 1.002 0.710 1.036 1.213 1.077 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 
LR_Int_11 0.988 0.988 0.988 1.130 1.089 1.075 1.050 0.982 0.996 0.817 1.172 0.935 1.012 1.036 1.095 1.112 1.148 1.272 
LR_TN_6 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 1.000 0.985 0.976 0.980 0.817 0.994 1.077 1.166 1.213 1.260 1.308 1.160 1.284 
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Appendix B. The Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for all the models on the training data. 
 Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Naïve 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
F-score 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.980 0.954 0.814 0.949 0.969 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
M-score 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.881 0.969 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
DA_All 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.912 0.854 0.756 0.703 0.671 0.625 0.485 0.671 0.827 0.905 0.919 0.925 0.932 0.939 0.942 
DA_U15% 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.942 0.905 0.871 0.815 0.759 0.722 0.563 0.803 0.912 0.959 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 
DA_U15%LR 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.946 0.873 0.817 0.783 0.755 0.590 0.803 0.905 0.936 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 
DA_U1 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.956 0.902 0.828 0.758 0.708 0.668 0.546 0.698 0.824 0.902 0.908 0.912 0.915 0.922 0.932 
DA_Step 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.929 0.861 0.838 0.827 0.786 0.745 0.597 0.759 0.847 0.915 0.922 0.929 0.932 0.939 0.942 
LR_All 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.929 0.868 0.783 0.727 0.675 0.620 0.478 0.654 0.776 0.861 0.864 0.868 0.871 0.878 0.902 
LR_U15% 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.915 0.873 0.815 0.763 0.727 0.573 0.793 0.898 0.925 0.939 0.953 0.959 0.959 0.959 
LR_U15%LR 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.959 0.880 0.822 0.783 0.750 0.580 0.776 0.908 0.936 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 
LR_U1 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.956 0.895 0.816 0.761 0.692 0.644 0.508 0.695 0.820 0.892 0.905 0.919 0.932 0.936 0.936 
LR_Step 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.953 0.919 0.868 0.797 0.732 0.681 0.539 0.783 0.888 0.925 0.932 0.939 0.946 0.959 0.973 
LR_MS_S 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.868 0.834 0.768 0.705 0.660 0.522 0.702 0.861 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 
LR_MS_F 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.806 0.732 0.685 0.653 0.532 0.729 0.841 0.885 0.902 0.919 0.922 0.929 0.953 
NN_BK 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.936 0.902 0.832 0.769 0.728 0.603 0.844 0.895 0.942 0.966 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 
NN_GA_1 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.918 0.864 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NN_GA_5 0.759 0.475 0.220 0.119 0.085 0.073 0.068 0.064 0.062 0.054 0.085 0.102 0.136 0.153 0.169 0.186 0.220 0.332 
DT_Suite 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.899 0.215 0.366 0.408 0.034 0.542 0.827 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 1.000 1.000 
DT_One 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.038 0.034 0.061 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RF_8 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 
RF_66 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.068 
TN 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.593 
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Appendix B. The Weighted Error Cost (WEC) for all the models on the training data. 
 Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
NN_LR 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.905 0.861 0.783 0.700 0.634 0.590 0.468 0.664 0.817 0.885 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 
DT_LR 0.292 0.292 0.092 0.041 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.017 0.024 0.037 0.041 0.044 0.047 0.054 0.078 
DTnode_LR_Step 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.064 0.047 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.031 0.051 0.071 0.112 0.132 0.142 0.153 0.169 0.217 
NN-DTnode_LR_Step 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.051 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.031 0.044 0.058 0.085 0.098 0.112 0.125 0.139 0.186 
Vote5 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.868 0.600 0.495 0.447 0.014 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.393 0.746 0.756 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.895 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.593 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.586 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.078 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.593 
AV5_NoNN 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.746 0.397 0.312 0.203 0.119 0.095 0.027 0.071 0.169 0.498 0.637 0.658 0.685 0.725 0.854 
AV2_RF_TN 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.156 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.078 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.031 0.220 
DT_One_DA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.027 0.027 0.034 0.020 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Simpler Models (discussed in Chapter 6) 
TN_90%_6 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.454 0.156 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.980 
TN_4 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.512 0.501 0.427 0.285 0.280 0.136 0.315 0.454 0.993 0.997 1.000 1.003 1.010 1.034 
LR_Step_11 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.956 0.936 0.901 0.878 0.831 0.766 0.607 0.759 0.844 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 
LR_Int_11 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.959 0.939 0.905 0.863 0.807 0.767 0.631 0.803 0.908 0.946 0.959 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 
LR_TN_6 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.966 0.941 0.925 0.914 0.834 0.905 0.929 0.956 0.963 0.969 0.976 0.986 0.986 
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Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Naïve 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
F-score 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 52% 52% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 9% 31% 96% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 72% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
M-score 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 49% 53% 51% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 56% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 50% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DA_All 
O 51% 51% 51% 53% 59% 59% 59% 59% 61% 61% 61% 61% 56% 52% 52% 52% 52% 51% 
F 4% 4% 4% 8% 28% 29% 30% 30% 38% 50% 57% 67% 95% 95% 95% 98% 98% 99% 
L 99% 99% 99% 98% 90% 89% 89% 89% 83% 72% 65% 56% 17% 9% 9% 5% 5% 2% 
DA_U15% 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 53% 53% 57% 57% 57% 57% 58% 54% 54% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 
F 4% 4% 4% 5% 11% 11% 30% 30% 30% 49% 56% 89% 95% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 95% 95% 85% 85% 85% 66% 59% 19% 14% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
DA_U15%LA 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 55% 54% 54% 54% 54% 59% 59% 56% 55% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 17% 21% 21% 22% 22% 49% 53% 95% 95% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 93% 88% 88% 85% 85% 69% 64% 16% 15% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
DA_U1 
O 51% 51% 51% 52% 54% 57% 58% 59% 59% 62% 63% 63% 54% 53% 53% 53% 53% 51% 
F 4% 4% 4% 7% 16% 24% 30% 33% 33% 59% 72% 72% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 98% 
L 99% 99% 99% 97% 93% 91% 86% 85% 85% 65% 54% 53% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 3% 
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Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
DA_Step 
O 51% 51% 51% 53% 53% 53% 53% 57% 57% 61% 57% 57% 53% 53% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 9% 9% 9% 9% 25% 25% 50% 72% 72% 96% 96% 98% 98% 98% 99% 
L 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 88% 88% 71% 43% 43% 9% 9% 5% 5% 5% 4% 
LR_All 
O 51% 51% 51% 53% 59% 59% 60% 59% 59% 62% 63% 64% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
F 2% 2% 2% 7% 28% 28% 30% 42% 42% 55% 64% 71% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 
L 99% 99% 99% 98% 91% 91% 89% 76% 76% 69% 62% 57% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
LR_U15% 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 54% 54% 58% 57% 57% 57% 58% 55% 54% 54% 54% 49% 49% 49% 
F 3% 3% 3% 3% 12% 13% 29% 29% 29% 49% 57% 94% 94% 94% 94% 98% 98% 98% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 95% 86% 86% 86% 66% 59% 15% 14% 14% 14% 1% 1% 1% 
LA_U15%LA 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 55% 55% 54% 54% 57% 59% 59% 55% 56% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 17% 18% 22% 22% 30% 54% 54% 93% 95% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 92% 91% 86% 86% 83% 64% 64% 17% 16% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
LR_U1 
O 51% 51% 51% 52% 57% 57% 58% 60% 60% 62% 66% 66% 54% 54% 54% 53% 51% 51% 
F 3% 3% 3% 6% 25% 25% 34% 40% 40% 56% 75% 75% 96% 96% 96% 97% 99% 99% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 90% 90% 82% 80% 80% 69% 56% 56% 12% 12% 12% 9% 4% 4% 
LR_Step 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 54% 58% 61% 61% 62% 61% 58% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 50% 
F 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 14% 30% 36% 36% 47% 67% 80% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 95% 87% 85% 85% 76% 55% 36% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 0% 
LR_MS_S 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% 52% 59% 59% 58% 60% 58% 59% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 4% 4% 4% 4% 7% 7% 37% 37% 40% 49% 56% 80% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 97% 97% 80% 80% 76% 71% 60% 37% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
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Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
LR_MS_F 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 53% 58% 58% 58% 58% 59% 64% 57% 55% 55% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
F 5% 5% 5% 5% 11% 30% 30% 30% 30% 51% 70% 90% 93% 93% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 97% 97% 97% 97% 95% 86% 86% 86% 86% 66% 58% 24% 17% 17% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
NN_BK 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 54% 54% 54% 55% 55% 57% 55% 54% 54% 54% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 2% 2% 2% 2% 9% 24% 28% 31% 31% 56% 63% 91% 91% 91% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
L 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 85% 81% 78% 78% 59% 47% 18% 18% 18% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
NN_GA_1 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 50% 51% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 5% 10% 15% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 95% 92% 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
NN_GA_5 
O 56% 61% 61% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 
F 28% 62% 62% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 65% 65% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 70% 
L 83% 60% 60% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 50% 50% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 46% 
DT_Suite 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 51% 58% 59% 55% 67% 57% 51% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 49% 48% 47% 62% 70% 91% 97% 97% 97% 97% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 93% 98% 67% 70% 64% 72% 44% 12% 4% 4% 4% 4% 0% 0% 
DT_One 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 67% 67% 67% 67% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 62% 62% 62% 62% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 72% 72% 72% 72% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
RF_8 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% 55% 64% 65% 65% 66% 64% 64% 65% 65% 63% 63% 58% 53% 
F 2% 2% 2% 2% 7% 14% 37% 46% 46% 67% 82% 82% 85% 85% 91% 91% 99% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 96% 91% 85% 85% 64% 46% 46% 45% 45% 36% 36% 17% 6% 
           Page 311 
Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
RF_66 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 54% 61% 64% 66% 66% 66% 67% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 56% 56% 
F 5% 5% 5% 5% 9% 28% 46% 63% 63% 63% 66% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 100% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 94% 82% 69% 69% 69% 67% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 12% 12% 
TN 
O 50% 50% 50% 54% 58% 58% 64% 67% 67% 67% 64% 64% 64% 59% 59% 59% 59% 52% 
F 0% 0% 0% 8% 21% 23% 39% 50% 50% 55% 79% 79% 90% 98% 98% 98% 98% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 96% 93% 88% 83% 83% 80% 50% 50% 39% 21% 21% 21% 21% 4% 
NN_LR 
O 51% 51% 51% 53% 54% 60% 64% 64% 64% 61% 60% 58% 56% 55% 53% 53% 53% 53% 
F 3% 3% 3% 9% 12% 30% 44% 44% 44% 51% 57% 89% 96% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 96% 96% 89% 83% 83% 83% 70% 63% 27% 15% 13% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
DT_LR 
O 62% 62% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 
F 38% 38% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 
L 87% 87% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 
DTnode_LR_Step 
O 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 68% 68% 68% 67% 67% 
F 60% 60% 60% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 63% 63% 63% 63% 68% 68% 68% 69% 69% 
L 74% 74% 74% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 69% 69% 69% 64% 64% 
NN-
DTnode_LR_Step 
O 67% 67% 67% 67% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 66% 66% 
F 60% 60% 60% 60% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 66% 66% 
L 73% 73% 73% 73% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 66% 66% 
Vote5 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 53% 55% 60% 67% 67% 68% 64% 62% 57% 55% 53% 53% 52% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 7% 11% 24% 45% 45% 60% 75% 89% 96% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 97% 88% 88% 76% 54% 34% 17% 11% 5% 5% 4% 1% 
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Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 54% 61% 68% 68% 71% 65% 64% 64% 59% 59% 59% 57% 51% 
F 0% 0% 0% 1% 7% 12% 28% 50% 50% 66% 80% 86% 91% 98% 98% 98% 99% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 98% 96% 93% 87% 87% 76% 50% 43% 37% 21% 20% 20% 15% 3% 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 55% 57% 64% 66% 66% 67% 63% 63% 64% 59% 59% 59% 58% 51% 
F 2% 2% 2% 4% 13% 17% 34% 44% 44% 60% 79% 80% 90% 95% 96% 97% 99% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 98% 96% 93% 88% 87% 75% 47% 47% 38% 22% 22% 20% 17% 3% 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 
O 51% 51% 51% 50% 53% 57% 63% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 64% 59% 59% 59% 58% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 9% 17% 34% 44% 44% 60% 81% 85% 90% 94% 98% 98% 99% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 98% 96% 92% 86% 86% 70% 49% 45% 38% 24% 20% 20% 16% 3% 
AV5_NoNN 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 54% 56% 59% 62% 63% 70% 66% 63% 55% 53% 53% 53% 52% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 2% 9% 14% 20% 30% 33% 75% 85% 89% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 93% 92% 66% 46% 37% 12% 7% 7% 6% 4% 1% 
AV2_RF_TN 
O 50% 50% 50% 51% 56% 58% 64% 67% 67% 67% 66% 66% 64% 62% 62% 62% 59% 52% 
F 1% 1% 1% 2% 14% 20% 39% 50% 50% 57% 83% 83% 89% 95% 96% 96% 99% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 96% 89% 85% 85% 76% 48% 48% 40% 30% 29% 29% 18% 4% 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 
O 50% 50% 50% 51% 55% 56% 62% 65% 65% 70% 64% 63% 61% 59% 58% 58% 56% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 2% 11% 14% 28% 38% 38% 78% 85% 89% 93% 96% 98% 98% 99% 100% 
L 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 97% 96% 92% 92% 62% 44% 36% 30% 21% 19% 19% 14% 2% 
DT_One_DA 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 66% 66% 67% 66% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60% 60% 62% 64% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 73% 73% 72% 68% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Appendix C. The percentage accuracy of all models on the holdout data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Simpler Models (discussed in Chapter 6) 
TN_90%_6 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 56% 58% 63% 63% 63% 63% 60% 60% 60% 57% 57% 57% 57% 50% 
F 2% 2% 2% 2% 14% 25% 49% 49% 49% 49% 88% 88% 88% 94% 94% 94% 94% 99% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 91% 77% 77% 77% 77% 31% 31% 31% 20% 20% 20% 20% 1% 
TN_4 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 53% 53% 54% 55% 55% 54% 52% 54% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 20% 20% 24% 37% 37% 48% 79% 88% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 86% 86% 84% 73% 73% 59% 25% 20% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
LR_Step_11 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 57% 58% 64% 57% 57% 51% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 1% 1% 1% 3% 4% 7% 7% 25% 40% 63% 82% 82% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 96% 96% 88% 76% 66% 32% 32% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
LR_Int_11 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% 58% 58% 57% 59% 56% 56% 54% 54% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 5% 6% 8% 29% 29% 32% 57% 70% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
L 100% 100% 100% 98% 97% 95% 86% 86% 81% 61% 42% 14% 11% 11% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
LR_TN_6 
O 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% 52% 52% 52% 59% 54% 54% 51% 51% 51% 51% 50% 50% 
F 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 6% 6% 6% 6% 79% 92% 92% 95% 95% 95% 95% 98% 98% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 98% 98% 40% 17% 17% 7% 7% 7% 7% 2% 2% 
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Appendix D. The percentage accuracy of all models on the training data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Naïve 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
F-score 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 55% 55% 59% 54% 54% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 18% 18% 41% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 78% 9% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
M-score 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 56% 54% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 71% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 41% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DA_All 
O 54% 54% 54% 57% 69% 69% 70% 70% 74% 76% 75% 73% 59% 56% 56% 55% 55% 53% 
F 7% 7% 7% 16% 43% 45% 46% 46% 64% 77% 83% 86% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 94% 94% 94% 94% 84% 75% 67% 59% 20% 12% 12% 9% 9% 6% 
DA_U15% 
O 53% 53% 53% 54% 59% 59% 68% 68% 68% 72% 70% 58% 55% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 
F 5% 5% 5% 9% 20% 20% 46% 46% 46% 74% 79% 96% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 89% 89% 89% 69% 61% 21% 13% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
DA_U15%LA 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 61% 64% 64% 65% 65% 71% 70% 56% 56% 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 
F 4% 4% 4% 4% 26% 35% 35% 39% 39% 73% 80% 98% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 93% 93% 92% 92% 68% 60% 15% 13% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
DA_U1 
O 51% 51% 51% 57% 62% 65% 69% 71% 71% 73% 72% 71% 56% 55% 55% 55% 55% 53% 
F 3% 3% 3% 15% 27% 35% 49% 54% 54% 78% 87% 88% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 97% 95% 90% 88% 88% 68% 56% 54% 13% 11% 11% 11% 11% 7% 
           Page 315 
Appendix D. The percentage accuracy of all models on the training data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
DA_Step 
O 50% 50% 50% 60% 60% 60% 60% 67% 67% 70% 66% 66% 56% 56% 55% 55% 55% 53% 
F 1% 1% 1% 21% 21% 21% 21% 46% 46% 71% 91% 91% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 87% 87% 70% 42% 42% 12% 12% 9% 9% 9% 6% 
LR_All 
O 53% 53% 53% 57% 67% 67% 69% 74% 74% 76% 75% 73% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 
F 6% 6% 6% 14% 39% 39% 45% 65% 65% 78% 84% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 95% 95% 93% 84% 84% 74% 66% 59% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 
LR_U15% 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 59% 59% 67% 67% 67% 71% 70% 57% 56% 56% 56% 52% 52% 52% 
F 5% 5% 5% 5% 20% 22% 45% 45% 45% 73% 80% 98% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 97% 89% 89% 89% 70% 60% 15% 14% 14% 14% 4% 4% 4% 
LA_U15%LA 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 61% 62% 65% 65% 67% 71% 71% 57% 56% 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 
F 4% 4% 4% 4% 26% 28% 37% 37% 46% 80% 80% 98% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 95% 92% 92% 87% 62% 62% 16% 13% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
LR_U1 
O 52% 52% 52% 55% 65% 65% 70% 73% 73% 75% 72% 72% 58% 58% 58% 55% 53% 53% 
F 4% 4% 4% 11% 34% 34% 52% 59% 59% 76% 87% 87% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 95% 95% 89% 86% 86% 73% 56% 56% 18% 18% 18% 9% 6% 6% 
LR_Step 
O 51% 51% 51% 55% 55% 63% 69% 71% 71% 73% 69% 65% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 12% 12% 30% 51% 57% 57% 71% 84% 91% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 95% 88% 85% 85% 76% 53% 40% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 3% 
LR_MS_S 
O 55% 55% 55% 57% 61% 61% 71% 71% 72% 74% 74% 65% 55% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
F 11% 11% 11% 14% 23% 23% 55% 55% 60% 70% 83% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 87% 87% 84% 78% 64% 37% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
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Appendix D. The percentage accuracy of all models on the training data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
LR_MS_F 
O 54% 54% 54% 54% 61% 70% 70% 71% 71% 73% 71% 62% 59% 59% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
F 9% 9% 9% 9% 24% 49% 49% 51% 51% 76% 85% 96% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 91% 91% 91% 91% 71% 58% 28% 20% 20% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
NN_BK 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 57% 64% 66% 68% 68% 70% 68% 58% 58% 58% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 4% 4% 4% 4% 15% 37% 41% 48% 48% 75% 80% 98% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 92% 90% 87% 87% 64% 55% 18% 18% 18% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
NN_GA_1 
O 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 53% 54% 56% 57% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 10% 17% 26% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 95% 87% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
NN_GA_5 
O 62% 93% 93% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 94% 
F 24% 86% 86% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 99% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 98% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 
DT_Suite 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 58% 55% 91% 86% 83% 98% 76% 61% 54% 54% 54% 54% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 11% 84% 80% 76% 97% 93% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 98% 92% 90% 99% 60% 24% 9% 9% 9% 9% 0% 0% 
DT_One 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 98% 98% 98% 98% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97% 97% 97% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
RF_8 
O 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 
F 98% 98% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 
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Appendix D. The percentage accuracy of all models on the training data. F/L/O = Percentage of Fraudulent/Legitimate/Overall statements correctly classified. 
  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
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RF_66 
O 98% 98% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 
F 95% 95% 95% 95% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 93% 93% 
TN 
O 50% 50% 50% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 70% 
F 1% 1% 1% 78% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 92% 92% 41% 
NN_LR 
O 53% 53% 53% 58% 59% 68% 75% 75% 75% 77% 76% 65% 59% 58% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
F 7% 7% 7% 16% 19% 42% 63% 63% 63% 75% 82% 94% 98% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 94% 87% 87% 87% 78% 69% 37% 20% 18% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
DT_LR 
O 85% 85% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
F 71% 71% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
DTnode_LR_Step 
O 95% 95% 95% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 96% 96% 96% 95% 95% 
F 89% 89% 89% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 93% 93% 93% 90% 90% 
NN-
DTnode_LR_Step 
O 97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 96% 96% 
F 95% 95% 95% 95% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 93% 93% 
Vote5 
O 51% 51% 51% 57% 70% 75% 78% 99% 99% 100% 100% 80% 63% 62% 58% 58% 58% 55% 
F 2% 2% 2% 13% 40% 51% 55% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 61% 25% 24% 15% 15% 15% 11% 
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  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
 
0.004 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 10 17 
Vote3_RF_TN_DT 
O 50% 50% 50% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 70% 
F 1% 1% 1% 78% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 92% 92% 41% 
Vote3_RF_TN_DA 
O 54% 54% 54% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 71% 
F 8% 8% 8% 79% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 92% 92% 41% 
Vote3_RF_TN_NN 
O 52% 52% 52% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 70% 
F 5% 5% 5% 79% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 92% 92% 92% 41% 
AV5_NoNN 
O 56% 56% 56% 63% 80% 84% 90% 94% 95% 99% 96% 92% 75% 68% 67% 66% 64% 57% 
F 12% 12% 12% 25% 60% 69% 80% 88% 91% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 93% 83% 50% 36% 34% 32% 27% 15% 
AV2_RF_TN 
O 91% 91% 91% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 92% 
F 81% 81% 81% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 84% 
AV3_RF_TN_DT 
O 88% 88% 88% 96% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 98% 89% 
F 77% 77% 77% 92% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 97% 78% 
DT_One_DA 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 99% 99% 98% 99% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
F 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97% 97% 97% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
           Page 319 
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  Prior-adjusted Relative Cost of Missing Fraud (ÕÙà ¡) 
Model 
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Simpler Models (discussed in Chapter 6) 
TN_90%_6 
O 54% 54% 54% 54% 77% 92% 99% 99% 99% 99% 92% 92% 92% 77% 77% 77% 77% 51% 
F 7% 7% 7% 7% 55% 84% 98% 98% 98% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83% 83% 83% 53% 53% 53% 53% 2% 
TN_4 
O 50% 50% 50% 50% 76% 76% 79% 86% 86% 93% 85% 78% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
F 1% 1% 1% 1% 52% 52% 59% 74% 74% 90% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 96% 70% 57% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
LR_Step_11 
O 51% 51% 51% 54% 55% 58% 58% 65% 69% 70% 66% 66% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 
F 1% 1% 1% 8% 12% 19% 19% 42% 62% 77% 92% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 97% 97% 87% 77% 62% 41% 41% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
LR_Int_11 
O 51% 51% 51% 54% 56% 58% 65% 65% 67% 68% 67% 57% 55% 55% 52% 52% 52% 52% 
F 2% 2% 2% 7% 13% 20% 42% 42% 50% 74% 85% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 97% 89% 89% 84% 63% 50% 15% 12% 12% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
LR_TN_6 
O 52% 52% 52% 52% 52% 55% 55% 55% 55% 58% 56% 56% 54% 54% 54% 54% 51% 51% 
F 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 14% 14% 14% 14% 86% 98% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 
L 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 97% 31% 14% 14% 8% 8% 8% 8% 1% 1% 
 
 
